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SYNOPSIS 
Communication and contact between the two ancient civilizations of 
Iran and China have a long, if sometimes sporadic, history. From the 
time of the Han Dynasty (206 BCE -220 CE) ‘strategic’ communication  
- communication networks that are essential to the survival of a state - 
have been a significant aspect of statecraft as rulers over a millennium 
ago endeavoured to defend their dominions and sustain their power. 
The interdiction of communication networks could lead to governance 
becoming paralysed as the ability of rulers to maintain contact with far-
flung officials and collect vital intelligence about challenges to their 
power would be jeopardized. 
The thesis that is presented here is that whilst there are features 
common to most pre-modern communication systems, that of the 
Chinggisids’ displayed some unique characteristics. It will be further 
argued that the sheer extent of their conquests was the Achilles Heel of 
the imperial project since it resulted in the dangerous overstretch of the 
communication network.  This was exacerbated not only by the limited 
technology available but also by internecine strife within the imperial 
family which further endangered already vulnerable communications. 
Such factors, it will be argued, were an aggravating issue for the 
successors of Hülegü, the third son of Chinggis Khan’s youngest son 
Tolui and founder of the Hülegüid realm in Western Asia. It complicated 
their efforts to secure and sustain their domain, because the Qa’an, 
their theoretical overlord, fount of their legitimacy, ally, close relative 
and the supposed yeke gol or ‘great pivot’ of the Chinggisid imperium 
was thousands of miles distant across inhospitable and often hostile 
terrain. 
Though this study is firmly positioned in the pre-modern period, the 
central focus on the perennial problem of creating, maintaining and 
safeguarding efficient strategic communication networks, without which 
no government can function, continues to have resonance today. 
 
****************************** 
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TRANSLITERATION AND CHRONOLOGY 
In the course of their travels the Mongols encountered a number of different 
dating systems though their preference was for the Türkic version of the 
twelve-year Animal Cycle. For the sake of simplicity only two dating systems 
have been utilised here, the Gregorian/Western calendar and where 
appropriate the Muslim Hijrī year. This latter is only an approximation since 
the exact day is required for complete accuracy. 
Dates relating to individuals are either reign dates e.g. (r.   ) or birth/death 
dates. 
A decision has been taken here to follow in general the transliteration of a 
well-regarded and widely read work. The choice has fallen on Thomas T. 
Allsen’s Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia. This uses the Library of 
Congress system for Persian, Arabic and Russian. For Mongolian he follows 
the system in Cleaves’ translation of the Secret History and for Turkic he has 
followed Nadeliaev et al, Drevnetiurkskii slovar.  Chinese names are generally 
in Wade Giles as the more familiar but Pinyin on occasion.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Inception of the Study 
In his paper on ‘Sino-Western contacts under the Mongol Empire’, 
Herbert Franke questions whether ‘cultural contacts and interchange 
between China and the West were really more frequent and easy under 
the Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries than under the 
Six Dynasties and the Tang when no Eurasian universal empire like 
that of the Mongols existed’.1  This present work seeks to examine the 
latter element of this proposition; that of the supposed ease of contact 
between the extremes of Eurasia during the late thirteenth and early 
fourteenth century period of Chinggisid domination of much of Central 
and Eastern Eurasia. Nonetheless, the earlier period of contact cannot 
be completely ignored. 
Franke’s observation, moreover, provided a stimulus for an already 
intense interest in trans-Eurasian communication networks and the 
associated navigational difficulties across deeply inhospitable terrain in 
the pre-modern period. What is termed ‘cognitive mapping’ is a topic of 
much academic interest today2 though such communications are more 
often than not studied by historians as conduits of commerce or cross-
cultural exchange - ground well-trodden by scholars.3 The interest here, 
                                       
1 Herbert Franke, ‘Sino-Western Contacts under the Mongol Empire’. Journal of the 
Royal Asiatic Society (Hong Kong Branch) vol. 6 (1996) and China Under Mongol Rule, 
Ashgate, Variorum, 1994, Ch. VII 
2 See especially the July/August 2015 edition of the Magazine of the Royal Institute of 
Navigation which is devoted to ‘cog nav’. 
3 Michael Loewe in his article ‘Spices and Silk: Aspects of World Trade in the First 
Seven Centuries of the Christian Era’ has given a timely warning that the exchange of 
ideas, skills and material goods between the cultures of the East and the West will 
probably never be more than a matter of surmise’ ..... ‘the full story of these exchanges 
can never be told for the evidence is sadly deficient’ in The Journal of the Royal Asiatic 
Society of Great Britain and Ireland, New Series, vol. 103, issue 02 April  1971, pp. 166-
179 
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however, is rather on their ‘strategic’ significance. Directly arising from 
this latter aspect is the intriguing issue of what might have been the 
implications for rulers when such vulnerable networks were interdicted.  
It is important to note that here ‘strategic communications’ refer to 
communication networks that are essential to the survival of a state. In 
the context of such survival, the US Department of Defense has 
identified as ‘strategic vulnerabilities’ six vital instruments of power as 
being susceptible to strategic vulnerability. According to this 
assessment, states can be ‘politically, economically, informationally 
(especially intelligence), sociologically and militarily vulnerable’.4 It will 
be immediately noticed that this list takes for granted the legitimacy of 
the power-holder. In the course of this work, however, it will argued 
that the Hülegüids in Western Eurasia were not only vulnerable in each 
of the above spheres, but crucially, their core strategic vulnerability was 
their tainted legitimacy as rulers, a factor which, it will be contended, 
was compounded by their extended lines of communication.  
A word of caution should perhaps be interpolated at this juncture in 
that there is a considerable difference between ‘strategic 
communications’ and the current preoccupation with ‘communicating 
strategically’.5  Thus whilst the Mongols well understood that the 
command and control of their extensive conquests depended on a 
functioning communication network, it has to be conceded that their 
                                       
4 US Department of Defense, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dodict/data/s/05206.html the complete list 
includes political, geographic, economic, informational, scientific, sociological or 
military factors thus the only missing one above is ‘scientific’. 
5Whilst security of their communications in cyber space is a pressing issue for 
governments and military strategists today, at the same time so is ‘communicating 
strategically’. For this latter see e.g. a Chatham House report of 2011 by Paul Cornish, 
Julia Lindley-French and Claire Yorke on Strategic Communications and National 
Strategy which focuses on governments informing, persuading and influencing 
audiences both internal and external. Also Lawrence Freedman, Adelphi Paper for the 
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) 2006 ‘The Transformation of Strategic 
Affairs’. Ch. 5 on ‘Strategic Communications’.  
11 
 
interpretation of ‘communicating strategically’ was less to ‘persuade 
their audience’ than inform them of their duties of submission.6 
Thus the premise underpinning this work is that communication 
networks form a critical constituent of statecraft as rulers endeavour to 
retain and sustain their power as well as defend their dominions, an 
issue which remains constant to this day. The focus, however, 
specifically embraces the historic contacts between the empires of 
Eurasia, especially those between the two ancient civilizations of China 
and Iran. It thus precludes more recent developments and what has 
been dubbed the ‘Electronic Silk Road’7   
Despite the antiquity of these interactions one of the most remarkable 
periods is the short and complex late thirteenth- and early fourteenth 
century Chinggisid Imperium.8 This was a time of particularly cordial 
Sino-Iranian relations because, uniquely in the history of Eurasia, the 
‘overlords’ of the then masters of the Iranian plateau and its hinterland 
were cousins of the far-distant Yuan emperors in China.  
This relationship, however, raises a number of significant issues, one of 
which is the implication of the extended and vulnerable lines of 
communication that linked the Yuan court and the far-flung Hülegüid 
court, that is between the ‘centre’ and the ‘periphery’. The distance 
which had to be traversed between the two courts was not just immense 
but was also across some of the most inhospitable terrain in Eurasia, in 
itself a considerable challenge. Furthermore, before embarking on their 
conquests in the first half of the thirteenth century, the Mongols had 
relatively limited geo-political horizons, which meant they could keep 
up-to-date on affairs in their immediate area fairly efficiently by word of 
                                       
6 Perhaps the most famous Mongol example of ‘communicating strategically’ is the 
purported speech by Chinggis Khan to the assembled notables of Bukhara after its 
fall. Juvaynī, Tarīkh-i Jahān-gushā; trans. Boyle, History of the World Conqueror I , 
p.105 
7See for example Anupam Chander, The Electronic Silk Road, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 2013, also www.jstor.org.stable/ctt32bgn9 accessed 05/06/2013 
8 The period of ‘empire’ is not straightforward and is considered in Chapter X.  
12 
 
mouth. As these horizons expanded to encompass most of Eurasia, 
communications, news, commands, intelligence, people and goods had 
to be transmitted over increasingly vast distances whilst often taking 
considerable time to reach the recipient.9 
The fundamental issue is whether it was possible, in view of the limited 
technology available, for a theoretical overlord located at best many 
months or at worst several years’ journey time distant to control his 
supposed underling and ensure the timely and efficient administration 
of their far-off dominion. The corollary is that, because of the vast 
distance and time-lag, the rulers of the peripheral domain could find 
they were unable to function because of their duty to their overlord to 
consult, inform, pass on taxes and receive instructions. For the 
Hülegüids there was also the major complicating issue of the 
legitimising function of their far-off overlord.  There was thus an in-built 
tension in such long-distance relations including the temptation for the 
distant outpost to ‘go it alone’ if communications became problematic.  
The second impetus, immediately arising from the first and in particular 
the vulnerability of such strategic lines of communication, is that alarm 
bells inevitably start to ring over a statement in a letter from the 
penultimate Hülegüid Khan in Iran, Öljeitü  (r.703-716/1304-1316) to 
the French king, Philip IV ‘the Fair’ (r.1285-1314) in 1305. In his letter 
to Philip, Öljeitü conveyed the tidings of the general peace agreed 
between the rulers of the various Chinggisid khanates, thereby 
restoring forty years or so of fractured Chinggisid unity. However, the 
                                       
9 The Chinggisid communication network has been investigated by D. Morgan, The 
Mongols, 1986 pp. 103-111 and particularly his chapter ‘Reflections on Mongol 
Communications in the Ilkhanate’ in Studies in Honour of Clifford Edmund Bosworth, 
vol. II, The Sultan’s Turret: Studies in Persian and Turkish Culture, ed. Carole 
Hillenbrand, Brill, Leiden, Boston, Koln, 2000; Silverstein has a chapter in his Postal 
Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World, CUP, 2007. Allsen has a long and important 
review of Silverstein’s work entitled ‘Imperial Posts, West, East and North: A review 
Article’ of Adam J. Silverstein, Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World. 
Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi,. Olbricht is interested in the Chinese portion of the 
network in his Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft im 13 und 14 
Jahrhundert (1954) 
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crucial statement for present purposes is "Naran urgakhui Nankhiyasiin 
ornoos avan Talu dalai khurtel ulus barildaj zamuudaa uyuulav” thus 
announcing that from Nangiyas (i.e. Southern China) where the sun 
rises, as far as the Ocean Sea the roads were once again open between 
the warring cousins.10 The ramifications of this piece of intelligence are 
potentially immense since for a theoretically subordinate ruler such an 
interdiction of the trans-Eurasian routes could potentially mean either 
a welcome independence of action or conversely being abandoned to his 
fate. For the ‘centre’ such an interdiction in the lines of communication 
to the ‘periphery’ could lead to a catastrophic loss of control.  
That the Yām horse relay network had indeed been interdicted is 
confirmed in the sources. Rashīd al-Dīn (645-718/1247-1318), in his 
capacity as vizier and director of the history project culminating in the 
Jāmi’ al-Tawārīkh should have been particularly well-informed. 
Nonetheless, there is an aside in the section on the then Yuan emperor 
Temür Qa’an (1294-1307) that, ‘Temür had many wives and concubines 
in his ordos but on account of the great distance and the closure of the 
roads (emphasis added) the names of all of them have not so far been 
ascertained’.11  Similarly, apropos the offspring of Jochi, (d.1227) the 
eldest of Chinggis Khan’s four chief sons, whose ordo was centred on 
the Qipchaq Steppe, Rashīd al-Dīn remarks that ‘because of the great 
distance and that no authority could be found it was not possible to 
ascertain their genealogies with exactitude’.12  
It was not unknown, however, for the ‘roads’ to be ‘closed’ as an act of 
statecraft for either security reasons or as a means of applying pressure 
on obdurate rival rulers. Marvazī (d. c.514/1120) records closure of the 
roads for security reasons. Thus during the time of Sultan Mahmūd of 
                                       
10 The letter is held in the Bibliothèque Nationale, France.  D’Ohsson, Histoire des 
Mongols, depuis Tchinguiz-Khan jusqu’à Timour Bey ou Tamerlan, vol. 4. pp. 587-589. 
See also Mostaert and Cleaves, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3-4, 
(Dec.,1952) pp.419-506 
11 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 319. 
12 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 99 
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Ghazni (r.388-421/998-1030) he remarks that ‘the kings of Khitai and 
Uighur, in spite of the fact that their countries are situated far from the 
countries of Islam and that the roads leading to them are cut off, do not 
feel safe on the side bordering on the kings of Islam and Islamic 
armies.... therefore they protect themselves and their country by closing 
the road and stationing guards’.13 Such a policy could have drawbacks 
as the Khitan ruler found in circa 1024 when he wished to make 
overtures to Sultan Mahmūd in distant north Afghanistan, he then had 
to order his subordinate, the Ilig Uighur-Khan, to ‘open’ the roads to 
allow the Khitan envoy passage.14  
 
Furthermore, on the death of a ruler, the order could be given that the 
roads should be closed, not necessarily as a mark of respect, rather 
more as a security precaution. Theoretically this meant that all 
travellers and potential rivals were required to stay exactly where they 
were until the succession was clarified.15 Rashīd al-Dīn  records that 
this occurred after the death of Güyüg Khan, when a yarlïgh or 
instruction was issued that everyone should halt in whatever place he 
had reached, ‘whether it was inhabited or desert’ and this was also 
observed on the death of Hülegü.16  
Moreover, roads could also be closed as a hostile act by rival rulers as 
an application of pressure. Thus, Ibn al-Athīr (556-630/1160-1233) in 
his al-Kāmil fī’l-ta’rīkh, records that after the then Khwārazmshah had 
conquered Transoxiana from the Qarakhitai ‘he closed the routes from 
Türkestan and the lands beyond it’.17  
                                       
13 Emphasis added. ‘Sharaf al-Zamān Ṭāhir Marvazī on China, the Turks, and India. 
Arabic text with an English translation and commentary by V. Minorsky. Royal Asiatic 
Society, 1942 p. 19 
14 ‘we have ordered Qadir khan to open the road to our envoy to him (i.e. to Mahmud)’ 
Minorsky, Sharaf al-Zamān p.19  
15Ibn al-Athīr/Richards, Pt.3 p. 205 
16 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 185 
17 Ibn al-Athīr/Richards, Pt.3. p.205 
15 
 
Clearly, the interdiction of the communication networks at the behest of 
a ruler – therefore acts under his control and which can be regarded as 
‘state’ policy - are in a different category to those that might be 
described as ad hoc insecurity.  Even during the time of the great 
Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazni official travel appears to have been 
hazardous. Indeed, the memoirs of a senior Ghaznavid official, Abū ‘l-
Fazl Beyhaqi (385-469/995-1077) provide one of the most illuminating 
pre-Tīmūrid examples of the efforts of rulers in asserting their control 
and the role of communications in such endeavours.18 Thus, the 
aforementioned Ilig Uighur-Khan added his own envoy to the Khitan 
initiative and explained in his letter to Sultan Mahmūd that ‘We have 
not entrusted any presents to our envoy because there is no safe 
road’.19 Indeed it seems that the return journey of the envoys took 
somewhere between three to four years.20  
That the trans-Eurasian routes were also hazardous during the early 
period of the Chinggisid domination of Eurasia is apparent from reports 
by the intrepid friars who travelled to Mongolia during the 1240s and 
1250s - in particular William of Rubruck, John of Plano Carpini and 
Benedict the Pole. They record the stresses, strains and difficulties of 
travel encountered on the overland routes in the mid-thirteenth century 
when the going was supposedly secure and their experiences confirm 
that it is no coincidence that the derivation of the word ‘travel’ is derived 
from the French travail, meaning toil or labour.  
Whilst such travellers were on quasi-state business on behalf of the 
papacy and nominally under the protection of the Mongols, others such 
as traders and their customers could be seriously inconvenienced 
should some routes be closed. Jūzjānī remarks that in 621/1224 he 
was sent by Malik Tāj-ud-Dīn to reopen one of the caravan routes 
                                       
18 The History of Beyhaqi, trans. C.E.Bosworth, revised by Mohsen Ashtiany, 2011 in 3 
vols  
19 Minorsky,‘Sharaf al-Zamān’,p. 20 
20 Minorsky,‘Sharaf al-Zamān’,p.19 
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closed by the struggle with the incoming Mongols which had led to 
scarcities.21  Marco Polo’s father and uncle in circa 1262 found 
themselves stranded in Bukhārā in the Chaghadaid khanate for three 
years, unable to go forward or go back until they were allowed to join a 
caravan of envoys on its way to the court of the Qa’an.22 Whilst traders 
are renowned for their resourcefulness in rescheduling their operations 
to markets that were still accessible, as indeed the example of the Polos 
shows, a change of destination was not really an option for those 
travelling on ‘official’ business. On the other hand, even a temporary 
suspension of trade could prove catastrophic for merchants, since 
goods in the East were often taken on credit.23 
Thus, though travellers and traders could be incommoded if there was 
an interdiction in the communication network, for rulers it could fatally 
compromise their authority and control. When communications could 
not be guaranteed, governance could well be endangered with the 
corollary that the survival of the dynasty might also be imperilled. This 
worst-case scenario was noted by the fourteenth century historian Ibn 
Khaldūn (732-808/1332-1406) when analysing the life-cycle of 
conquest dynasties in his Muqaddimah of c.779/1377.24  
He argued that not only defence and protection of the community from 
its enemies25 should be amongst the top priorities of a ruler but also 
maintaining the security of the roads.26 An interdiction of 
communications could impinge on the circulation of the profits of 
empire whether in the form of taxes or tribute or embassies bearing 
                                       
21 Juzjānī, (tr. H. G. Raverty) Tabakāt-i-Nāsīrī  2 vols. London: Gilbert & Rivington, 
1881, Elibron Classics print on demand 2012) p. 1197 
22 The Book of Ser Marco Polo, Henry Yule, Henri Cordier, Munshiram Manoharlal 
Publishers Ltd. 2 vols. 1998. Vol. I, p.10 of the text. 
23 Barthold, Turkestan, p. 395 comments that at the beginning of the 13th century 
overland trade with China was of greater importance than the maritime trade, since 
there was a dispute between the rulers of the ports of Hormuz and Kish, each of whom 
in every possible way prevented merchants from setting out from the port belonging to 
the other.  
24 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal, 1969. 
25 Ibn Khaldūn, 1969. p.5 
26 Ibn Khaldūn, 1969. 189 
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gifts as well as on the market place if merchants were unable to obtain 
their merchandise, whether luxury goods, raw materials or foodstuffs to 
the detriment of the ruler’s finances.  
As most rulers down the ages have realized, there were also critical 
security issues involved if their lines of communication were at risk. 
Sargon II of Assyria (r. 722-705 BCE) has a heartfelt account of what it 
was like when communications were lost with his troops when on 
campaign: 
"I could not give ease to their 
weariness, I could not give them water 
to drink, I could not set up the camp, I 
could not organize the defence of the 
headquarters and could not direct my 
advance guards. ...."27   
 
Communication issues, however, did not only include the difficulties 
encountered by Sargon II.  Rulers recognised that they had to keep their 
borders safe, to control their population, to keep abreast of political 
developments abroad as well as ensure the internal security of their 
own regime. In order to do so they needed to collect the intelligence 
which enabled them to make informed decisions in order to avoid that 
dangerous condition which has been graphically described as ‘the fog of 
uncertainty?’28 If communications were paralysed such objectives could 
well prove unachievable.   
Whilst security and control are a consistent concern for rulers and 
though it could be said of most eras that uneasy lies the head which 
wears the crown, this was especially so in the period between the Arab 
conquests in the seventh century and the death of the last of the great 
                                       
27 Alan D Crown, ‘Tidings and Instructions: How News Travelled in the Ancient Near East’ Journal 
of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sept., 1974), pp. 244-
271  
28 For an outstanding examination of the role of intelligence in the ancient world, see  
R. M. Sheldon, Espionage in the Ancient World,  2003 and Intelligence Activities in 
Ancient Rome, 2005 
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conquerors, the Amir Tīmūr in 1405. The challenges facing such rulers 
have been pithily summarised by Patricia Crone in her discussion of the 
genre of mirrors for princes.  As she observes, ‘Most mirrors think of 
governance (Siyāsa) as the art of staying in the saddle. The king must 
ensure that his underlings do not conspire against him, that brigands, 
robbers, rebels and heretics do not evict him, that foreign rulers do not 
invade his lands, that nobody fleeces his sheep and that generally 
speaking he is always in control.’ It required, says Crone, endless 
vigilance.29   
Rulers perforce had to become their own grand strategists. To survive 
they had to identify threats to their crowns and devise politico-military 
means to fend off the inevitable extinction of their dynasty. As Nizām al-
Mulk, (d.485/1092) was only too well aware, the  
‘government will change and pass from 
one house to another, or the country 
will be thrown into disorder through 
seditions and tumults; opposing 
swords [will be drawn and there will be 
killing] burning, plunder and 
violence’.30 
 
These considerable challenges were not made any easier during this 
period as rulers had an almost kleptomaniac approach to enhancing 
their dominions at the expense of their rivals. One of the most honest 
allusions to this lust for conquest came from the youthful great-great-
grandson of the Amir Tīmūr, the future emperor Bābur, who remarked 
in his memoirs that ‘’there was in me ambition for rule and desire of 
conquest’.31Likewise, Ibn al-Athīr was moved to comment that the 
                                       
29 Patricia Crone, Medieval Islamic Political Thought, 2004, p. 156; Babur’s experiences 
in his early years graphically illustrate such issues. Bābur-nāma,  (tr. A. S. Beveridge), 
4 vols. London, Luzac, 1922 
30 Siyar al-Muluk or Siyasat-nama of Nizam al-Mulk. The Book of Government or Rules 
for Kings, trans. H. Darke, 2002 Chapter XL, p. 139 
31 Bābur,  Bābur-nāma, trans. A. S. Beveridge p. 92 
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Khwārazmshah’s son, Jalāl-al-Dīn constantly challenged his princely 
neighbours for their kingdoms.32  
On rare occasions, however, conquests did not always bring unalloyed 
pleasure to the victor and some conquerors found that the command 
and control of the conquered territory was hard-work. This was vividly 
made clear by the king of Khotan (r. 356-366/967-977) whose kingdom 
on the southern rim of the Taklamakan Desert had defeated the 
Qarakhanid army in 359/970 thereby winning control of the important 
commercial oasis of Kashgar. In reporting back to his uncle, the ruler of 
Dunhuang, now in Xinjiang Province of China, he wrote unhappily “that 
maintaining the government [of an alien territory] was great and 
difficult. And as an alien we do not secure control.”33 Despite taking 
Kashgar and enumerating the considerable plunder obtained, the king 
had discovered to his cost that his resources were spread too thinly to 
maintain and secure his prize.  
Such blunt realism can also be seen in the rebuke which the great 
Seljūq vizier Nizām al-Mulk, (d.485/1092) attributed to his master, 
Sultan Alp Arslān (r.455-465/1063-1072). Alp Arslān allegedly 
admonished his officials ‘I have told you over and over again that you 
Türks are the army of Khurāsān and Transoxiana and you are 
foreigners in this region; we conquered this country by the sword.....’34  
Conquest ‘by the sword’ did to some extent simplify the issue of 
legitimacy for conquest regimes, since it was based on the well-
understood concept of Macht geht vor Recht.35 On the other hand, an 
underlying leitmotif of Juvaynī’s Tarīkh-i Jahān-gushā is the transience 
                                       
32 Ibn al-Athīr/Richards, Pt.3 p. 303 
33 Valerie Hansen, The Silk Road, A New History, 2012, p.227 
34 Siyāsat-nama of Nizām al-Mulk, The Book of Government or Rules for Kings, trans. 
Hubert Darke, 2002 p.160 
35 Bismarck was accused by Count von Schwerin in 1863 that his motto was Macht 
ger vor Recht, loosely translated as ‘might trumps right’. For a comprehensive 
examination of the acquisition of territory through force see the excellent work by 
Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by Force in 
International Law and Practice. 1966  
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of empire.36 Certainly, most states today regard the protection and 
security of their lines of communication, whether physical or virtual, as 
a top-ranking priority, allowing them to communicate, trade and engage 
globally.37  It is this capability which is defined here as ‘strategic 
communications’ – and which become increasingly vulnerable when the 
‘lines of communication’ to be protected become progressively more 
extended.  
 
Chinggisid Strategic Over-stretch? 
This correlation between domination, power and communication has 
a particular resonance in terms of one of the most expansionist of 
land-based conquest dynasties of the pre-Tīmūrid era, that of 
Chinggis Khan and his descendants.  A shocked contemporary 
observer of the events triggered by the incident at Otrar38 in 
614/1218 which compelled an outraged Chinggis Khan to unleash his 
forces in pursuit of the Khwārazmshah was Ibn al-Athīr (d. 630/1233).39  
However, what is important in the present context is that in his 
horror at the Mongols performance of their own version of Macht geht 
vor Recht, Ibn al-Athīr unintentionally put his finger on what was 
potentially the greatest vulnerability of these seemingly invulnerable 
forces: 
‘these Tatars had done something unheard 
of in ancient or modern times. A people 
emerges from the borders of China and 
before a year passes some of them reach the 
                                       
36 Juvaynī/Boyle II, pp. 637. 681  
37 A particularly good example of this are New Zealand’s ‘Seven key objectives’ 
underpinning a comprehensive concept of national security, in which protection of 
their lines of communication comes second after preserving sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 
38  Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, II pp. 56-58 for geographical information on 
Otrar 
39 This is when an outraged Chinggis Khan unleashed his fury and his forces against 
the Khwārazmshah, Muhammad b. Tekish ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ((r.596-617/1200-1220) who, 
he had good reason to believe, had been complicit in the murder of his envoys and the 
plunder of his trading caravan.  
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lands of Armenia in this direction and go 
beyond Iraq in the direction of 
Hamadhan.........40.  
 
From ‘the borders of China’ which for present purposes will be 
construed as Qaraqorum, the complex built by Ögödei Qa’an in what is 
today central Mongolia, to Hamadan in Central Iran which is where 
Hülegü retired after the Fall of Baghdad, is in the region of 4,497 
miles/7,237 kilometres by vehicle today but undoubtedly more difficult 
by quadruped or on foot across an exhaustingly inhospitable terrain of 
deserts, steppe and mountain ranges.  If no crises were encountered 
en route and an average of 25 miles/40 kilometres a day could be kept 
up a traveller could theoretically make the return journey in twelve 
months. Thus, after his dispatch west by his brother, Möngke Qa’an 
(r.1251-1259), whatever the intention of Möngke as far as Hülegü’s 
tenure in West Eurasia was concerned, the lines of communication 
between Hülegü and his supreme commander were of heroic 
proportions. 
 
The Extent of the Chinggisid Domains contrasted 
with other pre-modern Eurasian land-based empires 
 
Whilst the empire conquered by Chinggis Khan and his successors is 
often cited as being the largest contiguous land empire in pre-modern 
history – a supposition that is disputable since it rests on the definition 
of empire41 - the Mongols incontrovertibly controlled great swathes of 
Eurasia. When the Hülegüids made Tabriz their main centre, the fastest 
motor route today between there and Ulaan Baatar, thus more or less 
between Hülegü and his brother Möngke Qa’an, is 4,693 miles/7,552 
kilometres travelling south of the Caspian or 4,429 miles/7,128 
                                       
40 Ibn al-Athīr/Richards, Pt.3  p. 215 (italic emphasis added) 
41 The problem of the period of ‘empire’ will be discussed in Chapter XII on the security 
of the communication system and the Pax Mongolica. 
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kilometres42 taking the route north of the Caspian. It may be instructive 
to compare how the Chinggisid extended lines of communication 
compared with those of other pre-modern empires. 
The hegemony of the Kushan Empire (130 BCE-300 CE) stretched 
from northern India to the borders of the Han Empire whilst the First 
and Second Türk empires (552 CE – 630 CE and 683-734 CE)) were 
also extensive, at their greatest extent their writ ran from the Black 
Sea to the borders of China. Other far-flung empires included the 
Roman, the distance from their outpost of York to Rome being a 
comparatively modest 1,365 miles/2197 kilometres43, whilst between 
the furthest extremes of the Roman empire, the distance between, for 
example, York and Antioch, was 2,889 miles/4,651 kilometres.  The 
Sasanian Empire (224 – 651 CE) controlled the Iranian plateau, 
Khurāsān, Transoxiana and Soghdia with their capital at Ctesiphon, 
near today’s Baghdad. From Ctesiphon to Samarkand, the distance 
today by road is 1,696 miles/2,730 kilometres.  
 
The Umayyad Caliphate’s (41-133/661-750) capital at Damascus was 
over 3,264 miles or 5,253 kilometres from Fez in Morocco. The Tang 
(618-907 CE) were able to project their power into Central Eurasia 
despite the considerable logistical challenges. The other notable 
empires were more ‘compact’. Thus the Uighur Empire (744-840 CE), 
the Qara Khitai (1124-1218 CE),  the Muslim Empires of the 
Sāmānids (204-395/819-1005),  the Qarakhanids (382-609/992-
1212) controlling Transoxiana through to Kashgar, the Ghaznavids 
(366-582/977-1186), Būyids (320-454/932-1062)  nor the Seljūqs 
(431-590/1040-1194)  had such extended lines of communication as 
between the Chinggisid realms in China and West Eurasia.44 More 
                                       
42 Distances calculated by Google Maps if available for driving by car, otherwise by air, 
which is noted ‘as the crow flies’. 
43 Courtesy of Google Maps 
44 A June 2010 Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee on 
Oversight and Goverment Reform of the US House of Representatives noted that ‘In 
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recently, the Russian Empire became arguably the most extensive 
contiguous land empire in history since the distance between St 
Petersburg, then the centre of Russian power, and Vladivostok on the 
furthest side of the Eurasian land mass, is roughly 6,000 miles/9,600 
kilometres45 - roughly a third more distant than Tabriz from 
Qaraqorum. 
 
Even though the Russians had many of the same logistical challenges 
in the eighteenth century that the Mongols had faced five hundred 
years previously, the Russian Empire was the product of a far higher 
economic, technological and intellectual base-line than that of the 
Mongols. Thus in the Mongol instance, it could be argued that this 
was a case, if not of ‘strategic over-stretch’46 then of ‘strategic over-
reach’ on an Olympian scale since tight centralised control is well-
nigh impossible when it could take anything from six months to five 
years to receive a response to a communication from the periphery to 
the centre and vice versa. Given the natural hazards en route as well 
as the resources and technology available to Chinggis Khan and his 
successors – essentially muscle power – any risk assessment could 
well have concluded that the Chinggisid enterprise was doomed to 
failure simply on the basis of the vulnerability of these extraordinarily 
extended lines of communication alone.  
 
The thesis that is presented here, then, is that the sheer extent of the 
Chinggisid dominions was the Achilles Heel of the imperial project since 
it resulted in the dangerous over-reach of the communication networks.  
This was particularly the case in the Chinggisid version of Sino-Iranian 
relations, that is between the Hülegüids and the Yuan. This over-reach 
                                                                                                                
Afghanistan, the US military faces one of the most complicated and difficult supply 
chains in the history of warfare..... across a difficult and hostile terrain with only 
minimal road infrastructure ....’ emphasis added. 
45 First Atlas of Russia, pub. 1745 
http://www.davidrumsey.com/blog/2011/7/11/first-atlas-of-russia-published-in-
1745 
46 ‘strategic’ defined as the coherent use of power resources to attain desired objectives 
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was exacerbated not only by the limited technology available and the 
nature of the hazards on both the overland and the alternative maritime 
routes but also by internecine strife within the imperial family which 
further endangered already vulnerable communications. It will be 
argued that such considerations had potentially serious repercussions 
for the imperial family's tradition of command, control and consultation. 
This latter, it will be further argued, was an aggravating issue for the 
successors of Hülegü, the grandson of Chinggis Khan, who founded the 
Toluid branch ruling in Western Eurasia. The view taken here is that 
the Hülegüid extended lines of communication complicated their efforts 
to secure, sustain and enlarge their domain since it had an adverse 
impact on the six strategic vulnerabilities referred to above including 
the most crucial, though not listed, which was their legitimacy.  
 
********************* 
 
METHODOLOGY  
For such a seemingly straightforward topic there are a surprising 
number of pitfalls for the unwary. Chief amongst these - at least for the 
historian - is the reminder by the renowned Polish philosopher, Leszek 
Kolakowski, that “the ‘Past’ is an "ocean of events that once happened."  
Those past events, he mused, "are reconstructed by us on the basis of 
our present experience - and it is only this present experience, our 
present reconstruction of the past that is real, not the past as such."47 
Historiographically, when considering approaches to the Mongols over 
the past thousand years or so, there is much truth in this statement. 
Chaucer’s (c.1345-1400) Squire’s Tale, written in the 1390s is generous 
                                       
47 A remark made in a speech delivered in 2004 when he was awarded the Kluge Prize 
by the Library of Congress, quoted in John Carter Brown Occasional Newsletter, No. 
35. Spring 2005 
25 
 
in its characterisation of a Mongol Khan.48 Five hundred years later, the 
Mongol episode was considered an abomination by such luminaries as 
the Swedish/Armenian historian, Constantin d’Ohsson (1779-1851) 49 
and the English scholar E.G. Browne, (1862-1926)50 whereas in recent 
years there has been something of a reassessment of their ‘rivers of 
blood’ reputation, at least in the Hülegüid west,  led by George Lane.51 
There is a further, perhaps double-edged issue, which historians have 
to resolve, since these days they have the luxury of approaching the 
past from many perspectives and within a choice of frameworks. 
Examples of the former include those of political, military, economic, 
maritime, gender, cultural, intellectual, religious or regional history. 
The approach taken here, of focusing on the timeless aspect of strategic 
communications may, to some extent, mitigate the ‘baggage of present 
experience’ alluded to above. This is partly because ‘strategic’ and 
‘communications’, whilst not being value-free concepts, are a central 
feature of governance whatever the period and place. 
Similarly, for the historian, there are a multiplicity of frameworks 
including the Grand Narrative, the French Annales School or a plethora 
of  ‘isms’ including Marxist-Leninism, Post-Modernism, Conceptualism 
and so on.  It can thus be fairly said that ‘the writing of history is a 
process of highly selective reconstruction of features of the past.’  
Clearly, this is one reason why ‘historiography is a contested terrain at 
many levels, not least that of competing interpretations, but also at the 
level of the assumption historians make about what constitutes 
                                       
48 He appears to have been a Jochid khan; Geoffrey Chaucer, ed. Larry D. Benson, 
The Riverside Chaucer, reissued.2008, p. 169 
49 Baron Constantin d’Ohsson was a leading proponent of the ‘sang et des ruines’ view 
of the Mongols. In his Exposition in Vol. I Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchinguiz-Khan 
jusqu’a Timour bey, Elibron Classics facsimile reprint of a 1834 edition 
50E.G. Browne’s view of the Mongols as ‘cunning, ruthless, bloodthirsty marauders’  in 
A Literary History of Persia, Vol. III, 1928 p. 4-5 
51 George Lane, Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth Century Iran,  A Persian Renaissance, 
2003 
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particular varieties, versions, visions, re-visions, and conceptions of 
history.’52  
The theoretical framework adopted here is one that could be termed 
‘Nizām al-Mulkian’. It too has a timeless aspect since this vastly 
experienced vizier to the early Seljūqs in the latter part of the eleventh 
century had a particularly clear-sighted vision of the perils of loss of 
control by a ruler.53 Less than two hundred years later this leitmotif of 
the transience of power can be found, as has been noted above, 
throughout Juvaynī’s Tarīkh-i Jahān-gushā/ History of the World 
Conqueror.54  The experienced Florentine diplomat, Nicolo Machiavelli 
(1469-1527), also writing in turbulent times in 1513, understood that 
one of the prime concerns of a prince was to stay in the saddle.  Thus 
in his advice to his Prince,55 written in the chaos of fifteenth century 
‘Italy’, he held to the belief that survival was the highest objective for 
a ruler.  
It is probably undeniable, therefore, that this study may be thought of 
as coming within the genre of ‘rises and falls’. However, there is a 
fundamental difficulty inherent in ‘decline and fall’ literature, in that 
‘the fall’ is an acknowledged event in the historical record. As far as 
the Hülegüids are concerned, David Morgan concedes that he is in 
‘barefaced defiance’ of what he calls ‘Gibbon’s Law’ of decline and fall, 
by taking the view that the Hülegüids ‘fell without having previously 
declined’.56 This is in contradistinction, as he acknowledges, with the 
                                       
52Alan Munslow The Oxford Companion to Historical Studies, 2000 pp. 133-135 
53 See p. 18 above on Nizām al-Mulk’s observation on the transience of dynasties. 
54 Juvaynī/Boyle, II, p. 681 
55 Drafted in 1513 but not published until 1532. Machiavelli, The Prince, eds. Quentin 
Skinner and Russell Price, Cambridge, CUP, 2000 
56 David Morgan, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Mongol Empire’ Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, Third Series, vol. 19, No. 4 (Oct., 2009) p. 433 
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view of Charles Melville, who ‘considers it all explicable in terms of 
long-term decay, factional struggle and disintegration’.57  
There is a potential danger, then, for historians searching with the 
benefit of hindsight for evidence with which to account for the ‘decline 
and fall’ rather than focusing on the endeavours of a dynasty to ‘stay 
in the saddle’. Indeed, ‘the danger of overdosing on hindsight’ is a 
temptation that Peter Jackson has identified as something which 
bedevils all backward glances at the past, since historians’ access to 
sources sometimes affords them an eyrie more commanding than any 
vantage-point available to the people they study.58 Furthermore, 
anachronism, or the action of attributing something to a period to 
which it does not belong, can perhaps be as great a danger as 
hindsight. 
Yet another challenge has been identified by Chase Robinson apropos 
the Arab conquests of the seventh century. He has observed that ‘so 
far as reconstructing conquest history is concerned, we must set our 
sights relatively low’. The reason he gives is that whilst it is possible 
to make out the general contours of conquest history and infer some 
generalities, it has to be remembered that it was a discourse 
generated by elites and for elites.59  
Thus the framework here is ‘Nizām al-Mulkian’ in that, whilst 
recognising the transience of dynasties, there should also be an 
appreciation that a ruler’s main concern was expanding his power or 
at least holding on to what he had and fending off for as long as 
                                       
57 Charles Melville, The Fall of Amir Chupan and the Decline of the Ilkhanate, 1327-37: 
A Decade of Discord in Mongol Iran, Bloomington, 1999 and David Morgan,‘The Decline 
and Fall of the Mongol Empire’ p. 433 
58 Peter Jackson, Mongols and the West 1221-1410, 2005. p.6. Jackson also makes the 
important point that it is only hindsight on the part of historians that has elevated the 
territorial and subject people assignments of Chinggis Khan’s four senior sons to the 
status of official division of the Mongol empire at an early date. ’From Ulus to Khanate’ 
in R. Amitai-Preiss & D. O. Morgan (eds) The Mongol Empire & its Legacy. p. 35 
59 Chase F Robinson, Empires and Elites after the Muslim Conquest – The 
Transformation of Northern Mesopotamia, 2000, p. 31 
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possible the demise of his dynasty. In the meantime, the chosen 
perspective is that of strategic communications within a Sino-Iranian 
context. These have dictated a ‘forensic’ and ‘conceptual’ approach 
which, it has to be said, also poses its own challenges for historians.  
Part I is short but pivotal and attempts to analyse what aspects of 
Hülegüid governance could have been compromised or complicated 
by problems due to the extended lines of communication. Part II 
onwards dissects the issues and challenges in ‘communicating’ for 
the Chinggisids’ as their conquests took them beyond the confines of 
Mongolia. Part III is particularly ‘forensic’ since it has involved 
collecting data to underpin the rather involved section on routes and 
travellers as well as on hostilities for the section on security aspects 
and the Pax Mongolica. Such data is presented in tables in the 
appendices. 
 
******************* 
 
 Concepts 
Until comparatively recently there has been an inherent tendency 
amongst historians to avoid so far as possible the use of concepts as 
an organising device within their works with the result that  ‘the 
studies were inevitably descriptive and rarely produced a satisfactory 
understanding of events or issues.’60  It is, however, impossible for 
most historians to avoid the use of such terms as ‘state’ or ‘empire’ 
and there is of course the problem of translation of unfamiliar terms 
                                       
60
 Claude Bélanger, Concepts in Social Science and History, 
http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/events/concepts.htm 
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such as the Mongol ulus.  Historians, moreover, have to bear in mind 
that within the disciplines in which such terms feature most 
prominently such as the Social Sciences and most particularly 
Political Science, International Relations and Anthropology, concepts 
such as ‘power’, ‘state’, empire and ‘tribe’ can be highly contentious.  
Furthermore, this is not the only difficulty with concepts, since there 
are also the dangers attached to the inevitably heavy burden of 
cultural baggage with which they are loaded at any point in time, 
which in turn relates back to the comment above by Leszek 
Kolakowski.  The realisation that such concepts have inherent perils 
for the unwary has necessitated the clarification of the more 
contentious before progressing further since they are fundamental to 
this work. These are ‘strategic’ and ‘communication’.  Equally fraught 
are such terms as Inner Asia versus Central Asia/Eurasia so that the 
choice opted for here also needs an explanation.  
Strategy/Strategic 
As far as the term ‘strategic’ is concerned, a problem that has been 
identified by Lawrence Freedman, one of the leading Western strategic 
thinkers today, is that ‘strategy’ has few suitable synonyms, and for this 
reason it has become a multifarious term that has been ‘...diluted 
through promiscuous and often inappropriate use.’ Freedman argues 
that strategy is essentially the ‘art of creating power’, which in the 
present context can reasonably be expanded to creating, sustaining and 
retaining power, (stress added) while other strategists emphasise that 
the objective of strategy is simply ‘control.’  Thus when Mongke Qa’an is 
referred to in this work as a ‘grand strategist’ this is because he 
masterminded the expansion of Chinggisid power utilizing all the 
resources at his disposal. 
However, it has to be recognised that ‘power’ is in itself a contentious 
concept. The definition that is utilized here is that ‘power’ simply 
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defined is ‘the ability to control people and other assets’61 with ‘control’ 
used in the sense of bending to one’s will even the unwilling and 
antagonistic.  Such a definition of ‘raw power’ would seem to adequately 
describe the approach to statecraft of, for example, a Chinggis Khan or 
Amir Tīmūr.   
It is also important to differentiate between, ‘strategy/strategic’, ‘tactic’, 
‘stratagem’ and ‘plan’. Freedman strongly emphasises that a ‘strategy’ is 
not a ‘plan’, the latter implying a certain rigidity in moving through a 
list of actions to the foreseeable conclusion. ‘Strategy’ however, comes 
into play, he argues, through the inherent unpredictability of human 
affairs, due to chance, the efforts of opponents or the ‘miss-steps’ of 
friends which provide strategy with its challenge and drama.’62  
Communication 
The concept of communication, it should be swiftly acknowledged, is 
another multi-faceted concept that defies easy definition. The 
fundamental idea is one of ‘transmission’, which includes both the 
‘what’, as in what was communicated, and the ‘why’ it was 
communicated as well as the ‘how’ it was communicated. It implies 
inter-connectedness - whether tangible or intangible - through speech 
or by technical means or indeed physically. What was transmitted could 
include the exchange of information and conveyance of orders and 
instructions; the sharing of intellectual property or ideas, for example, 
religion, art, scholarship, design, technology, medical knowledge, or the 
inadvertent transmission of disease, a particularly horrific example 
during the Chinggisid period being that of bubonic plague.63  
                                       
61 Philip Pomper, The History and Theory of Empires. Source: History and Theory, vol. 
44. No. 4, Theme Issue 44: Theorizing Empire (Dec. 2005). Pp. 1027. Pub. Wiley for 
Wesleyan University. http://www.jstor.org.stable/3590855 
62 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy, A History, OUP, 2013, p. xi 
63 For bubonic plague and the probable Mongol role in its dissemination see for 
example William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 1977 pp. 146-190 and in particular 
pp. 160-163 
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Physical ‘transmission’ could include travellers, including the 
reassignment of troops or officials, the transfer of goods, including 
horses and flocks; pilgrims, the relocation of captives and artisans as 
well as the dispatch of envoys and brides. All three of these elements of 
communication, the ‘what’, the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ will inform the 
analysis below. 
There is also a presumption in the idea of communication of 
comprehension, that what is being communicated will be understood. 
The conquest of a number of peoples speaking different languages and 
with different writing systems could therefore be something of a 
challenge for both conquerors and conquered, an important issue that 
will be examined in Chapter IV. 
 
Geographical Terminology –  
Inner v Central Asia/Eurasia 
 
Even the geographical terminology is not immune to contestation. The 
idea of “Asia” is a peculiarly European notion and the terminological 
delineation of the geographic area of the Chinggisid conquests is 
problematic. Generally speaking, there have been two main approaches 
to identifying the vast area conquered by the Chinggisids, either 
geographical or cultural.64 For Iranians, the region beyond the 
Oxus/Amu Darya was identified with Tūrān and historically, there has 
been a tension between ‘Iran’ and ‘Tūrān’. This can be seen, for 
example, in Firdawsī’s epic, the Shāhnāmeh.65 In the Shāhnāmeh these 
two terms appear to refer to areas of linguistic, ethnic and cultural 
difference. Thus when Firdawsi refers to Tūrānian, for example the 
Tūrānian king Afrāsīyāb, he meant Türkish.  Tūrān thus equated to 
areas controlled by Türkic rulers,  which in turn complicated the 
                                       
64 These are discussed by Denis Sinor, Inner Asia, 2nd revised edition, 1971 Chs. I & II, 
and Andre Gunder Frank in The Centrality of Central Asia, 1992 
65 Abolqasem Ferdowsi, Shahnameh, the Persian Book of Kings, trans. Dick Davis, 
2007 
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boundaries of Tūrān, since such control fluctuated. ‘Iran’ on the other 
hand, referred to the area of the Persian cultural and linguistic 
oecumene.  
To complicate matters even further, ‘Tūrān’ was identified in Arabic as 
Mā Warā’ al-Nahr, or the land beyond the river, a ‘geographical’ rather 
than a ‘geographic’ term. In Western scholarship some geo-historians 
have used the term Inner Asia for this area. It was so described by the 
scholar Owen Lattimore in 1953 as being a region that has neither a 
frontage on the sea nor navigable rivers leading to the sea.  
Under this definition, he regarded northern, but not southern Iran and 
western, but not eastern Manchuria as Inner Asian regions.66 The 
Harvard Inner Asian programme expands this somewhat to include the 
history of the culture of the peoples in the steppe, mountain, forest and 
oasis areas between China, Russia, western Iran and Pakistan, 
including former Soviet Central Asia, Xinjiang, eastern Iran, 
Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, northern regions of Pakistan, Tibet, eastern 
Sichuan, Gansu and northwestern Yunnan, Mongolia and Manchuria.  
However, even this extensive area still excludes some of those 
conquered by the Chinggisids. The preferred term here for the extent 
stretching from the Caucasus to the Pacific is ‘Eurasia’.67The chosen 
term for the central swathe from the Black Sea to Mongolia can be 
thought of as Central Eurasia, this last based on that of the David 
Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard University apropos 
their Central Eurasian Studies World Wide programme as well as the 
Central Eurasian Studies Society. The former define the region as: 
‘Central Eurasia’ is ....‘a not-too-neatly 
circumscribed domain in the interior of the 
Asian continent’. Though ‘the domain 
                                       
66 Owen Lattimore, ‘The New Political Geography of Inner Asia’, The Geographical 
Journal Vol. 119, No. 1 (Mar., 1953), pp. 17-30  
67 See discussion in Sinor, Inner Asia, pp. 102 
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encompasses great diversity, there is also 
cultural continuity across the broad region, 
as well as shared history and contemporary 
problems.’ Amongst the characteristics of the 
region are: Linguistic and cultural roots 
deriving from Iranian and Türkic culture; 
Türkic dynasties and Türkic language 
predominating in many regions and periods, 
with Persian remaining a lingua franca over 
much of the region; The dominant religion in 
the area was Islam, Tibetan Buddhism and 
variant forms of Christianity68 
Geographically, this includes the Black Sea region, the Crimea and the 
Caucasus in the west, through the Middle Volga region, Central Asia69 
and Afghanistan, Siberia, Mongolia and Tibet in the east. In the view of 
Denis Sinor, Central Eurasia is more of a cultural concept than a 
geographical entity and its sole unifying factor is the continental climate 
characterised by extremes of cold in the winter and heat in the 
summer.70 However, even the above expanded area still does not wholly 
delineate the Chinggisid conquests which included some large chunks 
of territory that are geographically excluded from Central Eurasia such 
as southern China and Korea.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
68Italic emphasis added. This can be found at:  
http://cesww.fas.harvard.edu/ces_definition.html 
69 Defined by the European Society for Central Asian Studies in 1985 as 
encompassing the previous Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, the adjacent areas of Mongolia, Northern Iran, Northern 
Afghanistan and Northwestern China.   
70 Denis Sinor, Inner Asia, pp. 7-8 
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REVIEW OF THE SOURCES 
 
We are like dwarfs on the shoulders of giants, so that we can 
see more than they and things at a greater distance, not by 
virtue of any sharpness of sight on our part, or any physical 
distinction, but because we are carried high and raised up by 
their giant size 
(Bernard de Chartres) 
 
At the present time, despite the strategic importance of both China and 
Iran, the Sino-Iranian nexus is a field that is seldom trod in western 
academia71 though cartographic72 and art historians73 have become 
increasingly interested in trans-Eurasian cultural exchange relevant to 
their particular fields. Moreover, as the note on concepts above 
suggests, anyone attempting this subject is confronted by many perils, 
as neither the Mongols’ conquests nor their communications network 
respect academic, linguistic nor latter-day political boundaries.  
Possibly the most dangerous hazard is that relating to academic 
boundaries, since this is a subject that treads on a rather large number 
of scholarly toes. These include not only regional experts, but also 
political scientists, geographers, cartographers, ‘silk road’ scholars, and 
military historians, as well as those whose fields focus on 
                                       
71 One key reason being access, both linguistically and for the documents. John 
Garver, in his China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World, 2006, has 
commented precisely on this point. He notes that in the past forty or so years, only 
two books on the Sino-Iranian relationship have been published, one in English and 
one in Chinese. Today, interest is as often as not the preserve of ‘think-tanks’ and 
economic/intelligence communities as well as foreign policy specialists especially 
those concerned with nuclear proliferation, the security of cyber space and the global 
economic system, for example, Laura Schuurmans’ article on ‘The Future of the Sino-
Iranian Detente’, Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs,  2012, 
http://cenaa.org/analysis/the-future-of-the-sino-iran-entente/ 
72 Eg. H. de Weerdt, “Maps and Memory: Readings of Cartography in Twelfth and 
Thirteenth Century Song China”, Imago Mundi; Hyunhee Park, Mapping the Chinese 
and Islamic Worlds; History of Cartography: eds. J. B. Harley and David Woodward 
vols. I, 1987, II III 
73 Eg. Sheila Blair, A Compendium of Chronicles: Rashid al-Din's Illustrated History of 
the World, 1995  
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communications, travel writing, transport, security, intelligence, 
international relations, law and governance.  The only available defence 
is that strategic communications do not operate in a void. They are 
embedded in the cultures, institutions, technologies, security and geo-
historical context of the ruler whose objective is to sustain his power. 
Such widespread interests clearly have implications for the sources 
which will be examined here with reference to these aspects. 
 
The Mongol Cultural Milieu 
The development of the Chinggisids’ Yām network is not only about 
‘transmission’ but is also about the development of the Mongols 
themselves as they adjusted from their somewhat rough-edged 
existence on the steppe to their responsibilities as rulers of much of 
Eurasia. It will be argued that the Mongol ‘mindset’ was a significant 
factor both in the idiosyncrasies of the Yām network when compared to 
other early communication networks and that it also coloured their 
approach to many aspects of their increasing responsibilities. This 
means that some probing of the early Mongol weltanschauung is 
unavoidable. 
In this context it will be contended that one factor above all others 
characterised the Mongols who - like their steppe predecessors, the 
Xiongnu and the Türks - were a supremely equestrian society. The 
Mongol debt to these forerunners should be acknowledged, especially 
the Xiongnu. For this the Han Dynasty historian, Sima Qian’s (c. 145 or 
135 – 86 BCE), Records of the Grand Historian74 is pivotal. Moreover, 
since warriors from the steppe caused problems not just for the Middle 
Kingdom, but also rulers further to the west, mention should also be 
made of the advice and experience of a seasoned campaigner against 
                                       
74 Sima Qian, Records of the Grand Historian, trans. Burton Watson, rev. edition, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1961 
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the steppe warriors, the Byzantine emperor Maurice’s (r. 582-602) 
Strategikon.75 
One consequence of this equestrianism is that the key to the Mongol 
psyche as well as the most characteristic feature of the Mongols’ 
cultural, physical and emotional milieu was a symbiosis between 
Mongol and horse.76 Accordingly, it would be a dereliction of duty not to 
examine this profound relationship and - as importantly - the needs as 
well as the limitations of the rugged little horses whose trusty hooves 
not only carried the conquerors across Eurasia but also underpinned 
the Chinggisid communications network. Interestingly, despite their 
pivotal role in the Mongols’ life they do not seem to have produced an 
equivalent of the adab al-furūsiyya77  literature of the Abbāsids and the 
Mamluks which not only covered all aspects of horsemanship but also 
horse welfare. There are, however, some modern works which are 
useful. One such by a Mongol, Bekhjargal Bayarsaikhan, on Travelling 
by Mongol horse is a practical guide for foreign riders  but with useful 
insights and there is a constructive work by Natasha Fijn, Living with 
Herds, Human-Animal coexistence in Mongolia.  Bat Ochir-Bold, also a 
Mongol, has provided valuable insights from a Mongolian perspective in 
his Mongolian Nomadic Society, A Reconstruction of the ‘Medieval’ 
History of Mongolia  and articles on issues such as livestock and the 
Mongolian social structure in the early period.  
That there were limitations insofar as Mongol horses were concerned 
can be gleaned from, for example, Marino Sanudo Torsello’s Secreta 
fidelium Crucis, written between 1300 and 1321. Though primarily a 
work of strategy for regaining Jerusalem, it also has several insightful 
references to the problems the Hülegüids encountered with their horses 
                                       
75 Maurice’s Strategikon, Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy, trans. George T. 
Dennis, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984 
76 This can be seen in the extensive genre of the Mongols’ somewhat doleful songs 
centred on their horses 
77See e.g. Shihab al Sarraf, ‘Furusiyya Literature of the Mamluk period’, Furusiyya, 
Vol. I. ed.D. Alexander, Ryad, 1996 p. 118-135 
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in Western Eurasia. John Masson Smith Jr. has dissected in minute 
detail aspects of the Mongols equestrianism, some of which are referred 
to in the text. Lastly, despite the dearth of Mongol source material on 
the upkeep, limitations and capabilities of their horses, because such 
requirements have not dramatically changed in a thousand years it is 
possible to examine these issues in a ‘non-documentary’ form in 
Mongolia today ‘straight from the horse’s mouth’.  
Although the Mongols did not succeed in forcing submission from the 
Mamluks in Egypt, nor the submission of rulers in Western Europe and 
neither did they conquer North Africa, Japan nor parts of south and 
southeast Asia, in one way or another their activities touched all these 
areas. Thus one corollary of their far-reaching presence is a difficulty 
they themselves faced, which was the multiplicity of languages which 
will be discussed in Chapter IV. This was not resolved, as in the Roman 
and British empires for example, by the language of the conquerors 
becoming a lingua franca of the conquered areas except for the small 
number of those in the service of the imperial family. Even so, these 
officials did not write for posterity in Mongolian.  Inevitably, therefore, 
any scholar examining strategic communication networks in a historical 
context owes an enormous debt to those who have dedicated their lives 
to linguistic research and the nuances of the languages and cultures 
affected by the Mongols.   
Unfortunately for posterity the Mongols themselves did not produce 
much in the way of ‘primary source material’ as they settled down to 
enjoy the profits of empire.  Fairly early in their conquest career 
Chinggisid princes had scribes who daily wrote down all their profound 
but often convoluted utterances.  Rashīd al-Dīn records some of the 
maxims, or biligs, of Chinggis Khan78 and a few of those of his 
                                       
78 Trans. Wheeler M. Thackston, Jāmi‘u’t-tawīrikh. II, pp. 293-301; also D. Morgan, 
The Mongols, p. 99 
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successor Ögödei.79 Of Chinggisid official correspondence only a 
handful of documents are extant in the form of diplomatic letters.80 
Neither is there a copy of the controversial yasa available for scholarly 
consultation. Thus there is undue reliance on their epic Secret History 
of the Mongols,81 which has been minutely examined and commented on 
by Igor de Rachewiltz amongst others.  
Whilst the Secret History is invaluable in providing scholars with crucial 
access to the Mongol milieu during the rise of Temujin/Chinggis Khan it 
does have problems as a resource, not necessarily because of its 
unknown authorship82 or revisions83 but because in the view of De 
Rachewiltz it is an epic chronicle – rather than a heroic epic.84 
Conversely, Larry Moses has examined the epic themes in the Secret 
History in the context of those normally present in the genre of quest 
epic and those of the heroic warfare epic genre. He argues that elements 
of both feature in the Secret History which was meant to be sung to the 
assembled Mongol elite - possibly in 1229 -  in order to deify Chinggis 
Khan by proclaiming the supernatural forces that had produced and 
guided his lineage as well as to inspire and motivate his descendants.  
Because of these ‘epic’ elements, he questions what in the Secret History 
constitutes epic legend, predating Chinggis Khan and common to the 
peoples of the region and what is historical fact.85 Despite these 
misgivings, from the viewpoint of the focus here, the Secret History 
provides invaluable insights.  
 
There are, however other, less epic, Mongol sources, including the 
seventeenth century Erdeni-yin tobchi or Precious Summary by Prince 
                                       
79 Rashid al-Din/Boyle p. 76-94 
80See e.g. Mostaert,and Cleaves, ‘Trois documents mongols des Archives secretes 
vaticanes’ 
81 Igor de Rachewiltz, The Secret History of the Mongols, vols I and II 
82 SH vol. I Discussed by de Rachewiltz in his introduction, pp. xxv-xl 
83 SH vol. I. pp. xl-lix.  
84 SH, vol. I, p .lxix 
85 Larry W. Moses, ‘Epic Themes in the Secret History of the Mongols’, Folklore, vol. 
99, No. 2 (1988) pp. 170-173  
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Saghang Sechen (1604-?) which is a general history of the Mongols 
composed, however, after the Mongols were influenced by Tibetan 
Lamaism.86  Around the same period were promulgated the ‘Mongol-
Oirat Regulations’ or Monggol-Oirad Chaaji of 164087and because they 
were based on earlier practices, also provide useful insights into Mongol 
regulation.  
The situation does, nonetheless, become critical for the authentic voice 
of the Mongols after the period of the Secret History, the dating of the 
original text of which is controversial but in all probability was 
122888with further additions and editing.  Ghāzān’s (r. 694-703/1295-
1304) aim in his encouragement of the Jāmi al- t-Tavārikh project 
overseen by his vizier Rashīd al-Dīn (643-718/1245-1318) may well 
have been to preserve the Mongols’ identity and knowledge of their past 
though it was not written in Mongolian. Nonetheless, it had 
considerable ‘Mongol’ input both from Ghāzān’s own extensive 
familiarity with his family history as well as that of the Yuan emissary, 
Bolad and the Amir Nowruz. Even this, however, does not really get 
inside the mind of a Mongol Khan or Sultan in quite the same way as 
the Secret History, or for instance the founding Mughal Emperor, 
Bābur’s (888-937/1483-1530) memoirs which are particularly 
forthright on the problems faced by a ruler fighting to gain, regain and 
retain his throne.89  
Whilst the ‘authentic’ voice of the Mongols is conspicuous by its 
absence and the Mongol Imperium must be observed through the prism 
                                       
86 Ssanang Ssetsen, The Bejewelled Summary of the Origins of the Khans, tr. John R. 
Krueger 
87 These were formulated by an assembly in Western Mongolia attended by the most 
powerful khans of the Khalkha (Outer Mongolia), the Oirat rulers and twenty other 
senior nobles to provide the laws of a toro, or ‘state’ but one without a sovereign, a 
capital nor a centre. It was a joint project of rulership by powerful aristocrats and 
what was shared was a common law code and an aristocratic social order. The 
confederation lasted forty-eight years though the laws remained in force with the Oirat 
and among the Volga Kalmyks until 1892. (Sneath,  The Headless State Ch. 7) 
88 See de Rachewiltz’s introduction, SH, p. xxxiii 
89 Bābur, Zahiru’d-Din Muhammad, Bābur-nāma, tr. A. S. Beveridge,1922 
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of those whose lives were changed or shaped by the Mongol irruptions, 
Uli Schamiloglu has pointed out that some Turkic narrative sources 
have survived from the Later Golden Horde, a period of the successor 
states to the Jochids. He argues that these are of fundamental 
importance for the study of the history of western Eurasia in the 
thirteenth to eighteenth centuries and include the Umdet ül-ahbar. 
Whilst this was composed in Ottoman Turkish by Abdülgaffar al-Kirimi 
of the Crimean Khanate in the eighteenth century he used a wide range 
of Arabic, Persian and Turkic sources to survey the reign of each of the 
rulers of the Golden Horde thus preserving historical traditions from the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. He includes an important account 
of the negotiations between the Jochid amirs and Hülegü prior to the 
accession of Berke Khan (Ir. 1255-1266).90   
This dearth of sources from the Mongol perspective is confounded by a 
problem articulated by Lane - of the lack of ‘hard administrative data 
and the subjective nature of much of the narrative material’ leading to 
‘speculation and clever interpretation which can rarely be backed up by 
hard statistical data and reliable figures’.91 Though this may be even 
more of an issue for economic historians of the period, such evidence is 
also required on how their extended lines of communication may have 
complicated Hülegü and his successors’ attempts to sustain their 
domination. Such ‘hard data’ ideally needs to come from within the 
ruling circle from those who appreciated, like the Seljūq vizier, Nizām 
al-Mulk, the efforts entailed in order to stay in the saddle’ or from 
insiders such as Beyhaqi’s (385/469/995-1077) exposé of the problems 
of rulership in uncertain times.   
                                       
90 Uli Schamiloglu, ‘The Umdet ül-ahbar’ in Paksoy, H. B., Central Asian Monuments, 
Istanbul, Isis Press, 1992 pp. 81-93 
91 G. Lane, Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran, 2003, pp. 2-3 
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The ‘insiders’ writing with close proximity to the Hülegüid rulers are the 
Persian bureaucrat ‘Atā Malik Juvaynī,92 and Rashīd al-Dīn, the vizier 
of Ghāzān  (r.694-703/1295-1304) and his brother Öljeitü (703-
716/1304-1316). The former’s work was composed between 650-
58/1252-60 and his chapters on Körgüz and Arghūn Aqa come close to 
Beyhaqi in giving a flavour of the difficulties under which bureaucrats 
laboured, though unlike Sultan’s Mas’ūd’s bureaucrats, the Chinggisid 
officials come over more as ‘the enemy within’ with their toxic rivalries. 
It was almost fifty years later before another ‘insider’ account became 
available in the form of Ghāzān’s project overseen by his vizier Rashīd 
al-Dīn. He had been at the epicentre of the politics of the Hülegüid 
Court for twenty years (698-718/1298-1318) and before that had been 
associated with the Hülegüids for at least twenty years as a physician in 
the service of Hülegü Khan’s successor Abaqa.  
Juvaynī’s Tarīkh-i Jahān-gushā was a source for other historians of the 
period who included in their works the early history of the Mongols. 
These included not only Rashīd al-Dīn, but also Hamdallāh the 
Mustawfī or State Accountant of Qazvin’s Tarīkh-i Guzīda, completed he 
says in 730/1330 and which essentially covers the history of the Dār al-
Islām from the creation to Abū Sa’īd, though with the rather ominous 
comment ‘and let who will hereafter write the conclusion of their 
history’.93 It was also a source for the Chronography of the Syriac 
Orthodox bishop, Bar Hebraeus (1226 –1286) which is essentially a 
saga of the perfidious milieu in the areas under Hülegüid control.  
Included amongst the insiders who put pen to paper were the 
mathematician and Director of the Maragha Observatory under the first 
two Hülegüids, Nasīr al-Dīn Tūsī, (1201-1274). Refugees such as the 
Ghurid, Minhāj al-Dīn Juzjānī (589-?663/1193-?1265) who found 
                                       
92 Juvaynī/Qazwīnī) Tārikh-i-Jahān Gushā & Boyle, The History of the World Conqueror 
in 2 vols 
93 The Ta’rīkh-i-Guzīda or ‘Select history of Hamdullāh Mustawfī-i Qazwini. Eds. E. G. 
Browne and R. A.Nicholson, p. 6 
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sanctuary in the Sultanate of Delhi also provide insights on the 
conquest period since his intelligence sources on the Mongols seem to 
have been quite wide-ranging.94  
The Cilician and Greater Armenian historians have been extensively 
utilised here and pull few punches when it comes to showing what it 
was like to live under an occupying power. King Het ‘um (r. 1224-
1269),95 the ruler of Cilician Armenia and his brother Smbat sought an 
accommodation with the Mongols as a counterbalance to the 
neighbouring Muslims and both travelled to Qaraqorum. Their 
recollections fed into such works as that of their nephew, the Cilician 
Armenian historian Het ‘um’s History of the Tartars, or The Flower of 
Histories of the East which was dictated in French in Poitiers in 1307 
but also included his first-hand knowledge of the Hülegüids and has 
some useful intelligence, economic and ‘communications’ related 
insights. Vardan Arewelts’i’ in his Compilation of History records an 
interview he had with Hülegü. Grigor of Akner’s History of the Nation of 
Archers has a plausible but probably spurious account of why Hülegü 
was enthroned and gives the reason for the hostilities with the Jochids. 
Kirakos Ganjaketsi was captured by the Mongols and forced to serve 
them in a secretarial capacity and his experiences and insights in his 
History of the Armenians have proved invaluable. 
The later sources emanate from second or third generation historians 
who not only had time to adjust to the trauma of conquest but were 
also were ruled by ostensibly Muslim Mongols. The Court Panegyrist or 
Vassaf-e Hazrat (fl. 1299-1323) - actually a tax collector with 
pretensions - presented to Sultan Öljeitü his Tārikh-i Vassaf, as 
incomprehensible to the Sultan as to students today. Slightly later is 
Abu ‘l-Qāsim Kāshānī’s Tārīkh-i Uljāytū which for present purposes 
                                       
94 Juzjānī, Tabakāt-i-Nāsīrī   
95‘Journey of Hethum, the Pious King of the Armenians to Batu and Mangu Khans’, 
Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, volume I 
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helpfully indicates the Sultan’s annual peregrinations between the 
seasonal Royal Camps.96  
There are comparative riches to be found in the accounts of the long-
suffering trans-continental travellers during this period.  Amongst those 
who left important accounts of their travails and who are mentioned 
many times in the text are Ye-lu Ch’u Ts’ai, who travelled in 1219, Wu-
ku-Sun, (1220-1221), Ch’ang Ch’un, (1221-1224), Chang Te who 
travelled 1259, and from amongst the clergy, William of Rubruck, John 
of Plano Carpini, Benedict the Pole, Rabban Bar Sauma, (d. 1294) 
(travelling east to west).  
Despite the latter-day interest in the commercial benefits of the 
supposedly Pax Mongolica, there are few accounts from merchants with 
the controversial exception of the Venetian, Marco Polo, though his 
commercial perspective does not bear comparison with the later 
Florentine Francesco Balducci Pegolotti’s La Pratica della Mercatura 
completed in the late 1330s or early 1340s CE. Pegolotti, however, did not 
travel himself across Eurasia but culled his information from his fellow 
merchants who had ‘used the road’.   Ibn Battuta, for present purposes, 
is of rather less interest since much of his peregrinations were by sea 
and there is more doubt as to whether he did actually reach China than 
with Marco Polo. On the other hand, Ibn Battuta did take the 
opportunity of joining the mahalla or travelling court of Abu Sa’id for 
which he is an important source. Also of some interest is his ‘take’ on 
the collapse of the Hülegüid polity after the death of Abu Sa’id.97  
The dangers of such journeys did not abate with the demise of the Yuan 
and Hülegüids, meaning that accounts from later travellers can offer 
useful insights. The embassy of Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo (d. 1412) for 
Henry III of Castile (r. 1390-1406) to the Amir Tīmūr (771-807/1370-
                                       
96 His peregrinations have been examined in some details by Melville, ‘the Itineraries of 
Sultan Oljeitu’, 1304-16, Iran, vol. 28 
97 Ibn Battūta, The Travels of Ibn Battūta, vol II, pp. 335-346 
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1405) is particularly important.98 He not only travelled on the efficient 
Tīmūrid successor to the Chinggisid Yām network via Tabriz to 
Samarkand between1403-1405 but was also one of the most prestigious 
travellers – unlike poor Rubruck for example - to leave an account of 
their experiences.  
A slightly later, but equally important embassy though only travelling a 
fraction of the distance, was that dispatched by the Tīmūrid ruler of 
Herat, Mirza Shahrukh (r. 1404–1447), to the Court of the Yongle 
Emperor (r. 1402–1424) in 822/1419 arriving back in 825/1422 
travelling via Samarkand and Sairam, Turfan and Hami. This embassy 
was recorded99 by the official diarist Ghiyāth al-dīn Naqqāsh and is an 
important source for contact and travel as well as for early Ming China. 
In spite of the passing of the centuries it would be unwise to completely 
ignore eighteenth and nineteenth century explorers, geographers and 
travellers since very often their experiences were not dissimilar to those 
of the thirteenth and fourteenth travellers since the terrain and hazards 
had not changed substantially and the old transmission systems were 
still in use. Allsen firmly makes the case for studying later imperial 
postal communications. He emphasises that later travellers have much 
to teach us about the institution in the last centuries of its 
extraordinarily long life. Moreover, ‘some of the practices were truly 
frozen in time, surviving intact into the very recent past such as feed 
requirements, mortality rates, speed and carrying capacities of post 
animals as well as the longevity of routes and distances between the 
relay stations’. He also makes the important point that these latter 
imperial posts are far better documented than those of their 
                                       
98 Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo Embassy to Tamerlane, 1403-1406 tr. Guy le Strange     
99 Bellér-Hann, Ildikó, A History of Cathay: a translation and linguistic analysis of a 
fifteenth-century Turkic manuscript, Bloomington: Indiana University, Research 
Institute for Inner Asian Studies,1995 Hāfiz-i Abrū, A Persian embassy to China, being 
an extract from Zubdatu't tawarikh of Hāfiz Abrū, tr. K. M. Maitra, 1970 
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predecessors.100 This is a substantial genre of varying quality and those 
consulted appear in the text.  
 
Cartography and Itineraries 
Cartography is often overlooked as potential source material partly, 
perhaps, because it is a specialism in its own right. Cartography, 
however, along with itineraries, is a valuable tool for several reasons. 
One of these is that, in association with itineraries, it provides an 
indication of what the Islamic and Chinese worlds knew of their 
conquerors before the inundation. There is also the often forlorn hope 
that cartography and itineraries can firm up references in the sources 
to the likely routes taken by the Yām and earlier communication 
networks which the Yām may have utilised. 
It may be wise to caution at this stage that when reference is made to 
cartography in this early period it should be borne in mind that these 
are not ‘maps’ in the sense of navigational aids as can be deduced from 
the al-Īdrīsī Miniature Map of the World based on the famous map 
which al-Idrīsī (493-560/1100-1165) laboured on for Roger II of Sicily 
(1097-1154).101  Locales closer to home are more accurate than China, 
the Far East and South-East Asia. That there was also a serious 
deficiency of up-to-date information on China can be judged by al-
Idrīsī’s geographic compilation that underpinned his world map, his 
Kitāb Nuzhat al-mushtāq fī ikhtirāq al-afāq or The Pleasure of He who 
Longs to Cross the Horizons, also known as al-Kitāb al-Rujari or The 
Book of Roger.  
                                       
100 Thomas Allsen, ‘Imperial Posts, West, East and North: A review Article’ of Adam J. 
Silverstein, Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World. Archivum Eurasiae Medii 
Aevi, ed. Thomas T. Allsen, P. B. Golden, R. K, Kovalev, and A. P. Martinez, 17 (2010), 
Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz Verlag pp. 237-276 
101 Sicily had been in Christian hands since the early twelfth century and Roger had 
Greek and Arab tutors. His court became a venue for both Christian and especially 
Muslim scholarship. S. Maqbul Ahmad, A History of Arab-Islamic Geography, p. 164 
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al-Īdrīsī Miniature Map of the World  
With South at the Top  
Sicily bottom right, with the Black Sea centre left of Sicily102 
 
Difficulties include the identification of place names, many of which are 
no longer extant or have changed beyond recognition. A Geographical 
Gazetteer is included in the appendices, which gives some of the main 
alternatives to the places referred to in the text but this effort cannot 
possibly be regarded as definitive. Cartography, however,  is useful as a 
primary source because maps, although symbols of power and status 
illustrating the extent of a rulers domains were also created in a 
particular cultural context and can provide a snapshot of changing 
political realities and understandings as well as the level of knowledge 
at a particular time. Many happy hours can be spent poring over those 
early cartographic efforts - as well as more recent maps, though alas, 
there are many questions still unresolved. 
                                       
102 Well illustrated with brief commentary in Jerry Brotton, Great Maps London, DKP, 
2014, p.47-49. S. Maqbul Ahmad, ‘Cartography of al Sharīf al-Idrīsī’ ch. 7 of The 
History of Cartography, Vol. 1, Book 1, pp. 156-174 and Ahmad, A History of Arab-
Islamic Geography, p. 164 
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Pre-Mongol Geographical Knowledge 
The early thirteenth century Mongols were illiterate and cartography 
had no place in their campaigns of conquest though later Möngke 
Qa’an, Qubilai and the latter’s successors under the Yuan recognised 
the importance of both geography and cartography. Both of these 
subjects had nonetheless flourished for centuries in the extremes of 
Eurasia. A number of scholars have taken an interest in the history of 
cartography of the Islamic world and Eastern Eurasia and volumes one 
and two of the History of Cartography edited by J. B. Harley and David 
Woodward103 are indispensable for both these regions.  
Rashīd al-Dīn’s Geographical Data 
For the specific period here, Thomas Allsen’s chapter on geography and 
cartography in his Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia includes an 
examination of the body of geographical data incorporated into Rashīd 
al-Dīn’s Collected Chronicles. Indeed, as Allsen remarks, one of the 
greatest losses is that Rashīd al-Dīn apparently completed a geography 
entitled the Suvar al-āqālīm or “Configuration of Climes” describing the 
different climes of the world, the routes linking them and an 
enumeration of the way stations established throughout Eurasia by the 
Chinggisids.  
Whilst some scholars have doubts as to whether this work was actually 
completed, Allsen, Togan and Jahn regard it as having existed, possibly 
completed around 1310 CE, and subsequently lost.104 Tantalisingly 
Hamdallāh the Mustawfī may have been involved in that project, and 
indeed he mentions the works of Rashīd al-Dīn as a source for his 
information on Jurjat in Manchuria in his own Nuzhat al-Qulūb . This 
                                       
103 J. B. Harley and David Woodward eds. The History of Cartography Volume 2, Books 
1 & 2, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, 1994. 
104 Ahmet Zeki Validi [Togan] “Islam and the Science of Geography’, Islamic Culture 8 
(1934) pp. 514-15, 517, 522 n. 17 and 525, note 29; Karl Jahn, ‘Study of the 
Supplementary Persian Sources for the Mongol History of Iran’ in Denis Sinor, ed. 
Aspects of Altaic Civilization (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1963, p. 197 
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was compiled in 740/1340 and although derivative from earlier 
geographical descriptions of places also touches on the state of cities 
and towns in his own period along with the revenues and some 
itineraries.   
Rashīd al-Dīn’s source for his geographical information is inevitably 
regarded by Allsen as Qubilai’s ethnic Mongol emissary Bolad, who 
arrived in Azerbaijan in late 1285. What is noticeable, however, is that 
the section on Qubilai’s grandson, Ananda, effectively khan of his own 
ulus in the old Tangut territory south of the Gobi, is one of the most 
comprehensive parts of the history of Qubilai.  Given Ananda’s 
association with Islam and by deduction from his own connections with 
his Hülegüid cousin Ghāzān (r.694-703/1295-1304 it seems highly 
likely that Rashīd al-Dīn used a so far unknown source with 
connections to Ananda.105 
For present purposes one significance of Mustawfī is that for a period in 
which trans-Eurasian communication had apparently flowed, he was 
notably exceptionally weak on the highroads to the east. He ventures no 
further than the Oxus/Amu Darya and the Yuan centre of Dadu is 
disposed of simply as a great, mighty, cold and populous town which 
produced excellent cereals.   
There is thus no obvious surviving equivalent for the Chinggisid period 
of, for example, the Tabula Peutingeriana, a thirteenth century copy of a 
route planner based on earlier Roman sources which has been 
comprehensively examined by Emily Albu in her The Medieval Peutinger 
Map. Thus the way stations of the Yām network and the general 
direction of travel have had to be gleaned from the reports of travellers 
                                       
105 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, pp. 323-326 
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including the clerics, especially William of Rubruck as well as Juvaynī, 
and others who are mentioned in the text. 
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PART I 
Chapter I 
The Sino-Iranian Nexus 
 
Pre-Mongol Trans-Eurasian Communication and Contact 
 
When Chinggis Khan’s grandson, Hülegü, rode west from Mongolia on 
24th of Sha ‘ban, 658/19th October, 1253106 at the head of the imperial 
forces dispatched by his brother, Möngke Qa’an, contacts between the 
ancient civilizations of Iran and China had already had a long and 
tortuous history.107  A history which, as Herbert Franke has noted, is 
still far from sufficiently studied108 though perhaps oddly, in view of the 
strategic importance of these states today it is these early contacts that 
have long fascinated scholars. Even so, there has been a tendency to 
view this initial period of communication between eastern and western 
Eurasia through the prism of the history of commerce and ‘cultural 
exchange’.109 
This is particularly the case for the zenith of the so-called ‘Silk Road’110 
from the opening of the route west through the Tarim Basin by Chang 
Chien/Zhang Qian (d. 113 BCE) during the reign of Han Wudi (r. 140-
187 BCE) to the Arab conquests in the mid seventh century CE. 
                                       
106 The date given by Juvaynī/Boyle II, p. 611 
107 As Franke has remarked in his ‘Sino-Western Contacts under the Mongol Empire,’ 
p. 49. 
108 Franke, ‘Sino-Western Contacts’ p. 49 
109See especially Joseph Needham Science and Civilization in China, all volumes; 
Thomas Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 2001; Berthold Laufer, Sino Iranica, Chinese 
contributions to the history of civilization in ancient Iran, 1919; Edward H. Schafer, The 
Golden Peaches of Samarkand, 1963 
110 Daniel Waugh has cautioned that the ‘father of the Silk Road concept’, the German 
geographer, Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen (1833-1905) used the term sparingly 
based on his source, Marinus of Tyre and then only for the period of the Han. It 
appears on his Karte von Centrale Asien of 1876 and designates one road’, that 
between Chang’an and across the Tarim as die Siedenstrasse von Marinus.  Daniel, 
Waugh, The Silk Road, vol. 5 Number 1, Summer 2007. Leading article on ‘Von 
Richthofen’s Silk Roads: Toward the Archaeology of a Concept’.  
51 
 
Recently, however, the extent of the commercial and cultural exchanges 
exemplified by the vision of silk laden caravans traversing Central 
Eurasia has been robustly challenged by historians examining the 
documentary evidence. One of the leading ‘Silk Road’ scholars today, 
Valerie Hansen, has tartly observed that ‘The Silk Road was one of the 
least travelled routes in human history and possibly not worth studying 
– if tonnage carried, traffic or the number of travellers at any time were 
the sole measures of a given route’s significance’.111   
She is not alone in being sceptical. Warwick Ball, too, has remarked 
with some irritation that ‘nowadays it has become fashionable to lump 
the study of the routes and movements in to the one catch-all term, 
‘The Great Silk Road.’  In his view, the term ‘is largely a modern 
construct with little foundation in history or archaeology that is 
nonetheless now almost universally used both in popular and scholarly 
literature; the former understandable, the latter inexcusable’.112  
 
Early Trans-Eurasian Contact predicated on Reasons of State 
Such scepticism has a two-fold value here since it cautions against 
taking at face value the Victorian propensity for labels including such 
misnomers as “Silk Road’ and ‘Pax Mongolica’ - the latter being a 
particularly unfortunate term as will be seen in Chapter X. As Franke 
forcefully remarks, ‘historical tags’ such as these lose much of their 
seemingly incontrovertible truth when the historical facts are 
considered.113  It also brings into question scholarly enthusiasm for the 
commercial aspects of trans-Eurasian communication, where grand 
edifices categorised as ‘world trading networks’ have been erected by 
economic historians who, as Abu-Lughod herself admits, have 
‘imaginatively combined and recombined the same limited number of 
                                       
111 Hansen, Silk Road, for her revisioning of the history of the Silk Road, see p. 235. 
112 Warwick Ball: The Monuments of Afghanistan, History, Archaeology and Architecture, 2008, 
p.13 
113 Franke, ‘Sino-Western Contacts’ p. 44 
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informational scraps’114 whereas the statistical evidence to support 
such ambitious claims is extremely slim. Such an approach not only 
neglects the evidence in the sources that such contacts were instigated 
and largely sustained for ‘Reasons of State’ but also as Abu-Lughod 
acknowledges, accounts such as Marco Polo’s are ‘responsible for a 
distorted definition of the thirteenth century as a period of Commercial 
Revolution’.115  
Such dubiousness at the level of the commercial aspects of trans-
Eurasian communication suggest that it is the historic relations at state 
level between these two far distant polities over two millennia ago which 
are of significance. These inter-state contacts are regarded here as 
exemplifying some timeless aspects of statecraft as conquest dynasties 
endeavoured to retain and sustain their power by searching for allies, 
collecting intelligence, repelling enemies and taxing their populations in 
their attempts to fend off for as long as possible the inevitable moment 
foretold by ‘Ata-Malik Juvaynī: 
Now to every fortune there is a 
limit and to every cause a term, 
which has been fixed by God 
Almighty in His perfect knowledge 
and power at the beginning of time 
and until the appointed hour is 
come abundant strength and gear 
and equipment will accomplish 
nothing116   
 
Whilst some rulers might share Juvaynī‘s fatalism, in fact sustaining 
and increasing their power can be shown to have been the driving force 
in the earliest trans-Eurasian contacts as is shown by Han Wudi’s 
                                       
114 Janet Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, The World System A.D. 1250-1350, 
New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 299 
115 Abu-Lughod, p. 30 
116 Juvaynī/Boyle, II p. 681 
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attempts to seek out his former steppe allies, the Yuezhi’117 who had 
been forced to flee after being defeated by the Xiongnu. 
 
 
  ii. Eurasia in 200 CE 
Xiongnu (209 BCE – c. 48 CE)  
Split into Northern and Southern Branches (48-155) CE 
Former and Later Han (206 BC – 220 CE); Kushan Empire (c.100 – 224 CE) 
 
Though Han Wudi’s emissary to the Yuezhi, Zhang Qian, failed in his 
diplomatic objectives, one consequence of his missions was to have far 
reaching implications for the subsequent history of Central Eurasia and 
trans-Eurasian communications. This is because the Tarim Basin route 
which Zhang Qian traversed on his way westwards was something of a 
terrae incognitae for the Middle Kingdom. Indeed, some historians have 
argued that the earliest routes of transmission by which languages, 
genes and lifeways were exchanged between east and west Eurasia118 
                                       
117 C & S Benjamin have comprehensively examined the evidence for the migration of 
the Yuezhi in their The Yuezhi, Origin, Migration and the Conquest of Northern Bactria, 
Silk Road Studies XIV, Turnhout, Belgium, Brepols Publishers, 2007 
118 David Christian,“Silk Roads or Steppe Roads? The Silk Roads in World History’, 
Journal of World History, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Spring, 2000) 
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were the more northerly steppe bridle paths rather than via the 
particularly inhospitable Tarim Basin.  Thus one result of Zhang’s 
mission was that this latter route was consciously developed by Han for 
reasons of state.  
 
 
iii. Silk Roads versus Steppe Roads 
It was these historic links that were co-opted by Premier Zhou Enlai 
when Sino-Iranian relations were re-ignited in 1971 after a prolonged 
period of abeyance. In April of that year, the then Shah of Iran’s sister, 
Princess Ashraf, visited China and in his speech of welcome, Zhou Enlai 
stressed the ancient ties between the two countries whilst also 
observing how both had been brought low by “foreign aggression”, but 
that ‘longstanding historical contacts and traditional friendship’ had 
existed between China and Iran dating back “more than two thousand 
years”.119  
                                       
119 Xinhua, April 14, 1971, China Mainland Press – Survey of China Mainland Press, 
No. 71-17, April 26-30, 1971, 32-34. Quoted in Garver, China and Iran, p. 9 
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Though the mention by Zhou of ‘foreign aggression’ was a not so subtle 
reference to the trials and tribulations suffered by Iran and China at the 
hands of foreign powers over the past two hundred years or so, the two 
states did indeed have ‘long-standing historical contacts’, both 
diplomatic and cultural. These latter were manifested during the first 
half of the eighth century when there was a fashion amongst the Tang 
elite for Iranian objects and customs of all kinds: foodstuffs, clothing, 
furniture, music and dancing as well as Iranian influence on the visual 
arts.120 It is on the basis of such cultural contacts and exchange that 
led Franke to question whether such contacts ‘were really more frequent 
and easy under the Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
than under the Six Dynasties and the Tang when no Eurasian universal 
empire like that of the Mongols existed’.121  
A particularly intense period of Sino-Iranian interaction occurred 
between 638 CE and 729 CE after the intrusion of Arab forces into 
western and central Eurasia brought a new player into the already 
complex ‘international relations’ of the region. The Arab conquests 
initiated an explosion of contacts between the Tang and increasingly 
desperate Sasanian rulers seeking an alliance as the latter tried to 
negotiate the treacherous path between the incoming Arab forces and 
the omnipresent Turks. There appear to have been more embassies 
traversing Eurasia on Sasanian missions to Tang in this period than at 
the height of the later Hülegüid/Yuan interaction which took place 
during the reign of the last Hülegüid ruler, Abū Sa‘īd (r. 716-735/1316-
1335).122 
                                       
120 See especially B. Laufer, Sino Iranica: Chinese Contributions to the History of 
Civilization and Edward H. Schafer, The Golden Peaches of Samarkand, 1963. 
Sasanian motifs on silver vessels strongly influenced Tang metalwork and pearl-
bordered roundels almost certainly derived from Sasanian models. 
121 Franke, ‘Sino-Western Contacts’ p. 44 
122 For the embassies towards the end of the Hülegüid era see chapter herein on 
Contacts.  Yazdegerd III/Yi-si-si (632-651 CE) sent envoys in 638 CE pleading for help 
from Tang. His son, Pērōz/Bilusi took refuge in Tokarestan and sent an embassy to 
Tang in 661/662 CE asking for Tang intervention against the Arabs but was offered 
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The Trans-Eurasian Toluid Nexus 1260-1335 
 
These seventh and early eighth century relations between two ancient 
and illustrious powers were consummated by one forged in steel and 
blood in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Uniquely in 
the history of Eurasia, from 656/1258 to 735/1335, both China intra 
mures123and the Iranian plateau were theoretically under the sway – 
albeit for a comparatively short but complex period – of the same 
supreme authority, the Yuan emperors who descended from Chinggis 
Khan’s youngest son, Tolui, by his chief wife, Börte. This important 
Toluid lineage of the estranged Chinggisid imperial family produced not 
only the Mongol Yuan emperors, the first of whom was Qubilai Qa’an, 
but also the Hülegüids in West Asia, descendents of Qubilai’s younger 
brother Hülegü.  
 
                                                                                                                
instead the governorship of Po-ssu – in fact Sistan. From there he sent a number of 
further embassies to the Tang. Pērōz subsequently fled to Chang’an to join his son, 
Narseh/Ninieshi who was a hostage there. The Tang supported Narseh in his efforts to 
regain Sasanian territory, remaining for twenty years or so in Tokarestan from where 
he sent regular embassies to the Tang court, to which he returned, dying in Chang’an 
between 707 and 709 CE. Hs son also attempted to reconquer the Empire in 728-729 
CE.  
123 Prior to Qin, each state had tried to surround itself with walls as well as to provide 
a defence along the northern frontier. Qin linked these frontier walls though the “Great 
Wall” in its well-known form was only established during the Ming. See e.g. Barfield, 
The Perilous Frontier, p. 32 
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‘Close Relations’ 
The Yuan in East Eurasia 
Overlords of the Ilkhans/Hülegüids in Western Eurasia 
1260 and 1335  
 
 
 
The Toluids in the West – Möngke’s Grand Strategy 
 
The death of Ögödei Qa’an’s son and successor, Güyüg (r.1246-1248 
CE) resulted in the acrimonious accession of a non-Ögödeid successor, 
Chinggis Khan’s grandson Möngke and son of Tolui, the youngest son of 
the Conqueror, albeit with the support of the senior branch, the Jochid 
khan, Batu. Relationships thereafter within the Imperial Family became 
increasingly fraught even though Batu’s reasons for supporting a non-
Ögödeid Great Khan rather than a youngster from the Ögödeid branch 
cannot be faulted. 
...the administration of so vast an 
empire, which stretches from the 
East to the West, is beyond the 
strength of children’s arms124 
 A purported assassination attempt on Möngke by dissidents from the 
Ögödeid and Chaghadaid branches, whilst giving the new ruler the 
opportunity of culling potential rivals and ostensibly enforcing his 
authority, had the presumably unforeseen consequence of further 
                                       
124 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 203 
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fracturing the Imperial Family. This in turn was confounded on his own 
death by the succession dispute between his brothers Qubilai and Arïq 
Böke. 
In the meantime,  the account in Rashīd al-Dīn of Möngke despatching 
his two brothers, Qubilai and Hülegü eastwards and westwards 
respectively to the imperial  ‘collegiate’ territories with large armies, 
albeit with representatives from the other branches is, to put it mildly, 
somewhat opaque.125 As far as the reasons for Hülegü’s expedition are 
concerned, Ch’ang Te, Möngke’s emissary to his brother after the fall of 
Baghdad, admiringly remarks that, in the space of six years, Hülegü 
had succeeded in extending the frontiers of the empire by nearly ten 
thousand li.126    
Ch’ang Te had inadvertently but pithily summed up Möngke’s ‘Grand 
Strategy’. This was not, however, so much the acquisition of territory, 
rather it was to enforce the subjection of all those who had not yet 
submitted. That this was clearly realised by some in the west, such as 
Yvo of Narbonne as recorded by Matthew Paris in 1243 CE, is shown by 
Yvo’s understanding that the Mongols: 
‘being admonished by an oracle or 
vision to challenge dominion over the 
whole earth’ they ‘all persist in their 
purpose of subduing the whole world 
under their owne subjection...127  
 
Such a view is furthermore encapsulated in a letter from Möngke’s 
predecessor, Güyüg (r.1246-1248 CE) to Pope Innocent IV, who had 
complained about Mongol treatment of conquered Christian peoples. 
Güyüg responded sharply: “We do not understand these words of yours. 
                                       
125 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, pp.222 and 246 
126 Ch’ang Te, ‘Si Shi Ki,’ tr. Bretschneider, in Mediaeval Researches vol. I, p.122. 
127 C. Raymond Beazley, The Texts and Versions of John de Plano Carpini And William 
de Rubruquis, As Printed For The First Time by Hakluyt In 1598. London, Hakluyt 
Society, 1903 pp. 41 and 42 
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The Eternal Heaven (tengri) has slain and annihilated these lands and 
peoples, because they have heeded neither Chingiz Khan nor the 
Khagan (Ogodei), both of whom have been sent to make known God’s 
command. .........”128 It would appear that from this perspective, the 
Chinggisids were simply the tools chosen by Tengri for the task of 
enforcing the will of Eternal Heaven which in turn implied that there 
was a sacred dynamic driving Mongol expansion. 
Whilst world domination may have been Möngke’s grand strategy as 
decreed by God, he still had to deal with the practicalities. In his 
pursuit of this goal Möngke could simply have given open-ended orders 
to his brothers to conquer the remaining ‘rebels’ in ‘the furthest East 
and West of the world’. 129 Juvaynī in fact records that Möngke did 
exactly that in charging Hülegü ‘with the conquest of the Western 
parts’130 and Rashīd al-Dīn essentially follows suit.131  
There is, however, an anomaly within Möngke’s reported instructions to 
his brothers.  Whilst the campaigns against the Southern Sung, Japan 
and ‘Indo-China’ are easily explicable in terms of forcing the submission 
of those still outside the fold, the Mongols already had an assertive, if 
less than coherent, presence in Western Eurasia. The extent of this 
presence can be construed by the responsibilities of Juvaynī’s master, 
the Oirat or Jalayir Mongol Amir Arghun Aqa, duties which were 
increased by Ögödei’s widow, the regent, Toregene Khatün after the 
                                       
128 Donald Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols: cross cultural influences on the steppe  
frontier, 1304-1589, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 92-94. 
Jackson believes that David Morgan’s contention that the Mongols came to believe in a 
programme of world-conquest only when they discovered that they were in fact 
conquering the world may well be close to the truth. David O Morgan, “The Mongols 
and the Eastern Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Historical Review, vol. 4, 1989, p. 
200. Jackson’s chapter on ‘The Mongol age in Eastern Inner Asia’ in Jackson’s chapter 
on ‘The Mongol age in Eastern Inner Asia’ pp. 36-37 
129 Juvaynī/Boyle, II, p. 607 
130 Juvaynī/Boyle II, p. 607 
131 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, pp.222 and 246 
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murder of his mentor, Körgüz, governor of Khurasan shortly before 
641/1243-4.132  
Arghun’s increased remit was territorially extensive and included the 
region between the Oxus and Fars, as well as Georgia, Rum and 
Mosul.133 He is also reported by Juvaynī as restoring order in 
Azerbaijan which had been regarded by the great amirs appointed to 
administer the region, such as Chormaghun and Baiju, as their own 
property. Moreover, the Sultans of Rum, Syria and Aleppo sent 
ambassadors to him and sought his protection and favour.134  
There is also the problem of hindsight which makes Rubruck’s account 
of the essence since he arrived in the Imperial encampment in the midst 
of these events.  Whilst at Möngke’s Court in 1254 Rubruck picked up 
the local gossip and from this he may have discerned, albeit 
unintentionally, a rather more sophisticated approach on the part of 
Möngke. This was in the context of an exchange between a purported 
cleric, one Theodolus who was originally from Acre and who had made 
his way east in the wake of Andrew of Longjumeau in 1249 remaining at 
least until Rubruck’s arrival in 1253. This cleric was interrogated by 
Möngke about his reasons for traversing Eurasia to Qaraqorum during 
the course of which Theodolus told the Qa’an that ‘there were Saracens 
between him and the Franks, blocking the way and that if they were 
opened up they [the Franks] would send envoys and of their own accord 
make peace with him’.135  
This intelligence, albeit spurious, sparked Möngke’s interest sufficiently 
to arrange for Theodolus to accompany an envoy back to the west to 
substantiate these assertions. The deal which Möngke was prepared to 
                                       
132 Juvaynī/Boyle, II, p. 507 
133 Juvaynī/Boyle  II, p.507 and Lane, ‘Arghun Aqa: Mongol Bureaucrat’, Iranian 
Studies, vol. 32, No. 4 p. 461 
134 Juvaynī/Boyle II, pp. 507-508 
135 Rubruck, p. 186 
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offer to King Louis IX of France, a friend and patron of Rubruck,136 was 
that the Mongols would conquer the territory of the Saracens as far as 
that of the king’s and then grant Louis the remaining land to the west. 
If the king refused the deal, he was to be warned that the Mongols 
would, in effect, come after him.137  
Such a condominium arrangement was in fact mooted by Chinggis 
Khan himself circa 1217 CE vis- a-vis the Khwarazmshah when he 
responded to the latter saying ‘I am the sovereign of the sunrise and 
thou the sovereign of the sunset. Let there be between us a firm treaty 
of friendship, amity and peace....’138  This probably devious suggestion 
catastrophically failed when the latter was complicit in the murder of 
the Mongol envoys and the looting of the accompanying caravan. In 
view of Möngke’s expansionist objectives such a proposal in respect of 
carving up the rest of the world then known to the Mongols between the 
Chinggisids and King Louis does seem inconceivable and as it happened 
it was never put to the test.  The envoy managed to get as far as John III 
Vatatzes, emperor of Nicaea, but then fell ill and died and though the 
emperor sent back his attendants to Möngke, his ‘offer’ presumably did 
not get as far as Louis. On the other hand, Hülegü’s actions after the 
Fall of Baghdad, apparently on the advice of King Het’um, in attacking 
Aleppo followed by Damascus, were arguably in accord with his 
instructions from Möngke. 
 
Möngke’s Military Objectives for Hülegü in the West 
As a tested military commander it is unlikely that Möngke sent off his 
younger brother without specific objectives to further the overall grand 
strategic vision. This is rather more convoluted than might appear and 
                                       
136 Rubruck, Jackson’s Introduction, p. 4 which is presumably one reason why 
Rubruck took such an interest in the incident. 
137 Rubruck, p. 186 
138 Jūzjānī  p. 966 
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it may be worth trying to untangle the various pieces of evidence since 
the Toluid presence in western Eurasia for upwards of eighty years was 
in turn bedevilled by the conceptions and misconceptions of his 
Imperial relatives as to what was Hülegü’s actual remit. 
Thus the Persian sources noted above give the impression that Hülegü 
had carte blanche in his efforts to force the submission of the western 
‘rebels’.  Again, one of the problems of hindsight is that there is the 
supposition that the two major objectives were in fact those that were 
subsequently vanquished that is, the Isma’ilis and the Caliphate.  Post-
event Western and Chinese sources indicate, somewhat more rationally 
than Juvaynī, that Möngke had indeed given his commanders precise 
strategic/military targets. On these the Chinese sources are succinct 
and to the point. Thus the Yuan shi states under the year 1252: 
The emperor (Möngke) sent the 
general K’ie-di-bu hua (Kit-buka) to 
attack the Mu-li-hi (Mulahida or 
Isma’ili’s) and to lay siege to the 
fortress Mo-lai Ghi-rh-du-k’ie 
(Ghirdkuh of the Mulahida). The 
prince Hu-lie-wu (Hulagu) received 
orders to subdue the countries of the 
west belonging to the dominions of 
the su-dan (Sultan)139 
 
Under the following year the Yuan shi further states that Hülegü was 
ordered to set off for the Si yü or western Asia and subdue Ha-li-fa Ba-
ha-da, that is, the Caliphate, and other countries.  This somewhat terse 
record should not be dismissed since Kit-buka, who was initially 
charged with the destruction of the Ismā’īli fortresses had not made 
sufficient progress by the time of Hülegü’s arrival despite besieging their 
fortress of Ghirdkugh for two years. It was only after Hülegü came to his 
aid that the Ismā’īli threat was dealt with.  
                                       
139 Quoted in Bretschneider, Medieval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources, vol. I 
p. 121 
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Interestingly, it could be argued that the Yuan shi version of the 1252 
orders could be taken as vindicating Rubruck that Hülegü’s objective 
was the Sultan’s domains rather than specifically destroying the 
Caliphate itself though doubt is immediately cast on this in view of the 
comment under the year 1253 above. On the other hand, when 
Hülegü’s emissaries reached the Jochid camp with the portion of the 
loot destined for Berke, Batu’s successor, the Jochid khan was so 
incensed at the murder of the Caliph that according to Jūzjānī, he slew 
the emissaries. Berke’s fury, according to Jūzjānī was because he had 
been brought up as a Muslim140 and indeed Rubruck had heard that 
Berke made himself out to be a Saracen.141 From this it can be deduced 
that the Jochids – or at least the Muslim convert Berke, had not signed 
up for the destruction of the Caliphate per se but for the submission of 
the caliph and territorial control.142 
Notwithstanding Berke’s anger at the turn of events, post-Baghdad 
rationalisations are given in the sources for the attacks on the Ismā’īlis 
and the Caliph. Though these vary there appears to be a common 
thread. This is that Mongol aid was beseeched by influential individuals 
and Jūzjānī is one of the prime movers of this view. It seems that this 
usually well-informed refugee in the Delhi Sultanate viewed Hülegü’s 
attack on the Caliph as being at the instigation of the traitorous Shī ‘ī 
wazīr of the Caliphal Court. This individual purportedly clandestinely 
wrote to Hülegü when already in the region asking him to advance on 
Baghdad.143  
According to Jūzjānī, the main targets were nonetheless the Ismā’īli 
fortresses but these targets were also, so it appears, at the behest of 
other supplicants, in this instance the qādī of Qazwin, a city not far 
distant from the key Ismā’īli fortress of Alamut. The qādī was a devout 
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Sunni who, for unknown reasons, appears to have made several trips to 
Qaraqorum. It was not until Möngke ascended the throne, however, 
that he seems to have plucked up courage to paint a sensational picture 
of the conflicts between the townspeople and their neighbours144 and 
ask for Mongol aid in destroying the Ismā’īli spiritual and physical 
menace. 
His powers of persuasion were finely tuned to Chinggisid sensibilities as 
they were based on ‘reasons of state’ and the risk to Chinggisid power in 
western Eurasia if the Ismā’īlis were allowed to continue unmolested: 
They [the Ismā’īlis] parade their 
riches and they wait in expectation of 
this, that, if your power should 
sustain any decline or reverse, the 
sect will rise in the midst of those 
mountains and in those fortresses 
and overthrow the remainder of the 
people of Islam and not leave the 
trace of a Musalman’145 
  
There is a slight possibility that Jūzjānī was right in portraying the 
attack on the Caliphate, as distinct from the caliphal domains, if not as 
an after thought, then at least a secondary objective. The account of the 
Cilician Armenian historian and statesman, Het’um, nephew of King 
Het’um I (1226-1268 or 9) could be taken in support of this. Het’um 
records in his 1307 History of the Tartars that his uncle the king - who 
was one of his important first-hand sources - had requested seven 
favours from Möngke during his visit to Qaraqorum in 1254-1255. Two 
of these, the fourth and fifth, were that the Holy Land be wrested from 
the ‘Turks’ and given to the Christians and that the Mongols should 
                                       
144 Juvaynī also comments on the hostility between the Qazvini’s and Alamut. 
Juvaynī/Boyle, p. 700 
145 Juzjānī, pp. 1187-1196 
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encompass the destruction of Baghdad and the Caliph be done away 
with.146  
Möngke apparently politely responded that were it possible, he would 
like to revere the Holy Land in person but being occupied with other 
matters he would send his brother Hülegü to take it and return the 
Holy Land to the Christians. Moreover, ‘as for doing away with the 
Caliph of Baghdad, we entrust that task to Baiju, commander of the 
Tartars and to his people residing in the realm of the Turks and 
thereabouts’. This account is repeated by the wealthy, well educated, 
well travelled and informed Venetian Marino Sanudo Torsello, in his 
Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis, composed sometime between 1307 
and 1321. Fifty years earlier, however, in 1255, another Armenian 
historian, Kirakos Gandzaketsi, interviewed King Het’um personally and 
there is no mention of these seven favours, only that Möngke gave him a 
noteworthy edict that no-one dare harass him or his country as well as 
a document proclaiming freedom for the Church everywhere. 147 
A major problem with the Het’um scenario is that he returned to 
Armenia after spending fifty or so days at the Imperial Court, arriving 
back in 1255. Crucially this means that he was in Mongolia after 
Hülegü had left for the west. In fact Het’um met him en route near Talas 
on his return journey.148 Under these circumstances it would appear 
that Möngke could not have given direct orders to his brother to take 
Jerusalem and Baghdad on behalf of the Armenians.  
Hülegü’s actions after he had taken Baghdad and before he received a 
response from Möngke are instructive.  According to Het’um the 
                                       
146 Het’um the Armenian, History of the Tartars – The Flower of Histories of the East, 
tr. Robert Bedrosian, 
https://archive.org/stream/HetumTheHistoriansFlowerOfHistoriesOfTheEast/Hetum-
djvu.txt. Book 3 section, 32,  
147 Kirakos Ganjakets’i’s ‘History of the Armenians’, in Bretschneider, Mediaeval 
Researches, volume I, p. 168 
148 Kirakos Ganjakets’i’/Bretschneider,  I, p. 169 
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Armenian historian, Hülegü took time off to relax for a year149 in the 
city of Edessa before summoning King Het’um to join him with his 
troops ‘as he planned to go to the Holy Land to deliver it to the 
Christians.’150 The king suggested that the initial target should be the 
Sultan of Aleppo who held sway over the entire country of Syria, in 
which Jerusalem was located. The reasoning behind this strategy was 
sound, if one he lived to regret. This was that if Aleppo was taken then 
Hülegü ‘would be lord of the entire country of Syria’ which was 
undoubtedly a tempting proposal.151  Aleppo was not taken until 1260 
followed by Damascus and thereafter, according to Het’um, Hülegü 
prepared to advance on Jerusalem.  
But just then, bad tidings from a reliable 
source reached him regarding the death of 
his brother and the fact that the throne of 
the Tartar Khanate was vacant. As soon as 
he heard this [Hulegu] fell into deep sorrow 
and advanced no further.152 
 
What can be inferred from Hülegü’s activities after the Fall of Baghdad 
is that he continued to apply himself to ‘the conquest of the Western 
parts’ as per his orders from the Qa’an.  The news of Möngke’s demise 
and the instalment of his brothers Qubilai and Arïq Böke as rival 
Qa’ans, however, dramatically altered the familial landscape. In the 
meantime, the perplexing issue of quite how Möngke intended to 
proceed after the destruction of the Ismā’īlis and the extermination of 
the Caliphate is a subject which has been hotly debated by scholars.153 
Then again, whilst Möngke’s  intentions could well be deemed irrelevant 
as the Eastern Toluids fought for possession of the throne this may not 
                                       
149 On the other hand, Hülegü may have been ill after Baghdad, because it seems he 
spent some time on the plain outside Hamadan recuperating.   
150 Het’um/Bedrosian, Book 3, section 28. 
151 Het’um/Bedrosian, Book 3, section 28 
152 Het’um/Bedrosian, Book 3, section 29 
153 See especially, G. Lane, ‘Whose secret Intent?’ in Rossabi, Morris (ed), Eurasian 
Influences on Yuan China: Cross-Cultural Transmissions in the 13th and 14th Centuries. 
Singapore: University of Singapore Press, pp. 1-40 
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in fact be the case since they underpin Hülegü’s appropriation of power 
in Western Eurasia.  
 
Toluid Appropriation of Power in Western Eurasia 
Before Möngke’s death on campaign in China the good news of the Fall 
of Baghdad had been transmitted to him by Hülegü’s emissaries/īlchīs 
travelling at speed, whilst his share of the loot trundled more slowly 
across Eurasia. As far as the aftermath is concerned, there are a 
number of conflicting rationalizations on the transformation of Hülegü 
as an Imperial commander-in-chief to a ruler in his own right. One of 
the most plausible, but unverifiable, is that of Grigor of Akner, in his 
History of the Nation of Archers. This was completed in 1273 and whilst 
there is some confusion in his history154 his account does make sense 
for two reasons. Firstly, the Chinggisid adherence to consultation and 
secondly, Hülegü was known to have sent īlchīs/ambassadors to his 
brother Möngke with an oral message155 relaying the news.   
 
Under Hülegü as supreme commander were representatives of other 
branches of the Imperial Family and according to Grigor, the Jochid 
princes in particular were out of control and causing mayhem.156 As 
Chinggisid commanders including Imperial princes had a duty to 
consult on major issues it seems highly plausible that Hülegü’s envoy to 
his brother as well as relaying the news on Baghdad also asked: 
  
‘what else do you order us to do? 
For if we remain in this way 
without yasa and headless, the 
land will be ruined and Chinggis-
Khan’s commands will not be 
                                       
154 For example, he makes the Jochid prince Berke the brother of Güyük Khan. 
Grigor/Bedrosian, Ch. 12 section 13  
155 The report gives the impression that the message was wholly verbal which would be 
in keeping with Mongol preferences 
156 Grigor/Bedrosian. Ch. 12 section 13 
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realised. For he ordered us to 
subdue and hold the land through 
affection, not to ruin it. But now 
the command is with you. We will 
do whatever you order us to.” 157 
 
Hülegü’s future and indeed his legitimacy effectively rested on the 
outcome of this alleged request:  
 
As Baghdad fell in Safar 656/early 1258 a swift emissary could, with a 
fair wind, have made it to Möngke before the latter’s death in the late 
summer of 657 /1259. Whatever the veracity of Grigor’s account, 
Möngke is known to have sent in his turn an envoy, Cheng Te, to 
Hülegü in 1259, undoubtedly in response to the glad tidings of his 
brother’s military achievements in Western Eurasia.  The mission of 
Ch’ang Te158was exceptionally fast - between eleven and fourteen 
months for the round trip - and as he must have departed before 
August, the probable month of Möngke’s death on campaign in China, 
he may well have reached Hülegü in early 1260. This speed ties in with 
a remark of John of Monte Corvino that a letter from Dadu to the west 
took six months.159 He was certainly back in the east in 1263 when his 
account was written up by one Liu Yu as a Record of an Embassy to the 
Regions in the West.160 
 
In view of the Chinggisid custom of consultation, Grigor’s account has 
its attractions, perhaps more so than those, for example, of Juvaynī161 
                                       
157 Grigor/Bedrosian Ch. 12 section 13 
158 ‘Si Shi Ki, Record of an Embassy to the Regions in the West’, E. Bretschneider, 
Medieval Researches, I, Ch. IV, pp. 109-156. Chang Te-hui was tutor to Qubilai’s 
eldest son and the future ambassador and icon of cultural exchange, Bolad/Pūlād 
chīngsang 
159 First Letter of John of Monte Corvino, in Cathay and the Way Thither, ed. H. Yule, 
pp. 200-201 
160 ‘Si Shi Ki, Record of an Embassy to the Regions in the West’, E. Bretschneider, 
Medieval Researches, I, Ch. IV, pp. 109-156.  
161 Juvaynī/Boyle, II p.607 
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or Rashīd al-Dīn162 and on dates alone Grigor’s account could be 
credible. Moreover, Möngke’s purported response seems completely in 
character in view of his record of not condoning defiance, 
insubordination or unruliness. This was to despatch his 
judges/yarguchis with the full weight of his authority to  
 
“Go and put my brother Hülegü [in the 
position of] khan of that country. Impose 
the yasa on whomsoever does not submit 
to him”.163  
 
The judges accordingly traversed Eurasia although the timescale is 
imprecise and on arrival held a great quriltai at which Hülegü was 
enthroned.  Of those summoned to attend by the judges’ emissaries 
were Hülegü’s followers, plus the king of the Georgians, the Mongol 
commander Baiju and the out-of-control Jochid princes. Here Grigor 
parts company with his fellow Armenian Kirakos Ganjakets’i as well as 
Rashīd al-Dīn. According to the former, three of the Jochid princes did 
not want Hülegü to be khan, refused to submit and were strangled and 
the fourth, a child was incarcerated. Moreover, the judges, whose 
authority appears to be without limit, ordered the Georgian, Armenian 
and Hülegü’s troops to destroy the troops of the dissident princes.164  
 
 
Hülegüid Governance: Complicating Factors 
 
If there is any truth in Grigor’s account, then Hülegü’s authority in 
western Eurasia as supreme commander was not sufficient to discipline 
his relatives. Hence the perhaps spurious but not impossible reaction of 
an exasperated Möngke was to give his younger brother more ‘clout’. 
However, Möngke’s premature death in 1259 followed by the Toluid 
                                       
162 Rashīd al-Dīn for example explains that Mongke always expected Hülegü to remain 
in the west and his instruction to return to the homeland was a diplomatic cover. 
Rashīd/Karīmī, vol. II, p. 687 
163 Grigor/Bedrosian http://rbedrosian.com/ga2.htm#10 ch. 12 section 13 
164 Kirakos Ganjakets’i’/Bedrosian ch. 65 p. 11 of 12 
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succession crisis effectively abandoned Hülegü to his fate in western 
Eurasia to carry out as best he could his orders to continue with the 
‘conquest of the Western parts’. This he had to do without the authority 
of his brother in Qaraqorum nor, after the death of Batu and the 
disgust of his successor Berke at Hülegü’s actions in Baghdad, without 
the support of the Jochids. 
 
His brother’s demise and ensuing squabble for the succession could in 
fact have proved advantageous to Hülegü. There is evidence in the 
sources that not only officials but also Chinggisid princes and 
princesses took advantage of interregnums to act more independently 
than would be allowed under an elected Qa’an.165 This is in 
contradistinction to the Chinggisid custom of consultation which was 
enforced during the reign of Ögödei Qa’an (r. 1229-1241), an archetypal 
‘charismatic khan’, as well as in his nephew and eventual successor 
Möngke’s (r. 1251-1259) though both had to make efforts to stamp out 
unauthorised activities that occurred during the period before their 
accessions. On this score Hülegü could have regarded himself lucky to 
be able to act on his own initiative free of the problems of the 
exceptionally long lines of communication between himself and 
Qaraqorum.  
 
Hülegü and his successors, however, had a major complicating factor 
which was to test their efforts to remain firmly in the saddle.  This was 
not made any easier by the success of Qubilai in gaining the throne and 
his ill-judged removal of the political centre of gravity even further away 
to Dadu in far-off China – giving rise to a strategic overreach which was 
unique amongst conquest dynasties of the era. Chief amongst the 
possible challenges to Hülegüid governance that are identified here and 
which would have been complicated by the extended lines 
communications between the ‘periphery’ and the purported ‘centre’ was 
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the flawed basis of their right to being in the saddle in the first place, at 
least so far as some members of the Imperial Family were concerned.  
 
Legitimacy 
Both the Yuan and the Hülegüids’ control of their polities was bedevilled 
by a tainted legitimacy which was compounded in the case of the 
Hülegüids by the perception of the neighbouring Jochids that Hülegü 
had muscled in on their area of influence. That the Jochids could have 
a genuine grievance against Hülegü is indicated by the generally well-
informed Jūzjānī, who specifically remarks that after Möngke’s death 
‘all the cities of the east and west and in the countries of ‘Ajam, 
Mawara-un-Nahr and Khurāsān, the Khutbah is read for Barka 
Khan’.166  Equally, Juvaynī tells of close links between Chinggisid 
officials in Central Eurasia and Batu’s Court.167 
The fundamental issue revolved around the apportionment of the 
conquered areas and peoples by Chinggis Khan. Tolui’s older brothers, 
Jochi, Ögödei and Chaghadai, received specified territories,168 some as 
yet unconquered, as their personal ulus or pasturage for their herds, 
whilst Tolui as the Otchigin or Hearth Prince received Chinggis Khan’s 
original yurt which included the ordos, property, treasury, horsemen, 
emirs and private army of his father.169 Crucially, however, the 
Conqueror’s apportionment did not include Northern China or Iran, 
then coming under Chinggisid control. These two regions were expected 
to be administered by Chinggis Khan’s successors for the benefit of all 
the Chinggisid branches, each of which enjoyed control of subjected 
households and income located in Iran and China.  
                                       
166Jūzjānī, p. 1291 
167 For example see Juvaynī/Boyle, vol. II, p. 487 and 488. 
168 For Jochi, see Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 117; for Chaghadai, p. 145 and Ögödei, 
Juvaynī/Boyle, p. 43 
169Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 163 
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However, with the ascendancy of the Toluid grandsons of Chinggis 
Khan, this relatively tidy arrangement began to unravel. The contested 
elevation in 1251 of the eldest of Tolui’s sons, Möngke, to the supreme 
Qa’anate – albeit with the support of the Jochid Khan, Batu - initiated 
an extended period of intra-Chinggisid conflict with the rejected 
Ögödeids in alliance with the Chaghadaids.  
What is important for present purposes, however, is that Hülegü did not 
receive Azerbaijan and his wider Western Eurasian interests in a 
dispensation from Chinggis Khan. For this reason, the events 
surrounding the foundation of Hülegü’s newly minted ulus have led to 
much scholarly deliberation on whether Möngke had a ‘secret intent’ in 
sending his brother as commander-in-chief to deal with issues of 
Chinggisid control in Western Eurasia170rather than the grand strategy 
outlined above. If Hülegü’s purpose, either on his own initiative or at 
the instigation of Möngke, was to create a new ulus in Western Eurasia 
to counterbalance the Chaghadaids and Jochids, it could be seen as a 
deeply provocative action because it was not within the terms of the 
Founder’s original dispensation.  
In Chinggisid terms it would be considered ‘unlawful’.171 To make 
matters worse for Hülegü, assuming his new ulus was established either 
at Möngke’s instigation or with his blessing, and thereafter supported 
by Qubilai, such support could have been considered doubly 
provocative since Möngke and Qubilai were regarded as usurpers by 
some elements of the Imperial Family and especially by surviving 
Ögödeid dissidents. The view taken here is that it was Möngke, rather 
than Qubilai, who directed Hülegü to combine his military status of 
                                       
170 See also particular Allsen, Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia, pp. 18-23, 
Lane, Early Mongol Rule, ch. 2;  ; P. Jackson “The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire,”  
171 Allsen in Culture and Conquest also takes the view that using the dignity of Il-qan, 
hence not giving them equal status with their cousins who had received their 
dispensations directly from Chinggis Khan, was a contrivance to avoid the charge that 
they had violated the will of the founding father, p. 22. Lane, however, argues that the 
Jochids did not exploit this lack of legitimacy or apparent usurpation of Jochid rights. 
Early Mongol Rule, p. 15 
73 
 
commander-in-chief with that of khan since the former role did not give 
him the status to control his unmanageable relatives.  It may possibly 
be significant in this context that in his letter to King Louis in 1262 
Hülegü was referred to as ‘dux milicie Mungalorum’ or commander of the 
Mongolian military forces172 which aptly describes his role on arrival in 
the West but also as ‘khan’ which perhaps, albeit tentatively, lends 
credence to Grigor’s account. 
The major rift with the Jochids occurred, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, in 
660/1262 but only after the supposed poisoning of the above Jochid 
princes in Hülegüid-held territory in revenge for Jochid support of Arïq 
Böke.173 Kirakos confirms the deaths of the Jochid princes, but by the 
sword, giving a number of reasons: that it was partly prompted by the 
Jochid Khan Berke’s support for Arïq Böke against Qubilai, partly at the 
instigation of the Chaghaidaid Khan, Alghu (r. 1260-1265) and quite 
plausibly, because the Jochid princes appear not to have accepted 
Hülegü’s authority.174  
Despite the uncertainties surrounding these important events, there 
was a significant issue for the Hülegüid extended lines of 
communication. Het’um, in his History of the Tartars, mentions three 
routes leading to and from Hülegüid territories into the ‘realm of 
Greater Asia’. ‘One goes from Turkestan requiring passage of many days 
through the desert and no fodder for the horses is to be found there at 
all. From the context this was under the control of the Chaghadaids. 
The second route was via [Derbend on the western Caspian]... and the 
Iron Gate...’ which he says is negotiable only in wintertime and was the 
Jochid route. The third route passed through the Black Sea which no 
                                       
172 Paul Meyvaert “An Unknown Letter of Hulagu, Ilkhan of Persia to King Louis of 
France”, Viator 11 (1980), 253; Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 21 
173 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 123 
174 Kirakos Ganjakets’i’/Bedrosian ch. 65 
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invader contemplating attacking Hülegüid dominated territories had 
attempted.175  
Firstly and critically for the network, when hostilities broke out between 
the Hülegüids and Jochids the fastest route to East Eurasia from 
Azerbaijan via the Iron Gate, Northern Caspian/Jochid domains was 
endangered as reported by John of Monte Corvino from Dadu.176 
Secondly, the route via Turkestan was dependent on the goodwill of the 
Chaghadaids and the third route, which was used by the senior Polos 
on their first, unplanned trip to East Asia, also went via Jochid held 
territory. In effect, the Hülegüids were isolated except for the dangerous 
sea route. 
That the Yuan continued to consider the Hülegüids in military terms as 
their supreme commanders in western Eurasia until the final years of 
their tenure in Azerbaijan and beyond is spelled out in the Yuan Shih, 
in the context of Hülegü’s holdings in the Yuan. Here the current ruler, 
Öljeitü (703-716/1304-1316) is referred to as guarding ‘a far distant 
corner’177 – by inference on behalf of the Yuan emperor. Thus it would 
be a mistake to equate a Chinggisid Khan with the ‘Just Prince’ of the 
Muslim genre of ‘Mirrors of Princes’.178  Such ‘guard duties’ in their 
corner of the fractious and fractured imperium also included the duty of 
consultation with the supreme commander, the Qa’an. 
 
 
 
 
                                       
175Het’um/Bedrosian, section 47 
176 First Letter of John of Monte Corvino, in Cathay and the Way Thither, ed. H. Yule, 
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177YS, ch. 85, pp. 2141-42,  Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 49 
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The Duty of Consultation 
What should be noted in this connection is a statement by Het ‘um the 
Historian in his The Flower of Histories of the East - though it should be 
borne in mind that this was composed in 1307 CE: 
Temur Khan ‘resides in the great city of Cathay called 
Eons [Beijing], built by his father....... There are three 
kings, rulers of large lordships, who obey this emperor, 
everything being referred to him and resolved by him. 
[They are: Chapar [Khan of Chagatai, 1300-8], Totay 
[Toqta Khan, ruler of Qipchaq 1291-1312], and 
Tarbanda [Muhammed Uljeitü Gharbanda or Khar-
Banda/Khuda-Banda, Ilkhan of Persia 1304-16]179  
That consultation with the ‘centre’, that is the Qa’an, was considered 
mandatory is shown by Möngke’s actions immediately after his 
accession 649/1251 when he commanded that in future his relatives 
were not to write or issue instructions in any matter relating to the 
administration of the provinces without consulting the ministers of the 
Court.180 What is particularly pertinent for this study, however, is that 
matters of import were to be referred - and indeed according to Het ‘um 
should continue to be referred - to the Court of the Qa’an in far-off 
Dadu.  
As can be judged from these edicts, communication between 
Tabriz/Sultaniyya and Qaraqorum/Dadu should not be conceived in 
terms of the occasional missive containing family news, but was a 
pivotal requirement within the Chinggisid ruling order, hence the 
crucial importance of ‘communication’ and the security of the roads. 
Juvaynī, in fact, in his rendition of Batu’s speech to his relatives at the 
quriltai of 1251 encouraging them to support Möngke’s election as Qa’an 
specifically refers to him as one whose  ‘sound judgement and 
                                       
179 Emphasis added. Het ‘um the Historians History of the Tatars, The Flower of 
Histories of the East, ch. 47 trans. Robert Bedrosian. 
180 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 219 
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penetrating counsel might control the lands and guard the roads’ 
(emphasis added).181 
Unfortunately, it is not easy to ascertain how much weight Möngke’s 
surviving relatives gave to this edict. What it does illustrate, however, is 
that Möngke was prepared to stamp on the bid amongst some princes 
for independence of action and re-establish the tradition of consultation 
with the centre. This in turn required an efficient communication 
system even if it did not permit for efficient administration. Thus whilst 
the idea of consultation is all very well182 there are practical aspects too, 
including that of the sheer physical feasibility of the process, both in 
terms of the difficulties of transmission and in terms of the time factor 
involved, both of which were considerable so far as the Hülegüids were 
concerned.   
This latter consideration, even without the complicating factor of intra-
Chinggisid hostilities impeding communications, would arguably 
provide an impetus towards ‘autonomy’ though this is another concept 
that needs to be treated with care. In this context, however, it refers to a 
polity that is free to make its own rules and regulations, but within the 
confines of a larger government structure183 - in the Chinggisid instance 
this would be an acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the Qa’an - 
whilst formal independence would imply sovereign power over all 
aspects of the state. 
Further Critical Vulnerabilities 
There were, however, other aggravating factors which complicated 
Hülegüid governance and were directly related to communication 
‘overreach’. Firstly, the transfer of their income from their interests in 
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China was, as will be seen, caught up in the ‘closure of the roads’. 
Secondly, there may have been problems in ‘reinforcements’ and this 
will be briefly examined in the ‘Resupply Function’ of the strategic 
communication network in Part III, Chapter IX. 
  
Lastly, it should also be recognised that there were factors which were 
not a result of the distance of the Hülegüid rulers from Dadu but were 
rather a product of their journey within the short space of forty years 
from the Otrar incident in 1218 to the conquest of Baghdad in 1258. 
Thus from their early rough-edged, impoverished, illiterate, 
superstitious, status-conscious and marginal existence on the steppe 
the conquerors had to overcome more ‘developmental’ challenges than 
their conquest predecessors. As will be examined below in the context of 
their communications, many of these issues were faced head-on.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
PART II 
INCEPTION OF CHINGGISID STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS:  
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
The Mongol Worldview in the Late Twelfth Century 
 
 
 
In this chapter it will be argued that the Mongol conquests of the 
thirteenth century were also a history of expanding horizons, in 
geographical as well as in intellectual terms. Compared to other 
conquerors between the first millennium CE to the time of the Amir 
Tīmūr, the Mongols’ unique characteristics, tucked away in their remote 
backwater of Eurasia, were both their marginality and their limited 
geographical and geopolitical horizons. Whilst their intellectual 
adjustment to their role on a wider stage than Mongolia is one of the 
most fascinating aspects of the Mongol phenomenon, it is beyond the 
remit here. What is relevant, however, is an examination, as far as is 
possible, of the geopolitical element of Chinggis Khan’s Weltanschauung 
before he embarked on his conquests of much of Eurasia. 
 
The Mongols in the Late Twelfth Century 
 
Four hundred years before the birth of Temujin, Al Jāhiz’s (169-225/776-
868) description of the Türks of his time succinctly summed up the 
characteristics not only of the Türks, but also the twelfth century Mongols:  
Uninterested in craftsmanship or commerce, 
medicine, geometry, fruit-farming, building, 
digging canals or collecting taxes, they care only 
about raiding, hunting, horsemanship, 
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skirmishing with rival chieftains, taking booty and 
invading other countries.184   
 
Almost four hundred years later Zhao Gong, the Sung envoy to Chinggis 
Khan in 1221, noted that there were three branches of ‘Tatars’, the 
White, the Black and the Raw. In Zhao Gong’s considered view the 
‘Tatars’ of his time were ‘very simple and barbarous’ 185 though the 
White Tatars were of a more delicate appearance and were respectful, 
cautious and filial.186 These were not the branch to which Chinggis 
Khan belonged, indeed Zhao specifically refers to Chinggis and his 
generals and great ministers as being Black Tatars.187  
 
Whilst all Mongols were considered barbarous by Zhao, some were 
clearly more so than the rest. Thus the ‘Raw Tatars’, who from his 
description were still clearly Mongol horsemen and thus were of some 
standing he considered:  
 
‘very poor, crude and incompetent’ whose 
only talent was mounting their horses  
and following along with the rest..... 188 
 
 
This to some extent may have reflected the traditional Chinese 
disdainful categorisation of their non-Han neighbours, particularly 
those on their north-eastern borders, into either ‘cooked’ or ‘uncooked’ 
barbarians.189 The ‘cooked’ barbarians were those living close to China 
and were influenced by Chinese civilisation, such as the White Tatars, 
or Onggut irgen190. The ‘uncooked’ or ‘raw’ Tartars included those living 
                                       
184 Al Jāhiz: The Life and Works of Jāhiz -  trans. of selected texts by Charles Pellat, 
trans. from the French by D M Hawke, p.97 
185 Zhao Gong's "A Complete Record of the Mong Tatars." (Unpublished translation by 
Christopher P. Atwood with assistance from Lynne Struve, 2010) 
https://www.eastwestcentre.org/sites/all/NEHMongol2014/1.Zhao.pdf. p. 3 
186 See following paragraph on their identification 
187 Zhao Gong, p. 2 
188 Zhao Gong. p. 2 
189 Morgan, The Mongols, 1986 p. 35  
190 Morgan, The Mongols, 1986 p. 35 
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on the margins of the steppe and forest further from the benefits of 
Chinese civilisation191 whilst the Black Tartars, though also ‘simple and 
barbarous’ were not quite as crude and incompetent as their ‘uncooked’ 
or ‘Raw’ compatriots. 
Moreover, even their steppe neighbours considered the Mongols 
uncouth.192 Whilst there is the possibility that elements of such views 
could be ‘literary tropes’193 illustrating the rise of a great leader from 
exceptionally humble beginnings, such reports of the early Mongols by 
those acquainted with them in their pre-and-early imperial days 
unanimously concur that the pre-imperial Mongols were exceptionally 
rough even by the standards of the steppe. Not just ‘uncooked’ and 
uncouth194as well as illiterate but regarded with contempt and scorn, 
tributary to everyone, with the apparent height of their opulence being 
iron stirrups for their greatest amirs.  
 
Moreover, Zhao also implies that the Mongols had fallen on very hard 
times since ‘In olden times there was the Monggus kingdom.... [which] 
once harassed the [Jurchen] causing distress’ but it appears the 
Mongols were bought off in the time-honoured fashion by presents of 
gold and silk.195 By the time of Zhao, however: 
 
The Tatars today are very primitive and 
barbarous and have almost no institutions. 
I (Gong) once looked into that statement 
and learned that even the remnants of the 
                                       
191 Owen Lattimore remarks on the importance of the margins, either between steppe 
and sown or between steppe and forest, and comments that the Khitan Liao, the 
Jurchen Chin and the Manchus were all masters of the marginal terrain before taking 
over northern China. Lattimore, ‘The Geographical Factor in Mongol History’. 1938, 
p.13. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1787812 
192 Juvaynī,/Boyle, p.21; Jūzjānī p. 936; Het'um/Bedrosian, ch.16.  
193 In his ‘Epic Themes in the Secret History of the Mongols’, Larry Moses does not list 
a theme based on an impoverished outcast hero amongst his criteria for identifying 
‘epic’ themes. Folklore, vol. 99, No. 2 (1988), pp. 170-173 
194 When the Roman Empire was threatened by the Turkic Huns, they too were 
described as being ugly and with ragged clothes which were worn until they 
disintegrated because of their habit of never washing. 
195 Zhao Gong, p. 3 
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Mong were ravaged and eliminated long 
ago.”196 
 
Such poverty and marginality, however, are curious since sixty years 
before the 1206 quriltai confirming the election of Temujin as Khan, the 
Ta-Chin Kuo-chih bears out Zhao’s reference to a high point in Mongol 
history:   
 
‘It is said that in the year 1147, after much 
fighting at the northern border of the Chin, the 
state of the Mongols (Meng-ku kuo) was pacified 
and  “its chieftain Ao-lo po-chi-lieh was invested 
as assisting state ruler of the Meng. Only after 
that peaceful relations were established. (The 
Chin) gave annually very generous presents. 
Thereupon Ao-lo po-chi-lieh called himself 
Ancestral and Originating Emperor (or Tsu-yuan 
huang-ti) and proclaimed the era T’ien-hsing 
197(Heavenly Rise). The Great Chin had used 
military force but eventually could not subdue 
them and only sent elite troops which occupied 
several strategic points and then returned.” 198 
 
This ‘Ancestral and Originating Emperor’ was Temujin’s Great-Uncle 
Qutula Khan.199  The lineage of Chinggis Khan was thus aristocratic 
and of the Kiyat/Qiyat branch of the Borjigid Mongols.200 Aristocratic 
roots do not necessarily a world conqueror make and after Temujin’s 
father, Yesügei Ba’atur, was murdered by the Tartars, the youngster 
and his family were abandoned by their distant cousins, the Tayici’ut, 
whose Borgijid branch had produced a khan slightly earlier than Qutula 
Khan. At this desperate moment the very survival of the family seemed 
improbable.   
 
                                       
196 Zhao Gong, p. 3 
197 Franke’s, ‘From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God’ comments that this 
reign name, apart from one instance, belongs to illegitimate or barbarian usurpers.  
198 Franke, ‘From Tribal Chieftain to Universal Emperor and God’ p.10 
199 According to the family tree in de Rachewiltz, The Secret History of the Mongols 
between pages 1348 and 1349. 
200 Juvaynī/Boyle, p. 35 
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There seems no reason, therefore, to quibble with the view of a modern-
day Mongolian historian who has been moved to observe of the period 
immediately before the rise of Chinggis Khan that ‘the Mongols had no 
obvious influence in Central Asia before the twelfth century’. In his 
view, ‘their name before the period of Chinggis Khaan had an extremely 
limited area of use and was only applied to the members of a small tribe 
that lived southeast of Lake Baikal as far as the Khentii Mountains.’201   
This ‘Rise of the Mongols’ from obscurity to ‘World Conquerors’ has 
been exhaustively examined, not least by contemporaries such as 
Juvaynī, Jūzjānī and Ibn al-Athīr, who indeed had a vested interest in 
the predicament in which much of Eurasia was mired. Their despair 
was further fuelled by the fact that whilst the lately departed Seljūqs 
and Khwārazmshahs had at least been Muslim, the Mongols palpably 
were not. Over and above this absorbing ‘rags to riches’ saga, however, 
is the intriguing question of whether it is possible to determine the 
‘worldview’ of the pre-conquest Mongols and Temujin. 
 
 
The Geo-Political Horizons 
of the late Twelfth Century Mongols 
 
It is a vast leap from the apparently narrow horizons of north-western 
Mongolia as articulated in the Secret History to the title which ‘Ata-
Malik Juvaynī gave his work - Juvaynī’s History of the World Conqueror, 
a world conquest which at the time of his writing in 650-651/1252-
1253 in Qaraqorum was proceeding apace.  As Ibn al-Athīr famously 
remarked, 
A people emerged from the confines of China  
and made for the cities of Transoxania...202 
 
 
                                       
201 Bat-Ochir Bold, 2001, Mongolian Nomadic Society: A reconstruction of the ‘Medieval’ 
History of Mongolia. p.82 
202 Ibn al-Athīr/Richards, Pt.3 p. 202 
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Broadening Geo-Political Horizons: The Kereit Connection 
The impression gained from the Secret History is that there is little 
evidence that the young Temujin’s geo-political horizons extended 
beyond his immediate environs. The traditional focus of the steppe was 
China and Temujin was evidently fully conscious of the Jurchen/Chin 
(1115-1234 CE) in North China. Indeed, according to Zhao Gong, 
Temujin had been captured by the Jurchen/Chin when he was small 
and kept in slavery for ten years until he managed to escape, ‘thus he 
has a thorough knowledge of Jin affairs’.203 Though this captivity is not 
recorded in the Secret History, Zhao’s statement does imply that 
Chinggis Khan was not an ignoramus when it came to northern China.  
Indeed with his proclivity for vengeance204 this was yet another 
potential reason for his subsequent attacks on them over and above the 
unpleasant death as a prisoner of the Jurchen/Chin of Chinggis Khan’s 
Great-Grandfather Qabul Khan’s cousin and successor, the Kiyat 
Borjigin Tayiĉi’ut, Ambaqai Khan. As the captive was on his way to 
being delivered to the Chin Emperor, the Altan Qa’an, the Secret History 
memorably invokes Ambaqai’s message to his relatives demanding they 
avenge his death: 
   Until the nails of your five fingers 
   Are ground down 
   Until your ten fingers are worn away 
   Strive to revenge me! 205 
 
Whilst it might have been the sacred duty of the Mongols to avenge 
their Khan, and Chinggis does appear to have taken vengeance rather  
seriously, there is a serious flaw in this particular vengeance scenario. 
                                       
203 This long captivity was not mentioned in the Secret History and is complicated by 
the fact that Zhao says it occurred when Temujin was ‘small’. As his father took him to 
be betrothed at the age of nine it must have occurred after his father’s murder but 
would mean that if captured just before puberty almost his entire teenage years were 
spent as a slave of the Jurchen/Chin which does not fit in with the account of his 
early years in the SH.  Zhao Gong, p. 2.  
204 See SH, esp. paras 58, 113, 154 
205 SH para 53 
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It was the Tayiĉi’ut who had abandoned Temujin’s family after the death 
of his father, and who indeed had subsequently determined to eliminate 
the youngster as he was growing up because, as his subsequent savour 
told him, he was clever and his Tayiĉi’ut kinsmen were jealous of him 
because  
 
   There is fire in your eyes 
   There is light in your face206 
 
Arthur Waley has identified another and perhaps more plausible motive 
for attacking the Jurchen/Chin. He postulates, based on the Meng-ta 
Pei-lu, that it was Chinqai, an early adviser to the Conqueror, a 
Christian and possibly an Uighur, who encouraged Chinggis in his 
Jurchen/Chin campaigns.  
 
‘a certain native of Türkestan with the 
surname Tien [who] had acquired 
enormous wealth by commerce. This man 
had travelled about a great deal in 
Shantung and northern China. He 
described to the Mongols the richness of 
these lands and as his account coincided 
with that of some levies who had revolted 
against the rulers of northern Chin and 
joined the Mongols, it was decided to 
make an attack on the border provinces 
of northern China’.207  
 
What is evident is that Temujin, even if not from personal experience as 
a slave, had access to data on northern China. What is not quite so 
evident, however, is whether, as an aspiring leader, he had a similar 
grasp of the geo-political situation in Western Eurasia or indeed 
                                       
206 SH para 82. Jackson & Morgan postulate that Rubruck’s mention of the Tangut 
capturing Chinggis Khan in battle in one of his five campaigns against them between 
1205 and 1227 may be a confusion with his capture by the Tayiĉi’ut. Rubruck, p.158, 
note 1 
207 Chinkai was at Baljuna and subsequently c. 1222 was deputed to escort the Taoist 
Ch’ang Ch’un on what for an elderly sage was an epic trans-Eurasian trip from China 
to north Afghanistan. Li Chih-Ch’ang,  trans & ed. Arthur Waley, Travels of an Alchemist, p. 37. 
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whether he had any inkling of the existence of the caliphate or that 
there was an Islamic world far to his west. 
Temujin’s Mentor: the Influence of the Ong Khan 
In his early manhood Temujin’s worldview seems to have been largely 
constructed through the prism of his patron, who had been his late 
father’s blood brother, or anda, the Kereit Khan To’oril (Türkish: 
Toghril). In the Secret History To’oril, or the Ong Khan to give him the 
Jurchen/Chin title by which he is generally known, is portrayed as a 
rather unsavoury character given to murdering his own brothers but he 
was also one of the most important figures of the eastern steppe. Once 
he had brutally established himself with the help of Temujin’s father, 
Yesügei Ba’atur, the young Temujin was placed with other youngsters 
as a ‘hostage’ to be brought up at the peripatetic court of the Ong Khan. 
Thus To’oril must have been the most important exemplar for Temujin 
in his wealth,208 domestic, military and administrative arrangements 
though as subsequent history was to show, not an ideal model.  
As Togan has pointed out, Qutula Khan, then Khan of the Mongols, did 
not approve of his kinsman Yesügei’s support of the Ong Khan, 
preferring instead the unstained character of To’oril’s uncle, the 
Gūrkhan, but Yesügei persisted. There is a strong inference that both 
his and To’oril’s accumulation of power was against the established 
order rather than with the support of the elder statesmen of the 
lineages.209 For present purposes, however, To’oril was also important 
to the development of Temujin since the Ong Khan was well travelled, 
even if not always by his own choosing.  
                                       
208 Compared to the Mongols. According to the SH the Ong Khan is known to have had 
a gold painted ger as well as golden kumiss bowls, Onon, SH, p. 83 but such 
descriptions should be treated with care, since ‘golden’ could also mean regal or as 
with Chinggis Khan’s reference to his ‘Golden Reins’ with the meaning of imperial. 
209 Togan, Flexibility and Limitation in Steppe Formations: The Kerait Khanate and 
Chinggis Khan, p. 72, argues that both the Ong Khan and Yesügei made their careers 
by defending the unusual and not the traditional.  
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The Kereit irgen or people consisted of diverse Türk, Mongol and 
possibly Tangut yasun or lineages.  They were located to the south-west 
of the Mongols on the Orkhon, Kerulen and Onon rivers, and controlled 
much of Central-Eastern Mongolia stretching southwards towards the 
Gobi Desert. Rashīd al-Dīn regarded them as being of the “tribes of the 
Türks” as well as having cultural ties with the Nestorian communities 
among the Uighur, Qarluq Türks and the Qarakhitai Empire.210 As 
Isenbike Togan remarks, the Kereits ‘were not at all an isolated tribe 
roaming aimlessly on the Mongolia steppes. On the contrary they had 
connections with most of the neighbouring people in Inner and East 
Asia’.211 The Ong Khan’s brother Jaqa Gambu had been brought up 
amongst the Hsi Hsia/Tanguts.212  
Such connections were not always from choice as the Ong Khan’s early 
career graphically shows - as well as illustrating both the hazards of life 
on the steppe and providing an insight into how horizons could be 
broadened through adversity. At the age of seven To’oril was kidnapped 
by the Merkit peoples, (who were also involved in the kidnap of 
Temujin’s own wife) until To’oril’s father raided the Merkit and rescued 
his son. His days of being captured continued, when he was thirteen 
years old, he was carried off together with his mother, though this time 
by Ajai Qan of the Tatar who made him look after his camels until he 
managed to escape.213  
                                       
210 According to Abū’l-Faraj (Bar Hebraeus) in the Syriac Chronicle and Ecclesiastical 
Chronicle repeating earlier legends the Kereit khan converted to Christianity in 1007 - 
also found in Kitāb’l-Mijdal, or Book of the Tower, by Mari b. Sulaiman, a Nestorian of 
the twelfth century who wrote in Arabic. See D M Dunlop in Bulletin of the School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London vol.11, no. 2 (1944) 276-289. Bar 
Hebraeus’s account is disputed by Erica Hunter who regards it as an interpolation by 
Bar Hebraeus himself. See ‘The conversion of the Kerait to Christianity in A.D. 1007’, 
Zentralasiatische Studien 22 (1989), 142-163  
211 Isenbike Togan, Flexibility and Limitation in Steppe Formations: The Kerait Khanate 
and Chinggis Khan, p. 78 
212 The Tangut state of Hsi Hsia founded in 1032 CE was destroyed by the Mongols in 
1227. It had comprised part of the Ordos and Shensi, as well as Kansu and Ninghsia. 
Its capital was Chung-hsing, the former Ning-hsia hsien (now Yin-ch’uan in Ninghsia) 
known to the Mongols as Eriqaya. 
213 SH, para. 152, de Rachewiltz II p. 561 
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To’oril’s adventures were not yet over since he was forced to flee on at 
least three further occasions. Once, before 1161 when, after killing his 
half-brothers who were the sons of a Naiman princess, to the outrage of 
her Naiman relatives, he fled to the frontiers of the Jurchen/Chin for 
around seven years until restored with the help of Chinggis Khan’s 
father, Yesügei Ba’atur. Secondly, after attempting to murder another 
half-brother, he was forced by the hostile Naiman to disappear again, 
this time to the Gürkhan of the Qarakhitai in Türkestan, possibly 
between 1173-1174, followed by a rather longer period in circa 
1194/1196 which lasted perhaps two years.214 As Temujin himself 
pointed out, travel to the comparative security of Qarakhitai territory 
was a long and arduous journey which ended with To’oril’s return, 
albeit in desperate straits. He was then restored, though shakily, to his 
previous eminence by Yesügei.215  
The Ong Khan, on the occasion of this last flight, had covered a lot of 
ground, possibly because of having to make extensive detours to avoid 
the hostile Naiman irgen situated to his west whose territory. Thus 
‘‘[Ong Qan] in his wanderings (Mongolian Bitün yorciju – gone wandering 
about) had already passed three cities and has made his way to the 
gūrkhan/universal qan of the Qarakhitai. From there, having rebelled 
against the gūrkhan, he passed through the cities of the Uyiqut 
(Uighurs) and the Tangut.’216 The Ong Khan, then, was also a source of 
considerable information on the ‘outside’ world. 
Given Chinggis Khan’s thirst for intelligence and close contacts with the 
Ong Khan, by 1206 he would have absorbed and mentally worked out a 
geographical, political and topographical schema derived from To’oril’s 
travels as well as his own recent contacts.  
 
                                       
214 SH, paras. 151, 152; Togan, Flexibility and Limitation in Steppe Formations p. 87 
215 SH, para. 164 
216 SH, para. 152 
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Chinggis Khan’s Worldview in the late Twelfth Century 
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Early Contacts between Mongols and Muslims 
How far the Dār al-Islām was terrae incognitae for Chinggis Khan is not 
easy to ascertain. In the Secret History Muslims are generally referred to 
as Sarta’ul irgen or sartaq which designated any native of Central and 
Western Asia and after Chinggis Khan’s commanders Jebe and 
Sübe’etei Ba’atur clashed with the troops of Khwārazmshah 
Muhammad in 1216/17, this term also designated Khwārazm .217 The 
Secret History also has references to sartaq sheep, (sartaqchin qonin) 
which are the fat-tailed sheep of Uzbekistan and the Kirghiz steppe.218  
The Ong Khan’s furthest travels westwards were to the Qarakhitai, the 
elite of whom were Buddhist, at least until the usurpation of the 
Naiman refugee prince, Küchluk, though the population was primarily 
Muslim. However, the earliest known actual contact between Temujin 
and a Muslim was in the desperate days following Temujin’s forced 
retreat to Lake Baljuna in c.599/1202. There has been much 
discussion as to the location of Baljuna, with the two leading 
possibilities being 51˚N 113/114˚E which would place it in today’s 
Buriat Republic or 48˚N 119˚E which, in view of the Onggut connection 
below, would place it more plausibly on the border between today’s 
Mongolia and Inner Mongolia.219 This latter location has the added 
advantage of casting some light on Temujin’s first recorded 
acquaintance with the Islamic world in the form of an encounter with a 
Muslim trader. 
According to the Secret History, a Muslim trader, Asan the Sartaq, 
whose identity has also generated much discussion amongst 
scholars,220 providentially appeared mounted on a white camel driving a 
                                       
217 SH, De Rachewiltz II, pp. 845 and 931 
218 SH para 181, de Rachewiltz II,  p.654 
219For overview of the scholarly debate see de Rachewiltz, SH II, p. 655-658; Perlee, 
Kh. ‘On some Place Names in the Secret History’, tr. L. Moses, MSt.9: 1985-8, 83-102 
220 SH, De Rachewiltz II, pp. 657-658.  
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thousand sheep downstream thereby supplying Chinggis Khan and his 
remaining loyal adherents with food.221  
The critical piece of information, however, gained from the Secret 
History, is that this Muslim had reached Baljuna from the Onggut 
irgen222 whose vast domains paralleled the Great Wall of China. This 
slight evidence could imply that Asan/Hasan may not have toiled from 
Central Eurasia to providentially save Chinggis Khan from starvation 
but either from Jurchen/Chin territory to the east or possibly from the 
Tarim basin, skirting the southern Gobi to enter the Onggut region.223 
However, driving a vast herd of sheep from the Onggut lands across the 
Gobi to Baljuna would be a difficult enterprise. Whilst Asan/Hasan 
needs to be treated with caution, there seems no reason to doubt that 
some time later bona fide Central Eurasian Muslims were persuaded by 
potential profit margins that travelling to the court of Chinggis Khan 
was worth the potential risks.  
For the Islamic world such ventures were to prove a mixed blessing.  As 
Juvaynī remarks, in their early rise the Mongols regarded Muslims with 
respect and would even erect for them clean tents of white felt but, to 
his regret, such respect did not last.224 Juvaynī gives as a reason the 
grasping behaviour of three Muslim traders who had taken the 
opportunity of putting together ‘an immeasurable quantity of 
merchandise’ including gold embroidered fabrics, cottons and Zandan 
cloth to tempt Chinggis Khan to part with some of his new-found 
                                       
221 SH para 182. 
222 SH para 182. The Onggut were a Turkish tribe, converted to Nestorian Christianity 
who had been settled by the Tang court in the great bend of the Yellow River in the 9th 
century and were very much Sinicized. In 1204 they allied with Chinggis Khan which 
was sealed by a marriage between Chinggis Khan’s daughter Alaqai Beki and the son 
of the Onggut Khan, Boyoqa, marriage alliances continuing for several reigns. See SH, 
II de Rachewiltz, p. 656 
223 The Taklamakan oases – Kashgaria - had been conquered by the Muslim 
Qarakhanids in the mid-tenth century until they were conquered in turn by the 
Khitan Liao in 1130 so this particular Muslim trader may just have come from 
Kashgaria, skirting the southern Gobi to enter Onggut territory and hence to Baljuna.  
224 Juvaynī/Boyle, p. 78 
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wealth. These traders irritated the conqueror to such an extent that 
they were lucky to escape with their lives. Hence Juvaynī’s resigned 
observation that ‘today on account of their calumny one of another and 
other defects in their morals they have rendered themselves thus abject 
and ragged’.225   
Notwithstanding his exasperation, Chinggis Khan utilised the return of 
the traders in c. 1218 by putting together a trading caravan of his own 
‘in order to engage in commerce’ and ‘acquire strange and precious 
wares’ from the territory of the Khwārazmshah. However, despite its role 
as a historical watershed, what is also interesting about this ill-fated 
caravan to Otrar was that four hundred and fifty Muslims were 
allegedly gathered from amongst the entourages of the Chinggisid elite 
to accompany it.226  
Before Baljuna in 599/1202 or 1203, then, it is quite possible that 
Chinggis Khan’s geo-political awareness of western and central Eurasia 
was, somewhat unexpectedly, predicated on sheep. Nevertheless, 
through subsequent contacts with Muslim traders he was becoming 
increasingly conversant with Muslims, if not reliably au fait with the 
geo-political composition of Western Eurasia nor was his view of 
Muslims necessarily positive.  This particular geo-political horizon was 
to become considerably broadened, however, because of the actions of 
the Muslim Khwārazmshah Muhammad (r. 596-617/1200-1220). 
By the time of his confrontation with the Khwārazmshah in 1218, the 
putative world conqueror had the incumbent Jurchen/Chin dynasty in 
northern China effectively on the run. He had also forced the 
Tangut/Hsi Hsia to submit after campaigns against them in 1205, 1207 
and 1209 which would have given his commanders experience of 
                                       
225 Juvaynī/Boyle, p. 78 
226 Juvaynī/Boyle, p. 79 
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difficult logistics since they were located south of the Gobi.227 These and 
the campaigns against the Chin thus helped to develop not just the 
Chinggisids’ military and diplomatic skills, as well as introducing them 
to possible administrative templates,228 they also considerably 
contributed to the expansion of their geographical and geo-political 
horizons.   
 
Widening Horizons – the Mongols and the Dār al-Islām 
West of the Pamirs, the Khwārazmshah, whose alleged ambitions also 
included the conquest of Chin, despatched envoys/spies under the 
leadership of Bahā ad-Dīn Rāzī to verify Chinggisid activities in Eastern 
Eurasia.229 The embassy reported back that Northern China was in a 
state of devastation but that Chinggis Khan considered the 
Khwārazmshah to be the ruler of the West as he himself was ruler of 
the East. Furthermore, it was suggested such a policy of peaceful co-
existence would enable trading relations to be established between the 
two sides. De Rachewiltz argues that there is no reason to doubt the 
sincerity of Chinggis Khan. This, however, is not necessarily for the 
reason he gives, that only two nomad empires, the Xiongnu and the 
Türks had embraced both the eastern and western parts of Central 
Asia. It is more likely to have been because the Khwārazmshah had not 
yet given Chinggis Khan a reason for either punishment or revenge.230 
Alternatively, it is quite possible that Chinggis Khan was biding his time 
                                       
227 The Tangut’s ruler, Burqan Qan, reneged on his submission when he refused to 
provide military assistance in 1226, leading to the invasion and destruction of the Hsi 
Hsia state.  
228 The selective adoption of Chinese practices can be seen in the career of the son of 
Chinggis Khan’s supreme commander in the Far East, Muqali, who had Chinese 
tutors and under Qubilai mediated between Mongol and Chinese administrative 
practices. Within the imperial family, the most prominent beneficiaries of such 
practices were Tolui’s widow Sorqoqtani Beki (d. 1252) and their sons who were 
allotted as part of their share of the profits of empire Chen-ting in Hopei province, the 
administration of which provided administrative insights into governing northern 
China for Qubilai in particular. 
229 from whom Jūzjānī received his first-hand information 
230 See SH, esp. paras 58, 113, 154 
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by waiting for a casus belli, though it is equally possible that his geo-
political horizons simply did not embrace western Eurasia at this period 
of his career of conquest. 
The pre-Chinggisid Mongols then appear to have had no more than a 
local presence around the time of the birth of Temujin with limited 
geopolitical horizons though the steppe love of gossip and heroic epics 
would have provided some degree of geopolitical awareness. Temujin’s 
own weltanschauung, it has been argued, was at first influenced by his 
relations with the Ong Khan in his capacity as mentor, ally and 
inadvertent traveller and his horizons subsequently broadened through 
his early campaigns. 
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‘... a commander should have itineraries of all the war zones very fully 
written so that he may thoroughly acquaint himself with the intervening 
terrain, as regards not only distance but standard of roads and may 
study reliable descriptions of short-cuts, deviations, mountains and 
rivers.’ 
Vegetius’s ‘De re militari’ c. 383-95 CE231 
 
CHAPTER III 
The Challenge of Terrae Incognitae - Mongol Orientation and 
Cognitive Navigation 
 
Though the Secret History can be considered simply as an ‘epic’ account 
of the rise of the Borjigid Mongols and of their early campaigns,232 it is 
also a history of movement and communication, of overcoming 
inadequacies and problematic logistics.  Moreover, whilst the 
Chinggisids did not pioneer new routes between east and west Eurasia, 
they still had to ‘discover’ these ancient channels of communication for 
themselves. One incidental conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is 
that the Mongols ‘discovery’ of Western Eurasia with the limited 
technology available to them is one of the unsung achievements of 
exploration and navigation. 
Thus the focus of this chapter and that following is to explore from a 
Mongol perspective some of the underlying practicalities and 
constraints on travel and communication. These include navigation, 
orientation and the limitations of their transmission technology as they 
faced up to challenges of their expanding mental and geographical 
horizons. This will, it is hoped, go some way towards an appreciation of 
the constraints of their subsequent Yām network.  
                                       
231 Vegetius De re militari (Military Institutions of the Romans) quoted in the History of 
Cartography, vol. I, pp. 236-237 
232 De Rachewiltz, in his introduction to the SH believes that it is safe to state that the 
SH is an ‘epic chronicle’ rather than an ‘heroic epic’ p. lxix 
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Mongols and Maps 
Juvaynī, at best ambivalent about the new order, marvelled how 
Chinggis Khan had ‘sallied forth, a single man, with few troops and no 
accoutrement, reduced and subjugated the lords of the horizons from 
the East unto the West.’233 Whilst intelligence and guides are both 
essential requisites in planning campaigns in unfamiliar territory they 
do not give the kind of overview provided by a map. It was thus even 
more remarkable that Chinggis Khan, as commander-in-chief, had to do 
without the luxury of ‘itineraries of all the war zones very fully written 
out’ as recommended by Vegetius in his Military Manual of c. 383 CE.  
This was not because cartography was unknown in Eastern Eurasia. 
Nor was it unknown in Western Eurasia though the jūghrāfiya tradition 
was less an aid to navigation than a visual representation of the Dār al-
Islām or a visual expression of a ruler’s power. In Eastern Eurasia, 
however, there was a long history of the military applications of maps 
(tu).234 Chinese commanders and senior officials had experience going 
back hundreds of years of using maps as strategic tools enabling them 
to plan their campaigns, analyse the difficulties of the terrain, check 
distances and secure their communications. Whereas the early 
Chinggisid commanders gave their reports orally, their opposite 
numbers in the Middle Kingdom were expected to produce written 
reports to the throne and as a much later gazetteer from 1894 exhorted 
“Narration of events without maps is not clear; and maps without 
explanation are not intelligible.”235 
                                       
233 Tarīkh-i Jahān-gushā/Juvaynī I, p. 24 
234 Cordell D.K. Yee, Chinese Maps in Political Culture, Ch. 4 in History of 
Cartography p. 72 note 9:  Cordell explains that the character for tu can be ambiguous 
but by the early Han was used in the sense of a plan or chart whilst ditu = 
land+drawing denoted geographic maps. 
235 Guangping fu zhi, 1894.Cordell D.K. Yee, Chinese Maps in Political Culture, Ch. 4 
in History of Cartography p. 91 
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 In the Guanzi, or the book of Master Guan, dating from the third 
century BCE, in an instruction reminiscent of that of Vegetius above, 
there is an explicit direction that:  
All military commanders must first 
examine and come to know maps. 
They must know thoroughly the 
location of winding mountain 
passes; streams that may inundate 
their chariots; famous mountains, 
passable valleys, arterial rivers; 
highlands and hills; the places 
where grasses, trees and rushes 
grow; the distance of roads, the size 
of city and suburban walls; ...... 
they should completely store up [in 
their minds] the ways in and out of 
and the contrasts in the terrain..... 
This is the constant value of 
maps.236 
 
The military success of the Western Jin (265-317) was attributed by the 
cartographer Pei Xiu (223-271) to accurate maps of rival states237 and 
the use of three-dimensional maps for military tacticians was known 
from at least 32 CE.  After their enforced move south, the Southern 
Sung were very aware of the possible security implications of maps 
falling into the wrong hands and took drastic action to ensure that this 
did not occur. Unfortunately, there is no confirmation that the first duty 
of officials when an invasion was in the offing was to ‘burn the maps”. 
  
Much has been made in modern works on the Mongols of their military 
adaptability such as learning how to take walled cities, the use of 
trebuchet, siege engines and so on with the help of local experts and 
collaborators.238 Möngke Qa’an, who seems to have had a scientific turn 
of mind, ordered the submission of a map of the Dali kingdom in 
                                       
236 Yee, History of Cartography, ch. 4 p.73 
237 Yee, History of Cartography, ch. 4 p.82 
238 Timothy May, The Mongol Art of War, p.78 
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southwest China from its ruler in 1255. Twenty years later, Bayan 
initiated an inventory of maps [tu] and books after the fall of the Sung 
city of Lin-an239 but as yet there is no evidence that in their quriltais or 
assemblies the Chinggisids and their commanders planned their 
campaigns by poring over charts and gazetteers. One potential reason 
for this is that the early conquest commanders, including Chinggis 
Khan himself, as well as Jebe and Sübe’etei Ba’atur, were illiterate.  
 
The Challenges: Orientation and Navigation 
This lack of access to maps to assist them in finding ‘the ways in and 
out of and the contrasts in the terrain.....’  raises some intriguing 
questions in view of the Mongols’ extreme mobility, the extent of the 
terrain covered and Chinggis Khan’s scant lack of sympathy for late 
arrivals. As one scholar of medieval travel has graphically written, if 
early travellers wanted to survive in an unfriendly world they had to 
have the right information.240 This was not just how to find the way 
through woods and over narrow boulder strewn mountain tracks and 
about the location of supplies of fresh water for the animals and 
themselves as well as fords, ferries, bridges, they also needed to know 
the most dangerous areas where robbers operated, both freelance and 
the local avaricious lord. Not least amongst the hostile forces facing 
such travellers were the elements: heat, cold, sand and dust storms, 
early snows, rivers in flood, drought and pestilence.241  
A fundamental difficulty facing movement and communication across 
the vast terrae incognitae with which the Mongols were engaged was 
how to determine their position and direction. An associated 
conundrum is how they approached the all-important problem of time-
                                       
239 YS. Ch. 166, p. 3910, ch. 162, p. 3802 and ch. 127, p. 3112; Allsen, Culture and 
Conquest p. 106 
240 Norbert Ohler, The Medieval Traveller, p. xi-xii 
241 Norbert Ohler, p. xi-xii 
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keeping so that all their forces arrived at the designated destination 
present and correct at the appointed time.  
The Challenge of Orientation 
Orientation in essence has two dimensions: firstly, being able to 
determine the current location242 the corollary of which is determining 
the direction to take for onward travel – always assuming there is an 
actual destination. This was not necessarily the case for the Mongols, 
most particularly in their pursuit of the Khwārazmshah since he was 
literally a moving target or indeed for Sübe’etei Ba’atur and Jebe on 
their epic reconnoitre beyond the Caspian. 
The Mongols were also technologically limited.  Though the science 
behind the compass was known in China since at least the Western or 
Former Han dynasty (202 BCE- 9 CE) and Eastern or Later Han (25 CE 
– 220 CE) its original purpose was geomancy to ascertain the most 
favourable locations for burials, buildings and lucky days. It was only 
around 1119 CE that there is evidence a magnetic needle compass as 
an aid to navigation at sea documented by Zhu Yu in his Pingzhou Table 
Talks.243 The party travelling with the sage Ch’ang Ch’un at the 
summons of Chinggis Khan in the early 1220s from north China to 
northern Afghanistan checked the moment of the summer solstice by 
the shadow of the gnomon244, which could also have been used to 
calculate the time, months and seasons as well as ascertaining north.  
However, such advanced technologies do not seem to have been 
disseminated to the Mongols who had no obvious orientational or 
navigational aids apart from what are termed today ‘natural navigation’ 
                                       
242 The classic example being Christopher Columbus who claimed in his famous 1493 
letter that he assumed he had reached Cathay ‘Quando yo llegue a la Juana segui io la 
costa della al poniente y la falle tan grande que pense que seria tierra firme, la 
prouincia de Catayo’ when he was actually in the West Indies. The Spanish Letter of 
Columbus: To Luis De Sant' Angel Escribano de Racion of the Kingdom of Aragon Dated 
15 February 1493, Michael P. Kerney, Bernard Quaritch 1893 
243 Robert Temple, The Genius of China, p. 150 
244 Si Yu Ki – Ch’ang Ch’un tr. Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, I, p. 52 
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or conversely what scientists call ‘allocentric navigation’. This latter, 
also known as geocentric frames of reference,245 overlaps to some extent 
with the former, which is mainly predicated on spatial orientation with 
reference to the stars, moon, sun, wind, landmarks etc.  
Nonetheless, the Mongols managed to pilot themselves around much of 
Eurasia and more to the point, find their way home again.  
Mongol Directional Orientations – The Cardinal Points 
Rubruck comments that before a drinking session, a steward was 
deputed to go outside and sprinkle some of the drink three times 
towards the south, in honour of fire; next towards the east, in honour of 
the air; next towards the west, in honour of water; and some was 
thrown northwards for the sake of the dead.246 Clearly the steward had 
to get his cardinal points right. 
One key to understanding how the Mongols’ approached orientation is 
through the concepts of o’mno and nar’zo. Nar’zo is the direction in 
which the sun moves and almost all ritual movements follow a 
clockwise rotation, considered the correct direction - for example 
around an ovoo.247 Similarly, o’mno also has ritual significance as well 
as being the orientation of the felt tent or ger, the entrance of which is 
generally facing south or south-east.248 This clockwise rotation is also 
maintained in the limited confines of the ger, where on entering the 
movement should be to the left, not to the right and never between the 
two central supports.  
                                       
245 ‘Spatial memory: the role of egocentric and allocentric frames of reference’ Gennaro 
Ruggiero, Tina Iachini, Francesco Ruotolo et al. 
http://www.academia.edu/628138/Spatial_memory_the_role_of_egocentric_and_allocentric_frames_of_r
eference. accessed 2011 
246 Rubruck, p. 76 
247 This is a pile of stones sometimes designating a boundary but more often with 
spiritual significance and the clockwise rotation is to ensure good luck or success in 
an enterprise. 
248 Rubruck, p. 74 
100 
 
The head of the household sits at the back but facing the entrance, 
which is therefore in front of him, thus in the body terms of the head of 
the household, o’mno means front, hoit means back, baruun right and 
zu’un left.249 Thus when reference is made to the right wing of the army, 
bara’un qar-un tumen, this in fact should be ‘the right hand side’ rather 
than translated as the ‘west’ wing.250  However, the correlation of 
cardinal points and bodily direction, such as right and left is not always 
scientific. For as Yule remarks apropos the Khalkas, Kirghis and 
Kalmucks in his supplementary notes to Prejevalsky’s travels in 
Mongolia,  they all pitched their tents facing east as the prevailing wind, 
in winter, is from the westward which means that ‘left’ would in fact 
mean north.........251   
If this is not confusing enough, in actual fact the direction also depends 
on the landscape. Thus, in some parts of Mongolia, the basis of 
direction is the course of a river, since the summer and winter flock 
movements are either upstream or deeshee and then downstream or 
dooshoo. Also confusingly, Tibet Proper was called by the Mongols 
Baron-tala, the Right, i.e. west quarter whereas it is actually to the 
south-west, whilst Mongolia was zu’un-tala, the left, i.e. east quarter.252 
Mongolia proper, however, or at least that part of it situated between 
the Onon and Kerulen rivers was - during the period of Chinggis Khan - 
also known as ‘ulus of the centre’ (qol-un ulus)253 though the centre of 
gravity moved westwards under Ögodei  to the Orkhon basin.  
Chinggis Khan’s son, Tolui, was the youngest son and therefore the 
Hearth Prince or Otchigin whose inheritance consisted of the family 
                                       
249 Futaki Hiroshi & Kamimura Akira eds. Landscapes Reflected in Old Mongolian 
Maps, Tokyo, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2005, pp. 17-18 
250SH, para. 190, de Rachewiltz, II, p. 685,815 left wing is je’un ar-un tumen 
251 Prejevalsky, Lieut.Col. N. Mongolia, The Tangut Country and the Solitudes of 
Northern Tibet, trans. E. Delmar Morgan 
252 Prejevalsky, Lieut.Col. Mongolia, The Tangut Country and the Solitudes of Northern 
Tibet, trans. E. Delmar Morgan p. 278 
253 P. Jackson has examined in detail the provision of pasture and peoples made 
during the early Chinggisid period. See his chapter ‘From Ulus to Khanate’ in R. 
Amitai-Preiss & D. O. Morgan (eds) The Mongol Empire & its Legacy. pp. 12-37. 
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heartland. He was designated the Prince of the Centre whilst his older 
brother Jochi was a prince of the right or west wing since his ulus was 
the Qipchaq Steppe and Central Asia. Chinggis Khan’s half-brothers 
and full brother Qasar had their domains in north-east Mongolia, 
adjacent to Manchuria, hence their denomination as princes of the left 
wing or east wing. Such placement of the princes was clearly not 
random though Tolui’s was the least random of all, since his was 
customary through inheritance.   
The cardinal points, at least in their ‘bodily’ format also had 
implications for the all important subject, at least for the Mongols, of 
status. This was certainly so within the ger. Chinggis Khan sat in the 
middle of the north side of his own tent, facing south and the next 
highest status seat was that immediately on his right or west. This was 
initially occupied by Father Mönglik who may have been his step-father 
but who in any case had been held in high esteem by Temujin.254 Thus 
the higher status side was to the right (or west) which was always the 
men’s place with the women on the eastern side, or the left, of the 
master.  
Whether the cardinal points also had status implications with reference 
to the wings of Mongol armies is not entirely clear though the main 
army was referred to as the qol cherik or army of the centre. The great 
commander Muqali (d. 1223) had been given ten thousand men on the 
east wing or left flank (je’ün qar-un tümen) and, though it may have 
been coincidental, made his career subduing Northern China.   
On the same occasion, the ‘second shaft’ of Chinggis Khan’s allegorical 
‘cart’, Bo’orchu, who was one of his oldest and trusted companions, was 
made commander of ten thousand on the right or west wing (bara’un ar-
un tümen).  Naya’a, who had impressed Chinggis Khan by his adherence 
to one of the great principles – that of loyalty - was given command of 
                                       
254 SH, para 204 and de Rachewiltz, II, p. 775 
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the most important of the three divisions, that of ten thousand men of 
the centre (tüb-ün tümen).255 Thus from this slight evidence but taken 
together with the disposition of the princes as well as the seating 
arrangements in a ger there seems to have been a pecking order 
associated with the cardinal points with the Centre being the highest 
status, followed by West or Right and then East or Left.256  
Cardinal directions were also associated with colour but interestingly, 
though both the steppe denizens, or at least the Mongols, and the Han 
both adhered to a system of direction associated with colour257, the 
former seem to have developed their own approach since there are some 
interesting departures from that of the Middle Kingdom.  
The Chinese had a long and complex history of associating cardinal 
directions, colours, elements and manoeuvres which was set out in the 
Eight Formations according to Tai Po Yin Ching. Thus heaven was 
associated with yin, a north-west direction and the colour black258 
though in Mongolia ‘Heaven’ was associated with the colour blue. The 
element earth was also yin and had a south-west direction and the 
colour yellow; wind was yin too but was a south-east direction and 
associated with the colour red. Clouds, as well as being yin were 
associated with north and the colour white.   
The Mongolian predilection for blue, then, was not replicated in China, 
whilst Chinggis Khan’s ‘white’ standard with nine tails’ yisün költü 
                                       
255 SH paras 205, 206 and 220; de Rachewiltz p. 815 – Naya’a succeeded Muqali on 
the latter’s death in 1223 
256 When the Ong Qan agreed to join in the rescue of Temujin’s wife Borte, he 
announced that he would form the right wing of the army and his younger brother 
Jamuqa would form the left leaving Temujin, presumably, to form the centre though 
any conclusions from this are necessarily speculative. SH, para 104. 
257 See also Franke, From Tribal Chieftain, pp. 70-71 
258 Interestingly, the QaraKhitai polity which was founded by elements of the defeated 
Liao and had departed north-westwards, finally settling in today’s Kirgizstan, were 
referred to as ‘Qara’ which potentially could mean either north-west Khitai or black – 
the latter suggested by Bose, Subjects and Masters, p. 75. This interpretation has been 
disputed by Michal Biran in her chapter ‘the Mongols and nomadic identity: The case 
of the Kitans in China’, in R. Amitai and M. Biran (eds), Nomads as Agents of Cultural 
Change (Honolulu, 2015), n. 6 p. 173, citing a paper by D. Kane. 
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čaqa’an tuq 259 was a deeply inauspicious colour in Han terms as well 
as not being the lucky number ‘eight’. Furthermore, for the Mongols, 
riding a white gelding was a mark of status as well as a special 
privilege.260  
The association between colour and cardinal point was utilised by the 
Mongol forces in a rather unusual manner when campaigning, since the 
mounts were allegedly grouped according to coat colour. This did not, 
however, correlate with the system set out by Tai Po Yin Ching.  Thus 
the south was represented by red sorrels, the north, by black, the 
horses stationed to the east were grey being the nearest colour to blue 
and the west, by white.261 This last included a colour called sharga or 
yellowish which seems to have been the colour of the ‘epicentre’ and 
though it could include whitish sharga, brownish sharga and reddish 
sharga perhaps golden palomino would be the closest term. Chinggis 
Khan had eight sharga coloured horses but, as the Secret History 
pointedly comments, the horse from which he fell hunting wild asses en 
route to campaigning against the Tangut/Xi Xia was Josotu Boro or 
Reddish Grey.262   
The nuances of cardinal points and colour can provide a window into 
the Mongol milieu that would otherwise be missed. This can especially 
be seen in the symbolism in the Secret History surrounding this 
campaign against the Tanguts and especially the abrupt account of the 
demise of the conqueror during its course; it may well be that his fall 
bruised more than his body. As De Rachewiltz ruminates, the emphasis 
in the Secret History on the fall - followed eighteen months or so later by 
                                       
259 SH para 202 
260 SH, para 216, de Rachewiltz vol. II, p. 808 
261 Fijn, Natasha, Living with Herds, Human-Animal coexistence in Mongolia, 
Cambridge, CUP, 2011, p.157 
262 SH para 264, de Rachewiltz SH II, p. 967 
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his death - may have been taken by his following that Heaven had 
withdrawn its protection or ihe’el from the great conqueror.263  
This snippet of information may also involve nuances and superstitions 
which are difficult to detect from this distance and it is just possible 
that Chinggis Khan was not riding the correct colour of horse for his 
status or indeed for a particular ‘cardinal point’ and was thus pushing 
his luck. The record that he was riding Josotu Boro could equally be a 
post-facto signal that could be deciphered by the immediately 
succeeding generations attuned to the critical importance of a 
particular mount of some political problem or, as de Rachewiltz 
postulates, provide an indication that his powers were failing. 
What is clear from this digression, however,  is that the Mongols were 
conversant with the cardinal directions as such and had a system, 
perhaps not as complex as that of Han China, of associating colours, 
directions, status and auspicious days. What is also apparent too is 
that ‘direction’ in Mongol terms was not entirely straightforward but 
depended on extraneous factors such as terrain. 
The ‘Navigational’ Challenge 
Having some idea, however rough, of directional bearings is essential for 
orientation but does not necessarily guarantee safe arrival at a pre-
determined destination. This can only be achieved through navigational 
– and survival – skills. There are hints in the Secret History as well as in 
the geo-historical literature mentioned above, particularly that referring 
to the Türks, about the navigational skills of the steppe peoples.  
Marvazī gives one of the clearest indications of the methods used when 
he remarks apropos the customs of the Pechenegs that: 
Between the Pechenegs and the Khazar there is a 
distance of ten days, the country being steppes 
and forest. There is no beaten track between 
the two territories, and they travel over (the distance)  
                                       
263 SH para 267, de Rachewiltz, SH II, p. 983 
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by means of the stars, landmarks or at random.264  
 
 
Landmarks 
Within their home range it is apparent from the Secret History that 
familiarity with the terrain was a major element in Mongol navigation. 
Named topographical landmarks abound in the Secret History, generally 
rivers and mountains, though most are unreliably identified today 
despite strenuous scholarly efforts. There are a number of references to 
the use of landmarks as meeting places or to describe where an event 
occurred. Thus when Jamuqa arranged for his forces to meet up with 
those of Temujin and To’oril Ong Khan on the mission to rescue 
Temujin’s bride, Börte from her Merkit kidnappers, he is quite specific 
in his instructions. They were to make their way by the south side of 
the Burqan-Qaldun,265 then travel up the Onon River to its source 
which was to be their rendez-vous point.266  
The challenge for the Mongols was of navigation when out of range of 
familiar landmarks. If the supposition in the previous chapter is well-
founded, that the Mongols were not particularly cognizant 
geographically, it raises the fascinating question of how the early 
Chinggisid commanders initially piloted themselves and their forces 
across Eurasia bearing in mind that in 1218 most of western Eurasia 
would have been terrae incognitae to them.  
 
Stars 
There are no clear references in the Secret History to Mongol navigation 
by the stars. Later on, after the Toluids had settled into their respective 
                                       
264 Sharaf al-Zamān Tahīr Marvazī On China, the Turks and India Trans. V. Minorsky, 
The Royal Asiatic Society 1942 p. 33 
265The sacred mountain identified by de Rachewiltz as Khentei Khan in the Great 
Khentei Range in northeastern Mongolia (48o 50 N109o E) overlooking the sources of 
the Onon, and Kerulen rivers. SH II, de Rachewiltz, p. 229 
266 SH, I para 106,   
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dominions in east and west Eurasia they sponsored the observatories of 
Marāgha, under the direction of the polymath Khwāja Nasīr al-Dīn Tūsī 
and the Muslim Astronomical Observatory in China. What may have 
attracted the attention of the Mongols to Tūsī were his abilities in the 
field of geomancy since he also wrote a treatise on geomancy in Arabic, 
Persian and Türkish.267  Thus geomancy rather than navigation would 
seem to have been the most likely ‘Mongol’ objective of these 
observatories.  
Tracking and Guides 
Though the main aids to orientation may not have been stars 
Prejevalsky casts some light on how the pre-mid twelfth century 
Mongols may have found their way around.  He observes that from his 
own experience they ‘will extricate themselves from the most desperate 
situation, foretell rain, storms, and other atmospheric changes; follow 
the almost imperceptible tracks of a stray horse or camel and are 
sensible of the proximity of a well.’268  
The Mongols were, and many still are, skilled trackers269 and the Secret 
History has several references to tracking. Thus, after Temujin’s father, 
Yisügei Ba’atur, had kidnapped his mother, Ho’elun, and she was 
bewailing her fate, his younger brother, Daritai Otchigin remonstrated 
with her that her former bridegroom was by now far away and even ‘if 
you look for his tracks, his trail you will not find them’.270 
There are also several references in the Secret History to the then 
Temujin’s own tracking abilities; thus when he escaped from the 
captivity of his hostile Tayyici’ut kinsmen, he found his fleeing family by 
following their tracks in the grass. Shortly afterwards he and his new 
friend Bo’orchu managed to locate the family’s stolen geldings by 
                                       
267 For a brief overview of the importance of Nasir al-Din Tusi and Maragha see G. 
Lane, Early Mongol Rule in Thirteenth-Century Iran, ch. 7, pp. 213 225 
268 Prejevalsky, Mongolia, The Tangut Country p. 63 
269 Based on personal experience after getting ‘mislaid’ in the Gobi 
270 SH I para. 56 
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tracking them for four days to the camp of the thieves. 271 His brother, 
Jochi Qasar does not seem to have had quite the same skill as he is 
said to have rejoined him with some difficulty around the time of the 
Baljuna episode. His efforts to find Temujin nonetheless illustrate the 
two main methods of communication in the forests and on the steppe:  
I looked for my elder brother, but he had 
disappeared. I looked for his tracks, but 
I could not find them. I shouted for him, 
but my voice could not be heard272 
Tracking and shouting, as the Mongols discovered, had their limitations 
beyond the familiar environs of the steppe.273 According to Ibn al-Athīr, 
after Chinggis Khan took Samarkand in 617/1220-1221 he despatched 
twenty-thousand armed horsemen with orders to ‘Pursue 
Khwārazmshah, wherever he may be.......’ These pursuers, commanded 
by Jebe and Sübe’etei, came to be known as ‘the westward’ as they 
travelled west of Khurāsān and penetrated deep into Muslim lands.274 
The hunt for Khwārazmshah Muhammad took place across what was to 
the pursuing Chinggisid forces at that time alien territory but there are 
hints in the sources as to the modus operandi employed by these 
commanders. This may have included tracking but as Chaghadai found 
when trying to locate Sultan Jalāl-al-Dīn after he crossed the Indus, 
tracking had shortcomings and the ‘westward’ forces did indeed fail, 
losing the trail of the Khwārazmshah somewhere in the region of 
Hamadan as he fled north to his natural death on an island in the 
Caspian Sea.275  
                                       
271 SH, I, para. 90 de Rachewiltz I, p. 27 
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Since tracking proved to be less than effective in finding the 
Khwārazmshah the main means of hunting him down seems to have 
been through a combination of intelligence and the procurement of 
guides.  Thus when Chinggis Khan arrived before Samarkand he 
received high-value intelligence that the Khwārazmshah had crossed 
the river at Termez and had dispersed the greater part of his army.276 
However, even with such excellent information, as Chaghadai 
discovered, locating their quarry was no easy matter. One obvious 
option was simply to enquire of the locals whether the Khwārazmshah 
had passed that way but even this may have been fraught, not just 
because there may have been communication problems but also 
because there may have been no locals available to question, they 
having either fled or been killed.  
Nonetheless, the pursuers were able to gather the Khwārazmshah’s 
general direction through information gathered at the towns which they 
had sacked or which had submitted.  Then, as Juvaynī and Ibn al-Athīr 
indicate, guides would be procured as at Balkh277 and Darband.278 This 
is well illustrated when, in their pursuit of Sultan Jalāl-al-Dīn, some 
Chinggisid forces arrived in Ghazna and finding the town undefended 
spent a desultory day setting fire to the Friday mosque whilst others 
killed some of the inhabitants, but clearly not all, since they managed to 
obtain a guide to lead them to the Sultan at Parvan.279 The importance 
of guides in lieu of maps or itineraries is also indicated by Juvaynī, who 
remarks when referring to the impending attack on Bukhārā, that a 
Turcoman who ‘had a perfect knowledge of the roads and highways, led 
them by a little frequented road’.280   
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Guides, however, are only useful when you know where you want to go, 
which raises the interesting question of navigation when the destination 
is unknown. Thus a great historical loss is that there are no first-hand 
reports from Sübe’etei Ba’atur or Jebe of their pursuit across the 
Iranian plateau to Azerbaijan, the Moghan Steppe (south of the Aras on 
the western coast of the Caspian) Georgia, the Qipchaq Steppe, and the 
lands of the Rus in 1223-1224. They eventually joined up with the 
forces of Chinggis Khan’s eldest son Jochi and found their way back to 
the conqueror then based at Samarkand though there was a high cost. 
Having set off with purportedly twenty-thousand horsemen - according 
to Ibn al-Athīr,281 or thirty-thousand according to Juvaynī282 - and 
joined on their way by Muslim and infidel troops as well as 
opportunists, this force suffered heavy losses in the siege of Hamadan. 
Moreover, according to Ibn al-Athīr, whose source is unknown, by the 
time they had finished with the Rus in 620/1223-1224 and been 
severely mauled by the Bulghars, of the surviving ‘westward Tatars’ who 
had set off in pursuit of the Khwārazmshah only four thousand made it 
back to Chinggis Khan at Samarkand.283  
Sübe’etei Ba’atur284 and Jebe’s epic expedition, essentially unplanned, 
through uncharted territory which they barely knew existed beforehand, 
was not just a remarkable military probing/intelligence collecting 
expedition but constituted an extraordinary challenge to their 
navigational and survival skills as well as a testament to their physical 
robustness.285 Jebe and Sübe’etei Ba’atur in particular amassed an 
extraordinary amount of intelligence as well as ‘local knowledge’ 
personally gained from their campaigning throughout Eurasia - ranging 
from Khitai to the Crimea to Hungary. Indeed Sübe’etei, who survived 
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into his early seventies, may well rank as the most travelled commander 
in history, having seen active service over a period of fifty years or so in 
what are today’s northern China, Manchuria, Khurāsān, Mazandaran, 
Azerbaijan, Arran, Georgia, Russia, the Qipchaq steppe, Crimea, 
Ukraine, Hungary, and the Tangut/Hsi Hsia territory south of the 
Gobi.286 As Carl Sverdrup observes, Sübe’etei could only have achieved 
what he did by developing a strategic-geographic map in his 
mind287which enabled him to overrun more territory, about 16,000 
square kilometres and move further in person than Alexander the 
Great, Chinggis Khan himself or Tamerlane.288  
As Jebe and Sübe’etei were exploring terrae incognitae and did not 
return the same way they would not have been assisted in finding their 
way back to Mongolia by constructing numerous oboo along their line of 
march to make the return trip easier. Though these are generally 
regarded as sacred stone mounds, often situated in a position of high 
elevation dedicated to heaven and local deities, they have also been 
used as boundary markers, directional markers or indicative of a 
dangerous area to which additional stones were added by travellers to 
ensure their own safety.289 Whilst the Yām network criss-crossed 
Eurasia it did not, as will be seen, necessarily follow clearly defined 
‘roads’ and the travellers for whom accounts exist were escorted on 
their journeys by those who were familiar with the general direction 
implying that even during the period of more organised travel guides 
were still necessary. 
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Whilst Chinggis Khan’s forces in pursuit of the Khwārazmshah were not 
exactly lone travellers, much of the above would still apply to them as 
they traversed previously uncharted territory. Nevertheless, by the time 
that Hülegü marched west in c. 650/1252-1253 the Mongols had 
grasped the geographical and geopolitical specifics of central and 
western Eurasia and Chinggisid commanders, emissaries and officials 
had considerable experience of criss-crossing the inhospitable wastes of 
Eurasia.  
The logistical experience which the Chinggisid forces had acquired in 
the northern China campaigns as well as their hard-won knowledge of 
the terrain and conditions that were encountered as they pursued the 
Khwārazmshah can be seen in the well-planned and executed progress 
of Hülegü’s forces westwards. Indeed, so well ordered were these 
logistical solutions that Juvaynī recounts that along the route which it 
was calculated the Hülegüid forces would pass, thorns and boulders 
were cleared, bridges were built over the rivers and streams and boats 
held in readiness at the ferries.290 Neither pasturage nor supplies were 
neglected since suitable grazing grounds were identified and reserved 
whilst arrangements were made for adequate supplies of qumiz to be 
available for the advancing forces.291   
 
Mongol Time-Keeping 
Navigation to the desired destination is one thing, but arriving when 
expected is another issue entirely, especially as one of the more 
noteworthy traits of the steppe commanders was an insistence on 
punctuality. This is well illustrated by the above mentioned rendez-vous 
between Temujin, To’oril and Jamuqa where the Secret History relates 
that the two former commanders were berated by Jamuqa for being 
three days late: 
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Did we not agree that we won’t be late 
At the appointed meeting 
Even if there be a blizzard; 
At the gathering 
Even if there be rain? 
 
Are we not Mongols, 
for whom a “yes” is the same 
as being bound by an oath?292 
 
For present purposes, Jamuqa’s stinging comment has several 
implications.  Firstly, the destination was identifiable to all the parties; 
secondly, that they would be able to find their way there; equally 
importantly, that they knew when to get there and thus assess how long 
it would take. Furthermore, as Jamuqa angrily pointed out, by agreeing 
to both the place and time this was tantamount to an oath emphatically 
underlying the point that arrangements for a rendez-vous had to be 
adhered to at all costs.  
 
The twelfth-century Mongols had their own customary ways for 
measuring distances and time. As Prejevalsky noted, the unit in the 
Mongol’s scale of distances was a day and a night and a Mongol had no 
idea of dividing them into hours. Time and distance were estimated by 
comparison either with the human body, with nature or horse-related.  
Thus a short-day would be the distance travelled by a horse in half-a-
day or five or six hours, perhaps 24-31 miles/40-50 km depending on 
the terrain. As Prejevalsky also observed, even in the nineteenth 
century: 
 
They calculate distances by the time 
occupied in travelling with camels and 
horses and have no other accurate scale of 
measurement. If you ask how far it is to 
any given place, the answer is always so 
many days’ journey with camels, or so 
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many days’ ride on horseback. But as the 
rate of travelling and length of marches 
vary according to circumstances and the 
disposition of the rider, they never fail to 
add ‘if you ride well.’ Or ‘if you travel 
slowly.’293 
 
 
Jamuqa’s anger is also interesting in the light of an observation by the 
Armenian historian, Het ‘um, who was writing in c. 1307 and had first-
hand experience of the Mongols:  
 
Let no one be surprised that I have not 
placed dating in this part of the narration. 
Although I asked many people about such, 
I was unable to find anyone who could 
fully inform me about it. I believe that this 
is because the Tartars then were 
unfamiliar with accurate chronology, for 
they had no script. Thus events and their 
dates passed by without being recorded by 
anyone and so were forgotten.294  
 
This view was partially confirmed by Zhao Gong, the Sung envoy to 
Chinggis Khan, writing in 1221, as he found it was the custom of the 
Mongols to acknowledge the passing of the years based on each time 
the grass grew green. Furthermore, ‘whenever they see a full moon, they 
consider it one month.’295 Furthermore, according to Zhao Gong, the 
annual programme during this period of the campaigns and conquests 
of the Mongols was dictated by ‘the moon’. Thus preliminary meetings 
were held in the third or fourth moons; this was followed by a full 
strategy meeting held by the Mongol high command on the fifth of the 
fifth moon they held an assembly with feasting and planned together 
                                       
293 Prejevalsky, Mongolia p. 64 
294 Het ‘um/Bedrosian Book III, section. 16  
295 Zhao Gong, p. 2 
114 
 
the next campaign. After this ‘everyone returns to his country to avoid 
the summer heat and raise their livestock. When it comes to the eighth 
moon, they all gather at the capital in Yanjing and only then set out.’ 296  
 
Het ‘um, however, was not entirely correct when saying that the 
Mongols were chronologically challenged since it is clear from the Secret 
History that they were familiar with the Chinese Civil Calendar with its 
Twelve Year cycle though in its popular Sino-Türkish astrological form 
of twelve animals. This ancient Chinese method functioned as a ‘day-
count’ and did not, as Needham has emphasised, depend on the sun 
and moon but was a sexagesimal cyclical system with twelve characters 
or branches and ten stems which together could be combined into sixty 
combinations. At the end of the cycle it started all over again.297 The 
twelve year cycle in itself can be a cause for confusion as even the 
compiler/s of the Secret History was caught out, for example, in 
crediting the wrong Year of the Ox for Sübe’etei’s expedition against the 
Merkit Toqto’a’s sons to 1205 rather than 1217.298  
 
What is not clear is exactly when the Mongols adopted this calendar. 
Though the earliest date in the Secret History is 1201 CE, the Year of 
the Cock, this is, of course, retrospective since the Secret History was 
not compiled until much later.299 Though it is generally assumed that 
the Mongols were introduced to it through the Uighur Türks300 who 
themselves had used it since the eighth century, Zhao Gong, the Sung 
envoy to Chinggis Khan in 1221 observes that: 
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Whatever name for the kingdom they 
use, whatever year name they use 
and whatever writings they circulate, 
is all solely that the fugitive 
ministers (i.e. Jurchen high officials) 
who know writing, strive with their 
cleverness and understanding to 
teach them. 301 
 
Moreover, this system was taken extremely seriously both at Marāgha 
in the west as well as by the Yuan and later under the Tīmūrids at 
Ulugh Beg’s observatory at Samarkand. Indeed, it has been observed 
that it was ‘one of the least conspicuous but most durable results of the 
Mongol conquest of Iran’ since it was not officially abrogated until 
March 1925.302  
It would appear, then, on an evidential basis that the Mongols had not 
even rudimentary technology to help them or indeed an elementary 
knowledge of the geography and topography of western Eurasia. Whilst 
Columbus may only inadvertently have discovered the American 
landmass he at least had the benefit of navigational instruments such as 
the astrolabe, quadrant, compass, chronometer, charts and a globe as 
well as the advantages of literacy.  As has been argued here, however, the 
Mongols’ early efforts at travel and communication were achieved without 
the benefits of maps or itineraries and were achieved through their own 
talents at tracking, ‘natural navigation’ or ‘geocentric frames of reference’ 
as well as guides.   
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Chapter IV 
 
Language and Literacy:  
The Challenges of a Multilingual Empire 
 
Language is rooted in history, politics, religion, traditions and it should 
perhaps be added, commercial contacts, but there is evidence in the 
sources, which will be discussed below, that the Chinggisid leadership 
was monolingual. Thus the oft-repeated statement that the Mongol 
Empire was the most extensive contiguous land-based empire in the 
pre-modern era implies not only challenges in transmission because of 
the extended lines of communication but also the considerable 
challenge of communicating with the subjected peoples. It may thus be 
prudent to state the obvious: that in efforts to communicate it is clearly 
imperative that the ‘message’ is comprehensible to the recipient 
otherwise it is a waste of time and effort.  
The act of sending a message might seem relatively straightforward in 
that it is composed and is then dispatched to the recipient by whatever 
means available. The reality, however, is rather more complex. There 
are three key elements:  language, form of transmission (verbal or 
written) and finally comprehension of the message on the part of the 
recipient.  All are intimately linked since problems can arise, as an 
interpreter with first-hand experience of interpreting for occupying 
military forces has pointed out, when the languages involved are not 
only disparate but so is the cultural milieu of the protagonists.303 
 
To give the Chinggisids their due, they understood from an early stage 
that a problem arising from their extensive conquests was 
communicating with peoples with a multitude of languages, scripts and 
customs. When Chinggis Khan famously harangued the unfortunate 
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inhabitants of Bukhārā after its capture in 616/1220, his message that 
he was ‘the punishment of God’ since ‘they had committed great 
sins’304must have been bellowed in Mongolian because, according to his 
son Ögödei, he spoke no other languages.305 He did, however, have an 
interpreter though what language the interpreter translated it into is 
not immediately obvious.306   
Language 
Mongols and ‘Mongolian’ 
One particularly notable feature of the Chinggisid Imperium is that 
Mongolian never came to occupy a position similar to Arabic during and 
after the Arab conquests. Whilst the process of ‘Arabicization’ - which 
should be distinguished from that of Islamicization – was not immediate 
and varied from place to place, it was nearly irresistible. As Robinson 
has remarked, ‘during the first centuries of Islamic rule, Arab and non-
Arab, Muslim and non-Muslim – indeed, virtually anyone with any 
intellectual ambitions to speak of – adopted Arabic as the language of 
high culture’.307  
An impetus for this was the action of the Umayyad caliph Abd al-Malik 
(65-86/685-705) in the year 81/700, sixty or more years after the 
earliest conquests, when he decreed that Arabic and Arabic alone was 
to be used in the administration. Kennedy remarks that this ruling was 
surprisingly effective as thenceforward those ‘wanting a position in the 
expanding bureaucracy of the Islamic state, whether they were Arab or 
non-Arab by descent and upbringing, needed to be able to read and 
write in Arabic.’ Moreover, even the roadside milestones had to be in 
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Arabic was taken for granted and his frequent use of Turkish words show how widely 
known that language was. Cambridge History of Iran, 5, The Saljuq and Mongol 
Periods, 1968, p. 561 
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Arabic.308 Unlike the Arabs, whose elite were equally self-confident in 
their own destiny and cultural superiority during and after the period of 
conquest, the Mongol-speaking elite does not seem to have been 
compelled to assert the dominance of Mongolian either as the language 
of prestige, or for the efficient transaction of business, or indeed as a 
language of daily contact.  
A clue to the Chinggisid attitude to their polyglot subjects may be found 
in two complementary versions recounting a well-known incident which 
was related by both Juvaynī and Jūzjānī which ostensibly confirms that 
Chinggis Khan was ‘monolingual’. The episode involved an Arabic-
speaking apostate intent on causing trouble for Muslims who was 
brought before Ögodei: 
In the night I saw Chinggis Khan in a dream 
and he said: “Tell my son to slay the 
Moslems, for they are evil”. After reflecting a 
while Qa’an asked whether he had spoken to 
him through an interpreter or in his own 
person. ‘With his own tongue,’ said the man. 
‘Dost thou know the Mongol and Türkish 
languages?’ asked Qa’an. ‘No,’ said the man. 
‘Neither am I in any doubt,’ said Qa’an, ‘but 
that Chinggis Khan knew no language save 
Mongolian. It is clear therefore that what 
thou sayest is nothing but lies.’ And he 
ordered the man to be put to death.309 
Whilst this could have taken place as described, the important point in 
Jūzjānī’s record is that Ögodei turned to the hereditary Mongol 
grandees whose lineage and descent were from pure Mongols .... 
(emphasis added) and asked them ‘unto ye it is certain and clear, that 
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the Chingiz Khan used not to understand any language whatever save 
the Mughali language?’310  
There is an insinuation in Jūzjānī’s account that ‘pure’ Mongols, not 
only aristocrats of the steppe but world conquerors, could hardly be 
expected to stoop to speaking to the subjected populations, who were 
in Mongol terms Muu Khun or ‘bad people’, in their own languages. 
Such ‘bad people’ had more often than not become ‘bad’ because they 
had been captured or were bo’ol/slaves. 
On the other hand, Ögodei did refer to Türkish as well as Mongolian.  
Whereas Mongolian and its dialects were confined to a comparatively 
small area of Eurasia, with an equally small number of native speakers, 
Türkic and Persian had been jostling for position in Central Eurasia for 
upwards of two hundred years. In the 1070s, the Türkish nobleman al 
Kāshgarī compiled in Baghdad his encyclopaedic lexicon of the Türkic 
dialects, Diwān Lughāt at-Türk or Register of the Dialects of the Türks in 
which he remarked on the importance of learning Türkish.311  
 
In his view, this was because the Türkish elite was gaining increasing 
influence in the Islamic world though since Kashgari lists at least five 
Türkic dialects plus the Royal language of the Qarakhanids of Kashgar, 
which ‘Türkish’ was learnt must have depended on location as well as 
the Türkic-speaking elite of the moment.  Furthermore, he noted that 
though “the people of Machin and Chin have a separate language, their 
natives excel in Türkish and their letters to us are written in Türkish 
(bi-khatt al-Türkiyya)”.  
The importance of Türkic is also emphasised by De Rachewiltz who 
argues that the Türkic title of Qa’an which was conferred on Ögodei 
during his lifetime was not surprising since he was not only the 
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supreme ruler of a vast empire but one in which the élite was largely, if 
not predominantly, Türkic-speaking. It was also the language of the 
Uighur advisers and dignitaries at Ögödei’s Court.312 Moreover, since 
interpreters are never mentioned in his relations with Temujin, the Ong 
Khan was presumably bilingual in Türkic and Mongol; in view of this 
intensely Türkic milieu it is almost inconceivable that Chinggis Khan 
did not speak – or at least understand - a dialect of it. It is, however, 
more than possible that Mongol aristocrats insisted on speaking 
Mongolian as an expression of their aristocratic status.  
This may also have been the case in Hülegüid western Eurasia. That the 
Mongols were not linguistically challenged is illustrated by the few 
references to those who were able to understand and presumably speak 
other languages, such as Hülegü’s  great-grandson, Ghāzān, reputed to 
have known Arabic, Hindi, “Kashmiri”, Tibetan, and Frankish as well as 
smatterings of other languages.  The famous Dörben Mongol Bolad Aqa 
(ca 1240-1313) who had been educated with Qubilai’s eldest son and 
who was dispatched to the West was able to orally translate Chinese 
into Mongol.313 Interestingly, Chinggis Khan, despite his possible 
captivity by the Jurchen/Chin, could not hold a conversation with the 
sage Ch’ang Ch’un since he had had to use the Khitan, Yeh-lu A-hai, as 
his interpreter into Mongolian. 314 
Nonetheless, that the Hülegüid establishment was dominated by 
Mongols even during Ghāzān’s reign has been ascertained by Melville. 
In the comprehensive listing of those who heard Ghāzān’s last 
testament at the time of his death in 1304 there were sixty or so top 
officials in his household establishment, of whom all but ‘two or three 
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were evidently Mongols. Only Malik Nasir al-Din, listed as one of the 
bitikchis and a certain Amir ‘Ali, an idachi, have non-Mongol names’.315  
 
Interpreters and Translators 
 
If the Mongols did remain attached to Mongolian as their language of 
choice, this obviously was not going to be a problem for 
communications within the Imperial Family, since they understood 
Mongolian. However, it was clearly going to pose problems for their 
officials who were not ethnic Mongols but a disparate group drawn 
willingly or unwillingly to the Chinggisid cause from amongst the 
submitted peoples. Thus senior administrators had to learn enough 
Mongolian to communicate with their masters otherwise government 
would have to be conducted through an extensive use of interpreters 
and translators.   
 
A passage from Qashani’s history referring to the reign of Ghāzān’s 
brother and successor Öljeitü hints that either Öljeitü spoke Persian 
and/or Türkish or the deputies of his minister Taj al-Din ‘Ali Shah 
spoke Mongolian. This supposition is based on an alleged exclamation 
by the Amir Choban: “O for the days of Hülegü and Abaqa, when if 
anyone wanted to say something to the ruler, he could only do so after 
consultation with all the Mongol amirs. Now affairs have reached such a 
pitch that a non-Mongol (Tazik) goes to the ruler in private in the middle of 
the night without first consulting a single amir, and the opinion of the 
amirs counts for nothing”!’316 (emphasis added).  It seems highly 
unlikely that Öljeitü went to bed with an interpreter on hand in case of 
nocturnal visits from his officials. 
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The experience of the intrepid friars, John of Plano Carpini and 
Benedict the Pole in their journey to Güyüg’s enthronement in 1246 
casts some light on the complex linguistic situation during the early 
Mongol Imperium. Thus ‘at first sight it is surprising, in view of the 
formidable language barriers, that the friars could travel many 
thousands of miles into Mongol and Türkish-speaking Asia and return 
with a vast body of detailed and valuable information derived from word 
of mouth.’317 One explanation for this is that the two friars were 
apparently excellent linguists; Carpini is thought to have spoken 
‘Italian, (his native language) Latin and probably German, French and 
Spanish’ whilst Benedict ‘spoke at least Latin and his native Polish and 
probably had a working knowledge of German, Czech and Russian’.318  
As neither spoke Mongolian, en route to Qaraqorum the friars were 
given interpreters, with Russian most probably the common language, 
and Benedict’s Russian skills were certainly put to good use after their 
arrival in Qaraqorum, ‘since as interpreters with Güyüg they had Duke 
Yaroslav’s knight Temer, his priests Duboslav and a Russian priest in 
the service of Güyük himself.’ Another Mongol-speaker was Güyüg’s 
Russian goldsmith Cosmas.319 Rubruck confirms the preponderance of 
captive eastern Europeans at Möngke’s court, including Hungarians, 
Russians, Georgians and Armenians320 including a woman from 
Lorraine but who was born in Hungary and who could speak French 
and ‘Coman’.321 Carpini furthermore records that Güyüg demanded to 
know whether the Pope had anyone who could understand Russian, 
‘Saracen’ or Mongolian in order to translate the letter he was proposing 
to send back with the Friars.322  
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En route, whilst at Batu’s court ‘they were supplied with interpreters, 
including a Russian from Susdal, for the translation of Pope Innocent’s 
letter into Russian, Türkish and Mongol and also met Alexander 
Nevsky’s attendant knight Sangor, a Coman converted to Christianity 
who would have known at least Türkish and Russian.’323 The friars 
combined language skills stood them in good stead after their arrival at 
Qaraqorum since: 
“We learned many of Güyüg’s secrets from 
persons who came with other princes; 
numerous Russians and Hungarians who 
knew French and Latin and Russian priests 
and others who had been with the Mongols 
some for thirty years, in their wars and 
other deeds and were acquainted with all 
their affairs because they knew their 
language and stayed with them constantly 
for ten or twenty years, some for longer and 
some for less, by means of whom we could 
examine everything. And they told us all 
voluntarily and sometimes without 
questioning, because they knew our 
wishes”. 324 
Two points immediately stand out from the friars’ linguistic experiences:  
perhaps unsurprisingly, in view of Batu’s location, the papal 
communication was translated into Russian, but also Türkish and 
Mongolian. It is not clear which ‘Türkish’ this could have been. Al-
‘Umarī (d. 1348/9) when referring to the Jochids, observes that 
although they made the Qipchaqs their subjects, ‘all (of them) became 
like the Qipchaq’ and whilst Mongolian was the chancery language, the 
lingua franca was Cuman-Qipchaq Türkish, but interleaved with 
Khwārazmian Türkic.325 The linguistic perspectives of the Jochids can 
perhaps best be seen in the late thirteenth century Codex Cumanicus 
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which consists of two parts, the first contained a handbook of Cuman-
Qipchaq with glossaries in Cuman, Persian and Italo-Latin. Rubruck, 
however, found that at Batu’s son Sartaq’s court there were Armenian 
priests who knew Syriac, Türkish and Arabic.326 
Whilst interpreters and translators were thus the way forward it should 
be emphasised that this was fundamentally a practical course of action. 
Much has been written on both the Abbāsid and Sāmānid translation 
movements, the former lasting from the second/eighth to the 
fourth/tenth centuries both of which are seen by scholars as essentially 
legitimising exercises.327 The Mongols had no such legitimising scruples 
– their legitimising philosophy was brutally simple: Macht geht vor 
Recht.  Interpreters and translators were there to further Chinggisid 
imperial business.  
In this multilingual environment, as the conquerors remained 
determinedly monolingual, linguistic skills were in heavy demand and 
were both a means of captives saving their skins and/or a means for 
the furtherance of a career. This is vividly shown by the experience of 
the Armenian historian Kirakos Ganjakets’i, whose fate after he was 
captured was to serve their secretarial needs, writing and reading 
letters.328 That this did not always work either to the conquerors’ 
benefit or to that of their newly conquered subjects is shown by 
Rubruck’s despair at his own interpreter’s incompetence329since 
Chinese and foreigners who succeeded in gaining a superficial 
knowledge of Mongolian could act as interpreters and collect revenue.330 
There was also the problem that even a competent interpreter with a 
good command of Mongolian also needed to have some understanding 
of Mongol customs and the nuances between the vocabularies.  
                                       
326 Rubruck, p. 118 
327 Peacock gives a useful overview in his Mediaeval Islamic Historiography and 
Political Legitimacy::Bal’ami’s Tarikhnama, 2007, p. 169. 
328 Kirakos/Bedrosian ch. 25 
329Rubruck, pp. 142, 171, 180; De Rachewiltz, ‘Personnel and Personalities’, p. 138.  
330Rubruck, pp. 142, 171, 180; De Rachewiltz, ‘Personnel and Personalities’, p. 138.  
125 
 
A further issue was that some interpreters and translators had their 
own agendas. Thus Rubruck’s experience of interpreters was not 
encouraging since he discovered they were either inadequate or not 
available when he urgently needed them.331 He also pinpointed one 
enduring problem with interpreters and translators, which was 
checking the accuracy of their work. He found with the translation of 
King Louis IX’s letter to the Qa’an that, because the translators had 
been Armenians from Greater Armenia, uncompromisingly hostile to the 
Muslims, they had turned the translation of King Louis’ letter to their 
own advantage by making a more forceful rendering than the 
original.332  
It is not surprising then, that the extent of the Chinggisid dominions 
also gave rise to a thriving industry in multi-lingual glossaries and 
grammatical studies which could be utilised in the chancelleries of 
Dadu, Tabriz, Sarai and Mamluk Cairo. How far these were utilized by 
those on the ground however, is unknown, even assuming that all 
interpreters were literate, which is unlikely.  One such famous glossary 
was published a generation after Chinggisid domination had ceased in 
western Eurasia and compiled in the Yemen by or for the sixth Rasulid 
ruler of Türkic descent (r. 764-779/1363-1377).  The Rasûlid 
Hexaglot333provides a snapshot overview of the languages that were 
considered important, at least in the commercial maritime environment 
of the Yemen. These included Arabic, Persian, and Türkic, (in three 
dialects including Qipchaq, Oghuz and Khwārazmian). Also included 
was a dialect of Mongol, Greek (colloquial Byzantine Greek) and Western 
Armenian/Cilician.  
As monolingual conquerors involved in hostilities with non-Mongol 
speakers the Chinggisid commanders were not able to communicate 
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their demands for submission or negotiations for surrender in the local 
languages. In his campaigns in China, the Chinggisid supreme 
commander Muqali, whilst being notably sympathetic to Chinese 
culture, is recorded as having had two interpreters, one of whom was a 
Khitan and the other a Chinese.334  
At the other end of Eurasia, the linguistic skills within the 
administrative elite in the Hülegüid dominions have been considered by 
DeWeese in the important context of Ibn al Fuwatī’s (1244–1323) 
biographical dictionary, Majma’ al-ādāb fi Mu’jam al-alqāb, composed in 
Arabic sometime between 1316 and 1322.335 Ibn al Fuwatī himself is an 
exceptional example of the career of a young captive, having been 
captured as a child of fourteen at the Fall of Baghdad. At the young age 
of 18 in 660/1261-62 he was installed by Nasīr al Dīn Tūsī (d. 
672/1274) as head of the library at the great observatory established in 
Maragha by command of Hülegü where he remained for twenty years 
keeping notes of the scholars who visited the library. Whilst Ibn al 
Fuwatī’s first language must have been Arabic, Deweese particularly 
notes the preponderance of those mentioned in the Majma as having 
linguistic skills are of Muslim Türkic origins.  
One of the most eminent of these was Mahmūd Yalavach Khwārazmī, 
whom the Secret History specifically mentions as coming from 
Urgench/Gurganj.336 According to Ibn al Fuwatī, Yalavach “wrote in 
Mongol, Uighur, Türkic and Persian, and spoke Chinese, ‘Hindi,’ and 
Arabic.”337 Another outstanding linguist was Ghiyāth al-Dīn Qutlugh 
Khwāja al-Kāshgharī whose family of merchants originated in Kashgar 
but who was brought up in Bukhārā. He was proficient in “the Persian, 
Türkic, Mongol and Chinese languages (lūghat al-furs wa al-türk wa al-
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moghūl wa al-khitā) and came to Baghdad in the service of the Mongol 
noyon Aruq when the latter came to Iraq as governor under Arghun (r. 
684-90/1284-91) in 683/1284.338  
Captives who were literate as well as competent Mongol speakers could 
have glittering if precarious careers though fate decreed where such 
educated captives spent their careers. Thus another Khurāsāni, but this 
time from Balkh, one Po-te-na, arrived in Cathay where his son Ch’a-
han/Chaghan was born.  Ch’a-han knew “the letters of all countries” 
became a high official, reached Annam (today’s Vietnam), worked as 
translator and interpreter and wrote historical and chronological 
studies. He was ordered to translate the Mongolian chronicle Tobchiyan 
(the ‘Summary’) into Chinese and a Chinese book of Tang edicts into 
Mongolian or Uighur.” 339 Another captive, who found her way by 
chance to Qaraqorum where she was a ‘procuress in the market’ and 
who was presumably a Persian-speaker340 since she had been captured 
at Meshed, was the notorious Fatima, subsequently in the service of 
Güyüg’s mother, Töregene. 341 
One of the important aspects of imperial court life were the biligs or 
sayings and aphorisms of the ruler or imperial prince. Rashīd al-Dīn 
observes that it was the custom in those days to write down day-by-day 
every word that the ruler uttered, despite the rhythmical and obscure 
language, and every one of note had appointed one of their entourage to 
write down their biligs.  This implies that the secretary/bitikchi would 
have to be able to understand obscure Mongolian. Chaghadai was 
especially fond of biligs and had acquired as a bitikchi to write down his 
biligs a Khitan captive who came to wield immense influence, albeit 
coming to the inevitable unpleasant end. Ögödei’s equivalent was his 
minister, Chinqai, either a Kereit or an Uighur, who served as one of the 
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most influential advisers not just of Ögödei and Güyüg but of Chinggis 
Khan as well.342  Rubruck also noted that when he was being 
interviewed by Batu his replies were written down.343 
It seems, then, that at least some officials could hold their own with 
their masters. Furthermore, since rulers who had submitted were 
required to send their sons as hostages to Court, presumably there was 
an increasing pool of non-Mongols who could at least get by in the 
language as these hostages were educated and grew-up in the Imperial 
encampments, though it has to be said that Juvaynī’s grasp of 
Mongolian is not much in evidence. 
In the assessment of Martinez, the rank and file Mongol soldiery, 
scattered in garrisons across the land, became Islamized and Türkicized 
by the mid-690s/1290s, earlier than the more insulated Mongol elite 
who maintained their native tongue up to the twilight years of the 
dynasty. This, however, may be a flawed assumption since few ‘Mongol 
soldiery’ were likely to have been ethnic Mongol344 and Juvaynī, who 
must have known his Mongols from his Türks, refers several times to 
non-ethnic Mongol forces.345  
 
Memory 
That ‘memory’ had a central role in the early Mongol milieu is suggested 
by an after-dinner entertainment much enjoyed by the Mongol elite in 
the thirteenth century. These were competitions based on reciting the 
memorised biligs or sayings of Chinggis Khan or senior imperial princes. 
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The recitation of poems and epics was another aspect of Mongol get-
togethers and as late as the twentieth century it has been recorded that 
‘the memory of storytellers could hold entire epics, among which one 
can find tales of nine or ten thousand verses’. This is the size of the 
Abai Geser Khübüün epic, the 10,592 verses of which were written down 
in 1906 by Zhamtsarano from the words of a Kuda Buryat storyteller.346    
Shagdaryn Bira has observed that the Mongols in ancient times 
customarily transmitted most messages orally ‘in a rhythmic and 
allegorical speech which was known as da ‘un bari ‘ulhu, that is, to 
entrust to the voice’. Bira also stresses the importance of such “oral 
letters” since they also ‘served to reproduce the historical past and to 
perpetuate the memory of outstanding personalities, famous 
particularly for their sharp-witted oratory and messages.’ 347This oral 
historiography created by the Mongols replaced written documents and 
the authors of such early sources as the Secret History looked on such 
recitations as important historical documents set forth in an oral form, 
hence the repetition of such ‘messages’ in the Secret History. 
Notwithstanding the Mongol attachment to such da ‘un bari ‘ulhu, there 
were going to be long-term problems with relying on memory insofar as 
the embryo imperial records were concerned.  Thus as each generation 
of secretaries passed away, they would have had to ensure that their 
successors had memorised the records. This may have been practical 
for one generation but as the administration expanded would have been 
problematic thereafter. The other problem with memory is that because 
an administrative career under the Chinggisids could be precarious, 
there was the danger that with the death of an official, the record would 
prematurely die with him. Moreover, the designated memoriser would 
have to be continually available either to memorise new records or to 
recite those required. None of which would have been entirely practical 
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for the keeping of population registers essential for the distribution of 
subjects to the elite as profits of empire.  
Notwithstanding these difficulties, messages emanating from the early 
Mongols were delivered orally from memory, ‘with even the envoys not 
daring to add or subtract even a single word from their message’ 
because ‘according to their law, he who lies, dies’.348 The Secret History 
records for example an intense exchange of ‘oral’ messages when 
Chinggis Khan’s relationship with his mentor the Ong Khan was under 
serious strain.349 Juvaynī notes too that when his party was travelling 
with the Amir Arghun to Möngke’s Court in 1251-1252 and finally made 
it through the snowdrifts the Amir made an oral report on the chaotic 
condition of the finances in Khurasan.350 
This attachment to the supposed veracity of oral messages – even if 
accompanied by a document -  is of major importance to any 
understanding of the physical transmission of messages and the Yām 
network since it provides a confirmation of sorts that emissaries had to 
complete the entire journey themselves in order to deliver the oral 
content of their message. It was clearly impracticable to teach it to 
messengers at every change-over across a distance of 5,000 
miles/8,000km. Thus the ‘relay’ system could not have been a relay of 
messengers but of fresh mounts. The choice of messengers was thus of 
some importance and this will be examined in the next chapter. 
 
Literacy 
 
One reason for the Mongols’ attachment to oral messages is that 
possibly the steepest mental adjustment they had to face as they 
conquered much of Eurasia was learning to trust the written word. This 
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is a significant difference between the early Mongol conquerors and for 
example, their Arab conquest predecessors. In the Arab case, messages 
from ‘Umar included written instructions, for example with orders to 
commanders to move on such-and-such a day and halt at such-and-
such a place as well as detailed descriptions from commanders of the 
terrain and local conditions.351 There is also specific mention of ‘Umar 
(13-23/634–644) ordering his commander Sa’d to ‘inform me in writing 
about the situation of the troops’.352  
 
In contradistinction, in the early Chinggisid period, as the Sung envoy 
Zhao Gong makes clear, the Mongols had ‘absolutely no writing, so 
whenever they issued orders or dispatched envoys back and forth, they 
reckoned with their fingers to remember things.’’353 Ch’ang Ch’un’s 
travelling companion too observed that in the early 1220s ‘They have no 
writing. Contracts are either verbal or recorded by tokens carved out of 
wood’.354 Thus if ten horses were being despatched, then ten incisions 
were made on the stick.355  
 
This was somewhat retrograde since Sima Qian, the 100 BCE Han 
dynasty historian, remarks apropos the Xiongnu that a defecting Han 
envoy had taught them not only how to make an itemized account of 
the number of persons and domestic animals in the country but he also 
makes clear that the two sides corresponded in writing on wooden 
tablets. The Xiongnu tablets were carefully measured so as to be one 
inch longer than those of Han and composed in the most extravagant 
manner.356  
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By the time Chinggis Khan was middle-aged he had, however, certainly 
grasped the value of written records. The Secret History records his 
giving his adopted son, Sigi Qutuqu, in 1206, the role of overseeing the 
apportionment of the irgen or subject people amongst the Imperial 
Family to be recorded in registers with kökö bichig or blue writing.357 De 
Rachewiltz, for his part, is of the view that the actual writing in the 
registers was done for Sigi Qutuqu by bitikchis under his supervision.358  
Furthermore Chinggis Khan appointed a tutor for Ögodei to teach him 
to write,359 possibly an added encouragement in choosing Ögodei as his 
successor. That Chinggis Khan had an eye for posterity is shown by his 
reaction to his conversations with the sage Ch’ang Ch’un. One of 
Chinggis Khan’s earliest adherents, Chinqai - who was to become a very 
influential adviser and chief scribe under the first three Mongol rulers - 
was with Chinggis Khan during his conversations with the sage. The 
Conqueror is recorded as having specifically asked that Ch’ang Ch’un’s 
words of wisdom be written down in Chinese characters, that they might 
be preserved from oblivion.   
Ch’ang Ch’un’s travelling companion, Li Chih-Ch’ang, also records that 
as the Taoist Master stoically journeyed west, he received in c. 1220 CE 
what appears to have been a written message from the Conqueror - 
though presumably penned by one of his aides not least because it 
must have been written in Chinese characters. If this remarkable 
document was actually dictated by Chinggis Khan, then the kindly 
concern and literary style cast the conqueror in a rather more mellow 
light than that in which he usually basks: 
‘Now that your cloud-girt chariot has 
issued from Fairyland, the cranes that 
draw it will carry you pleasantly through 
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the realms of India.... The way before you, 
both by land and water, is indeed long; but 
I trust that the comforts I shall provide will 
make it not seem long. This reply to your 
letter will show you my anxiety on your 
behalf......360 
 
As de Rachewiltz points out, as early as 1206 there were at least three 
literate individuals supporting Chinggis Khan: the Türkic/Chinese 
speaking Chinqai, (ca 1169-1252) who was quite plausibly an Onggüt 
though described variously as an Uighur or a Kereit;361 T’a-t’a T’ung-a, 
an Uighur who was captured from the Naiman and the Kereit Sira Oqul 
who was appointed bitikchi not later than 1206.362 However, the 
supposed literacy skills of Sigi Qutuqu363 may, or indeed may not, be 
confirmed by an altercation which took place in north China between 
the monk Hai-yun and the chancellor Hsia-li in the context of a 
government decree that only such as were able to read the religious 
scriptures should be allowed clerical status. The monk asks the 
possibly ironic question: ‘Is his Excellency the Grand Officer (Sigi 
Qutuqu) able to read?’364  
Scripts 
Reading, of course, is only one aspect of literacy; the more difficult side 
of the coin is learning how to write. This was compounded for the 
illiterate Mongols because they also had to decide which of the plethora 
of scripts in circulation365 they were to use for transcribing their own 
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language.  A multiplicity of languages and scripts has been one of the 
hazards of empire but what imperialist-minded conquerors had to 
avoid, which the Mongols barely did, was the complication of multiple 
scripts.366  
Unfortunately, so far as the choice of script and its adoption are 
concerned, the circumstances surrounding this great leap forward for 
the Mongols are shrouded in uncertainty since there are no precise 
references in the Secret History - though there are references in 1206 to 
‘writing’ or bichig.367 In view of the literacy of Chinqai and his 
colleagues, especially the captured seal-keeper of the Naimans, T’a-t’a 
T’ung-a, the assumption has tended to be that it was the latter who 
introduced writing ca. 1204 to the Mongols since his duties included 
affixing the seal to all imperial edicts, thus implying they were 
written.368 This first script was adapted from the Uighur script which in 
turn was descended from Syriac via Soghdian369 though unlike these 
the Uighur script is written vertically from left to right. The Franciscan, 
Friar Pascal of Vittoria, writing from ‘Cumania’ to his brethren in 1338 
refers triumphantly to his mastery of the Cumanian language and the 
Uighur characters ‘which language and character are commonly used 
throughout all those kingdoms or empires of the Tartars, Persian, 
Chaldaeans, Medes and of Cathay’.370   
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Qubilai in China decided to tackle the problems associated with the 
Uighur/Mongol script which was in use alongside Chinese characters. 
In a decree of 1269 he ‘emphasized the importance of writing for the 
perpetuation of speech and for recording events’. At the same time he 
blamed ‘the “simple mores of the North” for the lack of a proper writing 
system (suitable for Mongolian)’ whilst stating that the alien Chinese 
and Uighur characters were inadequate for recording Mongolian 
speech.371  
His solution was to command a prominent member of the Tibetan 
Buddhist Sa-skya order, ‘Phags-pa (Holy) Blo-gros rgyal-mts’an (1235-
1280) whom he had invited to Dadu before he became emperor, to 
devise a new script in which both Mongolian and Chinese would be 
written based on the Tibetan alphabet. This was written vertically and 
grouped in syllables like the Khitan Small Script and has had several 
designations including the “New Mongolian Alphabet” in Chinese meng-
ku hsin-tzu, as well as the “National” or “Imperial Alphabet” (Chin. kuo-
tzu) and, from its external shape, the “Square Script” (Mong. dörbel jin 
üsüg, or dörvoljin bichig, Khalkha dörwoljin üseg) and the “Phags-pa’s 
letters”.372  
It was adopted not just as the script for Mongolian but also a universal 
script in which all the languages of the empire were to be written and 
was, therefore, compulsory for all official documents. Subsequently, in 
1270, a school for teaching the New Mongolian Alphabet was 
established by Qubilai in the imperial capital which became the Yuan 
Mongolian Academy in 1275 with Sa-ti-mi-ti-li (Uighur Satimitiri, Skr. 
SatYāmitra ‘Friend of Truth’) at its head.373 This particularly farsighted 
undertaking could have had incalculable implications for sustaining 
Chinggisid centralised imperial control in much the same way that 
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Chinese characters have knit together the different dialectical groupings 
in China. The script, however, was not popular despite its accuracy and 
unambiguity and faltered after the death of Qubilai, in the event not 
surviving the dynasty.   
It is thus to their credit that some of the complications of an imperium 
operating in a multilingual, partially literate, environment were faced 
head-on by the Mongols. The difficulties of communication inherent in 
an extensive and polyglot Imperium were successfully tackled at an 
early stage of conquests which, with the provision of a communication 
network, provided the crucial underpinning of the vast Chinggisid 
enterprise.  Without these initiatives, Chinggisid control would have 
been unviable. 
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‘The messenger deserves neither death nor punishment, so long as he 
faithfully reports what he has heard. For this messenger is merely a 
spokesman, and when the spokesman transmits his message, he is not 
killed but is left alone’ 
1069 CE Yüsuf of Balasaghun, Qutadghu Bilig374 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
Long-Distance Transmission Options  
Shortcomings and Advantages of the 
Alternatives 
 
Whether the message was to be delivered orally, in writing or a 
combination of both, to be acted upon it required transmission. In the 
pre-wireless and pre-combustion engine era this relied on muscle 
power, whether four-legged, two-legged, winged, rowed or sailed - 
though brief messages could be transmitted through, for example, 
whistling arrows, drum beats, smoke signals and optical devices such 
as mirrors or flags or indeed shouted over short distances.375 The 
options available to the Chinggisids in setting up their trans-Eurasian 
communications were thus varied but the main method of transmission 
was muscle powered and included horses, runners, carrier pigeons, 
camels, oxen and, in the northern fastnesses even dogs, though all 
these bar the pigeons required human involvement in the actual 
process of transmission. 
                                       
374 Quoted in Robert Dankoff ‘Qarakhanid Literature and Turco-Islamic Culture’ in 
Hasan B. Paksoy, ed. Central Asian Monuments, Istanbul, Isis Press, 1992 p.79 
375 Tabarī describes how the Persian sovereign, Yazdegird, dispensed with the 
messenger system, or Barīd, replacing it instead with a relay system of ‘shouters’ 
stationed between the ruler and his foe, Rustam. The latter’s every move was then 
shouted by relay back to Yazdegird. (Ta’rīkh al-rusul wa’l-mulūk) The History of al-
Tabarī, volume xii: The Battle of al-Qādisiyyah and the Conquest of Syria and Palestine 
14-15 AH/635-637 CE. Trans. by Yohanan Friedmann. New York, State University of 
New York Press, 1992 pp. 82-83 
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It may well seem superfluous to examine these options in any detail but 
there are two key reasons for doing so. Firstly, in today’s inter-
connected world, it is easy to lose sight of the shortcomings or relative 
advantages of earlier means of transmission and secondly, any 
limitations on the means of conveyance of messages inescapably 
constrain the efficiency of the communication network. Moreover, 
despite the rapid advances in technology, some, if not all, of these 
means of transmission have been in use into the modern era376 thereby 
making it possible to verify, as well as assess, the comparative 
advantages and disadvantages to the Mongols of the available 
alternatives. It is thus proposed to briefly investigate these ‘muscle-
power’ alternatives in the context of their potential utility for 
communications between the Hülegüids and the Yuan. 
 
The Messenger 
 
Apart from the courier pigeon, the backbone of all pre-modern 
communication networks was the human messenger even if they were 
not delivering the message in person, but by signal. However, the 
advantage of human point-to-point delivery of a communication was 
that, unlike pigeons, they could carry oral messages and if needs be, 
they could answer questions.  
 
Messengers versus Envoys 
 
The Secret History has references to elĉi/elĉin377 - a term which is 
variously translated as messengers, couriers, envoys, emissaries or 
ambassadors. Such diverse meanings can have the unfortunate side-
                                       
376 See e.g. Carruthers, Unknown Mongolia, 1910 p. 279 on the ortoo/yam stations still 
functioning in Mongolia. The Times of India reported in February 2002 that the Orissa 
Courier Pigeon Service was being discontinued. 
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Orissa-to-retire-its-
pigeons/articleshow/900187.cms 
377 See especially SH, de Rachewiltz’s commentary in Vols. I and II, pp. 466 and 923 
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effect of distorting latter day conceptions of the Yām network.  As far as 
the term is used in the Secret History, De Rachewiltz observes that the 
one hundred378 merchants under the leadership of one Uquna or Billy-
Goat who were massacred at Otrar by the governor of the 
Khwarazmshah actually bore credentials from the Mongol court. This 
meant that from the Mongol point of view they had the status of envoys 
or elĉin379.  As he points out, the status of the victims as ambassadors 
made their murder an inevitable casus belli.  
 
That elĉin was a widely accepted term for ambassadors is confirmed by 
the Armenian Grigor of Akner who, in his History of the Nation of 
Archers, recounts how Hülegü sent ‘elch’is’/ambassadors to his brother 
Möngke after the Fall of Baghdad.380  Six hundred and fifty years later, 
this term is consistent with the experience of Captain John Wood on his 
expedition to discover the source of the River Oxus who was 
accompanied for some of his journey by an individual he refers to as an 
Elchi or ambassador from Dost Mohamen Khan to Murad Ali Beg of 
Kunduz.381 There seems little doubt, then, that the use of the term 
‘messenger/s’ to translate elĉi/elĉin rather under-rates the role. 
 
During the Chinggisid era there seem to have been four main categories 
of elĉin . Firstly, communications between the Imperial Family were 
delivered by close associates of the correspondent and such 
‘messengers’ were generally regarded as ‘ambassadors’; secondly, 
‘envoys’ carrying messages between the various steppe polities; thirdly, 
‘informants’ who delivered kele - in Mongolian meaning ‘tongue’ but in 
context refers to oral and secret information, presumably 
‘intelligence’.382 Lastly, according to Jūzjānī, there were ‘swift 
                                       
378 SH, de Rachewiltz’s commentary, Vol. II, p. 923 
379 See especially SH, de Rachewiltz’s commentary in Vols. I and II, pp. 466 and 923 
380 Grigor/Bedrosian, Ch. 12, section 13. 
381 John Wood, A Journey to the Source of the River Oxus, Elibron Classics, [1872] 
2005 p. 119 
382 SH, de Rachewiltz, p. 521 
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messengers’ or musri ‘ān, who, from the context, were despatched as 
military messengers when there was urgency or a state of emergency.383  
Thus Chinggis Khan received military intelligence from northern China 
whilst he was on campaign in Turkestan in 1224-1225 CE. Such 
messengers may have been attached to the military/secret stations, the 
Narin Yām/Na-lin zhan, or may simply have been chosen on an ad hoc 
basis from amongst a commander’s forces when on campaign.  
In the preceding chapter the emphasis the Mongols put on oral 
messages was noted and a corollary of this was that the messenger 
would have to complete the entire journey rather than the message 
being relayed by a succession of couriers. That is not to say that relay 
couriers were unknown to the Chinggisids. They have been famously 
described by Marco Polo but rather in the context of the network taken 
over by the Yuan from its predecessors within the Great Wall.  
 
Over six hundred years later, when writing of his travels in 1905 in 
Qing Dynasty China, Bruce comments that whilst there was a telegraph 
line from Beijing to Kashgar ‘the Imperial courier post still survived. By 
it the transfer of information or special orders was extraordinarily rapid. 
An Imperial despatch, wrapped in the well-known yellow silk and tied 
round the waist of a succession of mounted couriers, would reach 
Liang-chou in Gansu/Kansu province under nineteen days from Peking. 
The time usually taken for the same journey by well-equipped travellers 
was forty-three days.’384 Eight hundred miles was not unknown.385   In 
western Eurasia, the Ghaznavid official Beyhaqi (995—1077 CE) also 
has numerous references to the arrival of the couriers of the postal and 
                                       
383 Jūzjānī p. 1217,  
384 Major C D Bruce, In the Footsteps of Marco Polo, p. 210 
385 Stanford’s Compendium of Geography and Travel: Asia, Augustus H. Keane, 2nd ed. 1886 
p. 595. The strictly disciplined Būyid messengers did Baghdad to Shiraz, around 683 
miles/1,100 kilometres, in around eight days, or 140 km a day. By way of contrast, 
the express messengers towards the end of the Ottoman empire between 
Constantinople and Baghdad, a distance of 1100 miles/1770 km was completed in 
twenty days by four ‘Tartars’ riding day and night. Marco Polo, Yule/Cordier, I, pp. 
433-438  
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intelligence services with their despatch bags closed with a ring and 
with seals in several places.386  
 
That delivering state communications could be a hazardous enterprise 
is incidentally confirmed by Beyhaqi who has an enlightening report of 
one unfortunate messenger whose task was to deliver a message from 
Sultan Mahmud to his son Mas‘ud: 
 
The Amir (Mas‘ud) reined back his horse 
and one of the senior officers took the letter 
and gave it to him and he began to read it. 
When he had come to the end, he said to 
the courier, “It’s five or six months since 
this letter was written; where have you 
tarried all this time and what is the reason 
for this late arrival?” (emphasis added) 
The courier replied: ....  “When I set out 
from Baghlan for Balkh, I fell ill and had to 
stay for a while at Balkh. When I reached 
Sarakhs, the Commander-in-Chief of 
Khurasan, the General Ghazi was there 
and the news arrived of Sultan Mahmud’s 
decease. He went off to Nishapur, taking 
me with him and not allowing me to 
proceed, saying that ‘The Lord will arrive 
with auspiciousness; there is no point in 
proceeding, since the roads have become 
unsafe and it is inadvisable for a solitary 
rider to travel lest some outrage occur.’ 
When the letter reached Ghazi with the 
news that the lord had set out from Ray, he 
gave permission for me to continue my 
journey. The road to here from Nishapur is 
very disturbed. I took very keen 
precautions so that I was able to arrive 
here in safety.” 387 
 
                                       
386 For example, under the year 431,Tarīkh-e Mas’udi, I, p. 350 
387 Beyhaqi, vol. I, p. 108 
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There are a number of interesting implications arising from this 
account; not least that the Ghaznavid messenger was apparently 
travelling solo and was clearly expected to deliver the written message 
himself whatever the difficulties encountered.  
The apparent Chinggisid preference for oral communications thus 
immediately impinged on their transmission since such messengers 
would also have had to be point-to-point.  This aspect brought into play 
the Mongol fixation on ‘status’. That this was the default position of the 
‘seed of Chinggis Khan’ can be seen in two encounters. The first was 
between Körgüz, travelling yet again to Court away from his 
responsibilities in Khurasan. En route he had a dispute with one of 
Chaghadai’s chief amirs, who unfortunately for Körgüz turned out to be 
a descendant of Chinggis Khan. As Juvaynī remarks, ‘with such 
persons words are finer than a hair of the head or a sharp sword’; the 
emir took grave exception to a response of Körgüz, leading to his 
subsequent arrest, trial and death.388 
Another not dissimilar incident occurred between Ögödei’s grandson, 
Qipchaq Oghul and one Jalayirtai - who described himself as the 
servant of Baraq, the Chaghadaid khan who had recently deposed his 
cousin.389 When Jalayirtai took issue with Qipchaq, the latter’s 
insightful response was ‘when has a qarachu390 ever argued with the 
seed of Chingiz Khan, for a dog like thee to give me an unmannerly 
answer’.391 As a qarachu was deemed the lowest of the low this was a 
serious case of lèse-majesté. 
On the evidence of such incidents it was extremely unlikely that 
members of the Imperial Family would communicate with each other, 
with grandees of the Imperium, governors, commanders and high 
                                       
388 Juvaynī/Boyle, II, pp. 502-503 
389 In another example of status, the cousin had been humiliated by being reduced to 
the position of head cheetah-keeper. 
390 whose status is not clearly definable and which may have varied over time SH, para 
191; De Rachewiltz, II, p. 692 
391 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle  p. 152 
143 
 
officials or vice versa via a mere postal courier. A message delivered in 
such a fashion would not have the required gravitas, would have 
reflected ill on the sender and hence would not be taken seriously. Thus 
in order not to cause offence to prickly Imperial sensibilities, emissaries 
had to be chosen with great care. 
 
The Implications of Mongol Social Stratification and the choice of 
Envoys 
As the episode involving the qarachu shows, the Mongol elite enforced 
their social stratification inherited as part of the long-held traditions of 
the steppe milieu. These included what has been called ‘grand-
domestication’ in which strong groups of nomadic herders had an ethos 
which exalted the ruling aristocracy, condoned power play and 
legitimized warfare, subdued and took control of peoples and 
settlements who were then managed as if they were some kind of 
herds.392 This was the tradition into which Temujin was born and of all 
the customs which the Mongols carried with them as they conquered 
the world could well have been the most problematic - not just for their 
‘victims’ - but a contentious challenge to the traditional outlook of the 
Mongols themselves as they had to adapt to different kinds of human 
‘herds’. 
Steppe society, however, was not simply divided between aristocrats 
and ‘herds of people’ – the aristocratic lineages were at the summit but 
beneath this summit there were surprisingly complex social strata.393 
Based on later evidence but on earlier custom in Khamag 
                                       
392 Quoted in Uighur Stories from Along the Silk Road by Cuiyi Wei and Karl W. 
Luckert,1998, p. 9. Karl Luckert was the originator of the idea of five evolutionary 
phases or strata in the development of folklore and religions: era of gathering-hunting; 
domestication; over-domestication; universal salvation religions and democratic 
revolts; 
393 This passion for the stratification and classification of subject populations can also 
be seen in the Yuan where not only were there categories dependent on when each 
submitted but also sub-categories dependent on function, such as civilian, military, 
postal relay and artisan. The latter were then sub-divided into three further categories 
of what were hereditary servitors. See e.g. Allsen, Commodity and Exchange, p. 32. 
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Mongolia394the lower orders beneath this Borjigid pinnacle consisted of 
at least three different social groupings. Thus under the aristocratic 
Borjigid elite were the Sain khun or good people; under them were the 
Dund khun or average people and right at the bottom were the Muu 
khun or bad people. A particularly complicated category was bo’ol or 
hereditary slaves. 
Emissaries were not likely to have been chosen from the categories of 
Dund khun or the Muu khun or ‘Bad People’. Black or khar (qara) 
yastan or black bone lineages  is a term that stretches back at least 
to the Türk empires, in which kara bodun was the term for subjects. 
In the Secret History they are the qarachus, whose status is not 
clearly definable and which may have varied over time.395  There are 
indications that the Muu Khun originated as captives but the waters 
are considerably muddied by a category with the status of bo’ol who 
also originated as captives396 who were not quite slaves, nor freemen, 
but a form of bondservant or serf.  
The Dund khun or ‘Average People’ included some rich people and 
those who performed moderate or lowly civil and military services, for 
example, lubchitan, dugulgatan, demch etc. These may have been the 
‘ordinary people’ or düri-yin gü-ün mentioned in the Secret History, 
whom if talented or well-built could be of use to the khan.397 
The Sain Khun constituted the ‘Good People’ and could be used as 
emissaries. These included high-ranking nobles of non-Chinggisid descent 
and other high-ranking official princes of ordinary descent – the vast 
majority of whom did not have the right to obtain offices by inheritance. 
They are known in the chronicles by the names darkhad, tabunang, (son-
in-law) khonjin, shigchin, aimgiin akhas, tushmel, zaisan and shuulenge. 
                                       
394 That is, the confederation of Mongolian tribes before 1206, Bold, p. 82 
395 SH, para 191; De Rachewiltz, II, p. 692 
396 The term bo’ol was a complex term, which though it is often translated as slave, 
could refer to someone either very menial or to someone with a very responsible 
position see also note 448 
397 SH, para 191; De Rachewiltz, II p. 692 
145 
 
The darkhad (sing. darkhan) were a group mentioned several times in the 
Secret History as one whose members had been awarded special rights by 
the Chinggis Khan for services rendered, possibly by performing 
outstandingly in battle. Unlike household serfs and grooms, the darkhan 
were freemen, and were allowed to carry quivers and participate in formal 
drinking.398 It is believed that these darkhan along with the noyans 
provided the ‘officer class’ of the Chinggisid armed forces.399  This was a 
category with a long precedent amongst steppe empires, including that of 
the Türk in the sixth to eighth centuries and amongst their rights was that 
of being allowed to keep war booty and members of conquered tribes.400  
It is something of a shock, however, to discover that not all high-
ranking commanders were Sain Khun as some conquered nobles had 
bo’ol status. For example, the Jalayir, an ancient lineage defeated by 
the Chinggisids in the mid-eleventh century, held high office under 
the Yuan, the Chaghadai khanate and the Jochids but their status 
was that of dependent vassals or slaves, ötögü bo’ol - where ötögü has 
a similar meaning to yeke, or great.401  
Two of Chinggis Khan’s most trusted generals, Jelme and Muqali of 
the Jalayir had bo’ol status. The Jalayirs had apparently been 
hereditary serfs of the Mongols since the time of Chinggis Khan’s 
ancestor Qaidu and were thus ‘hereditary slaves or emchu bo’ol’.402 
Indeed Muqali’s son was actually called Böl – Bo’ol. Even the 
commander-in-chief in western Eurasia in 1231, Chormaghan Noyan, 
(d. c. 639/1242) was an ötogü bo’ol.403  
                                       
398 De Rachewiltz, SH, para 187; II. Commentary, p. 672  
399 H. Desmond Martin, p. 78 
400 Bold, p. 110  
401 SH, para 230, De Rachewiltz, II, p. 833 
402 In the Service of the Khan eds. de Rachewiltz, Hok-lam Chan, Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing and 
Geier, ch. i. p. 3. 
403 SH,  De Rachewiltz II, p. 955. Though it has been repeatedly said that under the 
Chinggisids any man of ability, whether Mongol, Chinese, or Persian, the road to 
command lay open,403 the careers of the ötögü bo’ol  would indicate that this is clearly 
a complex category within the social intercourse which needs further examination 
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Notwithstanding the complexities of Mongol social classifications, Biran, 
in her significant article on diplomacy and chancellery practices in the 
Chaghadaid khanate confirms that their diplomatic contacts were 
conducted through envoys or ambassadors (Mon. ilchiyan; Ar. & Pers. 
rusūl; Persian, firistādahgān, Chinese shi). She found that of the 
Ögödeid and Chaghadaid envoys mentioned in the sources the majority 
were invariably members of the appropriate keshig or military entourage 
of the sender though relatives delivering the communication gave it the 
most elevated status. She is undoubtedly correct that the high number 
of Chinggisid aristocrats, who were of course ethnic Mongols, selected 
as Chaghadaid envoys was to ensure that their reception and message 
were treated with the proper respect.404   
For specialised missions the emissaries would be selected to ensure 
that they interacted with the recipient thus the Hülegüid Arghun Khan 
despatched the Nestorian Rabban Sawmā to the Pope in 1287. Qubilai 
carefully chose a member of his keshig 405or personal guard, who was 
the son of the Uighur who had taught Qaidu’s father, as his emissary to 
Qaidu, which was the main reason Qaidu spared his life.406 Other 
envoys to Qaidu from both Möngke and Qubilai were selected from 
amongst their keshig for their personal links with the recipient.407 
Jūzjānī refers to ‘confidential persons’ being despatched by the sons of 
Chaghadai to Möngke before his elevation408 and one can only assume 
that they were members of the keshig of the individual Chaghadaid 
princes. 409  
                                       
404 Biran, ‘Diplomacy and Chancellery Practices,’ p. 379 
405 This functioned as a bodyguard, elite troops, household establishment and 
provided administrators. 
406 YS, ch. 134, p. 3246 and Biran, ‘Diplomacy and Chancellery Practices in the 
Chagataid Khanate: Some Preliminary Remarks’ pp. 381-382 
407 See especially p. 381 Biran ‘Diplomacy and Chancellery Practices’ for further 
examples of envoys chosen for their personal links to the recipient. 
408 Jūzjānī, p. 1182 
409 Rashid al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 150 
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Nevertheless, the Imperial Family had a somewhat ambivalent attitude 
to emissaries since they were perceived as being close to the sender of 
the communication and thereby redolent with the sender’s prestige. In 
the context of the purges following Möngke’s contested elevation one of 
the recipients of an ominous demand from Möngke to appear at Court 
was Khwāja Oghul, the son of the deceased khan, Güyüg. His 
immediate reaction was to murder the messenger, Shilemun Bitikchi.  
He was constrained by one of his wives who pointed out to him ‘it is the 
messenger’s duty to deliver his message and in no age have men 
molested the messengers even of rebels. How then can one make an 
attack upon an ambassador (emphasis added) who has come from 
Möngke Qa’an? And by the killing of one person what harm can be done 
to his kingdom......’410 Fortunately for Khwāja, he heeded the advice and 
against very considerable odds, survived his summons. 
Such prudent sentiments were not, however, much in evidence during 
the Arïq Böke crisis from 1260 onwards following the death of Möngke. 
Although practically every member of Möngke’s personal keshig 
supported his youngest brother, Arïq Böke,411 who was Tolui’s youngest 
son and thus the Otchigin or Hearth Prince, Qubilai contested the 
leadership.  Rashīd al-Dīn records that ‘a hundred messengers were 
appointed to represent the princes and sent to Ariq Böke, to whom they 
delivered the following message: “We, the princes and emirs, having 
taken counsel together, have set up Qubilai Qa’an as Qa’an’.  
These messengers continued to pass to and fro between the 
protagonists until the defeat of Arïq Böke and his army who ‘took fright 
and scattered in disorder, having first put to death the two princes that 
had been imprisoned and the hundred envoys’. 412This was not an 
isolated incident of the insecurity of envoys in the unfolding drama. In 
661/1262-1263 Arïq Böke sent as envoys Buritei Bitikchi and Shadi to 
                                       
410 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 214 
411 Thomas T. Allsen, ‘Guard and Government’ p. 520 
412 Rashid al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 253 and ff. 
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levy cattle, money and arms for his army from his purported ally, Alghu, 
a Chaghadaid prince. These envoys were able to assemble some of the 
items until Alghu changed his mind imprisoning the ‘ambassadors’ and 
subsequently having them killed.413  
Thus emissaries did not only have to overcome the hazards of terrain, 
climate and insecure roads but also as dangerous, the character and 
disposition of the recipient. It seems then, that despite Chinggis Khan’s 
view on the sacrosanct nature of envoys, not all sovereigns or would-be 
rulers went along with this including his own grand-children. 
 
The Means of Transmission 
Having selected an emissary the next problem was getting the message 
to the addressee. The transmission options available to the sender 
depended not only on the urgency but also in large part on availability, 
distance and terrain. As one of the participants in the above embassy of 
Shāhrūkh observed, from the border city of Suzhou in the Hexi Corridor 
to the capital there were ninety-nine stages between which were 
qarghus, or signalling towers with sight-lines to each other. In the event 
of invasion, a signal could be transmitted over a distance of three 
months journey in the course of a night and day. Even so, a ‘hard-copy’ 
written message was also sent by relays of runners to confirm the 
signal.414   
 
Despite the speed by which signals could convey urgent messages, 
communicating by signal from Tabriz to Dadu or vice versa, for reasons 
which will be amplified below, was not an option, especially if it was 
more complicated than simply relaying the news that the Qa’an was 
dead. This meant that any communication had to rely on muscle power 
                                       
413 Rashid al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 258 
414 Hāfiz-i Abrū, A Persian Embassy to China, p. 33 
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for delivery - either runners or the four-legged variety both of which will 
be examined below.   
 
The Mongol and His Mount 
 
In the order of importance to the Mongols of their five kinds of livestock 
(tabun qosighu mal) the horse/morin is most valued, followed by the 
camel/temegen, the ox/üker, the sheep/qonin and lastly the 
goat/imaghan. The ratio between the number of horses and for example 
sheep was reportedly one horse for every six or seven sheep.415  
 
As travellers amongst the Mongols have noted time and again, from 
their earliest days Mongols are inseparable from their mounts. Natasha 
Fijn, in her study on Mongol herding customs notes that a ‘man was 
known by his horse. Mongols did not judge a man by his clothes or his 
accent. They looked carefully at his horse and by its proportions, 
colour, gait and by the look in its eye they could tell all the essentials 
about its owner. Knowing this, people chose and educated their riding 
horses with almost unbelievable care.’416 
Moreover, writing in the nineteenth century, the Russian explorer, 
Colonel Prejevalsky, observed: 
The Mongol is so indolent that he will not 
walk any distance, no matter how short, if 
he can ride; his horse is always tethered 
outside the yurt, ready for use at any 
moment; he herds his cattle on horseback 
and when on a caravan journey nothing 
but intense cold will oblige him to 
dismount and warm his limbs by walking 
a mile or two. His legs are bowed by 
                                       
415 quoted in Bat-Ochir Bold,‘ The Quantity of Livestock Owned by the Mongols in the 
Thirteenth Century’ Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, Vol. 8, Part 2, 
July 1998 p. 245 
416  Natasha Fijn, Living with Herds, Human-Animal coexistence in Mongolia, 
Cambridge, CUP. p.151 
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constant equestrianism and he grasps the 
saddle like a centaur. He loves and 
understands horses; a fast galloper or a 
good ambler is his greatest delight and he 
will not part with such a treasure, even in 
his direst need. His contempt for 
pedestrianism is so great that he considers 
it beneath his dignity to walk even as far 
as the next yurt. 
 
This horror of pedestrianism to some extent shaped the Türco-Mongol 
character since the horse was absolutely pivotal to what was an extreme 
form of equestrian society. Indeed, the implication from Prejevalsky is 
that an unhorsed Mongol would forfeit not just his means of transport 
but also his status – hence Temujin’s dismay when he discovered his 
family geldings had been rustled after the death of his father.417  
 
Zhao Gong, the Sung envoy, noted in 1221 that ‘the Tatars are born 
and grow up among saddles and horses.....418 The Chinese official Sü-
T’ing, travelling through Mongolia during the 1230s observed “I, T’ing, 
have never seen during my journeys through the steppes a single man 
going on foot”. 419 From the Secret History it is obvious that it was not 
only hunting that occupied the thirteenth century steppe dwellers.  As 
Captain John Wood was told during his mid-nineteenth century travels 
in the Pamirs, a good horse was a great blessing for without the horse, 
it would be impossible to raid and there would be no occupation and no 
glory, an utterance which undoubtedly applied six hundred years 
earlier in Mongolia.  
The dangerous corollary to a man’s status and character being judged 
by his mount was that those who had to go about on foot, in effect most 
                                       
417 Prejevalsky, Mongolia, The Tangut Country p. 60 
418 Zhao Gong, p. 7 
419 Sü-T’ing was a co-author of Hei-Ta shih-lüeh, quoted in Bat-Ochir Bold,‘The 
Quantity of Livestock Owned by the Mongols in the Thirteenth Century’ p. 243 
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of the settled populations of Eurasia except for elements of the military 
elites, were held in contempt. As Zhao Gong observed, the ‘Tatars 
despise the aged and love the strong’. John of Plano Carpini also noted 
that towards other people, the Tartars were ‘most insolent’ and were of 
a ‘disdainful nature’. Even when visitors were of high rank, ‘they scorn 
and set nought by all other noble and ignoble persons whatsoever.....’420 
 Such an attitude inevitably had serious repercussions for unfortunate 
civilians in conquered areas who acquired the dubious status of a ‘herd’ 
or ‘flock’.  When a city fell, each cavalryman was required to take ten 
prisoners who were then forced to work from earliest morn to night for 
the Mongols ‘and the slow ones are killed’. 421 Likewise, Ibn al-Athīr 
recounts with disgust that after the fall of Bukhārā, the survivors were 
taken prisoner and were ‘made to travel on foot in the most wretched 
fashion. All who became exhausted and unable to walk they killed’.422 
The Armenian historian Kirakos Ganjakets’i also discovered that despite 
being saved because of his literacy he was harassed and harried, 
travelling on foot whilst his Iranian guards would strike the skull or 
body of any captive who paused even for a moment.423 For such ‘herds’ 
of captives their forced relocation was tantamount to a death march. 
 
On the other hand, the much vaunted Türco-Mongol mobility may need 
to be revisited. In the context of the Chinggisid conquest of much of 
Eurasia, the fourteenth century Venetian geographer and strategist, 
Sanudo Torsello (c.1270-c.1334), remarked that foot soldiers made up 
the greatest part of their forces whilst ‘the lesser part sat in ox-carts 
and least of all were the asses, pack animals and foals’.424 That carts 
were a not insignificant mode of transport when on campaign is 
                                       
420 John of Plano Carpini, (tr. C. Raymond Beazley) The Texts and Versions of John of 
Plano, Carpini and William de Rubruquis, As printed for the First Time by Hakluyt in 
1598, London, The Hakluyt Society, 1890, pp. 110 & 111 
421 Zhao Gong, p. 8 
422 Ibn al-Athīr/Richards, Pt.3 p. 209 
423 The hatred of the Muslim Iranians for the Christian Armenians is one of the 
undercurrents in the Armenian sources. Kirakos, ch. 24 
424 Sanudo Torsello, p. 374 
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confirmed by the Armenian Kirakos Ganjakets’i who remarks that a 
substantial Jochid force crossed through the Derbend Gate/Iron Gate 
and ‘levelled and made easy all the passes on the route they travelled, 
for they were coming by cart’. 425The famed Mongol hordes galloping 
across Eurasia could well have been a rather less mobile and more 
motley force than is sometimes envisioned. 
Even the mobility of the elite mounted horsemen, however,  did not 
come cost-free, since horses, and even sturdy Mongol ones, are not all-
terrain vehicles able to keep going day and night without the need for 
refuelling and rest breaks. They too have needs as Chinggis Khan 
recognised in his military directive of c.1205 CE against unnecessarily 
fatiguing the horses before reaching their destination.426 This was to be 
done, according to his instructions, by removing the bit and crupper so 
that the horseman would not be able to direct nor control the animal 
and indeed would probably fall off if travelling too fast.427  
In view of their equestrian lifestyle it stands to reason that the first 
choice of transport for the Mongols were their sturdy little Mongolian 
horses on whose trusty hooves they had conquered much of Eurasia. 
Even so, like most forms of transport, these had their limitations which 
it is important to recognise as they formed the backbone both of the 
Chinggisid conquests and their communication network.  
Equus Caballus or the Mongol Horse 
There are two types of horse in Mongolia: the Takhi or equus 
przewalski, which is the truly wild horse and the free-ranging 
Mongolian horse, equus caballus, a distinctive breed indigenous to 
Mongolia ranging between twelve to fourteen hands (forty-eight to fifty-
six inches or one hundred and twenty-two to one hundred and forty-two 
cm) high.  There are chromosomatic differences between the two since 
                                       
425 Kirakos Ganjakets’i/Bedrosian Ch. 59 section 310 
426 SH para 199 and de Rachewiltz, SH II, p. 737 
427 SH para 199 and de Rachewiltz, SH II, p. 737 
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the Mongolian horse has sixty-five and the Takhi has sixty-six whilst an 
ass has only sixty-two.  
 
 
                                                                   Photographed in 2013 
 
A small band of Mongolian Horses above compared to the  
Takhi or Przewalski Horse below 
 
 
Przewalski's Horse photo courtesy of the World Wildlife Fund 
 
Bold has computed the number of geldings and stallions available in 
Mongolia at the turn of the thirteenth century as constituting thirty 
percent of the entire horse stock giving a figure of 420,000. He 
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estimates that the number of males and females younger than four 
years stood at 616,000 and the number of mares older than three years 
as 364,000 giving a grand total of 1,400,000 horses.428 Bold’s figures 
have implications for the number of mounts available to the Chinggisid 
forces though any computation is complicated by a number of factors, 
some of which are undoubtedly beyond our reach today including how 
many geldings were left behind in Mongolia.  
John Masson Smith has calculated that ‘Chinggis Khan’s army in 1206 
numbered some 135,000 men, approximately the whole adult male 
population of Outer Mongolia, which implies, multiplying by five, a total 
population of perhaps 675,000’.429  As a comparator, Prejevalsky 
observes that whilst in the 1870s there are no reliable statistics for the 
population of Mongolia, in his estimation  ‘If the whole nation were 
called out for military duty, Mongolia ought to supply 284,000 men (but 
less than one-tenth that number would be available)’.430 If Bold’s 
statistic for the number of horses in Mongolia in the thirteenth century 
is anywhere near correct and taking a figure between that of Prejevalsky 
and Masson Smith for those available for military duty say of 150,000 
men, assuming all were mounted on geldings,  each would only have a 
maximum of 2.8 mounts each. Or, on Masson Smith’s lower figure, then 
a maximum of 3 mounts. Taking into account the inevitable losses this 
seems a precarious number of mounts with which to conquer the 
known world.   
                                       
428 Bat-Ochir Bold,‘The Quantity of Livestock’, p. 242. To compute this he takes the 
supposed number of warriors in 1210 as being approximately 120,000 (out of a 
possible population of 695,000) and multiplies this by 3.5 horses taking the average of 
a warrior having between two and seven mounts depending on his circumstances, 
making in all 420,000 horses. For the other figures he looks at the ratios for which 
statistics are available in the late twentieth century. Carl Sverdrup has also computed 
the numbers of the Mongols available for action making a nominal total of 70,000 for 
the Mongol army in 1219.  Carl Sverdrup, ‘Numbers in Mongol Warfare’, Journal of 
Medieval Military History 8 (2010), pp. 109-117 
429 J. Masson Smith jr “Mongol Manpower and Persian Population” in Journal of the 
Economic and Social History of the Orient 18 (1975) 271-299; pp. 282-283 and  
430 Prejevalsky, N. Mongolia, The Tangut Country and the Solitudes of Northern Tibet. 
Trans. E. Delmar Morgan with introduction and notes by Colonel Henry Yule CB. 
London, Sampson p. 88 
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In view of the calculation above on numbers of horses it is interesting to 
note that apparently each horseman on campaign took along with him 
five mounts though some put the figure rather higher, at between ten 
and twenty.431 Zhao Gong simply remarks that when they go to war 
each man has several horses ‘and each day they alternate using one 
horse as a mount and therefore their horses do not become weary or 
exhausted.’ When on the move in Mongolia today a horseman can easily 
lead four horses432 so leading spare mounts would not cause any 
difficulties.  
On the other hand, General Ferrier, writing from personal experience in 
the nineteenth century, observed that when the Türkomans took to the 
field, they each had two horses, one a charger and the other a yābū or 
pack-horse used for burden.433 This may have been, however, because 
these chargers were not pastured when on campaign but were fed a 
special diet consisting of balls of raw sheep-tail fat mixed with barley 
and maize flour which presumably the pack-horse had to carry. There 
was thus a disincentive for taking extra mounts requiring extra rations 
and extra pack-horses to carry it all.434 
Upkeep 
As far as horse upkeep is concerned, the horses manage themselves 
while grazing throughout the day and are free to roam wherever they 
choose therefore much of a herder’s time is spent in finding the location 
of the individual bands each day. Mongolian horses tend to be an 
independent and self-directing group who mainly engage with other 
horses in small bands overseen by a stallion whose harem contains 
                                       
431 Peter P. Golden’s chapter on ‘Migrations, Ethnogenesis’ in The Cambridge History of 
Inner Asia, the Chinggisid Age, 2009, 
432 Personal observation 
433 General Ferrier, Caravan Journeys and Wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, 
Turkistan and Beloochistan, London, 1856, p.84 
434 This was precisely the problem identified by Major Bruce attempting to travel in the 
Footsteps of Marco Polo, that the more animals taken the more feed was required 
which meant more animals had to be taken to carry the feed thus requiring even more 
feed....p. 19 
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between one to twenty-six mares plus young. Stallions were gelded 
when they were four years old and strong. Bachelor bands of young 
males or geldings range from one to seventeen individuals and it is the 
geldings that are primarily ridden – individual geldings being selected 
from a whole herd and then only ridden over the course of two or three 
days and then left to rejoin their band to roam freely for months at a 
time.  Bat-Ochir Bold observes that Mongols traditionally do not use 
horses of less than four years of age as mounts and then only taken on 
long journeys after the sixth year.435  
Pasture: 
This factor to some extent explains the modus operandi of the Yām 
stations. The Mongol horse is bred in pasture throughout its life and 
because they eat selectively among plants and grass they do not graze 
for long at one place and once grazed the grass does not grow back thus 
the herd requires new pasture. From this viewpoint, it would be 
interesting to know how feasible the oft-repeated suggestion that 
Ögödei’s generals wanted northern China turned into pastureland436 
would actually have been. Evicting the incumbent farmers and 
ploughing up their small-holdings would not have been the end of the 
task since collecting the seeds of the preferred plants and grasses would 
have been a well-nigh impossible undertaking given the area to be 
sown.  
Pastures similar to those in Central Asia produce 500 kg/ha or 445 lbs 
an acre, which means that a Mongol tümen would have needed access 
to around 1124 acres – 1.75 square miles a day to obtain 10 lbs of (dry) 
grass for each of its 50,000 horses at the possibly generous figure of five 
horses per horseman. Thus the amount of sustenance required would 
be enormous for a full-strength tümen. Feeding the horses of a tümen 
                                       
435 Bat-Ochir Bold,‘The Quantity of Livestock Owned by the Mongols in the Thirteenth 
Century’, p. 244 
436 Allsen, Imperialism, p. 159; Ciociltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade, p. 28 
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the nutritional equivalent of grass in barley or hay, at 5 lbs of barley 
and 5 more of hay comes to 250 tons, meaning 1250 camel-loads of 400 
lbs each which is enough barley to feed 83,000 humans.437 Although 
the horses also require some salt, this can be obtained from plants and 
grass or drinking water at the rate of 5 grams a litre. Though the Yām 
stations were only supported by units of a thousand, this still goes 
some way to explaining why the ger encampments which did duty as 
Yām stations tended to move about so as not to be too far away from 
where the horses were in pasturage. 
 
Implications for the Yām Network of relying on pasture-fed horses 
 
Ögödei had commanded that the responsibility for the Yām stations 
were to be the units of a thousand. This unit of a thousand was 
primarily a military unit which presumably had to be prepared at all 
times to fulfil the duty of providing fighting men on demand and if near 
a boundary between polities, they also had border-guard duties. In the 
meantime, they had to ‘guard the roads’ as well as man the Yām 
stations. When Ögodei stipulated that twenty keepers be supplied for 
each post station, as the units of a thousand would have been scattered 
over their designated pasturelands with their families in reality these 
would have been twenty families or fewer if the families could provide 
sufficient manpower. Each family would have supplied the Yām/örtöö 
horses out of their own herds which could average fifty horses so the 
number of horses roaming the pastures would have been in the region 
of a thousand.  
 
Though Möngke stipulated that great ambassadors were not to be given 
more than fourteen mounts, these had to be fresh mounts, geldings as 
specified, meaning that the herds had to include not just the fourteen 
                                       
437 John Masson Smith Jr. ‘Mongol Nomadism and Middle Eastern Geography’, in the 
Mongol Empire and its Legacy p. 48. 
158 
 
geldings but also hold a reserve of geldings. Because they also had to 
supply kumiss the herds would have included milch mares and these 
would have been pastured in small herds overseen by a stallion. The 
families may well have had to provide camels and would have had at 
least one hundred sheep per family for their own use as well as for 
provisions as specified by Ögödei.  
An example of the ramifications of such figures is offered by the 
nineteenth century example of the one hundred and sixty-two families 
who managed five of the twenty stations on the military relay line 
towards the Altai (Mong. Altai zamyn buukhia örtöö).438 These five 
military relay-stations averaged thirty-two families per relay-station and 
each station had upwards of between four thousand and eight thousand 
five hundred animals. Admittedly, this was an above average number of 
families per station even for the period. This may have been because it 
was a military line since the average number of families responsible for 
postal relay stations seems to have been between five and seven. 
Ögödei’s number of post-horse keepers, then, was well above the Qing 
period average for postal stations in Mongolia. 
Furthermore, each unit of a thousand mentioned by Ögödei would have 
had pasture reserved for its usage, but out of that pasture-land some 
would have had to be reserved for the örtöönii nutag or relay stations. 
The one hundred and thirty-four relay postal stations in Mongolia 
during the nineteenth century (including the military relay westwards) 
had reserved for their pasturage the huge amount of 74,564 square 
miles/120,000 square kilometres.439 In some areas where there were 
many relay lines non-örtöö pasture lands for the remaining members of 
the units of a thousand became scarce.  
                                       
438 This military relay line expanded into sixty-four stations between the Chinese Gate 
Station in the Great Wall and the city of Uliastai in western Mongolia. Bold, p. 168 
439 Bold, Mongolian Nomadic Society, p. 45 
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There was the possible option of fodder fed horses and this has been 
explored in the context of China after Qubilai by Masson Smith with 
some interesting conclusions. He has done some very detailed 
calculations on the equation between the calorie requirements of the 
horses, the calorie requirements of the soldiers and the 75 acre land 
grants given to returning soldiery. In short, his conclusion is that the 
Yuan’s eventual dependency on fodder-fed horses meant that the Yuan 
were unable to campaign without prodigious quantities of fodder and 
supply trains which in his opinion they neither had the time nor the 
ability to raise. As importantly, they would not have been able to 
outmarch the pursuing rebels.440 Thus in his view the Yuan initiative of 
turning away from pasturing their horses was a major factor in the 
demise of the dynasty. 
On Campaign 
For Chinggisid commanders ‘refuelling’ the horses when on campaign, 
particularly in areas of scarce pasturage, could have serious 
implications especially for those campaigning in the rice paddies of the 
Southern Sung since the fodder available in rice paddy areas does not 
contain beta-carotene nor possibly salt, which the animals require to 
flourish.441 That unfamiliar and harsh terrain could seriously affect a 
campaign is shown to some extent by a comment of Sanudo Torsello, 
who puts the setbacks suffered by Chaghadai campaigning in ‘Lesser 
India’  down to the many deserts, mountains and arid and inhospitable 
lands’ where he lost a great number of men and pack animals.442   
Thus the Chinggisid conquerors were on the horns of a dilemma. The 
greater the geographical extent of their conquests and the more varied 
                                       
440 Masson Smith, ‘From Pasture to Manger: the evolution of Mongol cavalry logistics 
in Yuan China and its consequences’ in Pferde in Asien, Wien: Verlag der 
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441 Xinru Liu and Lynda Norene Shaffer, Connections Across Eurasia: Transportation, 
Communication and cultural Exchange on the Silk Roads, 2007, p. 248 
442 Sanudo Torsello’s Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis,  The Book of the Secrets of the 
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the terrain, the greater the likelihood that their Mongol horses would 
become vulnerable to local conditions, especially the humidity of 
southern China or the hot, dry Mediterranean littoral where summer 
fodder and most especially water were in short supply. The Mamluks 
did not have this problem because they not only generally confined 
themselves to one mount but also were not reliant on pasture.  Indeed, 
Sanudo Torsello specifically notes that on a number of occasions that 
the ‘Tatars’ ‘could not stay in [Syria] in the summer. This was because 
of the intense heat and because of a shortage of grazing for their 
suffering horses and flocks’.443 
For the Hülegüids one further consequence of their domicile in Western 
Asia was that their annual cycle became disrupted. Mongol horses in 
East Asia were used to roaming free to fatten up during this summer 
period in Mongolia whereas in the Hülegüid heartland of Azerbaijan, 
from summer on much of the extensive grasslands were becoming 
increasingly desiccated.444 Rubruck noted that every commander was 
familiar with the ‘limits of his pasturelands and where he ought to graze 
in summer and winter’445 and the routine of moving between summer 
and winter pastures was still continued in Western Asia. There was an 
important proviso, however, which was that the new grass did not start 
appearing until the winter. Thus rather than fattening during the 
summer, the horses had to fatten during the winter and spring which in 
Mongolia used to be the campaigning season. 
Such issues – as Michal Biran has identified - may have been a factor at 
the time of the Battle of Herat in 1270 between the forces of Baraq, the 
Chaghadaid khan and those of the Hülegüid Amir of Khurāsān, Arghūn 
Aqa. According to Rashīd al-Dīn the reason for Baraq’s eventual defeat 
was the unreadiness of his horses. He had been continuously 
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summer progresses they become increasingly dry and desiccated and water may also 
be an issue. 
445 Rubruck, p. 72 
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complaining that he was short of pasturage for them and was feeding 
those he had confiscated in Transoxiana and Herat with grain meant for 
the city dwellers and, humiliatingly, was reduced to ordering his troops 
in Khurāsān to ride donkeys and asses until the horses had fattened.446 
Hardening the Horses 
Natasha Fijn in her study on the herding culture in Mongolia447records 
the regime used for hardening horses before the festive Naadam horse 
races in Mongolia which is instructive since it may well have been that 
used for hardening the horses before campaigns. Thus after roughly a 
month long training regime the fat becomes solid and the horse should 
be able to gallop at full strength without losing its breath. It should also 
be able to participate in battles as well as go without sufficient (but still 
requiring some) water or grass for eight or nine days without exhausting 
its strength.   
Without this hardening even if a horse is in good shape it has been 
estimated that nine-tenths might collapse or die when run fast for a 
long distance.448 Allowances almost certainly need to be made for some 
exaggeration but even far lower statistics have worrying implications for 
the courier service. Rubruck himself notes that of the twenty or thirty 
horses available at the change-over, he and his party were invariably 
given the most inferior which were exhausted before reaching the next 
stopover. At least in the 1250s the implication being that not all the 
horses were fit for purpose and the much vaunted Mongol Yām rested 
on somewhat shaky equinine foundations. 
Eight or nine days on starvation rations, however, is an emergency 
regime rather than a long-term solution to lack of adequate pasturage. 
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162 
 
Such difficulties were overcome for Hülegü’s march westwards. As 
Juvaynī observed, ‘īlchīs were sent on in advance to reserve all 
pasturage and meadowland wherever the World-King’s troops might be 
expected to pass, from the Qanghai mountains between Qara-Qorum 
and Besh-Baligh; and all animals were forbidden to graze there lest the 
pastures might be harmed or the meadows injured’.....449   
 
Water Requirements:  
 
Though they have a reputation for hardiness, even Mongol horses need 
to drink, and regardless of age, are watered once a day. During warm 
seasons, they are watered in the middle of the day and afternoon. In 
winter, they are generally watered at noon. A fully adult horse would 
require between 33 and 45 litres (45 litres = almost 10 imperial gallons) 
of water a day during the summer and autumn while a three year old 
would require between 25 to 30 litres. For a full-strength tümen this 
would clearly be a lot of water to carry across waterless tracts. 
 
Water for the horses also had major logistical implications for the 
Chinggisid forces in Western Asia. Both Reuven Amitai-Preiss in his 
Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-llkhanid War, 1260-1281 and John 
Masson Smith in his review of that work have minutely dissected the 
logistical problems encountered by such forces in Western Asia, 
especially in Syria. Masson Smith concludes that pasture was less a 
problem than the water supply. In his estimation the 325,000 Mongol 
horses probably in the field against the Mamluks in 1299 needed at a 
minimum five gallons each.450 Indeed, Sanudo Torsello identified lack of 
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water supplies as a major vulnerability for any forces attempting to 
invade Egypt.451 
 
Water, however, was not just a logistical issue for the horses. Their 
riders needed up to two litres or so per day, particularly in the heat and 
with dry rations. This is vividly portrayed by Beyhaqi in his history of 
the Ghaznavids under the year 431/1039-1040. Beyhaqi emphasises 
the critical role caused by the dearth of fodder, food and decent mounts 
but particularly water available to the Ghaznavid forces of the Amir 
Ma’sud. These shortages caused such massive discontent before the 
Battle of Dandānqān that the battle was effectively lost even before the 
Seljūq forces were engaged.452  
 
In waterless areas, though the Mongols are famous for slitting a vein on 
their mount to obtain nourishment, to obtain two litres a day from the 
blood of their mounts was impracticable since it would seriously 
weaken the animal. A possible alternative was mares’ milk. According to 
the Sung envoy to Chinggis Khan, Zhao Gong, the milk of a single mare 
could satisfy three people’s thirst.  Rubruck for his part noted that so 
long as ‘their comos holds out, they care for no other food’453 but the 
difficulty here was this was only available during the summer months 
after foaling.  
 
Stamina  
 
A useful indication to the speed of travel comes from John of Plano 
Carpini who noted that remounts were less of a problem as they 
approached Güyüg’s Orda. Their guides had been commanded to bring 
the Papal Legates to the Imperial Court with all speed hence they 
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travelled from early in the morning to late at night, without food and ‘as 
fast as our horses could trot’.454  
In the early twentieth century, A.S. Kent in his travels in Mongolia 
found that an experienced rider mounted on a Mongol horse could cover 
five miles an hour with ease. Setting out after sunrise and going until 
sunset, though with a break at midday of a couple of hours, Mongol 
horses could cover distances varying from 35 to 45 miles/56-72 km 
without being unduly fatigued, depending on the nature of the 
terrain.455 This was partly predicated on the gait of the animals. Masson 
Smith points out that Chinggis Khan wanted his warriors to be 
mounted comfortably ‘on fluid paced mounts’ though Masson Smith has 
a less than generous view of the Mongol horse’s capabilities in this 
respect including the jolting ‘death trot’.456  
Five gaits have been identified with forty-two associated descriptive 
terms. For long-distance travel a particularly hard-to-come-by gait was 
preferred, that of the amble or joroolokh. This is smoother and more 
comfortable for the long-distance rider since the horse strikes the 
ground with its hooves on first one side and then the other, unlike the 
trot, where opposing legs strike the ground. Such amblers would form 
an important element of the “top herd” that is, the herds belonging to 
the noble elite and the khan himself. Thus the pace of Hülegü’s journey 
westwards was likely to have been a ‘stately amble’.  
Sickness 
There are few references in the sources to sick Mongol horses though 
Sanudo Torsello has a somewhat cryptic comment in relation to a siege 
in 1313 of two Mamluk occupied castles ‘beyond the Euphrates. The 
‘Tartars’ had to raise the siege after a month on account of food 
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shortages but most especially lack of grass for the mounts and ‘other 
animals’ but also because of a disease which afflicted the horses called 
pedana. Without any indication of the symptoms this is difficult to 
identify. A hint may be detected in the draconian outcome when the 
commander of Öljeitü’s forces had the horses killed. If Sanudo Torsello’s 
figures can be trusted this may have amounted to as many as a 
thousand animals.457  
Loads 
Stamina is also closely related to load. Thus William of Rubruck’s 
experience of the Yām network was rather coloured by, as he himself 
confessed, his corpulence as he had to be provided with the strongest 
mount available, some clearly not being up to the job and Rubruck was 
forced to transfer from the exhausted animals onto pack horses.458  
John of Plano Carpini also noted that after riding a horse for one day 
the Mongols did not ride the same animal for several days thereafter. 
One rule of thumb for estimating the load which a sturdy Mongol horse 
can cope with is that it can carry a weight equal to one third of its body 
for a long distance, unlike other breeds, which can bear the weight 
equal to/or less than one fourth of their body weight. If the average 
weight of a Mongol horse is six hundred pounds then theoretically it 
could carry two hundred pounds/fourteen stone/ninety kg. However, 
this is regarded by some experts today as overloading and the 
consensus amongst such nineteenth century explorers as Major Bruce 
is that the load should not exceed one hundred and fifty pounds/just 
under eleven stone/sixty-eight kilograms or the animal will become 
exhausted. John Masson Smith, on the other hand is very much more 
conservative in his estimation of the load the Mongol horses could 
carry, suggesting that seventeen percent of body weight was the 
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maximum459 with the implication that most riders were too heavy for 
the horses, hence the requirement for so many mounts.  
This may have been a factor in an aside in the Secret History relating to 
Sübe’etei’s command of an expedition in 1217 to finish off the Merkit 
who had fled to the Qipchaq Steppe. Sübe’etei was apparently furnished 
with a cart with an iron frame and iron covered wheels for this long and 
arduous journey. As it is hardly likely that Chinggis Khan would have 
despatched a sick man on such a mission it seems that Sübe’etei too 
was overweight for the Mongol horses. Whether he continued using his 
cart, drawn either by slow-moving oxen or by a faster team of horses or 
even camels, is not clear. What it does imply, however, is that the 
image, certainly amongst military tacticians such as Basil Liddell 
Hart,460of the supposedly blitzkrieg tactics used by the Mongols may 
need to be revised since the top long-distance speed of oxen is about 
one mile per hour with rest periods, not exactly speedy. One implication 
of the loading issue is that overweight Mongols, including 
Qubilai,461would have difficulty in taking to the field if mounted on 
Mongol horses.   
It is possible that the Tergen Yām or wagon station network used horse-
drawn carts to transport people as well as goods. As the early twentieth 
century explorer, Major Bruce, laconically remarked, this was not a 
mode of travel for the faint-hearted. The passenger was jolted and 
bumped for twelve or even sixteen hours at a stretch, day after day for 
three or four months on end, a fate for all whom duty or the emperor’s 
fiat sent from Peking to Xinjiang.  It was, ‘if not the tortures of the 
                                       
459 John Masson Smith jr. ‘Nomads on ponies versus slaves on horses’ in Journal of 
the American Oriental Society, Vol. 118, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1998), pp. 54- 62,  p. 58 
460 B. Liddell Hart, Great Captains Unveiled, Da Capo Press; New edition, (22 Mar 
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damned at least as good an imitation of them as this world could 
provide’.462  
The Rider 
Whilst the load carried by the horse is an important aspect of their well-
being, the experience of the traveller should not be overlooked as in the 
case of poor Rubruck above. Thus if Chinggisid trans-Eurasian 
communications were in part to convey envoys, the many ambassadors 
seen by Carpini’s party and Rubruck’s at Court were only there because 
they had invariably used the facilities of the Yām infrastructure, 
including, for present purposes, the mounts.  Though Rubruck himself 
had problems with mounts because he was overweight he also refers to 
a further hazard in which a gelding or indeed unruly packhorse, if not 
held firmly during dismounting or unloading, could bolt off through 
forests and over hills. If the disappearing animal was a packhorse then 
it could take everything with which it was loaded.  Similarly, when 
Ch’ang Ch’un was returning from his summons to Chinggis Khan, the 
horse that he was riding bolted to the north-east and his followers were 
unable to catch it.463  
One obvious mishap but which curiously is seldom mentioned by 
travellers but which must have occurred is being thrown or simply 
falling-off the horse. That this was not unknown, even for such 
experienced riders as Chinggis Khan himself, is briefly mentioned in the 
Secret History and it was clearly a heavy fall.464 That this must surely 
have been a more common occurrence than is mentioned in the sources 
can be ascertained today when riding on the steppe and must have 
been even more dangerous when fording rivers or scrambling up and 
down mountains. The grasslands in particular can be deceptive for even 
where they appear level there are not only untold millions of flies but 
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also unseen ruts and ridges, marmot holes, slippery stones and marshy 
ground which could cause even the most alert Mongol horse to stumble.  
Shod or Unshod? 
Before leaving the Mongol horse some consideration should be given to 
the thorny issue of shod versus unshod, though so far as the former are 
concerned,  iron horseshoes should be differentiated from 
‘hipposandals’. These latter covered the hooves with a material such as 
leather, rope or even wood and might be difficult to prove since these 
were perishable materials.465  
Denis Sinor has examined the evidence for iron horseshoes and in his 
succinct view the presence of the horseshoe cannot be established with 
certainty before the Mongol conquest in Inner Asia and then can only 
occasionally be attested. He is reasonably certain that the device is a 
western invention and that the lines of penetration into Inner Asia run 
from the west and the south and not from China. Interestingly he 
further notes that there is no common Turkic word for horseshoe 
though in Coman, Turkish, and Türkmen a loanword from Arabic, nal, 
is used. In a number of other Türkic languages taka refers to horseshoe 
with the Turkic etymology of ‘to fix’ or to ‘attach’.466 Taka passed into 
classical Mongol where it could possibly refer to a temporary horseshoe 
used for grip on ice or in the mountains.467  
A considerable and obvious challenge for the Mongols was that shoeing 
their vast herds of horses would require a considerable amount of iron, 
of which they were not over-supplied and in any case the first 
requirement was its use for weapons. As Sinor sagaciously remarks, the 
steppe provided the warrior with his mounts, which were the key factor 
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in his military success, but denied him the means necessary for the 
development of his weaponry.468 The same could be said for horseshoes 
and there is some evidence that Mongol horses were unshod. 
For example, Thomas, archdeacon of Spalato (1200-1268) was 
contemporary to the events he recounts though not always as an 
eyewitness. He observed that Mongol horses could ‘race over rocks and 
crags without horseshoes as though they were wild goats.’469 A further 
allusion is from an anonymous Latin poem composed on the occasion of 
the Mongol invasion of Hungary which notes that the Mongol horses 
were unshod.470   
There is some debate today in equestrian circles as to the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of ‘barefoot’ versus ‘shod’ animals.  A 
leading proponent for the ‘barefoot’ school, Professor Robert Cook who 
has authored numerous pro-barefoot articles, is an advocate for keeping 
all horses barefoot since hooves are healthier when unshod.471 He 
argues that ‘nature has developed the perfect design for grip and slide 
in all conditions and provided for unsurpassable shock absorption’ – 
which may go some way to account for Thomas of Spalato’s vision of 
Mongol horses happily scrambling over difficult terrain.  Moreover, 
neither can the foot expand and contract with each step when shod. 
One compromise was that observed by Captain John Wood during his 
travels in mid-nineteenth century Central Eurasia in which the Kunduz 
breed of horse, the description of which fits in with the Mongol horse, 
was shoed only on the fore feet and in the shape of a perfect circle.472 It 
seems, however, that the main reason for a horse being shod is that, if 
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it is stabled, the unshod hooves will rot through standing around in the 
detritus of the stall. It is interesting, therefore, that Kirakos of Gandzak 
mentions that the Mongols in Armenia levied one horseshoe per 
inhabitant.473  
Oxen and Carts 
Though horses may have been the transport of choice for the Mongols, 
Sübe’etei’s possible use of travel by ox cart and Chinggis Khan’s 
references to the shafts of his cart suggest that the alternative means of 
travel should not be overlooked. These included the camel which was 
second in the Mongol scale of the value of their livestock whilst the 
oxen, in third place, were more common than camels. 
Rubruck in Constantinople was given the choice between travelling with 
pack horses or wagons drawn by oxen for the first stage of his journey 
east. He opted for the oxen, reasoning that this would not mean having 
to unload and reload the pack horses at each change-over, to his 
subsequent regret since the first stage of his journey took twice as 
long.474  
The Mongols famed mobility also came at a price for those bringing up 
the rear in the baggage train since travel was by either ox or camel cart 
and clearly this too was not for the faint-hearted. The early twentieth 
century traveller, A.S. Kent, who used both means of transport 
describes the experience with some horror: 
.... the phenomenally uncomfortable camel cart .... long 
shafts are attached to this vehicle to permit harnessing a 
camel, but the peculiar stride and gait sets up a motion 
similar to that experienced on board ship in a choppy 
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sea, and in consequence of the vehicle itself being 
springless, the sensation is extremely unpleasant.  
....An ox-cart was a kind of two-wheeled trolley with 
shafts. The wooden wheels very soon lose their round 
shape over stony roads becoming in turn octagonal, 
hexagonal, pentagonal and at this stage the Mongol 
begins to think that it is time he had new wheels .....  
Travel by ox-cart is slow and tedious, the tortures en 
route increasing with the transformations in the shape 
of the wheels475 
 
Rubruck, on his own painful journey to the court of Möngke not far from 
Qaraqorum, was fascinated by the use of teams of oxen to move the tent-
carts of the Mongols. According to his reckoning one of these dwellings could 
be as much as thirty feet across, protruding beyond the wheels of the wagon 
by at least five feet on either side and was pulled by a team of twenty-two 
oxen driven by a woman. Since up to twenty or thirty wagons could be 
lashed together the whole convoy could be driven by one woman driving the 
lead wagon.476  
Rubruck also refers to chest wagons which could be pulled by either oxen or 
camels. These chests were made waterproof and contained the bedding and 
family valuables whilst the wagons were high so as to enable them to ford 
rivers without soaking the contents.  According to Rubruck a rich Mongol 
could easily have a hundred or two hundred chest wagons.477 At the same 
time, a Chinggisid prince would have numerous wives, each of whom would 
have had a large tent-wagon, plus the smaller ones behind for the maids. 
Thus for the tent wagons alone, if twenty wives were on the move with 
twenty oxen per tent wagon, then a minimum of four hundred oxen would be 
required, not to mention either oxen or camels for pulling the chest wagons. 
Thus when summoned to a quriltai accompanied by a full entourage, 
the princely encampments needed vast amounts of space. Not only 
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whilst plodding along at the stately pace of around a mile an hour or 
nine miles or so a day but also on arrival for pasturing their mounts as 
well as for the oxen, accompanying flocks and not least, the tent city. 
Furthermore, all this equipage was highly vulnerable, something which 
Chinggis Khan was well aware of since he ordered that when hunting 
one half of the nightguards was to remain behind to guard the tent-
wagons.478  
Apart from their stately pace and vulnerability to attack there was a 
third problem for the Mongols with their wagon-borne tent cities which 
was the terrain. When John DeFrancis tried to follow in the footsteps of 
Chinggis Khan in the 1930s he discovered, particularly when crossing 
Black Gobi,479 the track could be clearly made out thanks to the deep 
ruts made by carts that were also able to negotiate this area. Deep ruts, 
however, could also overturn a wagon and the time-honoured solution 
of moving parallel to the ruts led to ever-increasing parallel sets of ruts. 
At least these functioned as direction finders since as DeFrancis found, 
in areas of especially hard-packed soil, it was not easy to find the 
way.’480 
Bulliet has also pointed out that west of an imaginary line between 
Bukhārā and Karachi wagons were of little use because even up to the 
late nineteenth century and beyond there was a lack of developed roads. 
One reason for this was because pack camels and mules were cheap 
and efficient carriers over long distances where it would have been very 
expensive to develop wagon roads.481  
Not just a dearth of tracks could cause problems with oxen. Ch’ang 
Ch’un’s party travelling at the urgent behest of Chinggis Khan from 
northern China to northern Afghanistan had to abandon their oxen 
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because they became exhausted struggling up mountains and crossing 
hundreds of sand-dunes, thereafter presumably refusing to budge. The 
travellers decided against using oxen and replaced them by harnessing 
horses to their wagons. 482  
Yak 
Yak (Bos grunniens) tended to replace oxen for higher altitude journeys 
though ‘One of the drawbacks of yaks is that they are easily over-marched 
and then go off their feed. Their favourite pace can only be described as 
funereal’483  Neither Rubruck nor Carpini mention yak being deployed in 
Mongolia proper, though Rubruck does mention shaggy short-legged cattle 
with horns being used to haul the dwellings on carts in the Tangut country, 
north-east of Tibet.484 The Yuan do appear to have established a relay 
network in the heights of Tibet soon after 1269 in which both horses and 
yaks were used as mounts.485  
Camels 
Though there are sparse mentions of camels in the Secret History, 
except the famous incident of the Muslim Hasan riding on a white 
camel486 the main references are to them as haulers of the chest wagons 
rather than as fast riding camels. When the Tangut ruler, Burqan Qan 
offered many camels ‘reared in the shelter of the tall feather-grass’ as a 
levy to Chinggis Khan these were almost certainly the Bactrian variety 
rather than the one humped dromedary 
An experienced camel, like a horse, can remember even very difficult 
roads for several years and every farsākh (just over 4 miles or 6 
kilometres) they urinate to mark the spot for following camels. 
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Nevertheless, whilst the Mongols appear to have primarily used the 
camels as draught animals, despite the reputation of Bactrian camels 
as indefatigable transports across inhospitable terrain they too cannot 
be driven night and day without some care and attention.  
 Food and Drink Requirements 
Camels are famous for their ability to withstand waterless periods and 
can go without water for up to thirty percent of their body weight since 
in difficult conditions they can resolve their hump fat averaging 50 
kilograms each in a fit camel – equivalent to 700 kg of hay - and turn it 
into 100-200 litres of water. Normally, however, they cannot go without 
water in the autumn and winter for more than seven days, drinking up 
to 40 litres at a time often after nightfall. During the height of summer 
they need to drink every other day. They also cannot survive without 
salt but can obtain this from the soil on the steppes. 
Though camels can also go without food for several days, this should 
only be in extremis as if severely hungry they will simply collapse within 
forty-eight hours. That camels could be lost through lack of good 
grazing was recorded by A.S. Kent when travelling in Mongolia in 1919. 
He came across a camel caravan that had started its journey from 
Uliassutai in western Mongolia with twenty-five camels but had lost ten 
en route because of the poor state of the grazing grounds.487  
On the other hand, they do have some advantages over horses. It is 
thus interesting to note that during the winter, Bactrian camels had to 
be used to deliver the Russian mail between Beijing and Kiakhta across 
the Mongolian desert until the early twentieth century instead of 
horses.488 Moreover, they only need to feed for three hours or so.  
Camels, however, do need recovery time after arduous journeys, up to 
two months after a desert crossing before they are fit enough for the 
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next stage and their sagging humps have recovered to become firm 
again.  
 
Loading and stamina 
Jūzjānī mentions that when Chinggis Khan made overtures to the 
Khwārazmshah, he despatched five hundred camels laden with gold, 
silver, silks, khass-i Khitai (a coarse kind of woven silk), targhu (a silken 
fabric red in colour) kunduz (beaver) samur (sable) and raw silk and 
elegant and ingenious things of Chin and Tamghaj, along with 
merchants of his own, the majority of whose camels were laden with 
gold and silver.489  
These were presumably the Bactrian camels, whose load could be 
between 375-400 pounds 170/181 kg. A fit pack animal could manage 
roughly ten to twenty-five miles or sixteen to forty kilometres a day - 
roughly twice the speed of an ox wagon.  
 
Dogs 
 
In 1293, when north of Tabriz, Marco Polo may have had contact with 
an embassy to the Court of Geikhatu from the chief of the White Horde, 
a great-grandson of Jochi. This could explain Polo’s reference to 
Mongols living in an immense but tranquil area somewhere to the north 
where, because the country was impassable for horses because of the 
lakes, ice, mud and mire, dog sledges formed an important component 
of the communication network.  The courier sat on the sledge on a bear-
skin with the post-house keeper who guided the dogs by the best route 
to the next post-house station where the next relay dogs were 
waiting.490 Clearly, such a dog-sledge relay was only suitable for the 
immediate area in which it was situated and the envoys from the White 
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Horde would have used more conventional means on their journey to 
Tabriz. It is, however, an important indication how far-reaching were 
some parts of the Chinggisid communications network. 
 
Though not used as transport on the steppe, dogs were an ubiquitous 
and extremely dangerous aspect of travel on the grasslands especially 
when approaching encampments. Chinggis Khan himself was terrified 
of them491 and travellers arriving at a ger would be unable to dismount 
until the dogs had been restrained. Apart from their guard duties, 
however, the dogs were a vital element of navigation since their barks 
could be heard from some distance thus acting as inadvertent guides to 
the way-stations. 
 
Pigeons 
 
Of all the pre-modern means of transmission the fastest, most 
dependable and efficient were, as Youssef Ragheb makes clear in his 
classic Les messagers volants en terre d’islam  the ‘couriers of the 
sky’492 or the carrier/homing pigeon. 493 The role of carrier pigeons in 
the midst of hostilities as late as the Second World War is widely 
documented. Moreover, there were reports in 2011 that a special unit of 
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army based in Chengdu was training 
upwards of 10,000 pigeons.  Their role was deliver vital military 
communications in the event of the country's communication systems 
breaking down as they were the "most practical and effective short and 
medium distance tool for communications if there is electromagnetic 
interference or a collapse in our signals".494 
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Advantages of Pigeons: 
Pigeons as couriers have a number of advantages: they are fast, can fly 
through all weathers, and are also determined, even if badly injured, to 
get back to their loft.495 At the same time they do not require much in 
the way of feed nor an expensive infrastructure. They are also relatively 
inconspicuous and as they fly high, can overfly hostile territory without 
being shot down496 though this could be offset through losses from 
raptors. As Ragheb remarks, ‘Ĝrace aux pigeons, la rapidité des 
communications fut de tout temps prodigieuse.’497 Their cruising speed 
is approximately a mile a minute, though some have been recorded 
faster in short hops of a hundred miles or so, and they can cover 
considerable distances.  
 
By way of comparison, dromedaries used as swift courier mounts 
between Baghdad and Mecca could apparently achieve 200 miles/321 
kilometres a day whereas pigeons over the same distance could achieve 
up to 750 miles/ 1207 kilometres.498  Ragheb has examples of Abbāsid, 
Byzantine, Mamluk and Ottoman pigeons performing prodigious feats. 
In 329/940 a pigeon carrying a message from near Rayy in Iran 
informing the Sāmānid ruler in Bukhārā of the death of the rebel, 
Mākān b. Kākī flew more than 621 miles/1,000 kilometres.   
Within the Dār al-Islām, pigeons were extensively used under the 
Abbāsids. However, the height of the air courier service was under the 
Mamluks when Sultan Baybars organised his pigeon post in parallel 
with his mounted courier service in 659/1260-1261. Likewise, some of 
the very scarce references to Mongols and carrier pigeons were Mamluk 
related. There was the incident when an exhausted Mamluk pigeon with 
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a message warning the fleeing ruler of Mosul that he was about to be 
attacked by Hülegüid forces landed in Mongol-held territory and even 
more unfortunately chose as his perch one of the large Mongol 
catapaults where his message was promptly discovered.  
Despite such occasional hiccups, a fine example of the use of pigeons in 
strategic communications occurred in 682/1284 when envoys from 
Hülegü’s son and second successor Ahmad Teguder met with the 
Mamluk Sultan Qalawun. However, in the course of the meeting the 
Hülegüid envoys were put at a considerable disadvantage since 
Qalawun received a message via carrier pigeon reporting on Ahmad’s 
death, vitally important intelligence in the negotiations which was not 
revealed to the visiting envoys. 
It is perhaps suggestive that Juvaynī only mentions their use once. This 
was again not in the context of the Mongols but in that of Sultan Jalāl-
al-Dīn’s approach to Baghdad in 622/1224. Rather than the 
Commander of the Faithful coming to the Sultan’s aid as the Sultan 
had assumed, he instead despatched a force to expel Jalāl-al-Dīn from 
his territory and at the same time ‘carrier pigeons were dispatched to 
Irbil with the message that Muzaffar-ad-Dīn should likewise send 
10,000 men so that the Sultan might be caught between them’.499  
However, Mongke’s envoy to Hülegü in 1259, Ch’ang Te, has a passing 
reference to ‘pigeons which transmit news to a distance of a thousand li 
in one day’ but without giving details in whose service they operated.500 
Whilst there are references in pigeon-related literature to a trans-
Eurasian pigeon courier service set up by Chinggis Khan, it has to be 
said that the logistics would be interesting. Pigeons require a base, their 
loft, and they only fly a one-way trip, that is, from their point of take-off 
back to their loft. Whilst such aerial couriers formed an important 
element of Baybars’ strategic communications network, he had the 
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advantage of fixed points to establish their lofts which the Mongols 
certainly did not have in the time of Chinggis Khan.  
There were other, less obvious disadvantages, one of which was pigeons 
could not memorise messages, which as has been seen was a favoured 
means of transmission for the Mongols even though literacy was making 
inroads. Furthermore, they could only carry light loads though under 
the Abbāsids a script for pigeon-carried messages was devised which 
compressed information into the smallest possible space, the ghubar 
script which could be written as fine as a single hair.  
These constraints meant that pigeons could not be used as messengers 
when, for example, Chinggis Khan was on campaign and wanting to 
keep in touch with his commanders and sons. Whilst a human 
messenger could be told to ‘find Tolui’ there was little chance of a 
pigeon delivering the message even if Tolui had a mobile loft to which it 
could return. Such mobile lofts were experimented with during the First 
World War when it was found that confusion was a major issue if the 
pigeon’s loft at the front had been moved two or three times which 
disorientated the birds. 
On the other hand, as the Chinggisids became more settled, it was 
theoretically logistically possible to set up a pigeon relay between the 
Yuan and the Hülegüids by having lofts at way stations perhaps every 
six stages or so. However, this seemingly ideal solution does not seem to 
have been put into practice. One reason may have been that the 
communication system of an enemy was a prime target which is 
illustrated by reports in Maqrīzī and Qalqashandī. They both point out 
that when the Amir Tīmūr devastated Damascus in 804/1400-1, one of 
his key objectives was to ‘clip the wings of the Barīd’ by destroying the 
stations, including the pigeon lofts, thus obliterating the network in 
180 
 
Egypt and Syria.501 Thus whilst courier pigeons were an ideal means of 
transmission for short urgent messages over medium to long distances, 
in the Chinggisid context there were serious constraints in their use. 
Runners 
 
The means of transmission could also include runners and, like the 
alternatives, runners have both advantages and disadvantages. Where 
mounts were scarce or their upkeep problematic, such as in southern 
China, runners could come into their own since they were 
comparatively cheap as well as being more easily replaced hence 
runners formed a crucial component of the communications networks 
of the Jurchen/Chin, Sung and Yuan. As Marco Polo points out with 
reference to the Yām in China, runners ran extremely fast relays but 
only for a distance of around 3 miles or 4.82 km before handing the 
message over to the next runner.502  
Furthermore, unlike pigeons, runners could be interrogated by the 
recipients. Juvaynī records an incident in the period leading up to the 
fall of Merv when runners delivering messages to the defending 
grandees from a supposed ally were interrogated ‘one by one’ so clearly 
several had been despatched on this one mission.  On finding that the 
ally had in fact gone over to the Mongols, the unfortunate runners were 
slain.503 
Runners, however, seem to have had a patchy history in Islamic 
western Eurasia in contradistinction to China.  Al Jāhiz implies that 
during the reign of Harun al-Rashīd runners were unknown in the 
Abbāsid Barīd504possibly being introduced under Iranian influence 
during al-Mu ‘tasim’s Caliphate 218-227/833-842. In the Hülegüid 
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domains in the west, Ghāzān had relay runners or payks who could 
cover between 112 to 150 miles/180 to 240 kilometres a day with two 
runners located at each station. Allsen makes a case for a chiliarchy of 
Bekrin mountaineers from the Tian Shan who had submitted to 
Chinggis Khan some of whom accompanied Hülegü west and served as 
mountain couriers in the Caucasus. Allsen assumes this meant that 
they were runners.505  
 
However, to arrange such a network of runners across the wastes of 
Eurasia would have been administratively extremely difficult. Even with 
the Chinggisids’ logistical expertise it would have been extremely testing 
to organise and maintain a chain of runner relay stations at 3 mile/5 
kilometre intervals each with at least two runners, across thousands of 
miles/kilometres between Tabriz and Dadu with the attendant 
subsistence problems, hostile terrain, meteological extremes and other 
hazards.  
Beacons 
These could be a very fast means of communicating brief, 
uncomplicated messages. Whilst following in the footsteps of Marco Polo 
at the beginning of the twentieth century, Major Bruce quotes a story of 
a dervish traveller to China in about 1560 AD. The dervish related that 
questions were put to the merchants with whom he was travelling about 
what they were carrying, whence had they come and how many of them 
were there?” The answer being given, the king’s guards passed it by 
signal – smoke if in daylight, by fire if by night – to the next watch 
tower; then to the next and so on ‘until in a few hours the message 
reaches the king at Cathay; a thing which would by any other 
communication require many days. The king sends back his orders in 
                                       
505 Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmi ‘al-tavārīkh, ed. A. A. Romaskevich, A.A. Khetagurov and A. A. 
Alizade Moscow, 1968, I/1, pp. 343-345 also Allsen, ‘Imperial Posts’ p. 248 
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the same manner and with equal rapidity, saying whether all shall be 
admitted or only a part, or the whole put off.’506  
Perhaps more frequently beacons were used to warn of impending 
hostilities and the Qing had a chain of beacons stretching from Yarkand 
in the Tarim Basin to Beijing.  Watchtowers were erected along the 
Government Courier Roads every three miles.507 Beacons were also 
utilized by the Mamluks until the Mongols were no longer a threat by 
the peace treaty of 1323.  The Mamluks had a line of beacons stretching 
from the Euphrates to Gaza - roughly 793 miles/1277 km - on high 
mountains on which men were stationed and paid for by the sultan. If 
the Mongols showed any sign of movement, the beacons would relay 
smoke signals to Gaza from whence it would be flown by pigeon to 
Egypt, with the information arriving the same day.508  
The Qing beacon relay system covered a distance roughly half of the 
way to Iran of 2727 miles/4389 kilometres but between Yarkand and 
western Eurasia were the Pamirs which could be an insuperable barrier 
for such beacon communications.  
Whistling Arrows 
There are references in the sources to whistling arrows which 
commentators tend to regard as having a short-range military signalling 
function. However, two of the main references have a different 
connotation. When the young Temujin was eleven years old he and his 
friend Jamuqa had sworn friendship and had sealed this with by 
exchanging arrows which each had made. Jamuqa’s present to his new 
anda was a whistling arrowhead.509 In a not dissimilar vein, Rubruck 
has an interesting aside on whistling arrows being presented with a 
subliminal message. In this latter instance, Möngke Qa’an is reported 
                                       
506 Major C D Bruce, In the Footsteps of Marco Polo, p. 249 
507 L. Richards, Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire, p. 426 
508 Ansarī, Tafirīj, pp. 12-13, pp. 46-47 and Silverstein, p. 176  
509 SH I para 116 and commentary, p. 437 
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by Rubruck to have dispatched an envoy to the French king 
accompanied by a cleric, Theodolus, about whose credentials Rubruck 
was extremely sceptical. Möngke had a ‘very strong bow made that 
could scarcely be drawn by two men and two arrows [bousiones] with 
silver heads full of holes, so that when fired they whistle like pipes’. 510It 
is Möngke’s instructions to his envoy, however, which are significant: 
You will go to the king of the French, to 
whom this fellow will escort you and you 
will present him with these things on my 
behalf. If he wants peace with us, we shall 
conquer on the one hand from the 
Saracens the territory as far as his and we 
grant him on the other the remaining land 
to the west. If not, you will bring back to us 
the bow and the arrows and tell him that 
with bows like this we shoot far and hit 
hard.511 
********* 
 
Putting together the strands of evidence, including the preference for an 
oral dimension even if a written message was being sent and the Mongol 
obsession with status, suggests that the Chinggisid communication 
network was not a relay courier postal service though it did rely 
primarily on mounts and emissaries.512 In fact, it appears to have 
operated not dissimilarly from the Roman cursus publicus which Kolb 
forcefully argues was an ‘infrastructure’ for use by state officials and 
which had three purposes, also replicated in the Yām network. These 
were to secure state communications, transport government agents and 
                                       
510 Rubruck, p. 185 
511 Rubruck, pp. 185-186 
512 Carruthers on his journey through unknown Mongolia at the turn of the 20th 
century remarks that the khan’s ‘messenger’ in this sense an escort, who 
accompanied them had precedence over all that came their way and as the khan’s 
word was law, the requests of the ‘messenger’ were promptly carried out. Carruthers, 
Unknown Mongolia, pp. 279-281 
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the movement of certain goods.513 Similarly, the primary role of the Yām 
stations was to supply remounts and subsistence for emissaries rather 
than act as postal courier interchanges.  This means that the Yām did 
not replicate the function of the Barīd, which Allsen regards during the 
Umayyad period (AH 661-750) in particular as being primarily designed 
to convey information rather than the movement of goods or people. 514 
The fixation that it was  a ‘postal courier’ network, presumably on the 
basis that this was the form of most other similarly organised pre-
modern communication systems515 can be illustrated, for example, by 
C. Raymond Beazley’s translation of Carpini’s mission. In the Latin it 
states Hinc equi nobis dati sunt & tres Tartari, qui nos ducerent 
festinanter ad ducem Bathy.  Beazley, however, translates this ‘Here 
certain post horses [emphasis added] and three Tartars were appointed 
for us to conduct us from hence with al speede unto duke Bathy’.  The 
Latin, however, simply refers to ‘horses’ 
 
Though it cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt, the conclusion is 
thus that the vision of the Yām network comprising a courier service 
regularly galloping across Eurasia may have to be modified.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
513 Anne Kolb ‘Transport and Communication in the Roman State: The cursus 
publicus’ in eds. Colin Adams and Ray Laurence, Travel & Geography in the Roman 
Empire, London and New York, Routledge, [2001]  2011 pp. 95 and 98 
514 Thomas Allsen, ‘Imperial Posts, West, East and North: A review Article of Adam J. 
Silverstein, Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World. Archivum Eurasiae Medii 
Aevi, ed. Thomas T. Allsen, P. B. Golden, R. K, Kovalev, and A. P. Martinez, 17 (2010), 
Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz Verlag pp. 237-276, p. 238 
515 Even Silverstein assumes that it was a ‘postal’ system. Ch. 4, ‘The Mongol Yam and 
its legacy’ in Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World. 
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PART III 
 
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTIONS 
OF THE YĀM NETWORK 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
The Yām Network: 
From Ad Hoc to Formal 
 
 
[A ruler] must have postmasters; and in every age in the time of 
ignorance and of Islam, kings have had postmasters, through whom 
they have learnt everything that goes on, good and bad. 
Nizām al-Mulk516 
 
Although it was argued in the previous chapter that the Chinggisid 
communication network was not a postal courier service, the quotation 
above from the great Seljūq Vizier, Nizām al-Mulk (409-485/1018-1092) 
encapsulates a key reason rulers instituted an officially organized 
communication network. As Patricia Crone observed earlier, a ruler 
needed to be vigilant to ensure the security, not just of their realm but 
also of their throne.517  
 
Such a strategy required not just endless vigilance but also a reliable 
and robust system of communications so that rulers ‘received 
information as full, accurate, up-to-date and speedily conveyed as 
possible’518 on the activities of their enemies, allies, families, officials, 
                                       
516 Nizām al-Mulk (tr. Hubert Darke) The Book of Government or Rules for Kings p. 64 
517 Patricia Crone, Medieval Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press, 2004, p. 156 
518 Norbert Ohler, the Medieval Traveller, p. 64 
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the state of the harvest or the mood of the bazaar. Thus a 
communication system was intimately connected to the challenge facing 
all rulers of retaining their thrones and metaphorically as well as 
literally ‘staying in the saddle’.  
The Chinggisids were certainly not exceptions to these pressures and as 
their dominions expanded, their arrangements evolved to take account 
of the extended lines of communication and the responsibilities of 
governance. This development can be divided into three main phases: 
the period from Chinggis Khan to Ögödei Qa’an’s accession in 1228/29; 
the period between the improvements Ögödei made to his father’s 
system and Qubilai’s accession in 1260 when the latter moved the 
centre of gravity from the sacred soil of Mongolia to Dadu in northern 
China. This latter event initiated a third period which encompassed the 
re-ignition of Sino-Iranian relations within a Yuan-Hülegüid nexus.  The 
main aim in this chapter, then, is to analyse the development of the 
Chinggisid network which will be approached from a number of aspects. 
These will include the impetus within statecraft towards the 
establishment of an organised network of communications as against 
an arrangement whereby a trusted and resourceful messenger was 
plucked from an entourage and forced to use his own initiative in 
overcoming any perils to safely deliver his message.519  
 
The Two Archetypal Communication Systems 
Historically there have been two main approaches to organising pre-
modern state communication systems: a formally incorporated network, 
with professional messengers and way-stations charged with providing 
the transport, provisions and so forth which was overseen by state 
officials and with the expenses largely borne by the state. The courier 
service could either be a relay service or one in which a single courier 
                                       
519 The example of the trials of the messenger mentioned in the previous chapter by 
Beyhaqi nicely illustrate this aspect. 
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carried the message the entire route.  Examples of such formally 
constituted networks include the Chinese, Roman cursus publicus, the 
Sasanian, the Abbāsid Barīd, the Ghaznavid and the Venetian. 
Alternatively, it could be ‘informal’ whereby either an oral or a written 
message was entrusted to a resourceful member of the ruler’s 
household who was sent to find his own way to the recipient armed only 
with an authorisation such as a pa’iza permitting the requisition of  
replacement mounts and subsistence from the populace.  
This latter, somewhat ad hoc arrangement appears to have been the 
system under Chinggis Khan before Ögödei’s reforms between 1229 and 
1234. The impetus towards a more organised system seems to have 
been twofold: to expedite the delivery of important communications and 
to establish a more efficient means of providing mounts and 
subsistence for the emissaries.  Moreover, as domains become more 
extensive, communications have to reach further thereby becoming 
more vulnerable. There is thus an intrinsic stimulus impelling rulers 
towards more formalised communication networks as the hazards and 
limitations inherent in a haphazard system become apparent. Such a 
dynamic can be detected in the early conquests of both the Arabs and 
Mongols. The incoming Arabs in the first century AH/seventh century 
CE - and six hundred years later, the Mongols - were conquerors who 
were strangers to bureaucracy. Nonetheless, as Silverstein has pointed 
out,  ‘conquest movements’ tended to develop rudimentary postal 
systems even before establishing a stable administrative framework into 
which such a system could be incorporated.520 
 
 
 
                                       
520 Silverstein, 2007, p. 50 
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The period up to the death of Chinggis Khan: Improvised 
Communication Networks in the Early Conquest Period 
 
Silverstein regards the Mongol conquests as a valid historical paradigm 
for the Islamic conquests,521 though for present purposes the opposite 
is rather more apt. Whereas through their trading interests the Arabs 
had wider geo-political horizons than the Mongols, both sets of 
conquerors - at least in the initial stages of their conquests - had four 
important characteristics in common. In their distinctive ways each was 
emblematic of ‘Men of the Sword’ rather than ‘Men of the Pen’. Both had 
their roots in inhospitable regions and came from backgrounds where 
lineage was all important and the elites operated within an ‘aristocratic’ 
milieu.522 Equally both had to consolidate their conquests from a basis 
of little experience in administering ancient, settled and bureaucratic 
societies. Thus the Arab precedent, especially as far as their 
communication systems were concerned, could potentially offer some 
useful insights into an investigation into the later Mongol experience.  
There were also, however, some important areas of divergence between 
them. Initially, the Mongols were not literate and even when not on 
campaign continued to be peripatetic. Moreover, it appears from al-
Tabarī’s (224-310/839-923) Ta’rīkh al-rusul wa’l-mulūk that the second 
caliph ‘Umar (r. (13-23/634–644) was rather less ‘hands-on’ than 
Chinggis Khan and essentially directed the Arab conquests by post from 
Medina.523 Furthermore, the Mongols had to overcome a serious 
impediment to the efficient management of a communications network 
which the Arabs did not have to confront in that the scattered 
Chinggisid Imperial Family had an entrenched sense of entitlement. The 
Arabs, conversely, were in the happy position at least at first - and 
                                       
521 Silverstein, 2007, p. 50 
522 An interesting reference to this is in the speech of Al-Mughīrah b. Zurārah b. al-
Nabbāsh al-Usaydī to the Persian sovereign, Yazdagird, recorded by Tabarī, in his 
Ta’rīkh al-rusul wa’l-mulūk, trans. Yohanan Friedmann,  p. 37 
523 He did, however make at least four trips to Syria. Al-Tabarī 1992, pp. 149-154, 188  
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uniquely amongst conquerors – of not having to make allowances for 
the reward and conciliation of an ‘imperial’ family. That this sense of 
entitlement amongst the close relatives and followers of a khan was 
deeply-rooted in steppe society is made clear in the Secret History524and 
this particular issue will be addressed under the development of the 
Yām. 
 
The Early Chinggisid Experience 
In the early days of Temujin’s rise, the Secret History has several 
references to messages being sent and received including the important 
occasion when the Ong Qan agreed to help Temujin rescue his wife 
Borte from the Merkits. On that occasion, Temujin is recorded in the 
Secret History as sending his brothers Qasar and Belgutei to deliver a 
rhyming verbal plea soliciting help from his blood brother and the Ong 
Qan’s associate, Jamuqa.525  Such comparatively localised 
communication between neighbouring allies must have been achieved 
without too much difficulty using as messengers trusted members of 
the inner circle who would not only have been conversant with the 
context but also with the topography. 
The communication system operating before the death of Chinggis Khan 
is described by the Sung envoy to the conqueror, Zhao Gong.  In his 
report of c.1221 he refers to xuancha who, from his description of their 
treatment as they travelled, were not ‘postal couriers’ as such but 
appear rather to be ‘emissaries’ from Chinggis Khan or his ‘viceroy’ in 
northern China, Muqali. As envoys of such august personages they 
were clearly treated with great respect by those whose areas they 
                                       
524 SH para 242 for the apportionment of the profits of the conquests to date and CK’s 
mother’s dissatisfaction with her share 
525 SH, para 105, de Rachewiltz I, p. 35. Jamuqa was the childhood anda of Temujin 
and distantly related through their common ancestor Bodonchar. He was in his own 
right a chief of the Jadaran or Jajirat and thus potentially a serious rival to Temujin. 
See de Rachewiltz para. 104, p. 409 and para. 40, p. 278 for background to Jamuqa. 
190 
 
passed through, entertained and lodged with some magnificence and 
were also able to exchange their mount if they came across one they 
preferred which, according to Zhao, was called ‘riding a stationed horse’ 
or cheng pu ma. This, he helpfully explained, is what in ancient times 
was meant by ‘riding relay’, thus confirming that this referred to horses 
rather than messengers.526 
A system that relied on hospitality from local dignitaries and the 
requisition of mounts was not only a burden on the populace but as the 
field of operations expanded must have been put under considerable 
strain.  Silverstein argues that the travel account of Ch’ang Ch’un, 
summoned from Shantung province in north-eastern China to northern 
Afghanistan to discuss the prospects of immortality with Chinggis 
Khan, confirms that delineated post routes were in place as early as the 
1220s.  Certainly Chang’s companion remarks that on their return 
journey they ‘finally came out upon the post road previously taken by 
us, where it followed the course of a great river to the south of the Chin 
Shan.’527  
This would place the Yü-ērh-li or ‘long-lasting way’ just south of today’s 
Ulaan Baatar. If so its eastward trajectory would take it in the general 
direction of the ruined Uighur capital of Ordu Baliq/Karabalghasun on 
the western bank of the Orkhon River, a few miles NNE of Qaraqorum. 
That the Yü-ērh-li was an ancient way even before the Uighurs is 
suggested by the history of the Orkhon River Valley. This is now an 
UNESCO site recognised for its cultural importance as a centre for the 
Xiongnu and the Eastern Türk Empire, including the 8th and 9th 
century Orkhon Inscriptions, as well as for the Chinggisids and 
Buddhism in Mongolia.  
Ch’ang Ch’un’s allusion, however, would seem to have two 
ramifications: firstly, it implies that for much of their journey they 
                                       
526 Zhao Gong, p. 11 
527 Travels of an Alchemist, trans. Waley, p. 121 
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simply followed tracks going off in the general direction of their 
objective. Secondly, it underlines the problem that ‘delineated post 
routes’ might not actually go anywhere near the traveller’s proposed 
destination even if the objective happened to be Chinggis Khan’s 
current command post.  This is a point which has been rightly observed 
by Allsen who remarks that ‘even with a fully elaborated and 
“routinized” communication system, much government business is 
conducted off the beaten track by officials travelling in areas beyond the 
reach of the post’.528  What is not clear, however, is whether the turn-off 
which the party took after joining the main route towards the south-
east somewhere in the region of the key way station of 
Bishbalik/Urumchi was also part of the Yām network or simply a 
travellers’ pathway.529 
This track took Ch’ang Ch’un’s party near the northern frontier of the 
Tangut country which must mean they were crossing the Gobi. If it was 
indeed a formal Yām route, it does not seem to have much to 
recommend it. The party were forced to split into three groups travelling 
a week apart to ensure each party had enough water.  There were no 
organised way-stations for changing mounts since they had to change 
their horses at a fu-lu, a rough shelter of stones or skins and even when 
civilisation of sorts was reached, they had to rely on the hut and tent 
dwellers for fresh mounts.530  
 
This was in stark contrast to Ch’ang Ch’un’s experience in 1224, when 
the Governor of Chungdu /Middle Capital/Beijing suggested that the 
sage take up his residence in that city. Though the Chin had removed 
their capital to Nanching/Southern Capital/Kaifeng in Honan in 1215 
there was still armed resistance in northern China, which indeed had 
affected Ch’ang on his outward journey since many of the roads had 
                                       
528 Allsen ‘Imperial Posts’ p. 252. 
529 Bretschneider, Medieval Researches, p. 27 
530 Travels of an Alchemist, trans. Waley, p. 126-128 
192 
 
been blockaded. Nevertheless in 1224 arrangements were made for him 
to travel by post. Equally the Khitan Yelu Chucai travelled to Yen, the 
former Jin capital, ‘riding by stages [chichuan]’ as well as by post horses 
or chiyi.531 Thus despite the tremendous upheavals in northern China it 
seems that a residual Chin postal network was more or less 
operational.532  
 
Ögödei:  
From an Improvised to a Formalised Communication System 
 
That the early Chinggisid communications network was under pressure 
in his father’s lifetime was effectively confirmed by Chinggis Khan’s 
successor, Ögödei.  Following his enthronement at the quriltai of 1229 
he made some much needed improvements to his father’s 
organisational efforts which included his communications: 
  
‘Further, when the messengers ride in haste We 
allow them to ride moving freely among the 
population, and as a result the pace of these 
riding messengers is slow and they are an 
affliction on the people. Now We shall settle 
matter once and for all by providing post-station 
masters and post-horse keepers from the various 
units of a thousand of different areas, by setting 
up a post station at every stage, by not allowing 
the messengers to move freely among the 
population unless on urgent business but 
instead by having them ride in haste through the 
post stations...’533  
 
 
However, what Ögödei had in mind was a radical departure from the ad 
hoc arrangements of his father and neither were they within the 
customary remit of an elected khan.  
                                       
531 Igor de Rachewiltz, trans., “The Hsi-yu lu of Yeh-lu Ch’u-ts’ai,” Monumenta Serica 
21 (1962) pp. 17, 19, 112 (1a) and 114 (1a). Also Allsen ‘Imperial Posts’ p. 243 
532 See Rashid al-Din, trans. Boyle, p. 34 for a brief note on the situation in northern 
China in this period 
533 SH, para 279, de Rachewiltz I, p 214 and II, 1027-1028 
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The Duties of a Charismatic Khan 
 
Ögödei was particularly careful not to proceed with the projected 
networked communication system without the support of his elder 
brother, Chaghadai. His caution was understandable since what was 
being suggested could be construed by the Mongol elite as Ögödei 
overstepping the mark in what were considered to be the customary 
duties of a khan, hallowed by tradition.  
On the steppe each aristocratic polity ‘had its council the ey-e, 
eyedekhui and later khurildai/quriltai. This council, when  occasion 
demanded, nominated a leader, the khan, whose most important duty 
was to head operations during large-scale otor or migrations, in raids or 
in times of war.’534 The khan’s leadership role also included the 
distribution of plunder535 as well as the planning, organisation and 
control of the production process including the digging of wells.536  
What is noticeable is that the duties in the above ‘role description’ are 
essentially ‘military’ rather than what would be termed today as ‘civil’. 
The charismatic khan was thus more ‘commander-in-chief’ than ‘ruler’ 
and whilst he had absolute ‘command and control’ over his own keshig 
as well as his immediate family, within the wider aristocracy of the 
steppe obedience was predicated on a number of factors including his 
perceived ‘legitimacy’ as well as how he performed his duties.  
The legitimacy of such a khan was predicated on the attendance of the 
assembled grandees at a quriltai and even if the decision was not 
unanimous, the decision was binding on all present including those 
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535 SH  e.g. paras. 273, 179, 162,163,  
536 SH, para 281 
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unable to attend but who had representatives present.537 He could, 
however, expect absolute obedience to a decision at a quriltai reached in 
consultation with the aqa or most senior members and the ini, or lesser 
members.538 Theoretically, then, ‘obedience’ was an attribute of the 
decision-making process but even so there was an inherent tension in 
any steppe formation between the duties of the khan and the customary 
rights of the aqa and ini.  
Hence the care in which the Secret History records details of the 
attendees, distribution of goods, rewards and appointments associated 
with the elevations of Chinggis Khan and Ögödei. In circa 1184 Temujin 
was unanimously chosen to be their leader that is, Khan of the Borjigin 
Mongols539 by three of his cousins, who were the most senior members 
of the Borjigin. Temujin’s subsequent rise to the position of ‘a 
charismatic’ khan was within the steppe tradition of one who had the 
ability to form and lead federations of rival noble houses and this was 
consummated in 1206, the Year of the Tiger, when he was appointed 
the supreme leader of a greatly enlarged following with the title of 
‘Chinggis’ Khan.  
Notwithstanding securing nomination as leader of a federation the 
charismatic khan was not entirely secure in the saddle. If he upset 
enough of his ‘electoral college’ (its use here understood to be somewhat 
anachronistic) his tenure could well be a short-term contract with a 
bloody ending540 or if his good fortune deserted him541there was every 
                                       
537 Florence Hodous has investigated the legal aspects of quriltais in ‘The Quriltai as a 
Legal Institution in the Mongol Empire’, Central Asiatic Journal, Vol. 56 (2012/2013) 
pp. 87-103.  
538 For example, Chaghadai told Ögödei that ‘we, all of us, aqa and ini, spoke great 
words in the quriltai and gave written undertakings that Ögodei was the Qa’an and we 
should tread the path of loyalty and obedience and in no way oppose him’. Rashīd al-
Dīn/Boyle p. 148  
539 The context implies that the cousins were spokesmen for those who followed 
Temujin at this stage and the choice was not purely on their own behalf. 
540 The SH records Jamuqa being abandoned by his allies after he allegedly plundered 
some of them. SH, I, para. 144; de Rachewiltz I, pp. 526 and 527 
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possibility that they would simply abandon him.542 Chinggis Khan’s 
successor Ögödei was appointed Khan in the Year of the Rat, 1228/29 
over the heads of at least two eligible brothers and he well understood 
that such issues were magnified for the successors of the ‘charismatic’ 
founder of a dynasty. Thus, when his ‘Pillars of the Court’ remonstrated 
with him over his generosity Ögödei , according to Rashīd al-Dīn, 
responded realistically if cynically “It is known of a certainty to all 
mankind that the world is faithful to none (emphasis added) and that 
wisdom requires a man to keep himself alive by the perpetuation of a 
good name.”543 
That ‘good name’ was dependent on how the incumbent khan performed 
the customary duties mentioned above. There is no evidence whatsoever 
that it included imposing a postal/intelligence network through the 
domains and pasturage of his imperial relatives or noble followers, who 
would be held responsible for their particular sections.  Indeed, this 
may perhaps account for the uneven development of the horse relay 
system. Thus the Secret History is careful to record the unanimous 
approval, after Chaghadai544 had given the project his blessing, of the 
princes of the right and left hands, the princesses and sons-in-law of 
the centre and all the commanders.  
Possible Models 
The justification for the institution of a more regularized 
communications network came from Ögodei himself though Juvaynī 
                                                                                                                
541 de Rachewiltz has also pointed to the brief account of CK’s death on active duty in 
the SH, possibly because it implied that Chinggis Khan had lost Heaven’s favour. SH, 
Part II, Commentary, p. 983 
542 Rashīd al-Dīn has a potent example of such abandonment when Arïq Böke’s amirs 
abandoned his cause after the central pole of his audience tent broke, injuring many, 
which was taken as an omen predicting a decline in his fortunes. Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, 
p. 260   
543 Rashid al-Din/Boyle, p. 76 
544 Rashīd al-Dīn mentions that Ögödei was so impressed by Chaghadai’s adherence 
to his position as Qa’an that he would undertake nothing without his advice and 
approval, sending messengers to consult him on every decision, which he is also 
alleged to have done with his sister-in-law Sorqoqtani Beki. Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle. pp. 
148-149 
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added his own gloss. Moreover, it was clearly for reasons of state rather 
than a nod to the welfare of his subjects. This formal justification 
included the collection of intelligence, the efficient delivery of 
communications and the distribution of the profits of empire545  
When the extent of their territories became 
broad and vast and important events fell out, it 
became essential to ascertain the activities of 
their enemies and it was also necessary to 
transport goods from the West to the East and 
from the Far East to the West’.546 
 
Scholars are divided on possible models.  Allsen noted that while the 
composite character of the Mongol network is readily apparent, postal 
relay systems had deep roots in eastern Asia with conquest dynasties 
such as the Liao (907-1124), the Jurchen/Chin (1115-1234) and the 
Tangut (1038-1227) fashioning their own versions.547 The sources reveal 
some of these predecessor systems. Ibn Khurradādhbih in his Kitāb al-
Masālik wa l-Mamālik compiled before 232/846-847 refers to a journey 
from Kopal to the frontiers of China taking fifteen days by caravan but 
via ‘la poste türque’ the journey took three days.548 This, however, was 
three hundred and fifty years earlier than the Yām though there may 
have been residual vestiges. Amongst other ‘local’ models was that of 
the Uighurs, which is known from Tamīm ibn Bahr’s mission to them c. 
821 CE. They seemingly had a Barīd which at that time came complete 
with sikak/postal stations and was in the charge of ashāb al-sikak 
living in tents.549 What is noteworthy is that Tamim ibn Bahr’s 
                                       
545 Each member of the imperial family had been allotted a portion of the conquest 
booty, whether people, animals, luxuries or land - not necessarily contiguous to their 
own bases thus the ‘income’ from such assets had to be conveyed to them. 
546 Juvaynī, Tārikh-i-Jahān Gushā I, 160-25; tr. Boyle, I, p. 33 
547 Allsen ‘Imperial Posts’ p. 242 
548 Ibn Khurradādhbih’s Kitāb al-Masālik wa-al-mamālik was edited by Michael Jan de 
Goeje (Liber viarum et regnorum), Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, vol. 6 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1889; reprinted, 1967). p. 30 (Arabic) p. 26 (English)  
549 ‘Tamim ibn Bahr’s Journey to the Uighurs’ by V. Minorsky, BSOAS vol. 12. No. 
2,1948 pp. 275-305 
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description of his journey to the Uighur Khan in 821 CE could easily be 
superimposed on the later Chinggisid Yām. 
Closer in time was the Abbāsid Barīd though this had long since fallen 
into decay whilst the Ghaznavid courier/ intelligence postal service had 
disappeared from the scene with their demise. The late Seljūqs were not 
enamoured of the idea of having their own intelligence postal service 
and it is doubtful that the Khwārazmshah Muhammad had time to 
build up a sophisticated organisation in the short period of his own 
career of conquest between (r.596-617/1200-1220).  Moreover, his 
predations had not only severely disrupted trans-Eurasian routes but 
after conquering Transoxiana from the Qara Khitai, he had, according 
to Ibn al-Athīr, closed the routes from Türkestan and the lands beyond 
it550 not only hampering commerce but also in all probability 
intelligence gathering as well.  
Such factors would imply that over and above what remained of the 
sophisticated Jurchen/Chin system there were no immediately 
operational postal/intelligence services available to serve as models for 
an uncomplicated system of Yām stations in western Eurasia.  Indeed 
Morgan, de Rachewiltz and Buell551 have all persuasively argued for the 
role of the Khitans in providing expertise and guidance in the rise of the 
Mongols. Gazagnadou, for his part, follows Olbricht in firmly proposing 
the Jurchen/Chin as the exemplars. This is on the basis that after the 
Jurchen were defeated by the Mongols the latter observed that ‘ces 
fonctionnaires-lettrés de la bureaucratie Jin utilisaient, pour la 
transmission des documents officiels, le système chinois des relais de 
                                       
550  Ibn al-Athīr/Richards, Pt.3 p. 205 
551 D. Morgan, ‘Who ran the Mongol Empire?’ Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1982 
p. 129; De Rachewiltz, ‘Personnel and personalities in north China in the Early Mongol 
Period’, JESHO, IX, and P. Buell, ‘Sino-Khitan administration in Mongol Bukhara’, 
JAH, XIII, 2, 1979 
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poste qu’ils avaient hérité de la dynastie chinoise Song, lui-meme base 
sur celui des Tang’. 552 
 
On the other hand, it could also be persuasively argued that the 
Chinggisids were simply conforming to the historic pattern in which 
expanding horizons needed more formalised communication networks 
to speed the flow of intelligence and the profits of empire.553 If such was 
the case and the network was simply the logical outcome of the 
expansion of territories and of the ‘important events’ mentioned by 
Juvaynī, then the scholarly endeavour devoted to ascertaining ‘the 
model’ may have been in vain. This is not the view taken here and since 
the Chinggisid version had some interesting variants it may be worth 
exploring the provenance and inception of the Yām network in a little 
detail as well as such features as the pa’iza tablets of authority. 
 
Provenance of the term ‘Yām’ 
 
Inevitably, there is also scholarly contention as to the provenance of the 
term used to describe this Chinggisid network. Paul Pelliot regards ĵam 
as the Mongol form with Yām being the Türk form. B. Vladimircov 
published an article on the subject in 1929 with which Pelliot concurs 
but he parts company with Vladimircov in establishing at what date and 
in what form the word ĵam appeared for the first time. Pelliot for his 
part regards the term as emanating from the Wei Dynasty period in 
China at the beginning of the sixth century CE derived from the 
Chinese hien-tchen which he argues represents Yām-chi, or postal relay 
officer.554  
 
                                       
552 Gazagnadou, La poste ō relais en Eurasie, p. 54, Olbricht, Das Postwesen in China 
unter der Mongolherrschaft, p. 39 
553 As Morgan sagaciously points out, anyone faced with running a large empire is 
likely to think, without being prompted, that a system of efficient couriers might be an 
idea worth considering. Morgan, The Mongols, p. 107 
554 See Pelliot, ‘Sur yam or ĵam, for the intricacies of his argument. pp. 194-195 
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Allsen for his part cautions that the history of the word jam should 
immediately alert us to the complex origins and lengthy maturation 
period of this institution’.555 He does, however, affirm that the Northern 
Wei (386-535 CE) Tabgach language contained a specialised vocabulary 
concerning the postal network which included γiamchin/relay station 
chief which is closely related to the Mongolian jamuchi[n]. In Allsen’s 
opinion Serruys put forward cogent and compelling arguments that the 
Mongolian jam was borrowed into Chinese rather than vice versa. His 
view was based on transcriptions in Chinese texts using several 
different characters but all pronounced zhan.  During the Yuan (1271-
1268) zhan was transcribed using the character for “to stand” or “to 
stop” which became the permanent transcription because it was 
associated with the idea of a “stopping place” or “stage of a journey”. 556 
 
Though the etymology is disputed, what is of some importance is what 
is to be inferred from the term. Pelliot is in agreement with Vladimircov 
when he refers to the Mongol ĵam as a “relais postal” or post station 
rather than a ‘route’.  The word for ‘route’ in the Chinggisid period was 
mör which can be found in the Secret History  though at the beginning 
of the Ming a later term was used, targa’ur, being the Sino-Mongol 
translation of houa-yi yi-yu or “grand’ route”.557 Today, the “relais 
postal” is designated by the word ortoo.558  However, in the sense of a 
‘relais postal’ the original meaning was forgotten after the demise of the 
Chinggisid Imperium thus Yām became synonymous with ‘route’. In 
this present study, Yām has been used to designate the relay stations 
rather than the routes on which they stood which are called here the 
Yām network 
                                       
555 Allsen, ‘Imperial Posts, West, East and North: A review Article’ of Adam J. 
Silverstein, Postal Systems in the Pre-Modern Islamic World. Archivum Eurasiae Medii 
Aevi, ed. Thomas T. Allsen, P. B. Golden, R. K, Kovalev, and A. P. Martinez, 17 (2010), 
Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz Verlag p. 241 
556 Allsen, ‘Imperial Posts’ pp. 241-242 
557 Pelliot, Sur yam or ĵam, “Relais postal” p. 192 
558Bat-Ochir Bold defines an örtöö as a relay line and relay station – also a unit of 
distance: thus one örtöö = about 18 miles/30 km p. 177 
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The provenance of the pa’iza or ‘tablets of authority 
 
So far as the pa’iza are concerned there are a couple of matters to 
consider. Firstly, since logic would seem to point to messengers needing 
some sort of official identity in order to prove their credentials it could 
certainly be thought that most courier systems would come round to 
having such verification without having to have a precedent.  Thus the 
use of pā’izas need not necessarily be conclusive evidence that the Yām 
simply copied the Chinese postal service or Yi. Silverstein indeed 
dismisses the view that the Yām replicates the Yi tablet of authority - 
generally translated as pā’iza from the Persian but gerege in Mongolian 
and p’ai-tse in Chinese. He has found evidence that such tablets were 
ubiquitous throughout Eurasia since a golden tablet of authorisation 
was used as early as the first century CE on a journey made by 
Apollonius of Tyana from Ecbatana/Hamadan to India.559  
 
Whilst the concept may have been ubiquitous it is the timing, format 
and authorisations which may provide the best indication of its 
provenance. the practice of granting silver, gold and golden tiger tablets 
of authority seems to have begun in the lifetime of Chinggis Khan 
perhaps as early as 1212 or shortly thereafter and the Mongol pa’iza 
clearly emulates those of the Jurchen/Chin. Moreover,  from the travels 
of Zhao Gong and the travels of Ch’ang Ch’un it is clear that such 
tablets were an important feature in officialdom in north China even 
during the upheavals of the first two decades of the thirteenth century - 
especially amongst envoys who had need of an immediately recognisable 
proof of their credentials.560 
 
                                       
559 Silverstein, Postal Systems, p. 143 
560 Zhao Gong, p. 10;  Li Chih-Ch’ang, trans. Waley, Travels of an Alchemist p. 48 
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Thus the idea of the pa’iza may have been introduced to Chinggis Khan 
either by his Khitan advisers, most probably Yeh-lü A-hai or even 
directly from the Jurchen/Chin through emissaries. By 1221 Zhao 
Gong refers to Chinggisid high officials who wore a gold or silver pā’iza 
on their waists so it could not have been him. The highest officials wore 
a gold “tiger-head” one which had two tigers facing the words written in 
Chinese characters variously translated as: ‘The decree of Emperor 
Chinggis, endowed by heaven: the bearer shall take initiative on his own 
authority’561 or: ‘This man is empowered to act with the same freedom 
as I myself should exercise, had I come in person’.562   
 
One such high functionary was Liu Wen who, complete with a golden 
tiger- head tablet, was dispatched by Chinggis Khan to urgently ‘invite’ 
the elderly Taoist sage, Ch’ang Ch’un to meet with him whilst he was 
still engaged on the Western Campaigns.  It would thus appear that the 
Mongols had come into contact with pā’iza’s early on in their career of 
conquest. Rubruck described a golden seal given by Möngke Qa’an to 
his envoy to the king of France in the mid-1250s. It was ‘the breadth of 
a palm and half a cubit long, on which his commission is engraved: 
anyone who carries it may issue what order he likes, and it is carried 
out instantly.’563 Marco Polo remarks that his father and uncle were 
granted a tablet of gold on their first return from Qubilai’s Court on 
which was inscribed an instruction that the ambassadors should be 
supplied with everything that they should require.  On reaching Iran on 
their second return journey from the east, they were given four golden 
tablets of authority, two of which bore gerfalcons, one bore lions, whilst 
the fourth was plain though they all had inscriptions requiring supplies 
be rendered to them.564  
 
                                       
561 Zhao Gong, p. 10 
562 Travels of an Alchemist/Waley  p. 48 
563 Rubruck, p. 186 
564 The Book of Ser Marco Polo, I, Yule/Cordier, p. 35 
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Provenance of the Yām Relay Station network 
So far as the provenance of the Chinggisid relay network is concerned 
there is rather more speculation than hard fact. Morgan tends towards 
the system operated in north China by the Khitan Liao dynasty whose 
similarities to the Yām are striking.565 Silverstein remarks that it is 
generally regarded as having a close affinity with the Chinese Yi566 
which, it is argued, was introduced to the Mongols through their Khitan 
and/or Uighur advisers.567 Such views he regards as being misleading 
and even unhelpful and proceeds to comprehensively demolish the 
arguments used to substantiate this view568 - albeit eventually, if 
reluctantly, coming to the conclusion that the Chinggisids’ Uighur and 
Khitan officials were indeed behind the establishment of a more 
organised communication system. 
Silverstein’s attempted demolition of the argument that the pa’iza was a 
copy of the yi arrangements has been aired above but his argument that 
bureaucratisation was atypical of traditional (pre-Chinggis) Mongol 
society is incontestable. As he notes, manning permanent stations goes 
against the grain of Central Asian custom, particularly along roads that 
did not overlap with the pastoral routes. Moreover, as was seen earlier, 
a charismatic khan had to be extremely careful if he wished to foist 
relay station at their expense onto his imperial relatives and aristocratic 
supporters.  
 
                                       
565 Morgan, The Mongols, p. 107 
566 Silverstein, Postal Systems,  p. 142 
567 Influential is de Rachewiltz who in his ‘Personnel and Personalities in North China 
in the Early Mongol Period’ argues that Khitan (and Chinese) defectors played a major 
role in bureaucratic practices inspired by Chin and Khitan examples. See p. 112, 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 9. No.1/2 (Nov.1966) pp. 
88-144 
568 Silverstein, Postal Systems, p. 142 
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Ögödei’s improvements to his father’s communication system have at 
their heart an interesting conundrum. Though De Rachewiltz points out 
in his commentary on the Secret History that the funerary inscription 
for the Khitan adviser, Yeh-lu Ch’u-ts-ai, gives him credit for the 
important measures to curb the abuses of government couriers569 this 
does not fit well with the Secret History. In this there is a reference to 
Ögödei  proposing to overcome the difficulties encountered in the 
transmission of messages on the advice of Chanai and Bolqadar, who 
were ‘well informed’ on such matters. These measures, it has to be said, 
do not evoke the highly sophisticated Chinese yi:  
 
Providing post-station masters and post-horse 
keepers from the various units of a thousand of 
different areas, by setting up a post station at 
every stage, by not allowing the messengers to 
move freely among the population unless on 
urgent business but instead by having them 
ride in haste through the post stations’.570 
 
Since Ögödei was acting on the recommendation of these two officers 
there may be clues in their backgrounds or experiences as to why they 
were ‘well-informed’ on such matters. Chanai was related to the Uru’ut 
or Oirat chief Jurchedei. He not only shared a common ancestor with 
Chinggis Khan571 but was also married to Ibaqa Beki,572sister of Tolui’s 
remarkable widow, Sorqoqtani Beki. Chanai was clearly not one of the 
‘Bad People’ and not only had powerful relations at Court which gave 
him some sway, he was also one of the commanders of the day guards 
tasked with guarding the person of the conqueror on the left-hand or 
eastern side of the ordu.   
 
At the 1229 quriltai, however, Chanai was given new duties though 
these are somewhat confusing since he was put in charge of the camp 
                                       
569 SH, II, de Rachewiltz, p. 1031 
570 SH, I, para 279, p 214 and de Rachewiltz II, 1027-1028 
571 SH, I, de Rachewiltz,, p. 480 
572 Rashid al-Din/Boyle, p. 64 
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masters or yurtchis in the Col country that is, the Gobi, which lay 
between the old Naiman territories and those of the Xi Xia/Tangut. 
These camp masters, as well as choosing suitable stopping places and 
arranging for the establishment of the travelling encampment were also 
tasked with providing replacements for mares as well as being the 
herders of the milch mares.  At the same time, he was ordered to dig 
wells to make that vast area habitable. This command was immediately 
followed by Ögödei’s measures on the transmission of his 
communications. 
What is not totally clear at this stage is whether the two are linked but 
could well be since the Secret History reports that the third of Ögödei ’s 
‘good deeds’ centred on well-digging. Assuming there was a linkage, this 
would have been a particularly clever manoeuvre on the part of Ögödei. 
This is because ‘well-digging’ was within the remit of a khan, thus to 
link it to the proposal of a communication network which was an 
innovation, provided some reassurance to the assembled grandees that 
he was conscious of the traditional parameters of his position and it 
says a lot for Ögödei’s political abilities. 
Bolqadar, about whom virtually nothing is known, was also one of the 
commanders of the left-side or east night guard. One important duty of 
the night guards was guarding the tent-carts of the Palace. In addition 
the camp masters from among the night guards were sent ahead to set 
up the sleeping quarters for Ögödei if he went out hunting.573  
 
Though both these men had some logistical experience there is very 
little to explain their interest in persuading Ögödei to institute a more 
organised messenger system. However, revealingly, Chanai was 
appointed to his Gobi tasks in tandem with Ui’urtai, the ‘Uighur’. 
According to de Rachewiltz, Ui’urtai was the son of Qutluq Buqa and 
                                       
573 SH I, para 278, de Rachewiltz, p. 210 
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thus grandson of the great viceroy in Khurāsān, Körgüz,574 though this 
relationship has been questioned.575 Ui’urtai’s grandfather was not just 
a literate and highly competent Uighur but as noted above, the Uighurs 
historically had what appears to have been a recognisable Barīd. That 
the Uighurs who submitted to Chinggis Khan three hundred years later 
retained vestiges of this Barīd is perhaps improbable but not 
impossible. On the other hand, Körgüz could have been so fed up with 
the facilities on his several journeys to Court that at an opportune 
moment Ögödei was encouraged to institute improvements. 
Against this scenario, however, Juvaynī records that it was only from 
1239 onwards, that is ten years after Ögödei ’s pronouncement, that 
Körgüz in his capacity as viceroy in western Eurasia, ‘laid a firm 
foundation in the administration of affairs’. This included the 
establishment ‘of Yāms in various places, complete with horses and 
other necessities in order that the people might not be put to 
inconvenience by the ambassadors.’576  
Whatever the actual provenance, Ögödei’s Yām was a lasting memorial 
to him since it survived in Mongolia until 1954 and indeed became the 
basis of the very efficient Russian postal relay system.577 
 
The Yām Stations 
There appear to have been at least three different types of ‘station’. 
Firstly was the Morin Yām or horse station, in Chinese mo-lin or mu-lin 
zhan which has been taken to have as its primary function the 
                                       
574 SH, De Rachewiltz, p. 1027 
575 Peter Jackson, private note, April 2015. Clearly, if there was no relationship, then 
the Körgüz link and influence does not stand scrutiny. 
576 Juvaynī/Boyle II, p. 501. There is a cryptic comment in Rashīd al-Dīn implying 
that Körguz and his fellow amirs protected their positions through bribery though 
whether money passed in order to set-up the Yām is not clear. Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle , 
p. 189 
577Frederick Burnaby, A Ride to Khiva, Cassell, Petter and Galpin, 1876 
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movement of officials and envoys.578  Allsen believes it had the same 
function as the Tāyān Yām, a term which is used by Rashīd al-Dīn and 
which has an uncertain origin but which has been taken to mean just a 
relay station though it could also imply a station fit for the passage of 
envoys. 579 This may be the envoys’ lodgings or yām-
khānah580mentioned in the Persian text of Shahrukh’s embassy of 
1420-1422 to the Ming. 
A second type of station was the Tergen Yām or wagon station, in 
Chinese tie-li-gan or tie-li-jian-zhan.  This clearly was to provide animals 
such as oxen to pull the carts used either for provisioning, such as the 
convoys of carts used to bring in foodstuffs to Qaraqorum or for the 
wagon loads of the ‘profits of empire’ or loot trundling slowly across 
Eurasia as occurred after the Fall of Baghdad. 
Furthermore, there was also a military arm, the Narin Yām, in Chinese 
na-lin zhan, meaning careful [handling] station.  Allsen regards this arm 
of the system as handling goods and communications meant for the 
person of the qa’an.581 However, these stations have also been described 
as military or secret stations,582 to be used for urgent military matters 
though narin in another context has been translated by de Rachewiltz 
as ‘punctilious’ which at a stretch could be used to describe either a 
military network or for direct communication with the ruler.583  
So far as these latter are concerned, Rashīd al-Dīn has a perplexing 
comment apropos the internecine conflict within the Imperial Family.  
Four years after the accession of Qubilai’s successor, Temür Qa’an, that 
is, in 1298, Rashīd al-Dīn reports that the Yuan emperor had Yāms set 
                                       
578 Allsen’s conclusion, after comparing the ‘division of labour’ within the Yām as 
found in the Yuan Shih and the Collected Chronicles of Rashīd al-Dīn. ‘Imperial Posts’ 
p. 257 
579 Rashid al-Din/Boyle, p. 62 
580 K. M. Maitra, trans., A Persian Embassy to China, being an Extract from Zubdatu’t 
Tawarikh of Hafiz Abru (repr. New York, 1970) pp. 27 ff. Allsen, ‘Imperial Posts’ p. 263 
581 Allsen, ‘Imperial Posts’ p. 258 
582 Rashid al-Din/Boyle, p. 62 and Olbricht, p. 45, note 101.  
583 SH, II, de Rachewiltz, p. 868 
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up between the sübe or strategic choke points defended by Ajïqï and 
Chübei in the extreme west to the sübe of Muqali in the east in which 
couriers were stationed.584 These clearly had a military purpose so may 
have been Narin Yām whose main purpose was intelligence collecting 
and its despatch up the chain of command.585  
 
Development of the Yām 
Despite the agreement of Chaghadai and Batu, it seems that Ögödei   
was in fact rather slow in developing an efficient and secure 
communication network. In the event, if Rashīd al-Dīn is correct, it was 
only in the Year of the Horse, in 1234, that: 
 
as there was [much] coming and 
going of ambassadors both from the 
princes and from the Court to the 
princes upon important and 
necessary business, Yāms were set 
up in all the lands which were called 
tayan Yāms586, and for the setting up 
of those Yāms, ambassadors were 
designated and appointed on behalf of 
the princes 587 
 
Rashīd al-Dīn also refers to amirs being appointed for each branch of 
the family to oversee the setting up of the network through their 
dominions, thus Bitikchi Qoridai was appointed on behalf of Ögödei 
himself, Emergelchin Tayichi’utai on behalf of the Chaghadaids, Batu’s 
appointee was Suqa Mulchitai and for the Toluids, Alchiqa was 
appointed at the command of Sorqoqtani Beki.588  Additionally, Tayan 
Yāms were established between Qaraqorum and ‘Khitai’ from 1234 after 
                                       
584 Rashid al-Din/Boyle p. 326 and p. 299 note 231 
585 Rashid al-Din/Boyle p. 62 
586 Boyle considers a tayan yām to be an ordinary post station, though the thought 
could be ventured that it could be one that was slightly more comfortable than a morin 
yām or horse station. Rashīd al-Dīn, p. 62 
587 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 55 
588 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 55-56 
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Ögodei ordered a ‘great city to be built on the banks of the Orkhon to 
rival Baghdad and given the name of Qaraqorum.’589  Ögodei also 
commanded that Tergen Yāms, or wagon Yāms be set up in order to 
provision Qaraqorum around the same period. 
 
Twelve years after the order for the set-up of the Tayan Yāms there was 
certainly a Yām network of sorts between the environs of Qaraqorum 
and the West. Amongst the earliest non-Mongol trans-Eurasian 
travellers were the long-suffering friars Carpini and Benedict, travelling 
in 1246, who give mixed messages on the state of the Yām network. On 
the one hand Carpini reports that the khan’s subjects ‘must without 
delay find [messengers] horses and other necessaries’ whilst at the 
same time ambassadors suffered great misery, ‘in much want of both of 
victuals and apparel’ and also had to have provided for them horses, 
carriages and expenses.  Whether this was because the dignitaries and 
emissaries had left the relay routes or that the relay stations simply 
could not provide the necessities is not easy to discern.590 On the other 
hand, as he was nearing Batu he remarks that they were provided with 
three ‘Tartar’ escorts and had fresh horses three or four times a day.  
 
Further into their journey, Carpini’s party were assigned two ‘Tartar’ 
escorts, changing horses five times a day on the steppe though when 
crossing deserts they were allowed better and stronger horses which 
could manage the traverse in one go.591 Carpini also gives the 
impression that there was a dearth of accommodation for travellers 
since his party on their return during the winter had no sort of roof over 
their heads and perforce had to lie ‘in the deserts oftentimes upon the 
snow, except with our feete wee made a piece of ground bare to lye 
upon’.592 Despite Ögödei’s best intentions, then, it seems up to and 
                                       
589 Rashid al-Din/Boyle, p. 62 
590 Carpini/Beazley, p. 121 
591 Carpini/Beazley p. 134 
592 Carpini/Beazley p. 143 
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beyond 1246 the Yām network was patchy and its operation 
unpredictable. 
 
Rubruck’s experiences ten years or so later were not dissimilar to that 
of Ch’ang Ch’un’s miserable traverse of the southern Gobi. The outward 
journey was so terrible that before starting on the return journey to King 
Louis IX of France from Möngke’s court his colleague begged to be left 
behind since he could not face the ‘unbearable hardship’ of the journey. 
This was heightened by the discouraging advice of Möngke’s chief 
secretary that they might arrive at a postal station or Yām which would 
not provide for them593though this may realistically have been because 
of pressure caused by grander attendees at the quriltai returning home.  
 
Since it was suggested to the colleague that he remain until some 
envoys arrived with whom he could travel back at a gentler pace and by 
a route along which there were towns it would appear that there was a 
more southerly route for dignitaries which as will be seen was 
undoubtedly via Taraz and Samarkand.594 In the meantime, Rubruck 
and his small party, consisting only of his interpreter, a guide and one 
servant, were despatched westwards via Batu, albeit on a more 
northern trajectory than his outward journey which had taken place 
during the winter.   
 
The misgivings of Rubruck’s colleague were only too prescient since the 
long-suffering friar comments that ‘on occasions our situation was very 
hazardous since we were unable to find any people and our provisions 
were running out and our mounts exhausted’.595 Though the party had 
a tablet of authority entitling them to a sheep every four days, a pa’iza 
which somewhat oddly was in the possession of the servant, this 
arrangement does not seem to have been foolproof since the party had 
                                       
593 Rubruck, p.250  
594 Rubruck, p. 250 
595 Rubruck, p. 254 
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to subsist on ‘comos’ for several days. Furthermore, for two months and 
ten days they only had one day’s rest and this only because no horses 
were obtainable, which at least indicates that there was generally no 
shortage of mounts even if Rubruck’s modest party were forced to take 
the dross of what was available.  
Rubruck, however, was a comparatively insignificant though intrepid 
traveller compared to a great amir like the Mongol Oirat Arghun, who 
had been put in control of territories from the Oxus to Fars, Georgia, 
Rum and Mosul by Ögödei’s widow, Toregene Khatun. Arghun was also 
travelling to the east for Möngke’s enthronement but his party does not 
seem to have fared particularly well either.  Juvaynī reports that the 
party travelled ‘an immense distance fraught with terrors and menaces 
[and] arrived in Court on 20th Safar, 650/2nd May, 1252, after the 
quriltai had dispersed.’596  
Such accounts do not inspire confidence in the development and 
improvements of the Yām.  Moreover, disturbingly, those forced to 
endure its discomforts during this period did so at what was the height 
of the unified empire, that is, twenty-five years after the initial proposal 
to institute a Yām had been agreed by Ögödei and ten years or so before 
the fault-lines within the Chinggisids ignited forty-five years of 
internecine conflict.  
Subsequent to the grand affair and impressive turn-out for the quriltai 
sanctioning the appointment of Güyüg (r.1246-1248 CE) most of the 
attendees would have barely returned home before he died. 
Nevertheless, Ögödei’s Tayan Yām for ambassadors and the relay Morin 
Yām had been established after a fashion and played a crucial but 
testing role in the emergent crisis which was to shape the future of the 
entire Chinggisid Imperium and the Hülegüids in particular. Face-to-
face discussions were a problem as the senior ‘aqa’ Batu had mobility 
                                       
596 Juvaynī/Boyle, p. 514-515  
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problems and because of this, either the scattered Imperial Family had 
to travel to the Qipchaq Steppe for consultations or the negotiations had 
to take place using emissaries. What was graphically revealed, however, 
during the subsequent contentious negotiations was how the extended 
lines of communication added to the difficulties. The negotiations had to 
be conducted by emissary, almost certainly delivered orally and the 
whole process was clearly unsatisfactory, since as Rashīd al-Dīn 
observes, ‘because of the great distance between them there was no 
possibility of mutual consultation’.597 
Because of the vast distances involved and Batu’s base not being within 
the sacred Mongol heartland the only members of the Imperial Family to 
make their way to his ulus were Möngke and his brothers, despatched 
by their mother, Sorqoqtani Beki, on a strategic and highly successful 
visit. Batu duly decided that Möngke was the ideal candidate for the 
vacant Qa’anship and pronounced ‘It is in the interest of the ulus, the 
army, the people and us princes that we set him up as Qa’an’.598 The 
fall-out from these negotiations will be examined in more detail in the 
chapter on the Pax Mongolica, but suffice for the moment to say that 
Batu’s decision was deeply contentious to some elements of the 
Chaghadaid and Ögödeid branches. Though ostensibly carrying the day 
by having Möngke enthroned, one outcome was that Batu became the 
godfather of what were to become five virtually autonomous – as distinct 
from independent - khanates since his actions exposed the tensions 
inherent in the traditional duties of an appointed khan and the realities 
of the role. 
Following Möngke’s accession in 1251, apart from his attempts to 
reform the abuses in the Yām network, there is no mention of further 
development in this area, partly no doubt because his focus was on 
campaigns to subjugate ‘the farthest East and West of the world’. Just 
                                       
597 Rashid al-Din/ Boyle, p. 203 
598 Rashid al-Din/ Boyle, p. 203 
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over twelve years after his death, Marco Polo with his father and uncle 
travelled to Qubilai’s court from Hormuz via Kerman. Whilst the route 
after Kerman is contentious, the journey took, according to Polo, a good 
three and a half years because of the bad weather and severe cold. 
What is odd, however, is that despite Marco’s enthusiastic account of 
the postal relay system and rest houses within the Great Wall, unlike 
other travellers who remark on the discomforts, the mounts and the 
relay stations, Marco makes no mention of the Yām, or changing 
mounts.599 Whether this is because he was travelling ‘off-piste’ or, as 
Wood suspects, he simply got his information from a presently 
unknown itinerary is contentious though as such proponents of his 
travels as de Rachewiltz600 and Morris Rossabi601 aver, omission is not 
conclusive evidence that he did not reach China. 
The development of the Yām network westwards under the first four 
Chinggisid rulers may have been patchy but it seems from references to 
the Chaghadaid ulus that they had embraced the idea. Juvaynī remarks 
that during the lifetime of Chaghadai (r. 1227-1242) ‘for fear of his yasa 
and punishment his followers were so well disciplined that during his 
reign no traveller, so long as he was near his army, had need of guard 
or patrol on any stretch of road’.602 In c.1281 the governor of Bishbalik, 
a grandson of Chaghadai, asked Qubilai for thirty new Yām stations for 
a route out of Bishbalik implying that these were additions. Moreover in 
1283, also in the Chaghadaid ulus, four more Yām stations were 
established in Uighur territory603 also giving the impressions that these 
                                       
599 Frances Wood’s ‘Did Marco Polo Go to China?’ has been discredited not least by 
Hans Ulrich Vogel, Marco Polo was in China: New Evidence from Currencies, Salts and 
Revenues (Leiden: Brill, 2013). Her latest position given in a lecture in 2013 to the art 
history students at SOAS is that Polo’s purported travels east may be based on a so 
far undiscovered source or itinerary, not dissimilar to the background to Mandeville’s 
Travels.  
600 Igor de Rachewiltz “Marco Polo Went to China” Zentralasiatische Studien 27 (1997) 
pp. 34-92 
601 Essay in response to Frances Wood’s Did Marco Polo Go to China? 
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu.mongols/pop/polo/mp_essay.htm 
602 Juvaynī,/Boyle,  vol. I, p. 272 
603 Rashid al-Din/Boyle, p. 26 
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were additions. The Yuan shih, c. 1274, states that thirteen stations 
were established by imperial order between Khotan and Yarkand in the 
Tarim Basin apparently to facilitate communications by water604 and 
two land stations.  
 
The Hülegüid Section of the Yam 
Towards the end of the 1230s Ögödei’s representative in Khurāsān,  
Körgüz established himself in Tus, which was then in ruins, and rebuilt 
and restored the town. Included in his process of reconstruction were 
the establishment of Yāms in various places, ‘complete with horses and 
other necessities in order that the people might not be put to 
inconvenience by the ambassadors’.605 Juvaynī remarks how he had 
put Hülegü’s interest and pleasure in restoring ruins on his march 
westwards to his own ends. Juvaynī clearly had an eye for a good 
investment because he observes that he had purchased a quarter of the 
town of Khabushan, northwest of Mashhad in eastern Iran, from its 
inhabitants after its destruction in the first incursion of the Mongols. 
He persuaded Hülegü to issue a yarligh for  
 
the repair of the qanates, the erection of 
buildings, the establishment of a bazaar, 
the alleviation of the people’s lot and their 
re-assembly in the town. All the expense of 
rebuilding he met with cash form the 
treasury so that no charge fell upon the 
people606  
 
Apart from not being involved in any of the expense of restoration 
himself it is noticeable that there is no mention of the Yām. Quite what 
can be deduced from this omission is difficult to ascertain but since the 
                                       
604 These locations were under the control of Qubilai but there is no obvious water 
communication between them today. See  Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, vol. 
II, Part III, pp. 47-49 
605Juvaynī/ Boyle, II, p. 501 
606 Juvaynī/ Boyle, II, p. 617 
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progress of the imperial forces did not need the services of Yām stations 
it is possible that this requirement was simply overlooked. 
 
Once ensconced in his new domain, however, Hülegü is reported to 
have started to rebuild the destroyed places,607 including establishing a 
network of Yām stations since he took ‘from each cultivated (shen) 
village one householder, one from the small villages, two or three from 
the large ones and called them Iam.608 And he sent them to all the 
ruined places to undertake construction. They paid no tax whatever, 
but provided only bread and t’an (a yoghurt beverage) for travelling 
T’at’ars’. 609  
This excellent sounding arrangement would seem to have a 
fundamental flaw since it does not mention the supply of remounts. 
There are hints in the sources that the Hülegüids may have been short 
of horses though whether of horses generally or of their trusty little 
Mongolian horses is difficult to quantify. That the Hülegüids may have 
had a ‘horse deficit’ is one implication of remarks made by the 
Armenian historian, Kirakos, with reference to the Chinggisid forces 
that the ‘fanatical and wily army divided up by lot all the lands of 
Armenia, Georgia and Aghbania, each chief according to his importance 
receiving cities, districts, lands and fortresses..... each [chief] went to 
his allotted area with his wives, sons and military equipment where 
they remained without a care, polluting and eating all the vegetation 
with their camels and livestock’.610 Livestock is generally thought of as 
sheep and cattle and it is thus distinctly odd that Kirakos mentions 
camels but not horses. This differential is confirmed when, during this 
same period after the fall of the city of Shamk’or, the Armenians were 
                                       
607 The Armenian historian Kirakos in his History of the Armenians mentions the 
devastation caused not only by the Mongols but also by Sultan Jalāl-al-Dīn and that 
the conquerors ordered the rebuilding of Ray and Isfahan - ch.20 also ch. 28 for the 
order for survivors to return to their own place and to rebuild their villages and cities  
608 This is confusing the relay station Yām with the personnel, who were Yāmchi. 
609 Grigor/Bedrosian, ch. 12 section 14 
610 Kirakos/Bedrosian ch. 22 section 199 
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ordered to provide the Mongols with ‘horses and livestock and whatever 
else they demanded’.611  
If there was a shortage of the Mongolian horses in the Hülegüid 
controlled areas there were problems with changing to other breeds, 
even to Arabian horses which are also renowned for their stamina. This 
was identified by Al Jāhiz almost five hundred years earlier. Though he 
was assessing the capabilities of the Türks as against those of the rebel 
Khārijites his views are equally applicable to the steppe horses used by 
the Chinggisids of the thirteenth century and early fourteenth 
centuries. 
In the first place the Khārijite’s horse has not the 
staying-power of the Türk’s pony; and the 
Khārijite has no more than a horseman’s 
knowledge of how to look after his mount.  
The Türk demands so much of his mount that 
only the toughest of his horses is equal to the 
task; even one that he had ridden to exhaustion, 
so as to be useless for his expeditions, would 
outdo a Khārijite’s horse in staying-power and no 
Tukhari pony could compare with it..... 
The Türk is at one and the same time herdsman, 
groom, trainer, horse-dealer, farrier and rider; in 
short, a one-man team..... he is also a 
professional farrier and better than a trainer at 
getting what he wants from his pony612 
 
As Al Jāhiz noted, if mounted on a ‘Khārijite’  or for present purposes a 
larger ‘western’ horse, the horseman would immediately lose the 
advantages of his small steppe horse – not just their staying-power or 
the ability to scramble sure-footedly up and down hills, but also the 
many years of careful training.  Furthermore, the larger, hand-fed, 
                                       
611 Kirakos/Bedrosian, ch. 23 section 204 
612 Al Jāhiz: The Life and Works of Jāhiz -  trans. of selected texts by Charles Pellat, 
trans. from the French by D M Hawke Berkeley, University of Berkeley Press, 1969 
 pp. 92-94 
216 
 
Mamluk horses were essentially static platforms from which to shoot 
rather than the galloping archery of the Hülegüid forces.  
********** 
Thus, whilst there is some controversy over potential models for the 
Yām, what was in fact established was an uncomplicated system of 
remount and subsistence stations designed to facilitate the onward 
travel of emissaries. What evidence there is indicates an uneven 
development and despite Ögödei’s best intentions, up to and beyond 
1246 the Yām infrastructure appears to have been both basic and 
erratic.   
In the Hülegüid west, Chinggisid viceroys and then Hülegü himself, 
attempted to establish or reinstate a communication network in the 
aftermath of the destruction wrought by both their own forces as well as 
by the predations of the Khwarazmshah amongst other destructive 
forces. Moreover, abuse of the system, which will be discussed below, 
was apparently rampant and there is some slight evidence that the 
Hülegüids had a deficit of mounts. Hülegü’s difficulties may have 
affected internal communications rather more than the trans-Eurasian 
traffic which, when relations with the Jochids were not hostile, would 
have taken the fast and apparently quite efficient Jochid route east. 
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Chapter VII 
 
 
The Yām Network: Administration,  
Upkeep and Infrastructure 
 
 
The Imperial Relatives and Imperial Rights 
It was argued above that Ögödei had to tread carefully with his 
proposed establishment of a more organised communication network.  
However, there was one issue that was to bedevil the efficient 
administration of the Yām network: imperial relatives had imperial 
rights. 
As Bat-ochir Bold has affirmed, the group which formed the core of the 
steppe aristocracy were the blood relatives of the charismatic khan 
whose status increased with the victory or appointment of their khan as 
the khan of a federation. The closest family members of Chinggis Khan 
were designated altan urug or the ‘golden family’ whose role at the 
summit of the social order gave them not only immense status but also 
power and ‘rights’613 including, for those of the same lineage as the 
‘charismatic’ khan, a share in the benefits and profits of empire.614 As 
Khazanov points out, not only the ‘state’ but also its populace belonged 
to all members of a ruling clan or an extended family, as their corporate 
property.615  
                                       
613 Bold, pp. 84, 112 
614 There are several references in the SH to the sharing out of the profits of empire, 
e.g. para. 279, SH, Vol. I  
615 Anatoly M. Khazanov, ‘The Scythians and Their Neighbors,’ ch. 3 in Nomads as 
Agents of Cultural Change University of Hawai’i Press, p. 38 
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What was unresolved was whether such ownership also included use of 
the newly instituted Yām, the very nature of which meant that the trails 
criss-crossed the domains of the entire Imperial Family who, perhaps 
understandably, felt entitled to avail themselves of it as they were 
paying for their portion. On the other hand, the publicised purpose of 
the Yām, as far as Ögödei was concerned, was to expedite 
communications without disrupting the populace.  
That the Imperial Family had abused the system was observed by both 
Juvaynī and Rashīd al-Dīn,  
 
After the death of Güyüg Khan many of 
the khatuns and princes had issued 
yarlïghs and paizas without number to 
the people, had dispatched ambassadors 
to all parts of the Empire and had given 
protection to noble and base on the 
pretext of their being ortaqs, etc.616  
 
Möngke Qa’an was determined to resolve what he clearly regarded as 
the exploitation of the Yām facilities. Möngke is regarded by Allsen as 
the most successful of the Chinggisid Qa’ans, not least because he was 
a ‘systemiser’ and a ‘regulariser’. Möngke’s control was exercised 
through his Central Secretariat617 which was divided in subsections, 
each dedicated to a different facet of administration and the Yüan shih 
records that there was an officer in charge of the communication 
system, a Ĵirwōdai (Chih-erh-wo-tai).618 What is salient here is that as 
Allsen emphasises, this Central Secretariat was a ‘creature of the Qa’an’ 
without officials from other princely lines whilst its ‘main functions were 
to advise the ruler and to keep under close and continuous surveillance 
                                       
616 Juvaynī/Boyle p. 598; Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 219 
617 Allsen, ‘Guard and Government in the Reign of the Grand Qan Möngke, 1251-1259’ 
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol. 46, No. 2 (Dec., 1986)  p. 507 
618 Allsen, ‘Guard and Government’ p. 505 
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the activities of the administration in the interests of the throne’.619 As 
Allsen also points out, however, the Central Secretariat contended with 
the regional administrations which represented the interests of the 
entire imperial clan and whose officials sought to ‘defend and advance 
their own master’s particular sets of interests’.620  
Möngke was at the very limits of his already contentious powers of 
control in his attempt to reserve usage of the Yām for reasons of state 
and not the personal affairs of his relatives. Moreover, this was clearly a 
line that had many grey areas and Ĵirwōdai may have had a thankless 
task enforcing Möngke’s solution which was to issue 
a yarlïgh instructing each one of them to 
conduct an inquiry in his own territory 
and call in all the yarlïghs and paizas 
which the people had received from them 
and the other princes during the reigns of 
Chingiz-Khan, Ogetei Qa’an and Güyüg 
Khan.621 
 
As for the great ambassadors, they were 
not to have the use of more than fourteen 
post horses: they should proceed from 
Yām to Yām and not seize the people’s 
animals en route. In the reign of Qa’an it 
had been the custom for merchants to 
come to Mongolia on post horses. He 
denounced this practice, saying: 
“Merchants journey to and fro for the 
sake of gain. What is the point in their 
riding post horses?” 622 
 
Following Mongke’s death his imperial household/keshig opted for the 
loser, Ariq Böke, with the inevitable result that they were purged by 
Qubilai. This had the rather important consequence that those 
personnel within the Central Secretariat with experience of the 
                                       
619 Allsen, ‘Guard and Government’ p. 507 
620 Allsen, ‘Guard and Government’ p. 519 
621 Juvaynī/Boyle p. 598; Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 219 
622 Juvayni/ Boyle p. 598; Rashid al-Din/Boyle, p. 219 
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difficulties involved in trying to control the princely lines were 
eliminated.623 As Allsen observes, this lack of administrative continuity 
at the highest levels should be taken into consideration when 
considering the ‘dissolution’ of central control after the death of Möngke 
though what impact this might have had on the Yām network is 
impossible to evaluate.  
Amongst the abuses of the Yām were inflated receipts for goods in 
exchange for bribes, corrupt buka’uls, that is those who distributed the 
spoils of conquest and later, food and rations, so that the households of 
the ruler and his khatuns were in danger of running short of supplies as 
also were the military.624 Rashīd al-Dīn complained that the number of 
īlchīs or messengers circulating in the Hülegüid lands was so enormous 
that ‘even if five thousand mounts had been stationed at each Yām they 
would not have been enough for them’.625 Moreover, they travelled with 
huge escorts, all of whom required mounts and even the Mongol horse 
herders could find their herds requisitioned undoubtedly without 
adequate compensation, further leading to their impoverishment.626  
Those accused of sending out hordes of messengers included not only 
governors but also members of the keshig such as the qorchis or quiver 
bearers, barschis  or keepers of hunting leopards, qushchis or falconers 
and so on.627 Even bone fide messengers or īlchīs were exploiting their 
privileges,628 leading the contemptuous populace to sabotage the Yām 
by delaying the official emissaries as well as ensuring that they only had 
broken-down nags to accomplish their missions. Assuming this is not 
simply hyperbole, the conclusion has to be that – as far as the Yām was 
concerned - anarchic conditions existed in Hülegüid western Eurasia. 
                                       
623 Allsen,  ‘Guard and Government’ p. 520 
624 Melville, ‘The Keshig in Iran’, p. 151 
625 Rashid al-Din, ed. A.A. Alizade 1957, vol. III, pp. 480-483; also Silverstein, p. 158 
626 Morgan, ‘Reflections’, p. 381 
627 Melville, ‘The Keshig in Iran’, p. 160 
628 Morgan, ‘Reflections’, p. 381    
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The abuses were tackled by tightening up procedures so that 
documents had to be officially authorised with the appropriate tamghā 
or seals in order to obtain remounts and the ilchīs rate of travel was 
also noted by a paid official on the documents he carried.629  
Whilst there is some cynicism amongst scholars as to Rashīd al-dīn’s 
motives in painting quite such a dire picture of the situation prior to his 
reforms during the reign of Ghāzān,630 the Armenian sources do tend to 
validate the view that the  situation was somewhat unruly in Hülegüid 
administered territories. On the other hand, Grigor of Akner remarks, 
perhaps wistfully, that during the reign of Hülegü’s son Abaqa, ‘there 
was an abundance of everything throughout all the countries’.631   
 
Administration of the Yām 
Provisions 
Once Ögödei had received approval from his imperial relatives for the 
establishment of the Yām he had to equip and sustain it within the 
parameters of customary steppe tradition though as Silverstein quite 
rightly pointed out above, manning permanent stations goes against the 
grain of Central Asian custom.632  Ögödei’s efforts will be examined 
below under ‘expense’ but at least the administrative oversight was not 
bureaucratically top-heavy since according to the Secret History in 1234 
he appointed only two officials, Arajan and Toquchar, to be in charge of 
the network.633  
Neither have been satisfactorily identified but since such posts would 
normally be filled from the ruler’s keshig this is presumably their 
qualification for the job and equally clearly neither were the original 
                                       
629 Morgan, ‘Reflections’ p. 383 
630 See especially David Morgan, ‘Rašīd al-dīn and Gazan Khan’, in Denise Aigle (ed.), 
L’Iran face à la domination mongole (Tehran, 1997), 179-88. 
631 Grigor/Bedrosian ch. 14 section 16.  
632 Silverstein, p. 144 
633 SH, I para 280 
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proposers of the project.634 However, it is not easy to ascertain what 
their duties were since, as was seen above, Rashīd al-Dīn also refers to 
amirs being appointed for each branch of the family to oversee the 
setting up of the network through their dominions and neither of these 
two are mentioned as being Ögödei’s personal representatives.  
On the face of it, supplying a way-station should not have been 
particularly onerous since these were simply small encampments of 
gers. In his promulgation Ögödei commanded that the jamuchin 
(Mongolian plural of jamuci) and ula’achin (Mongolian plural of ula’achi) 
should be provided out of the units of a thousand. The former refers to 
the person in charge of a relay station whereas the latter refers to those 
in charge of the relay horses, or ula’a, usually geldings.635 Thus ‘at 
every stage there had to be a relay station with twenty relay-horse 
keepers each’ and they were also responsible for measuring the distance 
between each stage.  
The transport and provisions were similarly to be provided including 
geldings for use as remounts, along with carts and the oxen to be 
harnessed to them. When Ögödei arranged for additional post stations 
to be established between Qaraqorum and ‘Khitai’ to resupply 
Qaraqorum - which needed five hundred wagon loads of food and drink 
daily to restock the stores  - these tergen yām or wagon stations had to 
have six or eight oxen for each wagon.636   
Provisions included sheep and milch mares for kumiss.637 According to 
the Yuan Shih, regulations were issued in 1229, during the first year of 
Ogodei’s reign and confirmed by Qubilai in 1264, envoys were to receive 
as their daily ration one catty or pound of meat, one pound of flour, one 
pint of rice and one jug of rice wine.638 Rubruck’s party, travelling 
                                       
634 See SH, II, de Rachewiltz, 1030-1031 
635 SH, II de Rachewiltz, p. 1028 
636 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, pp. 62-63. 
637 SH,I para 280 
638 Yuan shih, ch. 101, p. 2584 and Allsen, ‘Imperial Posts’ p. 267 
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mostly through Jochid held territory most certainly did not enjoy such 
largesse. If Rubruck’s route had taken him more extensively through 
the Chaghadaid dominions he might have fared better as a permit, 
albeit dating from 1353, entitled the bearer not just to the use of  
remounts but also to grape wine as well as two legs of meat and three 
batman639 of food.640 
This basic plan was adhered to in Mongolia until 1954. According to 
Tumurjav, ‘When it operated, every sum (a small administrative unit of 
the aimag during the Qing dynasty which had to supply one hundred 
and fifty fighting men) had households with responsibility for 
performing relay-duty. Typically, the distance between relay stations 
was about 18 miles/30 kilometres. At each station, responsible 
household members would quickly feed the rider, change his horse and 
send him on his way.’641  That such basic facilities endured up to the 
twentieth century is confirmed by travellers such as Kent whose 
experiences exactly paralleled those of the Friars eight centuries earlier. 
Thus on his journey from Iliassutai, west of Ulaan Baatar to Kobdo in 
western Mongolia, the first ‘stage’ out of Iliassutai consisted of ‘a 
number of horses tethered to a line stretched between two stakes driven 
in the ground and a single ger’ guarded by the ubiquitous vicious 
dogs.642 Light refreshments were available in the form of cold fat mutton 
or mutton heated in water for about ten to fifteen minutes. Further 
stations consisted of between two to three gers, in which case there 
would be an ‘official’ ger which operated as the ‘station’.643 This is also 
confirmed by Carruthers, in his travels through unknown Mongolia, 
who remarks that what he calls guard-houses, but which seem to have 
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operated exactly like relay stations but close to the frontier, were simply 
gers about 30 miles/48 kilometres apart and every fifth ‘guard-house’ 
had a resident official with control over the other four.644  
Ögödei may have had doubts as to the competence of his jamuchin since 
he laid down that for transgressions the perpetrator would have half 
their goods confiscated. 
If one causes even a piece of string to be 
lacking He shall be guilty and liable To 
“splitting in half along the top of the head” If 
one causes even a spoon-shaped spoke Of a 
wheel to be lacking He shall be guilty and 
liable To “splitting in half along the nose.”645 
 
Möngke, as part of his reforms, additionally appointed two Muslim 
bitikchis, ‘Imād al-Mulk, who had occupied the same position under 
Ögödei Qa’an and Güyüg Khan and the Amir Fakhr al-Mulk, described 
as an ancient servant of the Court. Their duties seem to have been to 
issue paizas to officially sanctioned travellers. Later on, in the Hülegüid 
west as part of Ghāzān’s drive to eliminate abuses in the network in his 
domains, he appointed an Amir to oversee each Yām. Quite how this 
supervision operated in practice is unclear, as is the number of stations 
devolved on each grandee. Gazagnadou, without giving his source, 
reckons on around five hundred ‘relais de poste’ serving the Hülegüid 
sphere of influence.646 As the number of top officials, presumably 
Amirs, present at the reading of Ghāzān’s last testament was in the 
region of sixty and even if there were not as many as five hundred Yām 
stations, each Amir must have had a ‘portfolio’ of stations under his 
supervision otherwise there would not have been enough great amirs to 
go round. Despite Ghāzān’s attempts to tame the Yām in his own 
domains by introducing administrative reforms, little is known of the 
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day-to-day operational practicalities of the Hülegüid communication 
system.  
The Yām in Jochid domains 
Tantalisingly, there is circumstantial evidence that the Jochid Yām may 
have been the most developed of the Chinggisids outside the Yuan.  Alef 
is of the view that the creation of a system of communications was one 
of the most significant achievements of the reign of Ivan III (1440-
1505).647 However, Alef also makes clear that after the conquest of the 
Russian northeast in the thirteenth century by the Mongols, the jam, 
which he regards as a tax at this period, was inflicted on the 
inhabitants.  
Donald Ostrowski, for his part, argues that there is sufficient evidence 
to show that fourteenth century Muscovite government and 
administrative practices were overwhelmingly influenced by Mongol 
political institutions and practices648 and he agrees with Halperin on 
the Mongol antecedents of the communication system rather than, for 
example the Kievan povoz.649  Ivan III’s Yām also used some of the same 
terminology as its predecessor. In the early sixteenth century 
Sigismund von Herberstein, a Hapsburg envoy, who was sent on two 
missions to Muscovy, in 1517 and in 1526, lavishly praised the official 
communication system in his influential Rerum Moscoviticarum 
Commentaii650 and he refers to the relay-station master as the 
yamshchik and the way stations are referred to in documents as jam, 
                                       
647 Alef, ‘The Origin and Early Development of the Muscovite Postal Service’  p. 6 
648 Donald Ostrowski, ‘The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions’, Slavic 
Review, vol. 49, No. 4 (Winter, 1990) pp. 525, 526, 537 
649 Ostrowski, ‘The Mongol Origins of Muscovite Political Institutions’, p. 535 
650 Herberstein, Sigismund von, Notes upon Russia: being a translation of the earliest 
account of that country, entitled Rerum moscoviticarum commentarii by the Baron 
Sigismund von Herberstein, trans. and ed. by R. H. Major, London, Hakluyt Society, 
1851-1852, 2 vols. Also:  Description of Moscow and Muscovy, 1557, Sigmund von 
Herberstein, ed. Bertold Picard, trans. by J. B.C. Grundy, London, Dent, New York: 
Barnes & Noble, 1966;  Gustave Alef, ‘The Origin and Early Development of the 
Muscovite Postal Service’ 
Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge, Bd. 15, H. 1 (Marz 1967) pp. 1 
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What is of interest for present purposes, however, is that the logistical 
support of  Ivan III’s Yām seems to have been very sophisticated though 
how far it was based on Jochid precedents is not clear. Halperin points 
to the wide-ranging diplomatic and commercial interests of the Jochids, 
including fifty major embassies to Mamluk Egypt in which the Jochids 
observed all the niceties of Islamic diplomacy651 but also importantly 
would surely have been able to observe at first hand the Barīd.  
Alef reports that in the Muscovite Yām knowledgeable clerks in the 
capital kept up-to-date information on the routes to be used by native 
and foreign official travellers. They also kept abreast of information of 
conditions beyond the frontiers so that they might direct outgoing 
missions along relatively safe roads. They knew of existing inventories 
to be found at the relay stations and the availability of transportation – 
horses, wagons and so on – for the use of envoys. And they exhibited 
considerable knowledge of what should be provided for foreigners.652 
The clerks ‘calculated the number of conveyances needed for handlers 
and supplies, and estimated the food and fodder required for the 
journey. The occasional similarities in menus for different missions 
along the same routes arouse a suspicion that check lists existed and 
the clerks only varied the quantities of provisions depending upon the 
number of travellers. They were also aware of dietary differences 
between Christian and Moslems. ...... The dispatching officer in Moscow 
armed the overseer (pristav) assigned to conduct official parties within 
the connives of Muscovy with necessary letters, instructions and 
requisitions so that he might obtain clearances to travel through the 
provinces ......’653 
Allsen has also noted the efficiency of the Muscovite communication 
system which he argues rests on the well-documented fact that the 
                                       
651 Charles J. Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval 
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Russians had long-term, first-hand knowledge of the Yām which was 
first organised in the 1240s.  The almost identical correspondence 
between the operational orientation of the two communication networks 
can be explained, in his opinion, by the Mongols’ governing strategy in 
the region that relied heavily on long-distance communication. This 
Allsen puts down to a change in governance around 1300 when the 
Jochid resident agents in the Russian principalities were replaced with 
envoys, or elchin, Russian posoly, whom they sent on frequent but 
temporary missions to the Russian princes to make known their 
demands.654 Conversely, there was a constant stream of the Russian 
elite en route for the Jochid centre at Sarai or to the travelling 
encampments or ordu. This meant that ‘as a result of these techniques 
of governance, which lasted for well over two hundred years, all strata 
of Russian society, from grand princes to the general population, were 
intimately acquainted with Mongolian methods of moving and treating 
officials, messengers and foreign envoys’.655 Such administrative 
support made the Muscovite communication system one of the most 
efficient of its time in the West.  
It is, however, highly unlikely that, for example, Ögodei’s officials Arajan 
and Toquchar, who were appointed by him to be in charge of the 
network656 had similar duties to those of their later Muscovite 
counterparts. On the other hand as the Jochid Yām was the fastest 
route east, it may have developed a more sophisticated system than 
when travelled by, for example, a generally hungry Rubruck in the mid 
1250s, when it seems to have been a very basic, self-supporting, locally 
administered network.  
 
                                       
654 Charles Halperin, Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval 
Russian History, Bloomington, Ind. 1985, pp. 31-32, 33, 39-40 and 139-40, no. 37 
and 38. Also, Allsen, ‘Imperial Posts’, p. 263-264 
655 Allsen, ‘Imperial Posts’, p. 264 
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Upkeep and Expense of the Yām 
Ögodei’s blueprint for ensuring the viability of the communication 
network had three elements. The most important of these, from which 
the other two flowed, was that it should operate within the traditional 
economic framework of the steppe. At the same time this meant there 
was no cost to his treasury to set it up and it would be self-supporting. 
So far as the first is concerned, he ordered that the various units of a 
thousand in the appropriate areas would provide the basic relay-
station, later known as an örtöönii nutag.657 Such Yām stations were 
under the charge of units of a thousand, allocated grazing and had to 
supply the ‘staff’, remounts and subsistence for the envoys and 
emissaries passing by. There was thus supposedly minimal cost to the 
‘treasury’.  
That the ‘centre’ was not involved in the expense of the establishment 
and upkeep of the Yām stations is confirmed by a reference in the Yuan 
Shi relating to the Jochids. In 736/1336 Uzbeg Khan (r. 713-744/1313-
1343) sent an embassy to the Yuan soliciting the payment of his income 
from his lands in China for the establishment of relay-stations to 
facilitate the movement of troops. His envoy reminded the emperor that 
the Yām stations were not kept in repair by handouts from the Yuan 
but the Jochid khan had to meet the expense himself.658 This 
underscores the responsibility of the Imperial Family for the network in 
their domains – as also shown in Hülegü’s efforts to organise his 
communication network in the area under his control. That the 
Hülegüids did not receive any expenses for the upkeep of their section 
of the network from their overlords in China is indicated in Ghāzān’s 
reforms where he allotted funds for the upkeep of each station as well 
as fodder.659 Having to supply the latter may actually have made the 
Hülegüid element of the network one of the more expensive to run since 
                                       
657 Bold, Mongolian Nomadic Society, p. 45 
658 Yuan Shi, ch. cxvii. Also Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, p. 14 
659 Rashid al-Dīn III, 482-3 
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the animals apparently were not at pasture throughout the year or were 
in areas of poor pasture.  
Over and above the economic burdens imposed by the relay stations on 
the ‘landowners’ through whose domains the routes lay, they may also 
have had a more positive but perhaps infrequent economic impact on 
the units of a thousand. This was provided by opportunities to 
importune gifts and bribes. Travelling envoys provided a useful source 
of ‘income’ in the form of extorted ‘gifts’ if John of Plano Carpini and 
later Rubruck’s experience of ‘miserie and tribulation’ is anything to go 
by.660 The Papal Legates travelled for a good part of their journey east 
within the Jochid Ulus and amongst the adversities encountered was 
the behaviour of the ‘Tartars’ themselves whose behaviour was both 
‘uncivil and horrible’.  
 
Bribery in the form of gifts was the order of the day, from the start of 
their journey when gifts had to be bestowed before they were allowed to 
use relay horses and a guide, an arrangement which continued to be 
the only way to proceed.  The mission not only had to justify their 
journey to every armed group of Tartars who came across them, they 
also had to part with some of their precious stores of supplies to get rid 
of their inquisitors. Furthermore, whilst there are frequent mentions of 
horses this should not be taken to mean that this was an efficiently 
administered transmission of ambassadors. To obtain mounts and a 
guide on one occasion Carpini had to hand over the usual ‘gifts’ only to 
find that these were to be the same horses from which the Tartars had 
just dismounted.661 
Though Rubruck remarked with some resentment on the venality of the 
Tartars, he also noted that ‘admittedly they take away nothing by force, 
but when they see something they ask for it in a highly persistent and 
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impudent fashion. If a man gives it to them it is wasted because they 
feel no gratitude; for they regard themselves as the masters of the world 
and think that nobody should deny them anything.’662 
************** 
Infrastructure663 
 
The basic infrastructure requirements were established by an early 
proponent of the relay courier service - Cyrus the Great (r. 559-529 
BCE). Xenophon records that when Cyrus wanted to establish a relay 
messenger system his method was to see how far a horse ridden hard 
could cover in a day without collapsing. When this distance had been 
ascertained he erected way stations equipped with mounts, supplies 
and grooms together with an official to receive and forward the post by 
relays of mounted couriers or runners who were supplied with one day’s 
worth of rations.  Express royal couriers, according to Herodotus, could 
complete the distance from Ecbatana, modern day Hamadan, to 
Persepolis in nine days, covering up to 186 miles or 300 kilometres a 
day which was ten times faster than troops marching between the two 
destinations. This was destined to be the basic pattern of all pre-
modern communication networks modified according to local conditions 
and requirements. 
Some early communication networks had a highly developed 
infrastructure in terms of both highways and facilities. Thus the Roman 
cursus publicus had possibly the longest system of civil engineered 
highways of any pre-modern polity with the distance between the 
Antonine Wall on the borders of Scotland to Jerusalem estimated by 
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Gibbon as being 3,740 miles/6,018 kilometres.664 The cursus publicus 
was equipped with mansiones/rest houses and mutationes/stables 
every ten miles or so. Needham observes that, remarkably, the Chinese 
were aware of the Roman system as one Yü Huan in circa 264 CE wrote 
that in Roman Syria: 
They hoist flags, beat drums, use small 
carriages with white canopies and have post-
offices, mounted couriers, cantonal offices 
and post stations just as we do in China. 
Every ten li there is a cantonal office and 
every thirty li there is a post station665 
The Han interest in their communication network, which was based on 
earlier antecedents, may not be entirely unrelated to the fact that the 
founder of the Han, Liu Bang, the Emperor Gaozu (r. 202–195 BCE) was 
reputed to have been a cantonal officer/thing chang whose duties 
included guarding the roads.666 
In the second century BCE the Chou Li or Record of Institutions of the 
Chou Dynasty observes that: 
In principle, along all the roads of the 
Empire and the (feudal) states there is a rest 
house (lu) every ten li where food and drink 
may be had. Every thirty li there is an 
overnight rest-house with lodgings (lu shih) 
and a government grain-store. Every fifty li 
there is a market and a station with an 
abundant stock of supplies.667 
This basic pattern was to persist for another two millennia.  
Needham regards the Han dynastic period as the pinnacle of Chinese 
road building though in circa 493 CE the Northern Wei, who also took 
                                       
664 Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. IV, Physics and Physical 
Technology, Part II: Civil Engineering and Nautics, CUP 1971, p. 15., Gibbon, The 
History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. 12 vols. London, 1790 (1st ed. 
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665 Needham, vol. IV, p. 34 
666 Needham, vol. IV, p. 36 
667 Needham, vol. IV, p. 35. Needham observes that the short distances were 
undoubtedly so that drum and flag signals or fire smoke signals could be heard or 
observed.  
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an active interest in highway construction rather splendidly appointed a 
Regius Professor of Geographical Communications.668 After the Han, 
however, there does appear to have been an inexorable decline in the 
highways as their role was taken by the immense system of artificial 
canals and navigable rivers leaving only the mountain highways to 
continue their age-old function.669 There also appears to have been a 
steep drop in the total mileage of the Chinese network post-Han. Thus, 
during Tang the total mileage of roads has been computed at 
approximately 13,550 miles/21,806 kilometres, a drop from the 22,000 
miles/34,505 kilometres of road network of the Han which was already 
considerably less than the probable 48,000 miles/78,000 kilometres of 
the Roman system.670 
That the state highways depended on settled conditions for their 
efficient maintenance may be a factor in what appears to have been a 
major deterioration in the later Qing period. Stanford’s 1886 
Compendium of Geography of Asia points out that the main highways in 
the 1880s in China were little more than beaten tracks left to take care 
of themselves whilst roads as understood in the West scarcely existed 
anywhere in Central and Eastern Eurasia.671 These sentiments are 
reiterated in Richard’s 1907 Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese 
Empire. Here it is stated with conviction that ‘in no civilised country of 
the world are communications so difficult as in China’. Except for the 
Government courier roads, or Public Horse Great Roads, traffic had to 
use what were no more than footpaths, sometimes laid with flagstones 
while others were only beaten tracks through the fields.672  These 
observations could well be taken at face-value as they are based on the 
first-hand experience of Victorian travellers in the Celestial Kingdom. 
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On the other hand, the byways maintained by local ‘worthies’ were 
admired by Needham himself who observed from his own travels in 
China that the landscape was shot through ‘with millions of miles of 
well-paved paths suitable chiefly for pedestrians, porters with carrying 
poles, pushers of wheelbarrows and men carrying litters. In his 
experience, rough unpaved cart-tracks tended to predominate only in 
the eastern plains.’673  
In Western Eurasia, the Umayyad caliph al-Walid I ((r. 86-96/705-15) 
had reservoirs built to serve way-stations on the Syria-Mecca route.674 
Milestones were also placed along the routes, both as distance markers 
and directional aids which, as Silverstein comments, were also evidence 
to the populace both of imperial efforts in creating stability within the 
realm as well as signifying a potent imperial presence. In the Hülegüid 
domains, it seems that improvements to the main highways, though 
perhaps mainly in the conquerors’ heartland of Azerbaijan had to wait 
until Öljeitü (r. 703-716/1304-1316) since Mustawfi reports that he 
had routes measured and milestones erected,675  
Chinggisid efforts in contrast to those of other great empires do seem 
somewhat pitiful. Ögödei commanded the establishment of way-stations 
in the form of easily relocated ger encampments but as far as other 
elements of infrastructure were concerned references are few and far 
between. The envoy Chang Te dispatched to Hülegü in 1259 by Möngke 
does indicate, however, that there were built structures on his route 
since some way-stations as he proceeds further west had the 
appearance of bathing-houses with glass windows.676 These were 
presumably inherited possibly from the Qarakhitai.   
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It should perhaps be borne in mind that the communication 
infrastructure was not necessarily regarded as an unmitigated benefit 
by the local populations. It could have a negative connotation since the 
postal routes could be seen as symbols of oppressive conquerors. In 
China, as Needham points out, the population in general showed a 
passive hostility to the road authorities and all their works because of 
the burdens of corvee labour and taxation. Moreover, as Han troops 
inexorably penetrated into non-Han areas, it was not unknown, 
especially in southern China, for the conquered peoples to cut the roads 
and destroy the post-stations whenever they could.677  
Paved Roads 
During their invasions of northern China in the first quarter of the 
thirteenth century the Chinggisids could not have failed to notice the 
state controlled highways. However, one noticeable element that was 
missing in the Chinggisid Yām was the construction of paved roads. As 
the Tabula Peutingeriana mentioned earlier indicates, the Romans 
appreciated the merits of engineered roads as an aid to efficient 
communication and the initial section of the first great Roman road, the 
Via Appia, was completed around 312 BCE with the network finally 
covering 49,709 miles/80,000 kilometres. The Emperor Augustus (63 
BCE-14 CE) and his successors ‘recognised the link between this road 
network and imperium’ in that the roads played a critical role in the 
creation, maintenance and proclamation of the Roman Imperium as 
well as fully understanding ‘that Roman roads sustained the Pax 
Romana’.678 This ideological dimension does not appear to have 
occurred to the Chinggisids who regarded the Yām network in purely 
utilitarian terms. 
To be fair to the conquerors, however, Chinggis Khan is reported by 
Rashīd al-Dīn as having uttered a bilig in which one of his aims was to 
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straighten and clear the “royal roads and highways”.679  Allsen argues 
for the Mongols’ civil engineering capabilities based on a comment by 
Ch’ang Ch’un that, when accompanying his father on the Western 
Campaign, Chaghadai constructed a road through a ravine near Lake 
Sairam which required forty-eight timber bridges. 680 There is some 
further evidence that the Mongols were capable of rudimentary ‘civil 
engineering’ projects as was shown in the preparations for Hülegü’s 
advance westwards681 where bridges were organised and boulders 
removed from tracks. Without disparaging Chaghadai’s achievement in 
clearing a pathway for the troops and building the bridges in what must 
have been difficult terrain it is evident that, despite having a potential 
workforce in the shape of captives, none of this appears to have been 
translated into the construction of a transcontinental network of paved 
roads.682  
Building materials may have been a problem, though maintenance in 
the harsh conditions would also have been an issue, as can be seen in 
Mongolia today. Whether cost was also an issue is always possible since 
both the Roman and Chinese civil engineering efforts were 
extraordinarily expensive if the computations of between £55,000 and 
£109,000 per mile at 1960s values for Chinese roads constructed 
between 130 BCE and 65 CE and £105,000 per mile for the Roman Via 
Appia are anywhere near accurate.683  
Additionally, there may be a convoluted Mongol reason for this 
oversight. The Armenian Grigor of Akner affirms that a reason that the 
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tracks had to be cleared of obstacles was for the movement of the 
Mongols’ wagons and carts.684 On the other hand, whilst roads tend to 
be regarded as a great convenience for travellers, especially for wheeled 
transport, the Mongols were also horsemen who were used to operating 
in wide open spaces and whose modus operandi was cross-country 
travel. It is thus highly unlikely that even if Ögödei had decreed the 
construction of paved roads they would have been utilised by horsemen 
except perhaps as direction markers.   
Conversely, the Roman legions were foot soldiers; hence the building of 
roads was an aid to marching, especially through difficult terrain. 
Moreover, Roman messengers travelled by wheeled vehicles. Another 
factor is that throughout much of the Roman Empire the climate was 
not as extreme as in the midst of Eurasia which even today takes a 
huge toll on the road network.  
********** 
Perhaps the most important contention in this section is that the Yām 
network should be considered an infrastructure rather than a postal 
service. In this respect, Allsen observes that the caliphal Barīd was 
‘primarily designed to convey information rather than the movement of 
goods or people’ though it did, of course, also constitute an 
infrastructure.685 In contradistinction, Ann Kolb in her chapter on 
‘Transport and Communication in the Roman State’ has firmly 
emphasised that the widely held view that the cursus publicus was a 
postal delivery service is wrong.   
In the Roman instance, Kolb has argued that the cursus publicus could 
not be considered a postal system per se since couriers were employed 
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by the sender, not by the cursus publicus and that ‘those travelling by 
means of the cursus publicus were not using a transportation system. 
They were using an infrastructure based on the facilities of the cursus 
publicus’.686  Similarly, it is resolutely considered here that though on a 
rather more modest scale, the Chinggisid Yām should be considered an 
infrastructure rather than a postal service per se687 since it operated in a 
similar fashion to the Roman cursus publicus in that way-stations did 
not operate as ‘post-offices’. Those ‘staffing’ the Roman and the Mongol 
networks were necessary for the operation of the way-stations, 
including those responsible for the care, issue and maintenance of the 
animals and to guard stretches of the route. Thus this view is in 
opposition to, for example, Gazagnadou, who consistently refers to the 
‘Mongol postal service’ and ‘couriers of the yām’.688 Moreover, whilst it 
can probably be safely said that the Chinggisid Yām network may have 
been one of the most extensive pre-modern land-based communication 
networks, it was also one of the least ‘fancy’.  
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Chapter VIII 
 
The Yām Network: Routes 
 
In spite of the relatively uncomplicated set-up and the utilization of the 
ancient highways across Eurasia there is no getting away from the fact 
that in strategic terms the Yām network was overstretch on a heroic 
scale. This chapter then will attempt to examine, so far as possible, the 
main routes on which Yām stations had been established. 
 
Caveat 
As Lattimore and Ball have cautioned, routes were merely directions of 
travel689 and ‘anywhere – barring unscaleable precipices – qualified as a 
route’.690 This is an important caveat when attempting to map the exact 
tracks used by early communication networks. Such an endeavour is 
further complicated because, as Bretschneider has remarked, 
geographical names mentioned in the sources ‘escape critical 
investigation, owing to the scantiness of our knowledge with respect to 
these tracts from other sources, ancient or modern’.691 Thus even if 
place names are mentioned, identifying the exact locations beyond 
reasonable doubt can be well nigh impossible either because they are 
today little more than indistinguishable heaps of rubble692 or refer to 
places whose names have changed multiple times as they fall under the 
domination of different sets of rulers.693  Additionally, because of the 
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vagueness of the references, some locations are sheer guess work. Such 
challenges have been met with relish by historians, geographers and 
explorers, on occasion causing uproar when deliberated by the 
distinguished Fellows of the Royal Geographical Society.694  
 
The sources for the Roman Cursus Publicus or the Barīd in its various 
manifestations695may not enable an exact mapping of the routes and 
stages but from, for example, the Tabula Peutingeriana, it is at least 
possible to establish a fairly precise line of march during the Roman 
period.  
 
 
Fragment from the surviving eastern section of the 5th century CE 
Tabula Peutingeriana696 
Bactria top right. The routes go no further east than Merv and Kabul 
 
 
                                                                                                                
centres has been known as Kuldja and Yining. It is not to be confused with 
Almaty/Alma Ata/Vernoye which was founded as a Russian military post in 1854.  
694 E.g. Dr. M’Cosh, On the Various Lines of Overland Communication between India 
and China, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society vol. 5., no. 2 (1860-1861), 
Marco Polo’s route has also caused considerable contention see especially Yule- 
Cordier, The Book of Ser Marco Polo, I, pp. 172-176 
695 For example the Tabulae Peutingeriana and Ibn Khurdādhbeh’s Kitāb al-Masālik 
wa-al-mamālik 
696 Codex 324 Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Hofburg, Vienna. There are a 
number of accessible images on-line. This is from the Bibliotheca Augustana. 
https://www.hs-augsburg.de/~harsch/Chronologia/Lspost03/Tabula/tab_or11.html. 
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By contrast, the surviving references to the Yām network do not provide 
detailed itineraries of the overland tracks and trails used between the 
Hülegüid domains and the Yuan.697 Rashīd al-Dīn, in the best traditions 
of his predecessors, had apparently included in Volume III of the Jāmi’ 
al-Tawārīkh a section on Suwar al-Aqālīm, or the ‘climes’. This  
purportedly contained ‘not only a geographical and topographical 
description of the globe as it was then known....., but also an account of 
the system of highways in the Mongol Empire, with mention of the 
milestones erected at imperial command and a list of postal stages”.698 
For present purposes the loss of such a work is almost unbearable. 
 Thus the view that is taken here is that definitively charting the Yām 
network with any exactitude will never be realisable. This is partly on 
the grounds given above but also for an important reason given to an 
early twentieth traveller in ‘High Tartary’ by his guides, that the relay 
stations were continually shifting, hence the necessity of taking guides 
who knew the latest positions of the stages.699  
What scarce information there is has to be teased out of the sources or 
from the few clues which can be gleaned from the accounts of the 
travellers, some of whose itineraries – such as Marco Polo, are very 
confused. Neither is there much in the way of archaeological evidence 
since an encampment of gers, which constituted the horse relay 
stations, left no footprints. On the other hand, though it is not feasible 
to indicate each individual relay station, it is sometimes possible to 
trace the general route from snippets of information wrested from the 
                                       
697 In this context, Donald Ostrowski in his Muscovy and the Mongols p. 111 remarks 
that John of Plano Carpini joined the Bukhara-Samarkand-Tashkent main road at 
Otrar but there is no solid evidence for this assumption in Carpini’s account of his 
outward nor his return journey. It may well have been Taraz. 
698 Boyle, introduction to The Successors of Genghis Khan, p. 8 quoting K. Jahn: ‘The 
Still Missing Works of Rashid al-Din’, Central Asiatic Journal, IX/2, pp. 113-133 
699 Kent, Old Tartar Trails, p. 114. Carruthers in his Unknown Mongolia of 1910 also 
remarks on the impermanence of what he calls guard houses but which seem to have 
functioned as relay stations which could shift long distances from their original 
positions. P. 260 
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accounts of such travellers as the friars as they uncomfortably trotted 
their way to Qaraqorum.  
A further complication is that it was not only the Yām stations that 
shifted their whereabouts. Unlike the courier roads in China, which 
spread like a web in straight lines from the capital to the provincial 
centres, or indeed the ninth century network emanating from Baghdad, 
the principle actors in the Chinggisid Imperium did not have ‘fixed 
abodes’ but themselves moved between several locations, the 
implications of which will be examined below. 
Lastly, it should also be borne in mind that there were four different 
divisions of the communication network, each having different roles. 
Thus it should not be taken for granted that the Morin Yām/horse 
station, the Tergen Yām/wagon station, or the Tayan 
Yām/ambassadorial stations and the Narin Yām/secret communications 
all followed the same itineraries, especially this last.  It is also unclear 
whether the caravans of traders, large or small, plodded along the 
Tergen Yām or wagon station tracks or found their way independently 
along ancient caravan trails; though it was equally likely that the wagon 
trails in some areas followed the caravan tracks if heading towards the 
same destinations. Potentially, then, at least five different sets of 
itineraries could be involved. 
There are a number of ways to engage with such issues. The decisive 
factor, from which all else flows, is that the purpose of the network was 
to enable the ‘centre’ to retain control. Thus the whereabouts of the 
Khan or Qa’an was pivotal to the operation of the communication 
network though this was complicated, as will be seen, by the peripatetic 
nature of Chinggisid power as well as their propensity for campaigning. 
It is, however, generally safe to say that a route is dictated by the 
starting point and the presumed destination.  
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Secondly, the itinerary was also predicated on the accessibility of 
mountain passes even more perhaps than traversing deserts or rivers, 
or indeed the availability of a way-station/Yām. The time of year would 
also have been a factor because of weather conditions at points along 
the way such as the dreaded dust storms blowing off the Gobi and 
Taklamakan deserts during the spring as well as snow melt coming off 
mountains making rivers impassable. Polo comments that his father 
and uncle took three years on their return trip from Qubilai’s Court 
arriving back in Venice in 1269 because of snow, heavy rains and the 
great torrents which they found impassable.700 The third means of 
accessing the Chinggisid communication routes, especially during the 
Ögodeid period, is through his justification for establishing the network, 
which could provide clues to the general direction followed.  
 
 
Eurasia in the 1220s 
The Ögödeid Period 1228 – c.1244 
Thus one means of overcoming the intrinsic difficulties of mapping the 
Chinggisid communication network is through Ögödei’s foremost reason 
                                       
700 The Book of Ser Marco Polo, Yule/Cordier, Book I,  p.16 and p. 25 
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to instigate a more efficient communications system.701 As this was to 
expedite messages, and since he is said to have continually consulted 
his elder brother Chaghadai702 and his younger brother Tolui’s widow, 
Sorqaqtani Beki703 it follows that his emissaries would have travelled 
repeatedly between himself and these imperial relatives. Initially, 
therefore, the chief routes must have been between these personages 
and since these were not ‘contingency’ networks they must have been 
either Tayan Yām, Morin Yām/horse relay Yām and/or Tergen 
Yām/Wagon Yām.  
 
Disposition of the main centres of 
Ögödei and his most senior relatives 
 
1. Chaghadai; 2. Chinggis Khan’s birthplace inherited by Tolui; 3. Ögödei, 
near Qaraqorum, 4. Sorqaqtani Beki and Arïq Böke in the west Altai foothills 
and 5. the route to Batu on the Volga 
Rashīd al-Dīn emphasises that during the thirteen years that Ögödei 
was on the throne he would consult his elder brother Chaghadai on 
every important undertaking and would take no action without his 
advice and approval.704 The implication of this is that tracks between 
                                       
701 This is examined in Part IV, Chapter VIII 
702 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 149  
703 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 199 
704 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 149  
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the environs of Qaraqorum and Chaghadai’s ulus would have been 
especially well-trodden. However, Ögödei was not static but moved 
between his several residences. He spent around three months each at 
his summer base or yailāq of Sira-ordu in the meadows of Örmügetü, 
south-east of Qaraqorum. His winter quarters or qishlāq were on the 
Ongqin river, some distance to the south of Qaraqorum, whilst four to 
five weeks were spent at other retreats such as Qarshi-yi Sūrī, built for 
him in 1237 about 25 miles/40 kilometres north of Qaraqorum. In the 
autumn he could be found at Koke-Na’ur, four days’ journey from 
Qaraqorum.705  
Chaghadai was similarly peripatetic. His original ulus awarded by his 
father was in the strategically important lush Ili River valley south of 
Lake Balkhash and to the north of Tien Shan706 though Juvaynī was 
firmly of the opinion that Chaghadai received the territory extending 
from the land of the Uighur to Samarkand and Bukhārā.707 Chaghadai’s 
annual schedule involved spending the spring and summer in his 
quarters or yailāq in Almaliq - more recently Khuldja and now Yining, 
lying to the north of Kucha across the Tien Shan Mountains from the 
Taklamakan Desert - whilst he spent the autumn and winter on the 
banks of the Ili.708  Previous occupants of this area had included the 
Wusun, the objective of the Han-dynasty general Zhang Qian and more 
recently it had been the Qarakhitai709 and Qarluk heartland.  
At its height, this extensive Chaghadaid ulus was bounded in the north 
by the Jochid ulus of Orda, Batu’s elder brother, with Lake Balkhash as 
the ‘boundary’. Westwards it stretched beyond Lake Balkhash towards 
Khwārazm and north eastwards beyond Lake Zaisan and the western 
slopes of the Altai.  To the south it had contentious control over an area 
                                       
705 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, pp. 61-62. 
706 It is in what is today the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture in north-west Xinjiang. 
707 Juvaynī/Boyle, I, p. 43 
708 Juvaynī/Boyle, I, p. 272 
709 The northern limit of control of the Qarakhitai was Lake Balkhash and the 
southern just to the south of Lake Issyk-Kul; East as far as the Altai and west to the 
Syr Darya. 
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from Balkh to Kābul whilst in the east, Chaghadaid control continued 
as far as Hami at the north-eastern edge of the Taklamakan Desert. 
After Möngke’s disputed election, the Chaghadaid and Ögödeid 
territorial holdings became contested territory. Alghu, a grandson of 
Chaghadai, had seized control of the Chaghadaid ulus between c.1260 
and 1264, and dominated an area between the Amu-Darya and the 
Altai, effectively subsuming both the Ögödeid inheritance and that of 
Qubilai’s younger brother, Arïq Böke. By the 1260s then, the 
Chaghadaid ulus theoretically dominated an area which incorporated 
much of the entire central section of the trans-Eurasian routes.  
To the north-east of the Chaghadaids was Ögödei’s original ulus,710 
which lay to the east of Lake Alakol on today’s Kyrghiz- Xinjiang border. 
Thus after the death of Güyüg when Batu paused near today’s Kopal, 
just south of Lake Balkhash,711 the Ögödeids and the Chaghadaids were 
in fact within easy reach. Though the Ögödeid ulus had been to all 
intents and purposes dissolved by Möngke after his contested 
succession, Ögödei’s son Qaidu fought back to re-establish the 
ancestral dispensation from his grandfather. In this endeavour he was 
so successful that when he became the senior partner in an alliance 
with the Chaghadaid Du’a against Qubilai, Qaidu effectively controlled 
an area extending from the Amu Darya to beyond the Altai in the east 
as well as the Tarim Basin. Thus the Tuluids in eastern and western 
Eurasia had a hostile bloc sitting squarely on the most strategically 
important section of the communication network. 
Sorqaqtani Beki’s whereabouts is more problematic. Her late husband, 
Tolui, as the youngest son or keeper of the hearth (M.otchigin) inherited 
his father’s yurt and great ordo, including the army and treasury, in the 
Mongolian homeland on the Onon and Kerulen Rivers, north-east of 
today’s Ulaan Baatar and just south of the Russian border. As Carpini 
                                       
710 Juvaynī/Boyle I, p. 43 
711 Juvaynī/Boyle I, p. 557 
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remarks, it was the custom that the courts of princes were not dissolved 
on their deaths but governed thereafter by a widow,712in this instance, 
Sorqaqtani Beki. In the meantime, Tolui’s youngest son, Arïq Böke, had 
his main residence in the far west of Mongolia on the western slopes of 
the Altai Mountains with his winter quarters on the Urunge River, north 
of the Chaghadaid’s Besh Baliq, with his summer and winter quarters 
only two to three days apart.713   
Rubruck understood that Arïq Böke occupied the residence of his 
mother and inherited all her possessions714which must have included 
the original ordo of Chinggis Khan though somewhat confusingly, he 
remarked that during his visit to Möngke’s encampment, Möngke 
decided to visit his mother’s camp which was close by and where he 
was greeted by Arïq Böke. As Rubruck did not go further east than 
Qaraqorum this could not have referred to the Onon-Kerulen area and 
it is unlikely that Möngke would have crossed the Altai which implies 
that Sorqaqtani Beki must have had one of her yurts in the region of 
Qaraqorum.  
In addition, in 1236, Ögodei had presented Sorqoqtani Beki with Chen-
ting fu/Aq-Baliq or White Town, in Hopei, northern China, which had 
previously been given to Tolui who had campaigned in Khitai during the 
lifetime of his father. Sorqaqtani Beki took a deep personal interest in 
its administration715 though how often she visited is not certain. What 
these various residences imply, however, was that those wishing to 
communicate with Sorqaqtani Beki had to contend with at least four 
locations which were hundreds of miles/kilometres apart from each 
other.  
                                       
712 Carpini/Beazley p. 134 
713 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 310. This was stated in the context of his having gone to 
his brother Qubilai Qa’an seeking forgiveness for his rebellion. 
714 Rubruck, p. 224, and Carpini, Beazley, p. 134 
715 Details of the administration of this allotment can be found in the chapter  
on Shih T’ien-Tse (1202-1275) in In The Service of the Khan, Igor de Rachewiltz, Hok-
Lam Chan, Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing and Peter W Geier, p.31 ff 
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During Ögödei’s lifetime the most distant of the senior princes was 
Batu, who was comfortably ensconced on the River Volga.716  His father, 
Chinggis Khan’s eldest son Jochi, had been allotted as was customary, 
the most distant parts of the family domains. These, according to 
Rashīd al-Dīn, included all the countries and ulus which lay in the 
region of the Irtysh and the Altai mountains with a directive that he 
should take possession of the Qipchaq Steppe and the countries that 
had been conquered in that direction.717 Juvaynī is rather more 
expansive, including Khwārazm, as well as Qayaligh/Qayaliq, the Cailac 
of Rubruck, south of Lake Balkhash and thus arguably under 
Chaghadaid control. Rubruck was told by the son of a commander of a 
thousand, deputed to take him from Batu’s Court to Möngke’s that the 
journey, leaving Batu in September, would take four months on 
horseback with two packhorses between the three of them.718 The Yuan 
shih remarks on how little known were the Jochid domains because of 
their remoteness and that they were two hundred days or almost seven 
months distance from Dadu/Beijing.719  
Neither were the Hülegüids permanently settled in Baghdad. One 
reason for a peripatetic lifestyle is put forward by Fazl Allah Khunji, a 
late fifteenth century biographer of the Aq Qoyunlu sultan Ya’qub, who 
lists the qualities which demonstrate a ruler’s distinguished origin. One 
of these is that: 
He was not a town dweller affected by dirty 
habits, as was the case with many rulers of 
Khurasan, Fars and Kerman, but followed 
the seasons wandering in open spaces 
going from summer quarters to winter 
quarters.720 
                                       
716 Rubruck, pp. 130-131 
717 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 117 
718 Rubruck, p. 136 
719 Yuan shih, ch. cxvii, biography of Jochi and Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, I 
p. 8 
720 Fazlallāh b. Rūzbihān Khunjī, Tārīkh-i ‘Ālamārā-yi Amīnī tr. v. Minorsky as Persia 
in AD 1478-1490, London, 1957, p 20.  B. O’Kane, From Tents to Pavilions, p. 249 
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Scholars such as Charles Melville and Bernard d O’Kane have taken an 
interest in the ‘geochronology’ or ‘movements over time’ of the Hülegüid 
rulers721 noting that  the entire court spent around a hundred days a 
year moving between summer and winter quarters over and above being 
extensively involved in military operations.722  In their respective 
Imperial uluses, the summer quarters seem to have been the more 
important of their centres. Thus, for the Hülegüids in Azerbaijan - at 
least from the time of Ghāzān Khan - these were initially Ujān, to the 
east of Tabriz. His brother Öljeitü, however, favoured and developed 
Sultāniyya, 211 miles/339 kilometres south-east of Tabriz and situated 
in a long, fairly wide plain surrounded by hills and in fact rather 
reminiscent of the area around Qaraqorum with the advantage that it 
was more suitable than Tabriz for accommodating the encampments of 
the Court. Nonetheless, Öljeitü only spent forty percent of his time at 
Sultaniyya.723  
There are repeated references in the sources to the Mongols wintering 
on the Mūghān steppes north-east of Tabriz724 and west of the Caspian 
or the pasturage at Arrān.  Between 709/1309-10 and 713/1313-14 
however, Öljeitü overwintered at Muhawwal, to the west of Baghdad.  
Since these were regular annual progresses they may not have proved 
that dysfunctional for communications. On the other hand, the 
departure dates were not fixed and they could vary within a month or so 
                                       
721 See for example, Charles Melville, The Itineraries of Sultan Oljeitu, 1304-1316’, 
Iran: Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies, vol. xxviii, London, 1990 and 
Bernard O’Kane, ‘From Tents to Pavilions: Royal Mobility and Persian Palace Design’ 
ed. Gülru Necipoglu, special issue, Ars Orientalis, 23 (1993) pp. 249-268 
722 Of the more distant campaigns, Öljeitü, for example, was on campaign in Gīlān, a 
province adjacent to the Caspian Sea, in the summer of 706/1307 and the winter of 713/1313-
14 he was in Māzandarān. 
723 O’Kane, ‘From Tents to Pavilions’, p. 249 
724 The Armenian historian Kirakos remarks that the plain of Mughan was full of all 
kinds of water, wood, fruit and prey and was settled by the intruders with the whole 
mass of their families and goods during the reign of Ögodei. Kirakos 
Ganjakets’i’/Bedrosian ch. 20.  
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whilst the actual transfer could take as long as two months.725 Thus 
every year there could be around six months of uncertainty as to the 
actual location of the principal figures. For contact and communication 
within each individual ulus, this may not have been an issue, not least 
because this was not just a ruler on the move but the entire apparatus 
of governance as well. For long-distance communication, however, it 
was yet another impediment to the problems of contact.  
For these reasons there was an inherent complication with the 
Chinggisid network - unlike the Barīd or the Chinese relay courier 
network- in that the routes were not between two fixed points.  
Moreover, these locational difficulties were compounded when 
campaigning. The worst case scenario was when an emissary had to 
deal with two moving targets such as Hülegü on his slow progress 
towards Western Eurasia urgently needing to contact Möngke who was 
then engaged in northern China in 653/1255. 
However, it is possible to determine from the dispositions of his imperial 
relatives in relation to Ögödei’s own annual schedule the general 
direction in which the envoys/īlchīs between the senior members of the 
Imperial Family would have travelled. What cannot be determined, 
though, are the exact pathways which were followed or the locations of 
the individual Yām. Likewise, if it is not possible to accurately identify 
the exact trails used during the Ögödeid period - which was one of 
communication within a relatively circumscribed area- as the Imperium 
expanded after his death there seems little hope in charting with any 
degree of accuracy the increasingly extended lines of communication. 
 
 
 
                                       
725 Melville, ‘The Itineraries of Sultan Öljeitü’ Table I, p. 59 
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Post-Ögodei East-West Communications726 
After Ögödei‘s death, provided there was harmony between the Imperial 
relatives, theoretically there was a choice of East-West communication 
routes reaching beyond Ögödei’s original network. The problem 
remains, however, of ascertaining with any exactitude which were the 
Yām routes. This is regarded here as insoluble but the data in the Table 
on Travellers and Routes in the Appendices identifies patterns including 
strategic points on the network. It is culled from a number of sources 
and there are inevitably a number of cautions. Firstly, the routes of 
many of the travellers are not known and in some cases it is not even 
possible to say whether the traveller went overland or by sea.  Secondly, 
where the actual starting point is not known, assuming that the 
mission is between the Hūlegūids and the Yuan then the start and 
finish are specified simply as Tabriz to Dadu. Lastly, what is significant 
is that the journeys are those that are alluded to in the sources and 
there is a strong impression that trans-Eurasian journeys were actually 
quite rare even during the supposedly easier conditions of the 
Chinggisid period.  
                                       
726 No one map has provided all the detail required for this section. Yuri Bregel 
summarises the issues in the preface to his Historical Atlas of Central Asia, Brill, 
2003, and he was driven to making his own maps. His Atlas can only be, however, the 
starting point. The Royal Geographical Society’s map of the Mountains of Central Asia, 
1986, scale 1:3,000,000; is useful and Keane’s Asia, Stanford 1886 is essential.  
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                                                                         Map from own collection  
 
The Virtue Map of Lakes Balkhash and Issyk-Kul 
Designated in this work as 
‘The Balkhash Knot’ 
 
 
The Balkhash Knot: 727 
If the emotional heartland of the Chinggisid Imperium was Chinggis 
Khan’s birthplace close to the Onon River in north-eastern Mongolia728 
the ‘political’ heartland was the location of the Qa’an and his Court.  
There is, however, a strong argument for a ‘strategic’ heartland. This 
                                       
727Geo-historically for this (as well as for wider Eurasia) Stanford’s Asia, 1886 provides 
an important overview. Also useful is Semenov’s 1856 Travels in the Tian-Shan, 
Hakluyt, 2nd Series 189.  
728 As was argued by the sons of Güyüg and Chaghadai in the negotiations leading to 
the accession of Möngke. See Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p.200. Located east of today’s 
Dadal which is situated just west of 1220 longitude and just north of 420 latitude.  
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was the area between Lakes Alakol, Balkhash, and Zaysan with the 
epicentre at Chaghadai’s base of Almaliq, It was effectively the hub of 
the Yām network not only in the Chinggisid period but also historically, 
since it exploited the ancient migration routes between the Dzungarian 
Alatau and the Tarbagatai Mountains.729  
It was the route that Chinggis Khan took with his armies on the 
campaigns in pursuit of the Khwārazmshah 1219-1221 and his 
commander Sübe’etei is also supposed to have returned this way in c. 
1225/ after subduing the peoples north of the Caucasus.730 It was 
visited by Ch’ang Ch’un in 1221 and the Amir Arghun and Juvaynī 
returned from the Court of Möngke Qa’an via Almaliq 651/Oct-
Nov.1253 where they halted for a few weeks at the ordo of the then 
Chaghadaid khan Yesu to celebrate his nuptials.731 Hülegü passed 
through Almaliq in 1253 after his despatch westwards by his brother 
Möngke, where he was welcomed by Orqina, the widow of Chaghadai’s 
son, Qara Hülegü. The Cilician monarch, King Het’um I, journeyed to 
Qaraqorum in 1254-1255 and passed through on his way home. It was 
also a stopping place for the Papal Legate, Giovanni de Marignolli in 
1341, a year after the murder of the Latin bishop and six Minorites.  
Moreover, not far from modern day Kopal, just to the south of Lake 
Balkhash, was where Batu paused on his way to meet Güyüg Khan 
after hearing of the latter’s death. It was here that he summoned the 
princes for a consultation732 and as Juvaynī points out, the sons of 
Güyüg were already in the neighbourhood and the grandsons and wives 
of Ögödei were also in the region. Both Carpini and Rubruck travelled 
                                       
729 Semenov, Travels in the Tian-Shan, p. 234 conveys the crucial geo-historical 
importance of the steppe routes to the north and south of the Tarbagatai Mountains  
730Yuan Shih ch. cxxi under the biography of Sübe’etei and in Bretschneider, 
Mediaeval Researches, II, Part III, p. 43 
731 Juvaynī/Boyle I, p. 275 and II, p. 481 and p. 513 
732 Juvaynī/Boyle II, p. 557 
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via Lake Alakol of which Carpini has left a vivid description733 and 
Rubruck mentions the island, the brackish water and the wind.734  
The main thoroughfare seems to have led between Almaliq and Lake 
Alakul via the Sayram Hu/Lake Sairam/Sutkul to the north-east of 
which was a settlement which is mentioned by several travellers 
including Rubruck, Ye-lu Chu’ ts’ai, and Ye-lu Hi liang and called 
variously Bolat, Bu-la and Pulad.735 There is today a town called Bole 
just to the west of the ancient migratory trail through the Dzungarian 
Gate.   
Gazagnadou incorporates a map in his La Poste a Relais en Eurasie of 
the ‘Principaux réseaux de relais de poste dans l’empire Mongol (XIII et 
XIV siècles)’ in which the ‘réseaux de relais de poste’ rather curiously 
completely avoid the Lake Balkhash area, traversing Jochid territory 
considerably further north and Chaghadaid territory considerably 
further south.736  
Though the ‘Balkhash Knot’ up to the 1260s was within Chaghadaid 
controlled territory it was thereafter an area of dispute which had 
serious implications for the viability of the communications network.  
For nervous travellers it was, however,  possible to avoid it by travelling 
north of Lakes Alakol and Balkhash through the Jochid ulus following 
another ancient migration route slightly further north than the 
Dzungarian Gate – that is the ‘Zaysan Gate’ between the Tarbagatai and 
Altai mountains.737 Semenov regards this as the logical route that the 
Russian princes such as Yaroslav and Alexander Nevsky travelled to 
Qaraqorum. This took them through Jochid controlled territory, from 
the Volga to the Irtysh River entering upland Asia through the above 
historically important Lake Zaysan Gate. Alternatively, the Jochids and 
                                       
733 Carpini/Beazley, p. 134 
734 Rubruck, p. 165 and n. 4 
735Rubruck, p. 146, says it was a month’s journey from Taraz.  
736 Didier Gazagnadou, La Poste a Relais en Eurasie, editions Kime, [1994] 2013 
Annexe II, p. 151 
737 This is when travelling westwards. 
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Russian princes could have travelled south-east via Khwārazm following 
the line of the Amu Darya before turning due east through the 
Chaghadaid ulus providing they had friendly relations with the latter.   
The Hülegüids meanwhile had an interesting dilemma since 
theoretically they could despatch their envoys eastwards starting from 
Tabriz either through Georgia and around the north of the Caspian and 
into Jochid controlled territory or south of the Caspian via Mashhad 
and then through Chaghadaid controlled territory. In Rubruck’s time, 
he remarks that ‘all the Saracens who come from Persia and Türkia on 
their way to Batu’ on the Volga pass through Berke’s camp which was 
situated in pasturelands to the north of Derbend (the Iron Gate) on the 
western shore of the Caspian.738  If the Hülegüids were in conflict with 
both sets of relatives simultaneously or if the status of their envoys to 
the Yuan was not respected as they travelled across the domains of 
their imperial relatives then the only alternative was to go by sea. 
The effectiveness of Qaidu’s control of both the Pamirs and the Tarim 
Basin is difficult to gauge but on paper it would appear that every route 
but the sea route was problematic for the Hülegüids from the early 
1260s until the early fourteenth century. If the Polos’ experience is to be 
believed, taking to the seas was not for the faint-hearted. It was not only 
time-consuming but the attrition rate was dramatic. Polo remarks that 
in 1291, of those who boarded ship with him in China when he 
returned west with a bride for Arghun (r. 683-690/1284-1291), six 
hundred died on the voyage of nearly two years.739 The hazards of a sea 
voyage are also confirmed when during a subsequent mission 
despatched to the Yuan by sea by Ghāzān between 696/1297 and 
704/1305 two of the three envoys died on the return voyage.740  
 
                                       
738 Rubruck, p. 127 
739 The Book of Ser Marco Polo, I, Yule/Cordier, p. 35 and note 5 on p. 38 
740 Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 34 
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The Traditional Route between East and West Asia 
From the Han Dynasty onwards the traditional land route westwards 
emanated from Xian/Chang’an, through the Hexi/Gansu Corridor to 
Dunhuang and the Tarim Basin. It then followed either the northern 
edge of the Taklamakan desert at the base of the Tien Shan or the 
southern edge, skirting the Altun Shan and the Kunlun Shan. These 
two routes met again at Kashgar before diverging again. One funnelled 
through the Altai Mountains via Sary-Tash741 following the Kyzyl-Suu or 
Red River in the Alai Valley turning south-west at what is today 
Dushanbe leading eventually to Balkh and Termez.  The second track 
turned north-west at Sary-Tash leading to the Ferghana Valley where 
four tracks led to passes in the direction of Osh, Kokand or Andijan. A 
third track turned north at Dushanbe continuing northwards before 
branching west to Samarkand or north to Tashkent/Chach. 
Additionally, there were two ancient routes running parallel with the 
northern foothills of the Tien Shan which are of considerable interest 
here. Thus from Hami742 in the north-eastern Tarim Basin, the route 
took advantage of breaks in the Tien Shan with one wending through 
Turpan/Turfan, then Urumqi to the Chaghadaid centre of 
Yining/Kulja/Almaliq. It then continued to what is today Alma-
Ata/Almaty, Bishkek/Balasagun and Otrar743 from whence it kept 
westwards to Khwārazm , south of the Aral Sea or alternatively dropped 
down from Otrar to Tashkent, Samarkand and Bukhārā. Bretschneider, 
however, rather undermines this option since he remarks that Turfan 
seems to have been unknown during the Chinggisid period.744  
                                       
741 East of 720 longitude and south of 400 latitude 
742 This is the Camul in Marco Polo, Kamul in Turkish and Khamil in Mongolian. It 
was within Yuan control.  
743 Pegolotti in his Pratica della Mercatura mentions that to travel with pack asses 
between the Ural River and passing to the north of the Aral Sea to Otrar took thirty-
five to forty days.  Allan Evans, Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, p. 21 
744 Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, II, p. 193 
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The second route left Korla, which is located on the northern rim of the 
Taklamakan at the junction of the trans-Tarim Basin crossing; it 
traversed the Tien Shan via the Narat Pass then crossed the Lesser 
Yulduz plateau before joining the Turfan route at Yining/Kulja/Almaliq 
in the Ili valley. The mid-Tien Shan between Kucha/Kuqa and Kashgar 
has no passes. The Florentine merchant, Pegolotti, in his Pratica della 
Mercatura, compiled around 1340, allowed forty-five days’ journey with 
pack asses between Otrar and Almaliq ‘and every day you find Mongols’ 
with a further seventy days from Almaliq to Kanchou/Zhangye in the 
Gansu/Hexi corridor.745   
Routes between Qaraqorum and the West 
If travelling westwards from Qaraqorum746the initial obstacles to be 
overcome were the Altai and the Junggar Pendi or Dzungarian Plateau. 
Though it is impossible to prescribe the exact route it may well have 
been along a variety of trails leading in the direction of today’s 
Uliassutai747 or further to the north-west, Hovd/Kobdo in what had 
been Naiman territory.748 The latter route would have crossed the Altai 
in the region of Lake Zaysan and continued north of Lake Balkhash in 
Jochid held territory whilst the former could either have crossed the 
Altai further south and headed towards Urumqi and Almaliq or 
conversely crossed the Altai in the region of Lake Alakol.  
There was a third possibility which is touched on by Marco Polo though 
it is not clear whether he took this route himself since he was aiming for 
Dadu. It appears, however, that there was a direct track at that time 
from Qaraqorum via Etzina/Khara Khoto749 located on the southern the 
edge of the Gobi. This was a Tangut centre as well as an important 
                                       
745 Allan Evans, Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, p. 21; H. Yule, Cathay and the Way 
Thither, vol. III, Hakluyt Society pp. 138, 143,Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, II, 
p. 38 
746 West of 103 degrees longitude and just north of 47 degrees latitude 
747 C. 970 longitude and south of 480 latitude  
748 This extended from Hovd to the upper Irtysh and upper Selenge rivers. 
Hovd/Kobdo is West of 920 longitude and on 480latitude 
749 Longitude 1010 09’ East and 410 46’ north  
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crossroads: northwards it led to Qaraqorum across Gobi landscapes, or 
eastwards to Dadu and southwards down the river Hei Shui to two 
important Gansu/Hexi corridor settlements, Suzhou/Jiayuguan and 
Kanchou/Zhangye. Though Bretschneider’s preferred ‘highway’ from 
Qaraqorum to Transoxiana and Iran was across the Altai, 
Bishbalik/Urumqi, Sairam Lake, Almaliq, Chu River, Taraz,750 Sairam, 
Tashkent and Samarkand751 as will be seen this was not followed by the 
Friars. On the other hand, this may well have been the more relaxed 
route followed by ambassadors which was suggested to Rubruck as a 
possibility for his colleague’s return west.752 
When Qubilai moved the centre of gravity to northern China, the 
eastern segment of the network became rather trickier. Four main 
possibilities are conceivable though at least one can be discounted. 
These four are the northern Lake Baikal route; the Qaraqorum/Uliastai 
route as above; the Etzina route and a speculative route followed by 
Marco Polo route leading from Dunhuang to the Huang Ho/Yellow 
River.   
The Lake Baikal route is the most unlikely. The first part of this route 
was fast and much travelled. It was latterly the Qing postal route and 
chief trade route from Beijing towards the north-west which went via 
Zhangjiakou, formerly Kalgan, the main egress through the Great Wall 
to the north-west of Beijing, then across the Gobi to the west of 
Urga/Ulaan Baatar. The Qing postal couriers continued on their north-
western trajectory to the Siberian border which was crossed at Kyakhta, 
between Urga/Ulaan Baatar and Lake Baikal. Qing couriers carrying 
the light mail on two horses mounted by Mongol riders, travelling at full 
speed, with changes at relays every 20 miles/32 kilometres took eight 
                                       
750 Mentioned by Rubruck who bypassed it. He had hoped to find the Chaghadaid 
prince Buri’s German slaves there. Rubruck, p. 144 
751 Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, II, Part III p. 94 and p. 331 
752 Rubruck, p. 251 
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days in summer and nine and a half in winter to cover the distance.753   
However, whilst this may have been a well-galloped route between 
Urga/Ulaan Baatar and Beijing the continuation towards the west via 
Kyakhta, that is between Lake Baikal and Lake Zaysan, strategically 
located as seen above to the north-west of the Dzungarian Basin, was 
long and difficult taking two hundred and two days. Both the terrain 
and the inhabitants west of Lake Baikal were regarded in the tenth 
century with some horror,754 a view confirmed by a late nineteenth 
century traveller, who had to negotiate choking primeval forest and 
dismal fen.755Thus if the total travel time between Beijing and the 
Jochid centre at Sarai on the Volga was actually two hundred days756 
then this was clearly not the route taken.  
Rather than head north across Mongolia and turning west at Kyakhta, 
another option was to head for Qaraqorum and then pick up the 
Uliassutai or Hovd route and thence through the Dzungarian 
Gate.757On the other hand, Bishbalik, today’s Urumqi758formerly one of 
the major centres of the Uighurs but at that time under Chaghadaid 
control and located on the southern edge of the Dzungar plateau is 
mentioned by travellers coming from the general direction of Beijing 
such as Ye-lu Ch’u ts’ai, accompanying Chinggis Khan in 1219 to 
western Asia.759 Ch’ang Ch’un760also mentions it in 1221.  In contrast 
Urumqi is not mentioned by those travelling to Qaraqorum from the 
west since they would have turned off north-east in the region of 
Almaliq.  
                                       
753 Richards, Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire, pp. 518-519 
754 Hudūd al-Ālam, Minorsky, p. 283  
755 Carruthers, Unknown Mongolia, ch. III pp. 73-93 
756 Yuan shih, ch. cxvii, biography of Jochi. Bretschneider, II, Part III Mediaeval 
Researches, p. 8 
757 Richards, Geography pp. 518-519 
758 Urumqi, west of 88 degrees longitude and on the 44th parallel 
759 Ye-lu Ch’u ts’ai, ‘Si Yu Lu’ trans. Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches I, pp. 9-24 
760 Ch’ang Ch’un, ‘Si Yu Ki’,  Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches I, pp. 35-108 
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The problem remains how travellers reached Urumqi from Dadu, that 
is, whether the main Yām route from Beijing followed the Huangho 
Ho/Yellow River or cut across the Gobi close to the wall of Genghis 
Khan to Etzina and then dropped down to the track to Hami, which was 
under the control of the Yuan. From Hami the choice could be made 
dependent on circumstances and destination whether to continue via 
Urumqi or indeed Kashgar. 
Travellers known to have taken the Balkhash Knot Route 
Güyüg’s (r.1246-1248 CE) impending elevation to the imperial throne 
was a watershed for the Chinggisid communication network since it was 
the first big test of the Tayan Yām. Once again it is a great loss that so 
few attendees wrote of their experiences. Amongst those who did so 
were the friars John de Plano Carpini and his travelling companion 
Benedict the Pole, travelling on behalf of Pope Innocent IV between 
1245-1247. 
There are, however, some essential points to be borne in mind 
concerning the progression of grandees traversing Eurasia for reasons 
of state. They can be divided into roughly three groups. Firstly, they 
were either imperial princes or princesses travelling on imperial family 
business; secondly, were the ambassadors, ‘four thousand’ of whom 
were reported by Carpini attending Güyüg’s (r.1246-1248 CE) 
enthronement; lastly, there were senior officials summoned to Court 
such as the several trips of Körgüz (d.1242) in his capacity as sahib-
dīwān-i- mamālik.  Some of the former would have been accompanied by 
considerable impedimenta, in the form of baggage trains, entourages 
and so on. Rubruck observed Batu’s son Sartaq’s progress to Möngke’s 
Court with his flocks, herds, wives, and offspring, although the more 
sizeable of his dwellings had been left behind.761 Since such imperial 
progressions were akin to the annual seasonal migrations and would 
                                       
761 Rubruck, p. 255 
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have been self-sufficient as far as provisions and remounts were 
concerned they may not have been a burden on the Yām. It was only 
small groups of envoys who would have required the whole Yām 
package of mounts, sustenance and guides.  
 
********** 
The most such data can do is provide a pattern and even this may be 
too optimistic. What does emerge, however, is that in the earlier 
Hūlegūid period, the trans-Eurasian traffic emanated from the western 
regions to Qaraqorum and Dadu rather than the reverse and travelled 
via the geostrategically crucial Balkhash Knot. From the limited 
evidence available it seems that all the main routes, including the 
steppe/Jochid route, funnelled into the area of the Balkhash Knot.  
This latter route was, as John of Monte Corvino remarked, the shortest, 
fastest and probably the safest route762 but seems to have been used 
only for smallish groups or those having to travel via the Courts of the 
Jochid khans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
762 First Letter of John of Monte Corvino, in Cathay and the Way Thither, ed. H. Yule, 
vol. I, pp. 200-201 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
The Function of the Yām Network:  
Yuan-Hülegüid Contacts 1260-1335 
 
Thus far, Chinggisid strategic communications have been dissected in 
terms of the establishment, development, infrastructure, upkeep, and 
potential routes of the Yām network.  It was, however, established for a 
purpose, and in the Secret History, the major reasons for the 
incorporation of the Yām are that it would expedite communications 
without inconveniencing the populace;763 equally, that it would also 
expedite the comings and goings of ambassadors to Court.764 Juvaynī, 
on the other hand, also had no doubt that intelligence gathering was a 
key function since he remarks that setting up the Yām was to enable 
the khans to ‘ascertain the activities of their enemies.’ A further 
purpose was to transport the profits of empire to the scattered members 
of the imperial family765 bearing in mind that this latter could cover a 
multiplicity of items. These included not just plundered luxury goods 
but also herds and flocks, as well as individuals, including captives, 
especially artisans, but also brides, wrestlers, ‘scientists’ and so on.  
Though Juvaynī firmly states that ‘ascertaining the activities of their 
enemies’ was high on the list of reasons for the incorporation of the Yām 
the remaining five strategic vulnerabilities identified by the US 
Department of Defense mentioned in the Introduction – that is, political, 
economic, sociological and military – were also issues for the Hülegüids. 
The extent to which their governance was complicated by the extended 
lines of communication in these areas will be examined below. 
                                       
763 SH para. 279 
764 Rashid al-Din/Boyle, p. 55; Juvaynī/Boyle II  p. 501 
765 Juvaynī/Boyle p. 33 
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Intelligence Function of the Yām Network 
 ‘Intelligence’ is a term which needs to be handled with care since there 
are no hard and fast definitions. It should be differentiated from the 
‘information highway’ which disseminates news and gossip but which is 
not of strategic importance in sustaining the ruler’s hold on the polity.  
Here intelligence is taken to refer to the intelligence ‘cycle’ – a series of 
steps including the acquisition of information which is then interpreted 
and analysed, disseminated to the policy maker/s on whose ‘judgement’ 
rests the value of the intelligence. That this latter has been a constant is 
borne out by a comment from a thousand years ago by the Ghaznavid 
historian Abū’l Fazl Beyhaqi “Don’t account as veracious any news 
which does not tally with one’s sense and judgement.”766  
Juvaynī’s justification for the Yām network is, however, fully in line with 
precedent.  Procopius (500 – c. 560 CE) regarded the decline in the 
Byzantine version of the Roman official courier system or Cursus 
Publicus during the reign of Justinian (r. 527-565 CE) as a disaster, 
since external affairs ‘being reported both with difficulty and too late to 
give opportunity for action and behind the course of events, cannot be 
dealt with at all’.767 In the view of Nizām al-Mulk, d.485/1092 the fall of 
the Umayyads was because of the ‘cessation of intelligence’ since “No 
kingdom has ever lost its power except with the cessation of [the flow of] 
intelligence’.768Such verdicts are a salutary warning of the dangers of 
failing to maintain a viable state system of communications. 
Not all rulers, however, were convinced that the establishment of a 
communication system and its role in the transmission of intelligence 
was necessarily a good thing, most notably the Seljūqs (431-590/1040-
                                       
766 Beyhaqi, Under the year 428 AH, Vol. II. p. 175 
767 Procopius, Anecdota, XXX: 11 but ‘Umarī also states that the Umayyad Caliph, Mu 
‘āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān established his version of the Barīd with help from Persian 
dihqāns or landed gentry and people of the Byzantine provinces...Silverstein, p. 53 
768 Silverstein, p. 87 
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1194).  In this context, the Seljūq argument for not re-establishing such 
a system is worthy of note.  For their politically realistic vizier, Nizām al-
Mulk, the timely receipt of news was of paramount concern. In his view, 
‘Couriers must be posted along the principal highways and they must 
be paid monthly salaries and allowances. When this is done, everything 
that happens throughout the twenty-four hours within a radius of fifty 
farsangs will come to their knowledge.’ 769 Unfortunately for the vizier, 
the Seljūq ruler, Alp Arslan disagreed with him, using the equally 
politically realistic argument that intelligence agents are potentially 
untrustworthy since they either could be motivated by selfish interests 
or could simply be bribed with the result that they reported adversely 
on friends of the Seljūqs and warmly on their enemies. Thus, as far as 
Alp Arslan was concerned, an expensive network of agents was 
pointless.  
That Chinggis Khan appreciated the role of intelligence is shown in the 
Secret History though largely in the context of plans overheard by 
informers or enemy movements ascertained by scouts rather than 
through espionage.  In view of his appreciation that ‘knowledge is power’ 
it is curious that in 1206 at the time of the quriltai in which the 
Conqueror distributed rewards to his family and entourage, there is no 
mention in the list of his ‘appointments’ of any that implied intelligence 
duties.770 On the other hand, the Secret History does record that 
Chinggis Khan said of his adopted son/brother, Sigi Qutuqu, that he 
would be: 
Eyes for me to see with 
Ears for me to hear with 771 
 
De Rachewiltz explains this as a set phrase describing a person who 
performs important services and delicate missions though it equally 
                                       
769 Siyasat-nama, Nizām al-Mulk, tr. Hubert Darke, The Book of Government or Rules 
for Kings, p. 87 
770 SH. Onon pp. 122-123 
771 SH I, para 252 and de Rachewiltz, II, p. 770. 
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may point to Sigi Qutuqu being seen as an embryo chief of 
intelligence.772   
Whilst at Möngke’s Court Rubruck was most indignant at being asked 
numerous questions about 
the kingdom of France: whether it 
contained many sheep, cattle and 
horses – as if they were due to move 
in and take it all over forthwith773 
 
Rubruck’s alertness to the Mongols intelligence collecting methods has 
also left to posterity the most succinct report on the subject. In 1253, 
when in Möngke’s encampment in Mongolia, the Qa’an proposed 
sending an envoy to the king of the French accompanied by a somewhat 
dubious cleric called Theodolus who had made his way east in the wake 
of Friar Andrew of Longjumeau’s mission to the Mongols from King 
Louis in 1249. Möngke was overheard to say to his envoy: 
You will go with this man (i.e. 
Theodolus); be sure to take stock of 
the routes, the terrain, the towns and 
castles and the people and their 
weapons.’774 
 
In response Theodolus announced that they would travel by sea to 
avoid any possibility of espionage. The erstwhile spy seems to have got 
as far as John III Vatatzes, emperor of Nicaea where he died. The 
emperor sent back to Möngke the envoy’s attendants with the gold 
pa’iza so Möngke would presumably have received some sort of 
intelligence reports.775 
 
                                       
772 SH I, de Rachewiltz II, p. 770 
773 Rubruck, p. 180 emphasis added 
774 Rubruck, p. 186 also note 2 p. 230 
775 Rubruck, pp. 186-187 
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Intelligence deficit versus interdiction 
of the communication network 
 
 
As far as the Hülegüid experience is concerned, intelligencec is a deeply 
problematic subject. One reason is that it is not always possible to 
identify the role of intelligence in keeping a ruler securely in the saddle 
or, conversely, leading to their downfall. Thus in the Hülegüid instance 
even Nizām al-Mulk would be hard-pressed to ascribe the period of 
turmoil following Abū Sa‘īd’s death and the subsequent demise of the 
dynasty to an intelligence failure.  
 
It is therefore hard to argue that the strategic communication network 
and interdiction in communications between the Yuan and the 
Hülegüids was implicated in the latter’s implosion after 1335. Indeed, 
Abū Sa‘īd’s reign was also the most intense period of interaction 
between the Toluids since the early 1260s. Thus it could be argued that 
the Hülegüids were as up-to-date on events and Yuan activities as at 
any time in the previous sixty years, notwithstanding Bolad’s, Baiju’s 
and Bayan’s earlier arrivals in the west, since much of the ‘intelligence’ 
as distinct from ‘information’, news and gossip these personnel brought 
with them would soon have become outdated. 
 
The role of intelligence vis à vis the communications network in 
sustaining the Hülegüid polity for almost eighty years is not at all easy 
to assess. One reason for this is that the Hülegüids’ default intelligence 
condition appears to have been that of ‘intelligence deficit’, a condition 
implied by Amitai-Preiss who has taken an interest in the intelligence 
activities of both the Mamluks - whose organisation especially under 
Sultan Baybars776 was the benchmark for intelligence activities in the 
region -  as well as the Mongols. In his view, the pro-Mongol sources 
have no information whatsoever on Mongol espionage among the 
                                       
776 Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, Al-Rawd al-zāhir fī sīrat al-malik al-zāhir. 135, Amitai-Preiss, 
Mongols and Mamluks, pp. 140-141 
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Mamluks.777 Neither do these sources have accounts, such as appear in 
virtually every page of Beyhaqi, of the comings and goings of the postal 
intelligence officials nor of the analysis of the intelligence received and 
the decisions based it. Thus a coherent account of Hülegüid 
intelligence-based activity is very difficult. 
Over and above the Mamluks it would have been in the Hülegüids 
interests to at least have some idea of what their Jochid and 
Chaghadaid relatives were up to, amongst others. From the scant 
evidence it seems that the Hülegüids relied to a major extent on such 
trusted and tried sources of information on enemy activities as scouts 
and border patrols. Thus Vassaf reports that a Mamluk scout had been 
captured on the march from Aleppo and had provided important 
intelligence. This was supplemented by the account of a pilgrim 
returning from the hajj, who had seen the Mamluk army in 
Damascus.778  
Moreover, the Mongol propensity for revealing their plans continued to 
haunt them.779  In this context, the Armenian historian, Het ‘um, 
writing at the beginning of the fourteenth century, suggested that 
Mamluk successes in war were because the Mamluks could keep a 
secret better than could the Mongols. The reason for this was that when 
the Chinggisid high command met each year in council to consider 
plans for forthcoming military expeditions, they could not refrain from 
publicly discussing their campaigns.780  
However, one obvious impact of the Hülegüids extended lines of 
communication is that events can have a habit of moving faster than 
transmission of intelligence on them.  Thus when Hülegü received news 
                                       
777 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, pp. 140, 152 
778 Reuven Amitai, ‘Whither the Ilkhanid Army? Ghazan’s First Campaign into Syria 
(1299-1300)’ in Warfare in Inner Asian History (500-1800) ed. by Nicola di Cosmo. 
Brill, Leiden, Boston, Koln, 2002, p. 229 
779 SH, para 154, De Rachewiltz, I, p. 76-78 
780 Amitai-Preiss, p. 156; Het’um 2:251-2; D. Sinor, ‘On Mongol Strategy’ p. 240 in 
Ch’en Ch’ieh-hsien, ed. Proceedings of the Fourth Altaistic Conference, Tainan,Taiwan, 
1975, pp. 238-249 [Rpt. in Sinor, Inner Asia. Art. No. XVI].  
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that his brother Möngke Qa’an had died, he discontinued his operations 
in Syria, returned to Azerbaijan and set off for Mongolia. Before he had 
ridden very far, he heard that Qubilai had already been enthroned and 
turned back to Tabriz. Hülegü may well have found the time-lag in 
trans-Eurasian communication in the period following Möngke’s death 
extremely frustrating since, as will be seen below, by the time he 
received intelligence from East Asia on the activities of the rival 
claimants to the throne it had been overtaken by events.  
Moreover, an intelligence failure may not be a failure of 
communications. What also has to be balanced are factors that are 
associated with, but are outside of, the communication network. An 
example of this is an incident recorded by Rashīd al-Dīn when, in 1288, 
Arghun Khan set out from his winter quarters in Arran for his summer 
quarters when he had news of a great Jochid force approaching and 
was thereby forced to turn back to deal with them.781 Though this 
clearly complicated Arghun’s annual schedule it was less an outcome of 
the ‘closure of the roads’ than an intelligence failure on the part of the 
Hülegüids. The implication being that the Hülegüids had neither agents 
nor indeed any sources of information about the intentions of the 
Jochid camp which seems to be borne out by Rashid al-Dīn in his 
careful genealogy as he was unable to provide details of the marriage 
and offspring of some of the Jochid princes.782  
Whilst interdictions in the strategic communication network leading to 
a cessation in the flow of intelligence may not have led to the downfall of 
the Hülegüids this is largely because they do not appear to have had an 
effective intelligence operation in the first place. The fact that they 
managed to sustain their rule for upwards of eighty years without either 
being dispossessed of their domains by the Mamluks or taken over by 
                                       
781 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle. p. 124 
782 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle. pp,99-106 
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their cousins the Jochids or Chaghadaids does not seem, from the 
slender sources, to be down to any foreknowledge of enemy intentions.  
This is not to say that the Hülegüid Court operated on the Seljūq 
principle in being reluctant to establish a postal/intelligence network 
since there are slight indications that they tried to monitor Mamluk 
activities 783even if their efforts were not as efficient as the network 
operated by Baybars. Indeed, if the exhausted pigeon episode 
mentioned earlier is anything to go by, Hülegüid intelligence activities 
as far as the Mamluks were concerned were founded more on luck than 
good management.  
The Hülegüid Court, nonetheless, was clearly a hub of intelligence 
activity but not necessarily instigated by, or in the interests of, the 
ruler. The Cilician King, Het ‘um, is reported by Grigor of Akner as 
having secret messages conveyed to him from the Armenian princes 
who were at the court of Abaqa Khan.784 Baybars considerable efforts in 
this direction have been studied by Reuven Amitai-Preiss in whose view 
Baybars ran a regular, professional intelligence service. Ibn ‘Abd al-
Zahir, the contemporary biographer of Baybars mentioned that on 
several occasions intelligence collecting had led to early warnings of 
impending attacks (by the Ilkhans and the Armenians) and to the 
uncovering of enemy spies. Amitai-Preiss remarks that he is inclined to 
trust Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir in this instance since (not unlike Beyhaqi under 
the Ghaznavids) he was Baybars’s kātib al-sirr (privy secretary) and 
thus would have had at least some knowledge of such activities.785 More 
importantly, his evidence is corroborated by other sources.  
Two further factors need to be borne in mind. Firstly, as far as 
intelligence activities are concerned the Yuan and the Hülegüids were 
                                       
783Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, pp. 152-156 
784 Grigor/Bedrosian ch. 14 section 19 
785 Amitai-Press, Mongols and Mamluks p. 140 
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not adversaries and thus intelligence on hostile intentions was not an 
issue unlike the Hülegüids’ fraught relations with the Jochids, the 
Ögödeids or the Chaghadaids.  Intelligence on these latter was almost 
certainly gained from border scouts rather than spies in the opposing 
camps - who in any case would probably have had difficulty in relaying 
any intelligence back to Hülegüid commanders. The conclusion thus 
has to be that any interdiction in the trans-Eurasian communication 
networks does not seem to have unduly complicated the Hülegüids’ 
intelligence collecting activities. The second factor has less to do with 
communication networks and intelligence gathering for the policy 
decision making process. It is rather that the superstitious mindset of 
the Mongols, including their propensity for making decisions based on 
auguries from burning sheep bones786 and other omens, needs to be 
taken into account when examining their actions and decision-making 
processes.  
 
Political Vulnerability and  
 the Yām Network 
 
The Political/Imperial function of the Yām network was manifested 
primarily in the conveyance of ambassadors on imperial business and 
of all the functions of the Yām network, this, it will be argued, was for 
the Hülegüids the most important aspect of their strategic 
communications.  
 
As was seen in the first chapter, the conveyance of ambassadors was 
historically one of three major functions of a communications network. 
The term ‘ambassadors’, however, can be an all embracing expression 
for a number of exchanges at state level.  Whilst the Mongol term 
ilchiyan (Arabic and Persian rusūl or Persian firistādahgān, Chinese shi) 
                                       
786 Jūzjānī, pp. 1046-1047 
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has been employed in the context of ‘messengers’787 it was argued above 
that these were not postal couriers or ‘messengers’ per se but 
emissaries on state business as “envoys” of the ruler either to rulers 
outside the Empire788or to the imperial relatives.789 The missions of 
‘ambassadors’ however,  travelling in state and engaging in a formal, 
choreographed exchange should be differentiated from those of ‘envoys’ 
or ‘emissaries’ travelling at speed and engaged on a political mission. 
 
Ambassadorial contact has been categorised by Biran in her significant 
paper on the diplomacy and chancellery practices in the Chaghadaid 
khanate into two types, political or formal. As far as the former is 
concerned, she detects three kinds of political missions: to discuss 
alliances and submissions or to ask for military help, as well as, 
unofficially, gathering intelligence. In her researches into the practice in 
the Chaghadaid khanate, almost all of the Chaghadaid embassies 
recorded in the Muslim sources had practical political functions, had 
fewer envoys and returned more swiftly than the formal missions. These 
latter were sent to announce deaths and accessions,790 pay honour and 
express friendship or submission and to facilitate trade relations.791 
 
With Hülegü’s arrival in western Eurasia there was kindled more 
diverse communications than say, during the Sasanian and Tang 
                                       
787 Michal Biran is one of the few scholars who carefully makes the distinction that 
ilchiyan were not messengers per se but emissaries, envoys and ambassadors. See 
Biran, ‘Diplomacy and Chancellery Practices’ p. 373. As does Allsen, Culture and 
Conquest, p.73 
788 Despite their efforts at world conquest there were still rulers not subservient to the 
Mongols such as those of Western Europe, also the Pope and the Mamluk and Delhi 
Sultans. 
789 Michal Biran has examined the functions and conduct of Chaghadaid diplomacy, 
including the role of emissaries in her article on ‘Diplomacy and Chancellery Practices 
in the Chagataid Khanate: Some Preliminary Remarks’ in Oriente Moderno, LXXXVIII, 
2008, p. 369-393 esp. p. 373 
790 For a concise examination of the importance of these functions to Chinese dynasts 
and especially on Sung and Khitan-Liao relations see Herbert Franke Diplomatic 
missions of the Sung State 960-1276, Presented as a Public Lecture of the Australian 
National University on 25 March 1981  
791 Biran, ‘Diplomacy and Chancellery Practices in the Chagataid Khanate: Some 
Preliminary Remarks’ Oriente Moderno, LXXXVIII, 2008, 2, p. 373 
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periods in which the exchanges were primarily ‘formal’ and/or ‘political’. 
The new element in relations between Hülegüid Iran and Yuan China 
could perhaps best be described as ‘imperial family business’. 
 
Strategic Communications between the Yuan and Iran  
during the Arïq Böke Crisis 
 
 
The Hülegüid/Yuan ‘nexus’ was triggered by Möngke’s death in 
657/1259 which was followed by claims to the throne from his brothers 
Qubilai and Arïq Böke and this intra-Toluid conflict heralded a 
turbulent period in trans-Eurasian communication. Arïq Böke’s 
attempts to summon a quriltai of all the princes failed792and his 
supporters impatiently decided to set Arïq Böke ‘on the throne of the 
Khanate’ at his summer residence in the Altai. In 658/1260 Qubilai’s 
supporters also set their candidate ‘on the throne of the Empire’ at his 
summer residence of K’ai-p’ing fu/Shang-tu.793  
 
Inevitably, hostilities broke out between the two brothers. The 
protagonists dispatched ‘political’ rather than formal missions to each 
other to diplomatically resolve the impasse. Hülegü may have wobbled 
but came down on the side of Qubilai, in the meanwhile sending 
emissaries to his younger brother trying to restrain him. The problem 
with these contacts is one of time and distance since these must have 
been complicated by the concurrent Hülegüid/Jochid hostilities from 
1262 which probably precluded Hülegüid use of the ‘express’ route. 
This meant that responses to these urgent communications may well 
have been more protracted than, for example, Chang Te’s return trip of 
fourteen months or so794. 
                                       
792 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle pp. 250 
793 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle pp. 252 
794 Si Shi Ki, Record of an Embassy to the Regions in the West’, E. Bretschneider, 
Medieval Researches, I, Ch. IV, pp. 109-156. 
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The threat from Arïq Böke to his position forced Qubilai in c.1262 to 
issue an order to his allies, Hülegü and the Chaghadaid Khan, which to 
all intents and purposes was a military command. It has, however, been 
employed by scholars as Qubilai’s authorisation that Hülegü should 
have a similar status to that of the ‘lawful’ khanates: 
‘From the banks of the Oxus to 
the gates of Egypt the Tāzīk lands 
must be administered and well 
guarded by thee Hülegü;  from the 
Altai on the far side to the Oxus el 
and ulus must be administered 
and maintained by Alghu; and 
from the Altai on this side to the 
shores of the Ocean-Sea [all lands] 
will be maintained by me’.795   
 
By 662/1264 Arïq Böke’s cause was lost and he submitted to Qubilai, 
at which point the Chinggisid tradition of consultation meant that the 
communication network became a matter of life and death for him and 
his followers. Coincidentally present at Arïq Böke’s submission was an 
envoy from Hülegü, one Chingqur, who on his return to Hülegü 
reported this event. Hülegü then dispatched a further emissary to 
express his dismay at the Qa’ans lenience.796 Though the chronology of 
the east-west communications is difficult and highly suspect, Rashīd al-
Dīn reports that either in late 1264 or early 1265 Qubilai dispatched a 
royal yarlïgh to the senior Chinggisid princes, Hülegü, Berke and Alghu 
– which neatly encapsulates both the Chinggisid consultative tradition 
as well as the problems of distance when important decisions have to be 
made:  
Since your presence was not 
possible because of the distance of 
the road and the multiplicity of 
                                       
795 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle pp. 255-256 
796 Arïq Böke is supposed to have been banned from Qubilai’s presence for a year but 
the chronology is confusing. Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 262 
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your preoccupations and since to 
wait longer might have introduced 
into the affairs of the Empire such 
weakness and confusion as might 
not be put to rights we have 
therefore executed their emirs and 
have examined them both. We 
now consult you on this matter. 
We, that is all the aqa and ini, are 
agreed that we should spare Arïq 
Böke’s life and release Asutai. 
What do you say to this?”797 
 
The same emissaries delivered the communication to the senior aqa of 
the Imperial Family, first to the Chaghadaid Khan, Alghu, since he was 
the nearest, proceeding thereafter to Hülegü who added his own 
envoys as they set off for their final recipient, Berke, in order to 
arrange a meeting place so that they could travel together to the 
quriltai. The envoys then returned to Qubilai with the agreement of the 
three aqa that a quriltai was necessary and the date would be 
predicated on how long it took Berke to reach Qubilai.  
This would not be earlier than 1267 since he planned to leave the 
Qipchaq Steppe in 1265 and hoped to arrive in1267.798 It is a moot 
point whether he actually did set off but events overtook the quriltai. By 
the proposed date three of the leading players, Arïq Böke, (d. 664/1265-
1266, ostensibly from natural causes though Rashīd al-Dīn at one point 
suggests he died in 662), Hülegü (d.663/1265) and Berke (d. 665/1266-
1267), were dead and Alghu was seriously ill.  
 
 
 
                                       
797 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 264 emphasis added 
798 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 265 
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Strategic Communications between Yuan and Hülegüids: 
 
Accessions 
 
 
After Hülegü’s death in 1265 his son Abaqa took the throne. The 
dispatch of envoys to his uncle Qubilai requesting a yarlïgh to legitimise 
his accession, together with the traditional accoutrements of power 
such as a robe of honour had a degree of urgency since his brother 
Yoshmut was also an interested claimant. Such a yarlïgh would not 
have helped to legitimise his position vis-a-vis the other branches for 
the reasons given earlier. That the Chaghadaid Khan, Baraq’s (r.1266-
1271)799attempt to wrest some of Abaqa’s dominions had the approval 
of both the Jochid Möngke Temür and the Ögödeid Qaidu, because they 
were considered to have been taken by force rather than acquired by 
inheritance - gives some indication of Abaqa’s legitimacy issues.  
 
Where it was crucial, however, was to confirm his legitimacy amongst 
both the Mongol elite in his late father’s domains as well as reassure 
submitted rulers that he was firmly in the saddle. Until its arrival his 
authority would have been fragile since there were potentially other 
claimants, including his brother Tegüder as well as Yoshmut.   
 
This anxiously awaited event had to wait a long five years when, in 
October 1270,800 the returning envoy eventually located Abaqa at the 
future site of Sultaniyya. The mission, however, almost came to grief as 
the envoy/s only just escaped captivity by Abaqa’s cousin and enemy, 
the Chaghadaid Khan who, in association with the Ögödeid Qaidu was 
increasingly antagonistic towards the Tuluids. That Abaqa’s authority 
was shaky in those intervening five years is perhaps shown by the 
prompt enthronement ceremony which followed the receipt of Qubilai’s 
                                       
799 Michal Biran, ‘The Battle of Herat (1270): A Case of Inter-Mongol Warfare’ in 
Warfare in Inner Asian History (500-1800) ed. by Nicola di Cosmo. Brill, Leiden, 
Boston, Koln, 2002 
800 Het’um/Bedrosian has Abaqa confirmed as ruler by Qubilai in 1264 
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approval and symbols of authority.801Despite the great distance between 
Qubilai and himself, Abaqa maintained what was essentially ‘a fiction of 
Yuan overlordship’ in both his coinage and in his diplomatic 
correspondence.802   
One of the disadvantages of pre-modern communication networks was 
demonstrated on the demise of Abaqa in 1282.803 This is when a 
potential claimant can take advantage of the distance of rivals to seize 
the throne. The rival in this instance being Abaqa’s son Arghun who 
was guarding the eastern marches against the Ögödeid khan Qaidu and 
was, as Marco Polo points out, forty days march away from his late 
father’s Court. In the interim Bar Hebraeus implies that Tegüder, (r. 
681-683/June 1282- August1284) Hülegü’s eldest surviving son, was 
appointed Abaqa’s successor at a quriltai in June 1282. As a convert to 
Islam Tegüder designated himself Sultan Ahmad, whilst he overcame a 
possible hiccup to his accession by buying off the Mongol elite and 
troops through the simple expedient of dividing the treasury amongst 
them.804 
Importantly, for present purposes, this succession does not seem to 
have been followed by another urgent dash across Eurasia to seek a 
yarlïgh confirming Ahmad’s succession. Whilst Bar Hebraeus mentions 
the dispatch of ambassadors to the Mamluks and other regional 
grandees, there is no mention in the Chinese or Iranian sources805 of an 
emissary from Ahmad to Qubilai either to inform him of the death of his 
                                       
801 Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 25 
802 Reuven Amitai-Preiss, ‘An Exchange of Letters in Arabic between Abaqa Ilkhan and 
Sultan Baybars,’ Central Asiatic Journal 38 (1994) 16-17, 21-23 and 26-27; Allsen, 
Culture and Conquest p. 26 
803 His son Arghun believed he had been poisoned by the historian Juvaynī’s brother, 
Shams al-Din, who was the Master of the Diwan’, possibly to make way for 
Ahmad/Teguder; Bar Hebraeus ch. xi, p. 472 
804 Marco Polo II p. 467 may be doing Ahmad an injustice since Bar Hebraeus confirms 
that  his appointment was not a coup but properly confirmed at a quriltai at the same 
time confirming the largesse which followed this confirmation. Bar Hebraeus ch. xi, p. 
467  
805 Allsen postulates that his accession as a Muslim sultan was not recognised by the 
Yuan since there is no mention of him in the table of Chinggisid rulers of Iran. YS, ch. 
107, p. 2720. Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 26 
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brother or to announce his own accession. Indeed, the Chinese sources 
do not list his reign at all.  
 
Polo hints at a possible explanation for this lacuna as well as the basis 
of Sultan Ahmad’s legitimation when he ‘quotes’ the response to 
Arghun’s demand to his uncle to surrender the throne. Ahmad was 
dismissive, allegedly saying that he ‘..... had helped to conquer it as 
much as his father did’.806 If this was indeed his response, he was 
effectively co-opting Macht geht vor Recht as his legitimising principle. 
After Arghun’s subsequent defeat and capture in battle there was, for 
Ahmad, a fatal delay in his execution of his nephew. Whilst the actual 
motives of the group of Mongol Amirs who turned against Ahmad are 
somewhat speculative the immediate trigger may relate to Ahmad 
reneging on an oath not to hurt Arghun, who was saved from imminent 
execution by an amir close to his father, the Amir Buqa, who then 
swore allegiance to Arghun.807  
 
Thus after a reign of only two years Ahmad was forced to flee, captured 
en route to Egypt, taken to Tabriz and killed in 683/August 1284 either 
by the immediate command of Arghun or by the sons of one of his 
victims.808 These events triggered one of the more important examples 
of strategic communication between the Courts since it appears that 
Qubilai had started to make arrangements for a high-level embassy to 
the West in the spring of 1283, that is, eighteen months before the 
death of Ahmad. Thus if Ahmad had not sent a formal embassy to 
Qubilai’s Court announcing the death of his brother Abaqa, either 
someone else did so, possibly Arghun (r.683-690/1284-1291) himself 
asking for assistance since he was stationed in Khurāsān on the 
                                       
806 Marco Polo II, p. 467 
807 Chronography of Bar Hebraeus completed by Bar Sauma, ch. xi, pp. 471,477; Marco 
Polo, II p.471 
808 Bar Hebraeus/Chronography ch. xi, p. 472 says that Arghun did not want any part 
in the killing and left it to the sons of Ahmad’s brother, whom he had murdered to do 
the job. Marco Polo II pp. 472-474 has Arghun giving the order without consultation. 
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ambassadorial route or envoys reached the Yuan Court from Mongol 
Amirs who were concerned at Ahmad’s conversion. Though this is pure 
speculation there is some circumstantial evidence to back up the 
possibility that Qubilai was intervening in the succession of his distant 
underlings.  
 
The embassy was led by the īlchī-i Qā’ān or ambassador of the Great 
Qa’an, Bolad Noyan/ Pūlād chīnksānk (c.1240-1313).809 This embassy 
included Isā kelemichi, (d. 1308) or Jesus the Interpreter who, though 
Syrian, had travelled to Mongolia in the 1240s, and during Qubilai’s 
reign had established the Bureau of Western Astronomy and the 
Imperial Dispensary in Peking. Moreover, he was an experienced envoy 
and could also act as interpreter.810 After a hazardous journey the 
ambassadors arrived late in 1284 or early 1285 to find Arghun safely 
ensconced on the throne and in his winter quarters in Arrān. They 
started back to Qubilai with the gifts sent by Arghun in early 1286 but 
the ambassadors became separated because of the hostilities with 
Qaidu and Du’a, with only Isā making it to Dadu in 1287 as Bolad was 
forced to turn back and spent the last twenty-eight years of his life 
serving the Hülegüids. 
There are some unanswered questions about this high-level embassy, 
not least being what exactly was its purpose since within weeks of their 
arrival, Ūrdūqiyā, an envoy whom Arghun himself had dispatched to 
Qubilai in January 1285811 returned in early January of 1286, together 
with the yarlïgh confirming his accession. If it was in response to a plea 
for help from Arghun it shows again the disadvantages of extended lines 
                                       
809 Allsen has examined Bolad’s career in some depth in view of his importance not 
only as a ‘major political player’ in Sino-Iranian relations during this period but also 
for his role as a pivotal figure in the flow of science, technology and culture between 
east and west Eurasia’. See Thomas Allsen, Culture and Conquest chapters 9, 10 and 
11. 
810 This is presumably the same Isā who is described by Rashīd al-Dīn in the context 
of his role in China in persecuting Muslims pre-1291 as one of the mischievous, 
wicked, and corrupt men of their age. Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p. 294 
811 Bar Hebraeus/Chronography ch. xi,  
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of communication since Bolad’s mission did not arrive until December 
1285 by which time his services as intermediary between the claimants 
to the throne were no longer required.  
 
This role of arbitration is probably the most satisfactory explanation of 
why someone of Bolad’s stature should have been chosen, or put 
himself forward, for such a mission. Moreover, if Ūrdūqiyā also brought 
back the grant of the prestigious Yuan designation of chancellor or 
chīnksānk – an honour which had not previously been conferred in the 
Hülegüid domains - for Arghun’s saviour, the Mongol Amir Buqa, then 
Qubilai would hardly have expected Bolad, his own chīnksānk, to 
remain in the west. 
 
Meanwhile, during Arghun’s seven years at the helm at least two further 
missions between the extremes of Eurasia are known. Qubilai 
dispatched one to Iran in 1286 though the objective is not known812and 
Arghun in his turn sent a famous request to Qubilai for a bride after the 
death of his wife Bulughan in April 1286.813 Bulughan had asked that 
she be replaced by a girl of her own family, the Bayaut, and when 
Arghun’s three emissaries reached Qubilai at an unspecified date their 
request was graciously received.  
 
Once again the hazards of such extended communications became 
apparent when the ambassadors, who according to one account set out 
on the return journey via the overland route with a great escort, were 
forced to turn back after eight months because of the internecine 
Chinggisid hostilities in Central Eurasia.814  Arrangements were 
therefore made for the bride to be carried back to Arghun by sea, 
escorted not just by his envoys but also the Polos. This nightmare 
voyage had a purported fatality rate of six hundred including two of 
                                       
812 YS, ch. 11, p. 293. Also Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 29 
813 Marco Polo I, p. 32 and p.33 note 2 
814 Marco Polo I, p. 33 note 3 
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Arghun’s envoys and most of the ladies apart from the bride.815 The 
party finally made landfall at Hormuz where the Polos discovered that 
the groom, Arghun, had died in 1291 and thus perforce had to hand 
over their charge to his son, Ghāzān, then on guard duty in Khurāsān 
in c.1294.  
 
The death of Arghun yet again exposed the weakness of early 
communication systems. Of the three claimants, Arghun’s son, Ghāzān, 
like Arghun himself on the death of his own father, was in Khurāsān. 
Also like Arghun, there was a brother of the deceased sovereign in the 
frame, this time Geikhatu, and finally Baidu, a cousin. According to 
Marco Polo, Geikhatu, seized the throne816 though Bar Hebraeus 
records he was appointed by the assembled princes in 691/June 1292. 
Although Ghāzān was barely in his twenties and, as indeed happened, 
could claim the throne again, Geikhatu seems to have been a curious 
choice since he was quite content to lead a life of undisturbed 
debauchery in his own domain of Rum. Bar Hebraeus also heavily 
implies that he engaged in sodomy,817 a grievous fault to the Mongols 
and to add to the general disillusion his sāhib-dīwān, the Persian Sadr 
al-Dīn, was busily bankrupting the kingdom to feather his own nest818 - 
a poisoned chalice inherited by the eventual successor, Ghāzān and his 
renowned vizier, Rashīd al-Dīn (643-718/1245-1318). 
Unsurprisingly, Geikhatu was ‘hated with a very great hatred by all 
those who held the reins of his kingdom’ 819 and quite possibly with the 
connivance of both his rivals for the throne in 1291, Ghāzān and 
especially Baidu, Geikhatu was deposed and killed in 1295. What is 
important for present concerns, however, is that he apparently waited 
for his succession to be ratified by Qubilai before his enthronement in 
                                       
815 Marco Polo I, p. 36 and p.38, note 5 
816 Marco Polo II, p. 475 
817 Chronography of Bar Hebraeus completed by Bar Sauma, ch. xi,  p. 494, more 
explicitly on p. 504 
818 Bar Hebraeus ch. xi, p. 496 
819 Bar Hebraeus ch. xi, p. 494 
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691/29 June 1292820 and he was subsequently included, unlike his 
predecessor Ahmad, in the list of Hülegüid rulers in the Yuan shih.821  
Predictably the succession to Geikhatu was not straightforward, and 
once again the problems surrounding communications played a 
prominent role. According to Bar Sauma, one of the key claimants, 
Ghāzān, was quartered ‘a long way off, it was still the time of winter and 
the roads were destitute of grass and provender’ thus he was hampered 
in travelling to claim the throne leaving those around Baidu to suggest 
that he took the throne instead.822 When Ghāzān finally made it 
through the elements he was justly aggrieved that his exhausting 
travels to claim his throne had been wasted since Baidu had duly been 
enthroned.823  
Whilst Baidu (r. 694/1295) has a good press in the Chronography which 
describes in some detail Baidu’s convoluted religious beliefs, his reign 
only lasted upwards of eight months. In that short period, the 
Chronography reports that though Baidu was favourably disposed 
towards Christians he decided to become a Muslim - even if he never 
really grasped the essentials of Islam – the reason being that the Mongol 
nobles and their following in their entirety had become Muslims and 
had already been circumcised.824 By September 1295, however, his 
brief, albeit chaotic, reign was over.  
 
Even if Baidu had the inclination and opportunity to dispatch 
ambassadors to the Yuan announcing his succession it is highly 
unlikely that they would have been able to circumnavigate either 
Ghāzān’s troops who were situated on the main route east or the hostile 
armies of Qaidu and Du’a. At the same time, though good relations had 
been established with the Jochid Khan Toqta (r. 690/712/1291-1312) 
                                       
820 P. Jackson, Gaykātū Khan, Encyclopaedia Iranica,  
821 YS, ch. 107, p. 2721, Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 29 
822 Bar Hebraeus, ch. xi, p. 500 
823Bar Hebraeus, ch. xi, p. 500, 501 
824 Bar Hebraeus ch. xi, p. 506 
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this route east had also been interdicted because of intra-Jochid 
battles.825 
 
Ghāzān finally made it to the throne, reigning for nine years (r. 694-
703/1295-1304) but dying at the early age of thirty. Whether the 
internecine warfare had any influence on Ghāzān’s subsequent actions 
and indeed inaction is possible but not proven. Qubilai had died in 
1294, and was succeeded by his grandson Temür (r.1294-1307) but at 
what stage the western Tuluids were informed of the death of the Qa’an 
is unclear nor whether they appreciated he had been succeeded by a 
grandson. There is no evidence, however, that Ghāzān urgently 
dispatched either by land or by sea ambassadors to the Yuan to 
announce his succession and request from Temür Qa’an the traditional 
approval.  
This may not only have been because of logistical difficulties, he also 
had a lot on his mind. Along with the throne his inheritance included 
the legacy of financial mismanagement mentioned above,826 and the 
continuing hostilities with the Ögödeids and Chaghadaids but as was 
seen in the short reign of Baidu, a watershed had also been reached in 
the Mongol elites’ mental adjustment to Islam. Moreover, as Mustawfi 
catalogues, Ghāzān was also making inroads into his Mongol amirs and 
princes by executing dissidents, including his mentor, the Oirat Amir 
Nawruz, as well as other serving ministers throughout his reign.827 On 
the other hand, whilst there has been much scholarly deliberation on 
what Allsen has well described as a ‘domestication of the bases of 
Hülegüid legitimacy’ under Ghāzān he also notes that many passages in 
                                       
825 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle pp.102-103 and pp. 126-130 
826 This included the dire straits in which many of the Mongols who had accompanied 
Hülegü west found themselves, even being reduced to beggary. 
827 The Ta’rikh-i-guzida or Select history of Hamdu’llah Mustawfi-i Qazwini. Eds. 
Browne, Nicholson Pt. II, pp. 145-147 
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the Yuan shih make clear that the Yuan considered Ghāzān and his 
successors, Öljeitü and Abū Sa’īd, to be subordinate rulers.828 
All these factors came together at one of the most crucial points for any 
conquest dynasty, that of inter-generational transformation.  Ghāzān 
was a great-grandson of Hülegü, thus a third generation dynast and 
though in the Mongol tradition he was a trained commander he was 
also quadri-cultural. His strong Mongol roots were tempered by Türkic 
influences within a Persian milieu whilst his education had been 
overseen by a Chinese tutor, one Bāraq, arranged by his grandfather 
Abaqa so that he could become literate in Mongolian and Uighur, as 
well as Chinese sciences and manners.829 Included in this already 
diverse mix of influences was his support 830of Islam from mid-1295 
onwards. An equally critical factor may have been the more cordial 
relations between the Jochid Khan, Toqta (r. 1291-1312)831 and the 
Hülegüids. These were predicated on their joint concern at the activities 
of the Ögödeid and Chaghadaid khans on their respective frontiers. 
Whilst Allsen is up-beat on relations between the two Toluid entities832 
during the Ghāzān period, the actual extent of the contact is perplexing. 
The first seems to have been the despatch of Baiju from Dadu on 
secondment from Temür Qa’an (r.1294-1307) to Ghāzān.833  In 
698/1298-99 Ghāzān sent by sea as his envoys Fakhr-al-Diīn Ahmad 
and Bocai Ilchi to Temür Qa’an returning in 704/1305. Baiju appears to 
have returned to the Yuan possibly as the emissary of Ghāzān in 
703/1304 but there are three further possible ‘returns to Iran’ of 
missions between that date and 1306 which are difficult to account for. 
                                       
828 Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 55 
829 Rashid al-Din/Jahn II, pp. 3-4 
830 Perhaps a more ingenuous term than conversion since he continued to hold fast to 
Mongol traditions. 
831 Rashid al-Din/Boyle, pp. 129-130 
832 This period was, according to Allsen, one of the high points in the cultural 
exchange between China and Iran. Allsen, Culture and Conquest, pp. 33 and 34 
833 Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 34 
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Thus in nine years there were really only two confirmed missions from 
Ghāzān to the Yuan. 
 
Given Ghāzān’s exposure to the eastern influences, it is curious that 
during his tenure on the throne not just the Yuan, but Bolad too, seem 
to have suffered something of an eclipse. It was only in the reign of 
Ghāzān’s successor Öljeitü and Temür Qa’an’s successors that Bolad 
was honoured by the Yuan Court with a ‘dukedom’.834 Also telling is the 
numismatic evidence in which Ghāzān omitted the name of the Qa’an 
on some, but not all, coins as well as in his diplomatic 
correspondence.835  Explanations for the apparent distancing of the 
Hülegüid periphery away from the Yuan centre can only be tentative. 
Such factors as the death of Qubilai in 1294, the closure of the roads, 
the move towards Islam, the rapprochement with the Jochid khan, 
Toqta, and other sundry issues must have played a part. On the other 
hand, it has been hinted above that there may have been some 
irritation on the part of Ghāzān with his ostensible overlords, possibly 
because of some perceived lack of support in his two attempts to gain 
the throne or even because he was not impressed by stories of the 
young Qa’an Temür’s rather dissolute youth.836   
There is also some oblique evidence that Temür, initially at least, may 
have been less than happy with the Mongols’ drift towards Islam. 
Rashīd al-Dīn records that Temür was very annoyed at reports that his 
cousin Ananda, who had been given Tangut, had converted to Islam 
and was enforcing it with some vigour.837 Temür ordered Ananda’s’ 
imprisonment but in his defence Ananda retorted ‘If it was a devil that 
guided me, who was it who guided Ghāzān Khan, who is my aqa?’ 
Whether news of this incident ever reached Ghāzān is not known 
though it could certainly account for a cooling of relations. In fact, 
                                       
834 Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 76 
835 Mostaert and Cleaves, “Trois documents”  
836 Rashid al-Din/Boyle, pp. 301-302 
837 Rashid al-Din/Boyle, pp. 323-326 
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Temür did eventually come to terms with both Ananda and Ghāzān’s 
conversions. 838 
After Ghāzān’s death in 1304, for the first time distance and the 
communication network did not come between the heir apparent and 
the throne as Ghāzān’s brother Öljeitü (r. 1304-1316) then aged 23, 
who was also in Khurāsān when news of his brother’s death arrived, 
was enthroned in Tabriz on Dhu’l-Hijja 15 703/19 July 1304.  
It could well be argued that Sultan Öljeitü’s twelve years on the throne 
were not only the longest period of regnal stability since his grandfather 
Abaqa’s reign between 1265 and 1281 but also ushered in Ibn 
Khaldūn’s third dynastic stage. 
The third stage is one of leisure and 
tranquillity in which the fruits of 
royal authority are enjoyed.... All 
the ability of the ruler is expended 
on collecting taxes; regulating 
income and expenses.... erecting 
large buildings, big constructions, 
spacious cities and lofty 
monuments; presenting  gifts to 
embassies ..... 839 
 
Whilst not necessarily quite such an idyllic period of ‘leisure and 
tranquillity’ it was certainly one of the creation of lasting monuments.840 
Öljeitü’s predecessor, Ghāzān, had addressed the ‘regulation of income 
and expenses’ whilst as will be seen below, the ‘Profits of Empire’ 
providentially arrived from the Yuan after a lull of fifty years with the 
surviving envoy Fakhr al-Dīn Ahmad’s return by ship. As Ibn Khaldūn 
also astutely noted, this was also the last stage during which the ruler 
was in complete authority.  This ‘calm before the storm’ was not entirely 
                                       
838 Rashid al-Din/Boyle, pp. 323-326 
839 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, pp. 141-142 
840 As Mustawfi remarks, Öljeitü founded Sultaniyya, Sultanabad and Uljaytu 
Sultanabad, near Mughan. The Ta’rikh-i-guzida or Select history of Hamdu’llah 
Mustawfi-i Qazwini. Eds. Browne, Nicholson Pt. II, p. 147 
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of Hülegüid making since they were not involved in the most 
sensational event, which was the ending of intra-Chinggisid hostilities 
by Chabar, the son of the late Qaidu and his ally, the Chaghadaid khan, 
Du’a (r. 1282-1307).   
If one of the most dramatic traverses of Eurasia was Hülegü’s dispatch 
of envoys to inform Möngke of the Fall of Baghdad, the dispatch of 
envoys by Temür Qa’an to let the Hülegüids have the glad tidings that 
the Chaghadaids and Ögödeids had formally submitted in October 1304 
was also of great import.  In 1305 Öljeitü  passed on the news to Philip 
the Fair of France that the descendants of Chinggis Khan were at peace 
after forty-five years of civil war and, crucially, that the relay stations 
had been reconnected. 841 
The period that followed the cessation of hostilities was not, as will be 
seen in the Table of Military Operations during the period of Intra-
Chinggisid Conflict in the Appendices (Table VI) quite the cessation of 
hostilities that Öljeitü’s letter implied since they flared up again with 
the Chaghadaids around 1313 with the last recorded clash taking place 
in 1326.842 It is substantially true, however, that during the reigns of 
Öljeitü and Abū Sa’īd period formal Sino-Iranian relations reached a 
peak of cordiality and contact. A further embassy arrived from Temür in 
the west in early 1306. The embassy of 1308 almost certainly 
announced the demise of Temür Qa’an in 1307 and the accession of his 
nephew Qaishan (r.1307-1311). From the speed of these journeys it 
appears they took the overland route rather than travelling by sea. After 
1307, however, there seems to have been a pause in formal embassies 
until 1314, three years after the accession of Qaishan’s successor and 
brother, Buyantu (r. 1311-1320).  
                                       
841 Mostaert, Antoine, and Cleaves, Francis Woodman, Les Lettres de 1289 et 1305 des 
Ilkhan Arγun et Ölĵeitü à Philippe le bel. Cambridge, Mass., 1962 
842 Biran, ‘Diplomacy and chancellery practices in the Chagataid khanate: Some 
preliminary remarks’ Oriente Moderno, 88, 2008, p. 375 
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Following a familiar pattern, on Öljeitü’s demise in December 1316 aged 
thirty-nine, his twelve year old son, Abū Sa‘īd, was in Khurāsān. The 
child, the last Hülegüid ruler with a mention in the Yuan shih, 
succeeded to the throne (r. 716-735/1316-1335) with the powerful 
Oirat Mongol, the Amir Chuban as regent though the enthronement did 
not take place until spring of the following year, possibly because 
immediately after departing from Khurāsān the throne had been 
promptly seized by two Mongol grandees.843 Between Abū Sa‘īd’s 
accession and his death in 1335 there was a somewhat rapid turnover 
of Yuan emperors, including Gegen, (r. 1320-1323),  Yesun-Temür 
(r.1323-1328), Toq-Temür (r.1328-1329), Qutuqtu (r.1329-1332), 
Irinchinbal (r.1332) and the last Yuan emperor Toghan-Temür (r. 1332-
1370).  There was thus plenty of scope for formal condolence and 
succession announcement embassies. However, of the twenty or so 
‘embassies’ that have been noted in the Chinese annals between the 
Toluid polities during this period only one seems to have had a 
‘congratulatory’ objective, that of 24 July 1330. 
Allsen has tabulated seventeen of these embassies together with the 
reciprocal gifts exchanged with the first dated 22 April 1324 and the 
last November 1332. Thus these seventeen embassies took place over a 
period of eight years which is even more frequent than the mention by 
the anonymous Franciscan in his Book of the Estate of the Great Caan 
c.1330.844 Here he comments that embassies were sent annually to the 
‘Caan their lord’ by the Emperor of Armalech, which must be the 
Chaghadaids khan,845 by the Emperor Boussay, that is Abū Sa‘īd, as 
                                       
843 The Ta’rikh-i-guzida or Select History of Hamdu’llah Mustawfi-i Qazwini. Pt. II, p. 
148 
844 The author of the Book of the Estate of the Great Caan was long believed to have 
been the Archbishop of Sultāniyya, Jean of Cori but this has been discredited. See 
Christine Gadrat, ‘De statu, conditione ac regimine magni canis. L’original latin du 
<Livre de l’estat du Grand Caan> et la question de l’auteur’, Bibliothèque de l’Ecole des 
Chartes 165, 2007, 355-71. 
845 Biran notes that most of the documented Chaghataid formal relations with the 
Yuan took place between 1304 and 1333. Biran, ‘Diplomacy and chancellery practices 
in the Chagataid khanate p. 375 and YS. Ch. 21, pp. 462, 463, 466, 468. Ch. 24, p. 
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well as the Emperor Usbech, that is, Özbeg (r. 1313-1341) the Jochid 
Khan.846 As the Archbishop was based in the Hülegüid heartland, albeit 
in the dynasty’s latter days, his view is important since it appears that 
despite the difficulties of the extended lines of communication, as well 
as the Hülegüids’ shift to Islam and not least, the apparent autonomy of 
the later ‘Sultans’,  he has no doubt that the ‘peripheries’ acknowledged 
the ‘centre’. This relationship is perhaps most clearly spelled out in the 
Yuan Shih, in the context of Hülegü’s holdings in the Yuan. Here the 
current ruler, Öljeitü (703-716/1304-1316) is referred to as guarding ‘a 
far distant corner’847 for the Yuan emperor. 
 
Economic Vulnerability and the Profits of Empire Function 
of the Yām Network 
 
 
Amongst the scattered references in the sources are those which relate 
to the transmission of ‘the profits of empire’. This category covers a 
multitude of circumstances but one of the most important for the 
Imperial Family was receipt of the proceeds of their scattered 
apportionments or share/bakhsh or qubi, allocated to them by Chinggis 
Khan, Ögödei and Möngke.  The Timurid historian Natanzī neatly 
summarised these when he remarks that after dividing the empire 
among his four sons ‘he [further]assigned each son several possessions 
in the territory of the others so that in this way envoys would 
continuously pass to and fro between them.’ 848 As Jackson has pointed 
out, this eventually led throughout the empire to ‘an extremely complex 
pattern of rights over tribal elements, colonies of enslaved subject 
                                                                                                                
550, 551, 555. Ch. 27, p. 615, 620;ch. 28, p. 629; ch. 29, p. 640, 644, 648, 653, 658; 
ch. 30, p. 669, 670, 673, 680, 681;ch. 35, p. 794. Ch. 36, p. 800-801;  
846 Yule, ‘The Book of the Estate of the Great Caan, Set forth by the Archbishop of 
Soltan’ia, in Cathay and the Way Thither, 2010, p. 238 
847YS, ch. 85, pp. 2141-42,  Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 49 
848 Mu’in al-Dīn Natanzī, Muntakhab al-tawārīkh-i Mu’inī, ed. Jean Aubin, Tehran, 
Khayyam, 1957, p. 427; Cited in Biran, ‘Diplomacy and Chancellery Practices’, pp. 
374, n. 2 and 375; Allsen, “Sharing out the Empire”, p. 184 
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peoples and grazing-grounds, possibly with the addition of adjacent 
cities’ together with their cultivated land.849 
 
This thoughtful gesture to ensure his descendants kept in contact 
heavily relied on the Imperial Family respecting each other’s portions 
and passing on the proceeds however frosty the relationships. The 
Ögödeid heir, Qaidu, locked in hostilities with the Yuan and the 
Hülegüids, had particular problems in this respect. The proceeds due to 
him for his inheritance in the Yuan territories were frozen but were 
restored to his son Chapar after his submission to the Yuan in 
709/1310.850 The dispossessed Ögödeids as well as the Chaghadaids 
had interests in Hülegü’s newly acquired ulus and before the Battle of 
Herat in 668/1270 the two protagonists sent an emissary, Mas‘ūd Beg, 
to collect their share of the revenues. It is not clear whether his mission 
was successful though Biran remarks nothing more is heard of their 
possessions in Iran.851  
After 633/1236 the Imperial Family received as part of their share of 
the profits of empire852 households in northern China which are 
enumerated in the Yuan shi853 and in 655/1257 Hülegü was given by 
Möngke an annual income of a hundred ingots of silver and three 
hundred rolls of cloth. He also received 25,056 households in Chang-te 
of the category known as ‘five household silk households though by the 
time of Abū Sa‘īd, the Yuan policy of asserting control of these 
allotments had reduced the number of the Hülegüid allotment to only 
2,929 households.854  The Yuan emperor also had holdings in the West 
which consisted, at least until the time of Ghāzān, of herds, including 
                                       
849 Peter Jackson, ‘From Ulus to Khanate’ in R. Amitai-Preiss & D. O. Morgan (eds) The 
Mongol Empire & its Legacy. pp. 27-28 
850 Biran, Qaidu and the rise of the Independent Mongol State p. 78 
851 Biran, ‘Diplomacy and Chancellery Practices’, p. 374 
852 This has been examined by Peter Jackson in his chapter ‘From Ulus to Khanate’ in 
R. Amitai-Preiss & D. O. Morgan (eds) The Mongol Empire & its Legacy. pp. 12-37. 
853 YS, ch. 95, pp. 2417-18; Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p.46 
854 YS, ch. 95, pp. 2417-18; Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p.46 
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camels and it may be that the camels dispatched to the Yuan by Abū 
Sa‘īd were actually their own animals.855  
As was seen above, if the communications network was interdicted for 
any reason the receipt of the revenues from such holdings could be at 
risk.  Because of the hostilities on the overland route Ghāzān’s 696-
704/1297-1305 embassy had to go by sea but returned with silks as 
his share of the imperial manufacture which had not been paid since 
Hülegü departed for the west in 1253 and presumably were the income 
from the above holdings. The return journey also had to be by sea, 
incurring yet again a heavy death toll, since Ghāzān’s ambassador, 
Malik Fakhr al-Dīn died two days out from Malabar and the Qa’an’s 
ambassador also died on the voyage. It is not clear how far these silks 
bolstered Öljeitü’s finances but it could well be that they defrayed some 
of the costs of his building programme.  
Of all the Hülegüid rulers, Abū Sa‘īd should have had the fewest 
financial worries since between 1324 and 1332, when there was the 
most intense burst of contact between the Hülegüids and the Yuan, he 
received from them in total 340 rolls of multicoloured silk and 61,300 
ingots of cash. His offerings in return were comparatively modest being 
mostly of animals, though pearls and precious stones also appear in the 
list.856 The camels have been mentioned above but the horses, which 
are divided into ‘horses and ‘western’ horses are rather intriguing 
especially as the Yuan Shih lists them as arriving in four tranches 
between February 1326 and April 1327.857 That this was one mission 
which arrived in dribs and drabs is likely and they must have travelled 
overland.  
One particular facet of the ‘profits of empire’ function which can be 
overlooked but which should be mentioned is the transference of 
                                       
855 YS, ch. 95, pp. 2417-18; Allsen/Culture and Conquest Table 2, p. 44 
856 YS, ch. 95, pp. 2417-18; Allsen Table 2, p. 44 
857 YS, ch. 95, pp. 2417-18; Allsen Table 2, p. 44 
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captives and capitulated populations to further the objectives of the 
conquerors. The Mongols were not the first and certainly not the last, to 
deport or relocate populations. This tragic but important aspect of 
conquest has been examined by Allsen858 in the context of dislocation of 
populations but also importantly for present purposes for the forced 
movement of what were described in Chapter V above as ‘human herds’ 
of captured artisans and troops.  
Allsen, and before him McNeill in his seminal Plagues and Peoples, 
make the critical point that population movements between different 
disease pools, especially if those involved were already debilitated 
through malnourishment and ill-treatment provided ‘an optimum social 
and biological matrix for the outbreak and transmission of infectious 
disease.’859 This may account for what appears to have been the high 
rate of attrition of these wretched souls, a conclusion reached from 
reading between the lines in Rubruck and examined below. 
Many of these unfortunates were forced to trudge hundreds if not 
thousands of miles/kilometres from their homes, undoubtedly 
traumatised, ill-shod and ill-fed a - if the Armenian historian Kirakos 
Ganjakets’i 860experience is anything to go by - brutally treated. It is 
hardly surprising that, according to Sayfī, in one particular incident 
which occurred in the unsettled conditions of the Chaghadaid Khanate 
circa 1314/714 which involved thousands of captives of the 
Chaghadaid prince Yasa’ur, vast numbers perished on the forced 
marches.861  
                                       
858 Thomas T. Allsen, ‘Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia’ in Nomads of Agents 
of Cultural Change, University of Hawai’i Press, 2015, pp. 119-151 
859 W.H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, Garden City, NY, 1976, pp. 132-175, 263-264; 
M. W. Dols, The Black Death in the Middle East, Princeton, 1977, pp. 35-68, Allsen, 
Population Moveements in Mongol Eurasia’ p. 137 
860 Kirakos Ganjakets’i/Bedrosian ch. 24 section 211 
861 Sayf b. Muhammad b. Ya’qūb al-Harawi, Ta’rīkh-i namah-i Harat, ed. M. Sidiqi, 
Calcutta, 1944, pp. 643-644. Allsen, ‘Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia’ p. 
136-137 
291 
 
Rubruck also found, when he finally made it to Möngke’s encampment 
after his own slightly less demanding journey across Eurasia, that for 
those captives, such as the woman from Metz in Lorraine who had been 
captured in Hungary, unheard-of destitution was the norm not only on 
the forced march.862  He was shocked to find that for captives who had 
survived  to reach the comparative comforts of the Mongol Court, 
starvation was their lot and he felt bound to share his meagre rations 
with ‘so many starving people who are not provided with food’.863 
Such relocations generally consisted of three rough categories: to 
supply troops or military specialists; to repopulate devastated regions 
as was the intention of Yasa’ur above and to further the economic (or 
indeed sexual) objectives,  of the Chinggisid elite.  
The largest groups on the move were those in the first category when 
tens of thousands of troops were relocated from western to eastern 
Eurasia. Thus ‘ten thousand’ Alans from north of the Caucasus were 
dispatched to China in the late 1230s where they were formed into the 
Asud Army. One hundred and thirty years later the Yuan ‘could 
mobilise an army of six thousand Alans’ some of whom accompanied 
the last Yuan emperor back to the steppe.864 Other troops from western 
Eurasia included Qipchaqs who were first heard of in Mongolia after 
Sübe’etei returned from the western steppe in 1223 as well as Russians. 
Allsen concludes that as these groups did not assimilate over five 
generations they must have travelled east with their women and 
children.865 
 That there were any survivors at all from urban populations forced to 
march across Eurasia is extraordinary. The tribulations of the second 
group, namely deportations to repopulate devastated areas, have been 
                                       
862 Rubruck, p. 182 
863 Rubruck, p. 188. Not all captives were in such desperate straits since William 
Buchier the master craftsman originally from Paris had a skill valued by the Mongols. 
864 Allsen, ‘Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia’ p.122 
865 Allsen, ‘Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia’ p. 123 
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graphically described by Raverty based on an account in ‘Awfī in 
connection with Ögödei’s order that the cities of Khurasan ruined 
during the Mongol campaigns should be restored. When Herat 
surrendered to Tolui in 618 AH, the weavers had been relocated to 
Beshbalig/Urumchi in the Chaghadaid dominions and it appears they 
amounted to about two hundred and fifty families.  One of their leaders, 
‘Izz-ud-Dīn, had been to Ögödei’s Court and was ordered to return to 
Herat, taking fifty of his people along with him and furnished with a 
mandate to collect people from all parts of Khurasan so that Herat 
would quickly be re-peopled and restored to something like its former 
self again. Quite how such a mandate would have worked in practice is 
not immediately clear but having made some progress, in the following 
year (636 AH) ‘Izz-ud-Dīn set out for the Court of Qa’an ‘to arrange 
‘certain matters’ in connection with the restoration of the city. He also 
requested that he might be permitted to remove to Herat his own family 
and also the two hundred other families located in Turkistan and 
Mughalistan’.866  
Some of those forced to trek across Eurasia were seen by Li Chih-
Ch’ang when he accompanied his Master, Ch’ang Ch’un, who in his 
turn had been summoned to Chinggis Khan, whose campaign 
headquarters were then near Kabul.  Li reports that in December 1221 
the party reached Samarkand, the population of which had been 
depleted to such an extent that only a quarter remained: 
These people are quite unable to manage 
their fields and orchards for themselves and 
are obliged to call in Chinese, Kitai and 
Tanguts.... Chinese craftsmen are found 
everywhere..... A number of Chinese came to 
pay their respects and they once had an 
astronomer with them867 
 
                                       
866 Juzjānī, p. 1127, footnote 6 
867 Li Chih-Ch’ang trans. & ed. Waley, Arthur, The Travels of an Alchemist, pp. 93-94 
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Mustawfi in 1340 in turn praises the grapes and Payghambari pears of 
Khoi in Azerbaijan which were produced by fair-skinned Khitans868 
whilst Rashid al-Dīn confirms that during the Hülegüid period Khitans 
were relocated to the west, including Merv and then Tabriz, thus a very 
long way indeed from ‘home’.  At the opposite side of Eurasia Rashīd al-
Dīn is particularly well informed on Qubilai’s building activities which 
included a winter palace, named Qarshi, and a summer residence about 
50 parasangs from Dadu. One of the roads between these palaces 
passed near a small town called Sinali, the people of which, he says, 
were mostly from Samarkand.869  
Artisans and industrial workers were amongst some of the most prized 
‘profits of empire’. One of Rubruck’s objectives870 was to give succour to 
a group of Saxons who had been employed in Transylvania for their 
metallurgical skills and who had been captured in circa 1241 by 
Chaghadai’s grandson, Buri, who wanted to use their skills for himself. 
They were first frogmarched to Talas/Taraz between Tashkent and 
Bishkek and then after the Buri’s execution were transferred to 
Fülad/Bolad to the north of the Lake Sairam where they were forced to 
mine gold and make weapons for the Mongols.871 Rubruck mentions 
other captives whom he met at Möngke’s Court, including Master 
William of Paris, who was by then the slave of Arïq Böke after being 
captured in Hungary and appropriated by Arïq Böke’s formidable 
mother, Sorqoqtani Beki.872 Though a slave it is interesting to note that 
Master William was actually paid by Möngke the sum of a thousand 
marks (or elsewhere in Rubruck’s report three thousand marks) for his 
                                       
868 Hamd-Allah Mustawfi, The Geographical Part of the Nuzhat al Qutlub, trans. Le 
Strange, pp 86-87; Rashīd al-Dīn, ed. Karimi, vol. 2, p. 687, Allsen, ‘Population 
Movements in Mongol Eurasia’ p. 131 
869 Rashid al-Dīn /Karimi, vol, 1, p. 641; Rashid al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 276, Pelliot “Une ville 
musulmans dans la Chine du Nord sous les Mongols,” Journal Asiatique 211 (1927) 
pp. 261-179, Allsen, ‘Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia’ p. 131 
870 Rubruck, p. 226 ‘Bolat’  ‘where those Germans are to be found who were my chief 
reason for going there’ 
871 Rubruck, pp. 144-146 where he observed that Möngke relocated them with Batu’s 
permission. Allsen, ‘Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia’ p. 132 
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masterpiece consisting of a large silver tree that discharged different 
drinks from its branches.873  
What is valuable about Rubruck’s account is the realisation that 
despite captives apparently being herded here, there and everywhere he 
actually encountered few western Eurasians in Mongolia. In Qaraqorum 
Rubruck noted two quarters, that of the Saracens, which had bazaars 
and seems to have been frequented mostly by traders and a second 
quarter for the craftsmen, who were from Khitai.874 As far as European 
captives are concerned, these included a German slave-girl, a poor 
German, Master William’s wife, who was a Lorrainer but born in 
Hungary and Basil, the son of an Englishman but also born in 
Hungary. There were clearly other captive Christians since Rubruck 
remarks on them in the context of a great crowd including more 
Hungarians, Alans, Russians, Georgians and Armenians, who had not 
set their eyes on the sacrament since their capture.875  
So far as the Imperial ‘sexual objectives’ function of the Yām are 
concerned, Li Chih-Ch’ang also records his Master’s distress when he 
discovered that those escorting him from northern China to Chinggis 
Khan’s command headquarters near Kabul proposed to take along all 
the girls that had been collected for the Khan’s harem.  One of the four 
Mongol officials of the escort was dispatched with an urgent appeal 
from the horrified Taoist to the Conqueror pleading for this arrangement 
to be rescinded.876 Alas, no indication is given as to how many of these 
unlucky girls had been ‘collected’  nor how they were to be transported, 
but presumably by cart as far as the terrain allowed since it would not 
have been wise to have marched them across much of Eurasia with the 
danger of delivering ‘damaged’ goods intended for harem. 
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Allsen observes that the deportation of Eastern Eurasian residents to 
the west was part of Mongol efforts at reconstruction after the 
destruction of their military campaigns whilst residents of Western 
Eurasia were dispatched to the east as human booty to produce 
speciality goods. Thus ‘the Mongols sent East Asians to the west to 
increase the quantity of production and Westerners to the east to 
improve the quality of production’ geared to ‘Mongol tastes, preferences 
and priorities’.877  
What is missing from the equation is how such transfers actually 
operated in practice, such as, for example, whether those charged with 
shepherding the human flocks to their destination followed the Yām 
infrastructure and how their rations were obtained since clearly 
humans cannot graze in the same manner as sheep. Another intriguing 
statistic which is, however, impossible to calculate is the number of 
escapees. Allsen refers to a ‘loosely structured refugee state’ that 
functioned for decades as a buffer between the Hülegüids and the Delhi 
Sultanate. The disparate elements became known as Qara’unas or 
Negüderis, who were originally formed by Jochid troops fleeing Hulegu 
and thereafter attaching themselves to the Jochid commander stationed 
in Khurasan, Negüder. They in turn were joined by disparate 
desperadoes who must have deserted their commanders but whilst 
such desertions may have been possible for small numbers of men 
clearly whole families attempting to return to northern China from say 
Azerbaijan was highly improbably. 
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Imperial Business Function 
and  
 The Yām Network 
 
 
The peak period for officials traversing Eurasia either to answer a 
summons to Court to clear their names or to slander their colleagues 
was during the Ögödeid and Güyüg periods. The view that there was a 
continuous stream of officials’ criss-crossing Eurasia during the 
Hülegüid period is not supported by the surviving evidence.  Bolad has 
already been mentioned above as an ambassador from Qubilai to 
Arghun and his entourage may well have included officials and other 
personnel. Qubilai is also recorded by Rashīd al-Dīn as sending for a 
young Mongol commander then serving under Abaqa Khan, who had 
fallen ‘to the lot and share of Qubilai Qa’an’ on the death of Möngke.878 
Sartaq Noyan and ‘Abd al-Rahmān were dispatched on this mission and 
Sartaq returned in 1265 with Bayan leaving his colleague behind in 
Western Eurasia to ‘settle the accounts’.879 Though the twenty-eight 
year old Bayan, an ethnic Mongol, was to prove himself a distinguished 
soldier-statesman serving the Yuan,880 that he was urgently requested 
by Qubilai because he was desperately needed to energise the campaign 
against the Southern Sung is less likely than that Qubilai recognised 
Bayan’s qualities on his arrival.881  
Rashīd al-Dīn also reports that ‘a Frankish’ mangonel-maker called 
Tālib from Baalbek and Damascus was instrumental in the capture by 
Bayan of the town of Sayan-Fu/Siangyang. Two catapult makers were 
allegedly dispatched by Abaqa to Qubilai but in view of the travelling 
difficulties and the long wait endured by Abaqa for his own accession, it 
                                       
878 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, pp. 270-271 
879 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 271 
880 On Qubilai’s death it was purportedly Bayan who stood on the steps of the 
audience hall, sword in hand and enforced the enthronement of Qubilai’s informally 
nominated successor, his grandson, Temür. See the biography of Bayan in De 
Rachewiltz, Hok-lam Chan, Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing and Geier eds. In the Service of the Khan, 
Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1993, p. 602 
881 Ibid, p. 585 
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appears far more likely that these mangonel makers were actually in 
Bayan’s party. Rashīd al-Dīn also records an incident which occurred in 
the context of the persecution of Muslims during the vizierate of the 
Buddhist Senge/Sangha (downfall 1291) in which Qubilai was alerted to 
a verse in the Qur’ān about attacking those who join other gods with 
God.....882 This warning to Qubilai to be on his guard against Muslims 
was ascribed to a letter from Abaqa (r.1265-1281) though as it had 
clearly not been seen by Qubilai before it was suddenly produced it 
could well have been a forgery.  
Another military secondment noted only in the Yuan sources was the 
dispatch of an officer, one Baiju, in 1296 by Temür Qa’an (r.1294-1307) 
to Ghāzān (r.1295-1304). It is tempting to assume that Baiju was 
bringing congratulations to Ghāzān on his accession but there is no 
mention of a decree or the accompanying symbols. Baiju returned to the 
Yuan, possibly after the Peace of 1304 but was again dispatched west in 
1313, this time to consult with Öljeitü as well as bestow honours and a 
gold seal on Bolad, who had in fact died in April 1313.883 Honours were 
also requested by Abū Sa‘īd for his beleaguered ex-regent, the Oirat 
Amir Chuban. The request seems to have been received in the Yuan in 
November 1324884 and a title, gold tablet and silver seal duly arrived in 
Iran in 1327 via the Chaghadaid and Jochid khanates.885  
Remote administration of the Hülegüid qubi and fen-ti in the Yuan and 
presumably elsewhere could be problematic. Ögödei had been 
persuaded that the recipients of his largesse might install their own 
agents or darughachi in their fen-ti but only court-appointed officials 
could actually collect the revenues and would then disburse the 
proceeds. In the early 1260s Hülegü had been involved in prolonged 
long-distance negotiations with a Chinese scholar to administer Cheng-
                                       
882 Qur’ān ix, 36 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 295 
883 Yuan Chueh, Ch’ing-jung chu-shih chi, ch. 34, p. 22b; Allsen, Culture and 
Conquest, p.77 
884 YS, ch. 29. p. 651; Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p.39 
885 Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p.39 
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te on his behalf, requiring three trans-Eurasian missions before the 
candidate was persuaded to accept the role.886 Hülegü also had worries 
over the seven thousand families of hunters and falconers which had 
been placed under his control. Arrangements were made in 1261, 
possibly at the same time as the above, for their administration but for 
unknown reasons an envoy of Abaqa’s asked in 1275 that their 
administration be undertaken by the Court. By Abū Sa‘īd’s time these 
households too had been reduced to seven hundred and eighty.887 
 
The Resupply Function 
And The Yām Network 
 
As noted earlier, Ögödei commanded that Qaraqorum be resupplied by 
five hundred wagon loads daily of food and drink.888 The Hülegüids, 
however, did not need ‘home comforts’ brought in by the wagonload 
from Mongolia since mutton broth and kumiss could be obtained in 
Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, as will be shown, the resupply function 
impinged on two key vulnerabilities, one military and the other 
sociological both deriving on the Hülegüids isolation from the Mongolian 
heartland which impacted on reinforcements for the Mongol elite. 
 
Militarily, the Türko-Mongol forces that traversed Eurasia with Hülegü 
do not appear to have been reinforced in any numbers. Whilst the 
Hülegüids could rely to some extent on enforced allies including the 
Cilician Armenians, Armenians and Georgians as well as those more 
distant such as the Karts of Herat they also raised troops locally but 
even so, all these had to be overseen by Mongol amirs. How far these 
amirs were an endangered species in Hülegüid controlled territories and 
what the rate of attrition was is not entirely clear but statistically a 
                                       
886 YS, ch.160, p. 3758; Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p.46 
887 YS, ch. 101, p. 2600; Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p.47 
888 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 62 
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thirty-year old accompanying Hülegü west in the mid-1250s would 
almost certainly be dead by Ghāzān’s accession in 1304.  
It is instructive that of those who heard Ghāzān’s last testament at the 
time of his death in 1304, sixty or so were top officials in his household 
establishment, all but ‘two or three were evidently Mongols. Only Malik 
Nasir al-Din, listed as one of the bitikchis and a certain Amir ‘Ali, an 
idachi, have non-Mongol names’.889 This does not necessarily mean that 
there were only sixty ethnic Mongols in senior positions but at the same 
time, as Ibn Khaldun pointed out when referring to the period of 
consolidation after a conquest: 
A ruler can achieve power only with the 
help of his own people. They are his group 
and his helpers in his enterprise. He uses 
them to fight against those who revolt 
against his dynasty.... They help him to 
achieve superiority. They participate in the 
government. They share in all his other 
important affairs890 
 
What is fairly obvious is that without reinforcements the supply of 
ethnic Mongol amirs was down to the reproductive capacities of those 
who either accompanied Hülegü west or were already in situ.  
To exacerbate an already conceivable dearth there was always the 
possibility of a disaffected or endangered amir absconding. Allsen 
regards such defections from the Hülegüid domains to those of the 
Mamluks’ as so common that they became institutionalized with such 
defectors known as wāfidiyya or new arrivals who were without too 
                                       
889 Charles Melville, “The Keshig in Iran: the survival of the royal Mongol Household”, 
in Linda Komaroff (ed.), Beyond the Legacy of Genghis Khan, Leiden 2006, pp. 135-64. 
p. 153 
890 Ibn Khaldūn, (tr. F. Rosenthal) The Muqaddimah, p. 146 though Ibn Khaldūn does 
go on to say that in the second stage the ruler pushes his own people away from him 
as they could challenge his power 
300 
 
much ado drafted into the Mamluk forces.891 The most dramatic exit 
occurred in 1296 under the leadership of the grandson of the Mongol 
Oirat commander Temür Buqa who had come west with Hülegü. Temür 
Buqa had not supported Ghāzān’s (r.694-703/1295-1304) succession 
and undoubtedly rightly decided that moving out of his reach to 
Mamluk territory would be wise, absconding forthwith with ‘ten 
thousand’ Oirat troops and their families.892 
Ann Lambton has noted that ‘the Mongols appear to have declined in 
number and, apart from a few groups, to have virtually disappeared in 
Persia after the fall of the Ilkhans....’ further observing that ‘the 
apparent disappearance of the Mongols’ is ‘puzzling’. 893 She is not 
entirely happy with the view of al-Umarī or Vassaf, or indeed Professor 
Cahen,894that the Mongols either assimilated to the local population or 
were absorbed by the Turkomans. Her preferred explanation is that 
once the Hülegüids cut their links with Qaraqorum ‘and frontier 
marches were established between them and the Golden Horde in the 
northwest and the Chaghadai Khanate in the east, there was little 
possibility of a replenishment of the military manpower needed to 
sustain the Mongol hegemony over Persia’.  
She also takes account of the McNeill suggestion that the plague may 
have been a factor in undermining Mongol military might since he 
wonders whether if, from the mouth of the Amur to the mouth of the 
Danube steppe nomad populations suffered population decay as a 
consequence of their new exposure to highly lethal infection’. 895 Though 
this cannot be totally discounted the Mongols were a robust lot. They 
                                       
891 Thomas T. Allsen, ‘Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia’ in Nomads of Agents 
of Cultural Change, University of Hawai’i Press, 2015, p. 127 
892 Allsen, ‘Population Movements’ p. 127.  
893 Ann K. S. Lambton, Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia: Aspects of 
Administrative, Economic and Social History, 11th-14th century, London, I. B. Tauris, 
1988, p. 24 
894 In his chapter ‘The Mongols and the Near East’ in K. M. Setton (ed.) A History of the 
Crusades, ii. 720 
895 W. H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples, 1970, p. 178 
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mainly suffered, as far as medical disorders can be identified, from 
alcoholism,896fever and what they tended to put down to ‘poisoning’ but 
which could equally have been a combination of an ailment and the 
efforts of shamans or indeed  ‘doctors’ to cure them.897 
Some ethnic Mongols are known to have successfully accomplished the 
dangerous trans-Eurasian crossing though perhaps they should not be 
regarded as ‘resupply’ as such. The most well-known is probably Bolad, 
who was a Dörben Mongol,898also  Bayan a Barin Mongol899 and Baiju, 
who seems to have been descended from Muqali.900 Bolad was expected 
to return to the Yuan but turned back because of hostilities en route 
but the others certainly did so.  They do not seem to have travelled at 
the head of large forces though they must have travelled with an escort, 
the size and composition of which is not evident. Thus one consequence 
of their extended lines of communication may have been that the 
Hülegüid self-perpetuating elite had to ensure that they indeed ‘self-
perpetuated’ – otherwise they were in danger of becoming extinct as 
indeed eventually occurred with the Hülegüids themselves. 
A further ‘resupply’ implication of their sojourn in their far-flung 
outpost is not dissimilar. As has already been noted, the Hülegüids may 
have been either short of horses or short of the right sort of horses. On 
the other hand, during the reign of Abū Sa‘īd they were shipping 
‘horses’ and ‘western’ horses to the Yuan as ‘Gifts’.901 This ‘resupply’ 
function of the strategic communications network requires further 
examination as well as more data. 
                                       
896Juvaynī remarks on Ogodei turning to wine and drunkenness to assuage his grief 
after the death of his brother Tolui (Boyle, II, p. 550)  and Rubruck has references to 
the Mongol propensity for drunkenness and their addiction to alcohol and refers to 
Möngke Khan being drunk.  See p. 77 n. 3 and p. 180, 
897 Chinggis Khan’s father was, however, almost certainly poisoned. SH paras 67 & 68 
and Ögödei actually admits to ‘secretly harming’ Doqolqu i.e. poisoning him. SH para. 
281 
898 Thomas T. Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p. 63 
899 In the Service of the Khan, p. 584 
900 Louis Hambis, Le chapitre CVIII du Yuan che; les fiefs attribués aux membres de la 
famille impériale et aux ministres de la cour mongole Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1954 p. 74 
901 Allsen, Culture and Conquest, Table 2, p. 44 
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The conclusion here is that although the Hülegüids were undoubtedly a 
regional power in western Eurasia their geopolitical situation was 
uneasy, surrounded by hostile neighbours as well as far distant from 
their Toluid allies in the Yuan. It has been argued that this isolation 
had an impact on several aspects of the Hülegüids efforts to sustain 
their rule, not only for their legitimacy, but also politically, militarily, 
economically and sociologically. 
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CHAPTER X 
 
The Yām Network: 
Security Issues - The Pax Mongolica 
 
If communications are the vital blood stream that keep governance 
running and intact, then the corollary is that the security of the 
communication arteries has to be of critical importance to rulers.  During 
the Chinggisid period there are indications in the sources that despite 
natural hazards, the hostile terrain and the vast distances, their extended 
network was safe and secure for travellers and thus by inference was 
securely functioning for reasons of state. Such a conclusion is generally 
based on three authorities. Balducci Pegolotti, in his merchant’s handbook 
written around 1335 famously remarked that the route between Tana and 
Khitai was secure, thus Il cammino d’andare dalla Tana al Gattaio è 
sicurissimo e di e di note secondo che si conta per li mercatanti che l’anno 
usato....902  
Seventy years or so earlier Juvaynī harked back – albeit with some 
hyperbole – to the latter part of the reign of Chinggis Khan (d.1227), 
remarking that he had brought about ‘complete peace and quiet, 
security and tranquillity, and had achieved the extreme of prosperity 
and well-being; the roads were secure and disturbances 
allayed....903Moreover, Juvaynī also mentions that Chaghadai had 
brought security to travellers, since his followers, for fear of his yasa 
and punishment  were so well disciplined that during his reign ‘no 
travellers, so long as he was near his army, had need of guard or patrol 
on any stretch of road...’.904  On the evidence of these authorities there 
                                       
902 Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, La Practica della Mercatura, tr. Allan Evans 1936  
903 Juvaynī/Boyle I, p.77 
904 Juvaynī/Boyle I, p.272 
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would seem to be no doubt that the security and tranquillity of the Yām 
network had been assured. 
There is, however, a problem with these assurances. What will be 
immediately noted is that they refer to periods over a hundred years 
apart. Thus the period between 1227, or the death of Chinggis Khan, 
and the demise of Abū Sa‘īd in 1335, which is the period popularly 
thought of as the Pax Mongolica, is excluded. This lacuna is critical 
since these years not only cover the entire Hülegüid period in which 
Sino-Iranian relations were re-established but also those of the intra-
Chinggisid conflicts. It will be argued that the security of the roads 
linking the Hülegüids to the Yuan was most certainly not assured.  
Moreover, since there is a close association between ‘security’ and the 
alleged Pax Mongolica, it will be further argued that the concept of a Pax 
Mongolica is misconceived. 
***************** 
Provenance of the Term Pax Mongolica 
Since the idea of a Pax Mongolica with its connotations of untrammelled 
communication and exchange has become almost as emblematic of the 
Chinggisid conquests as their reputation for ‘rivers of blood’ it is proposed 
to briefly examine here its antecedents as well as the elements which are 
generally thought to underpin such a ‘Pax’. 
The expression Pax Mongolica has a distinguished provenance as well as a 
somewhat indeterminate ancestry since the first use of the term has 
proved elusive. More importantly, perhaps, it has carried with it into the 
twenty-first century a certain amount of ‘historical baggage’. What is 
proposed here is to test the apparently perfectly reasonable assumptions 
implied by the term ‘Pax’ in the Mongol context.  
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Before turning to the critical examination of these contending 
perceptions it may be constructive to look briefly at the distinguished 
antecedents of this ‘label’. 
The Pax Romana/Pax Augustae and the Gates of War 
The provenance of the term originates in ancient Rome. There, the 
Temple of Janus in the Forum had doors at both ends, named the 
Gates of War, which remained open when Rome was at war and closed 
when Rome was at peace.905 Before the time of the first Roman 
Emperor, Caesar Augustus (44 BCE-14 CE) they had only been closed 
twice since the foundation of the city, remaining open at one time for 
four hundred years until they were closed after the First Punic War in 
235 BCE but reopening again eight years later. Augustus records in his 
autobiographical Res Gestae Divi Augusti that the Gates of War had 
been closed on three occasions during his rule, in 29 and 25 BCE and 
again at an unknown date but possibly 7 BCE.906    
This closure was celebrated in Augustus’s lifetime by the magnificent 
altar of the Ara Pacis Augustae. Some scholars such as Arnaldo 
Momigliano have noted that the message of the Ara Pacis Augustae is 
more complex than that of the closing of the Gates of War since it also 
incorporated Greek ideals of peace as prosperity and fecundity, neither 
of which Augustus in fact explicitly claimed to have brought to Rome in 
his Res Gestae.907 These in reality came about because the ‘peace’ was 
underpinned by a complex set of legal, economic and cultural processes 
some of which were instigated by Augustus.908 This period outlasted the 
first Emperor, continuing for upwards of 200 years, that is from 27 BCE 
to the death of Marcus Aurelius in 180 CE. Thus the ‘Augustan Peace’, 
which was to transmogrify into the Pax Romana, was predicated on 
                                       
905 Res Gestae Divi Augusti, eds. Brunt and Moore, para 13 and notes pp. 54-55 
906 Res Gestae Divi Augusti, eds. Brunt and Moore, para 13 
907 Arnaldo Momigliano, ‘The Peace of the Ara Pacis’ Journal of the Warburg and 
Courtauld Institutes, Vol. 5 (1942), pp. 228-231.  
908 In fact he spent much of his wealth in bailing out the treasury. Res Gestae Divi 
Augusti, eds. Brunt and Moore, paras. 17 and 18 p.27 
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pacification both internally and externally - ‘to spare the conquered and 
vanquish the proud in war’909 as well as crushing internal dissidence. It 
also came to incorporate the Greek ideals of peace as prosperity but at 
the same time was also dependent on traditional Roman ‘mores’910 or 
customs.  
 
The Altar Ara Pacis Augusta 
 
Whilst the first use of the term Pax Romana has been traced to the 
writing of Seneca the Younger911 in 55 CE it was Edward Gibbon in his 
immense History of the Decline and the Fall of the Roman Empire912 who 
described the Pax at some length and he constantly refers to public 
peace, universal peace and so on. In the meantime, the first use of the 
term Pax Mongolica has eluded discovery. It may well be that the 
cessation of hostilities between the branches of the Imperial Family as 
relayed by Öljeitü in a letter to Philip the Fair of France in 1304/1305 
was the origin of the term amongst Western scholars.913   
 
                                       
909 Virgil, Aen,VI, 853, parcere subiectis et debellare superbos quoted in Res Gestaei, 
Brunt and Moore, p.41 
910 Res Gestae Divi Augusti, eds. Brunt and Moore para 8, p. 23 
911 Omnes considera gentes in quibus Romana pax desinit ........... 
912 Edward Gibbon, intro. D. Womersley. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman 
Empire…Penguin Classics 1995 
913 Mostaert, Antoine, and Cleaves, Francis Woodman, Les Lettres de 1289 et 1305 des 
Ilkhan Arγun et Ölĵeitü à Philippe le bel. 1962 
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The Pax Mongolica:  
A Period of Peace, Security and Prosperity? 
 
The association between ‘Peace’ as in the absence of insecurity, with 
prosperity has continued to be central to the concept of a ‘Pax’. Thus 
Warwick Ball argues that the Pax Kushanacae (2nd century BCE – 3rd 
century CE) was also a period that saw an enormous upsurge in 
prosperity and stability.914 Moreover, statements such as those of 
Pegolotti above on the security of the roads seem to have caught the 
imagination both of historians of trade and world systems and some 
historians of communication and exchange since it is implied that the 
Chinggisid period offered similar benefits to those of the earlier ‘Pax’.   
 
Of the ‘contact and exchange’ historians, Dru Gladney, writing under 
the auspices of the Silk Road Heritage Foundation, asserts that 
‘Throughout the period of Mongol rule the region prospered as an 
important overland trade center in the midst of the peace insured by the 
Pax Mongolica’.915 For their part, Komaroff and Carboni argue that for 
over a century, the Mongols created a unique opportunity for an 
unrestricted cultural exchange.916 
Such a view is also pervasive amongst trade and commerce historians. 
The general tenor of these latter is summarised by a comment in 
Findlay and O’Rourke. They argue that ‘despite competition and conflict 
between the components of the empire as a whole, particularly the 
Golden Horde and the Ilqans, there was a reality to the Pax Mongolica  
since the Mongols always wanted to encourage trade and the routes 
across Central Asia were safer and busier than previously or 
subsequently’.917 This view is echoed by Virgil Ciocîltan in his The 
                                       
914 Warwick Ball: The Monuments of Afghanistan, History, Archaeology and 
Architecture.  London, New York, I. B. Tauris, 2008, p. 80 
915 Dru Gladney, ‘Xinjiang: China’s Pre-and Post-Modern Crossroad’  Silk Road, Vol. 3.1 
916 Linda Komaroff & Stafano Carboni, The Legacy of Genghis Khan, p. 7 
917 Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and Plenty, Trade, War and the World Economy in the 
Second Millennium p.106;  Janet Abū-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World 
System AD 1250-1350; 
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Mongols and the Black Sea Trade where he remarks that 
‘transcontinental trade developed at this time at a dizzying rate’918 not 
least because the Pax Mongolica was indispensible to the safety of 
foreign travellers.  Even more extravagant claims for the Pax Mongolica 
are made by William Bernstein, a ‘financial theorist and historian’ who 
claims that for about a century, beginning around 1260 after the 
conquests of Chinggis Qan’s grandchildren and ending with the 
dissolution of Mongol dynasties from internal strife and the plague, the 
Silk Road lay unobstructed. He goes on to observe that large numbers of 
Europeans and Muslims exploited this relatively brief opportunity to 
shuttle with ease between China and the West.919  
 
The economic benefits of Chinggisid rule are outside the remit of this 
work, since trade, though critical for the financial health of a polity, is 
not easy to quantify from the scattered references in the sources.920 
Moreover, there is strong evidence that the bulk of Sino-Iranian trade 
during the Chinggisid period took to the high seas921rather than 
following the overland routes which are of interest here.  It also seems 
that for those who followed Hülegü west there is little sign that the 
‘profits of empire’ were cascaded down since there are references to the 
dire economic straits in which some such Mongols found themselves in 
the Hülegüid domains.922   
 
                                       
918 Virgil Ciocîltan, The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade in the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Centuries, Leiden and Boston, Brill, 2014, p. 2 and p. 32 
919 William Bernstein, A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World, p. 91; 
920 Even Ciocîltan in his The Mongols and the Black Sea Trade accepts that 
‘examination of the sources leads to an inescapable conclusion: the volume of trade-
related information is far too small to allow any scholar to write a ‘compact’ history of 
trade in the Mongol period.’ p. 5. 
921 Not only commerce but travellers too, see section on after the Peace of 1304 below. 
Hyunhee Park has argued persuasively for the maritime routes in Mapping the Chinese 
and Islamic Worlds.  
922 Sneath remarks that not all Mongol commoners benefited from the profits of empire 
and often found themselves so impoverished they had to sell their children to meet 
their obligations. The Headless State, p. 165 
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The Period of ‘Empire’ 
 
Together with the elements of peace and prosperity in the concept of 
Pax is the unwritten assumption that it takes an ‘Empire’ to achieve 
this desirable state of affairs. Empire, in this context is defined as a 
supreme political power over several countries exercised by a single 
authority. This definition, however, poses a problem when considering 
the exact period of the Chinggisid Imperium since not all members of 
the Imperial Family recognised a ‘single authority’ in the person of the 
Qa’an after the contentious elevation of Möngke to the Qa’anate in 
1251. This situation was further aggravated by challenges to the 
authority of his successor, Qubilai. 
 
What is today in Mongolia referred to as the Ikh (Great) Mongol Empire 
was declared as such by Chinggis Khan in 1206 but at that time the 
extent was barely the area of what is now sometimes referred to as 
(Outer) Mongolia. At the death of the Great Qa’an Möngke in 1259, the 
extent consisted of more or less directly dominated territory which 
reached from Azerbaijan in Western Asia to Northern China but did not 
include the whole of present day China, which was not completely 
conquered until 1279.  
 
Though Möngke had sons923 his death precipitated a major rift in the 
Toluid camp when his two brothers who had remained in Eastern 
Eurasia, Qubilai and Arïq Böke, contested the succession. This painful 
episode was eventually resolved in favour of Qubilai, whose focus under 
his older brother had been China. Qubilai moved the centre of gravity to 
Dadu when the denotation changed and this period is known in 
Mongolia today under the dynastic title chosen by Qubilai in 1271 of 
‘Yuan’ though the Toluids were effectively in control between 1260 and 
1368. This understandable error of judgement of Qubilai’s was one of 
                                       
923 Baltu pre-deceased his father and Ürüngtash and Asutai declared for Arïq Böke 
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the factors in diminishing the control of the Qa’an over recalcitrant 
members of other branches of the Imperial Family. Thus Biran notes 
that at the quriltai of the Ögödeid, Chaghadaid and Jochid dissidents in 
1268924 Baraq referred to Qubilai as a “regional” Khan ruling in the 
east, effectively reducing Qubilai to being one khan amongst many, 
albeit a particularly powerful one. 
Moreover, under the Yuan the Mongolian steppe gradually became 
marginalised,925 whilst the ‘Empire’ fractured into separate, more or less 
autonomous Khanates. The major khanates included the Yuan and that 
of the Hülegüids, both ruled by descendants of Chinggis Khan’s 
youngest son Tolui; the Jochid Khanate, ruled by descendants of his 
eldest son Jochi, and the Chaghadaid Khanate, ruled by descendants of 
his second son, Chaghadai. The dispossessed Ögödeid descendent, 
Qaidu, fought back to re-establish the Ögödeid inheritance and 
effectively controlled a fifth khanate. There were also at the beginning of 
Qubilai’s reign lesser khanates including areas under the control of 
descendants of Chinggis Khan’s half-brothers in Manchuria.  Qubilai’s 
grandson Ananda, apparently firmly ensconced in his ulus in the old 
Tangut domains, was to all intents and purposes a khan. As Rashīd al-
Dīn points out, even though Qubilai’s ministers were ostensibly in 
charge in Ananda’s ulus, not much of the revenue reached the Divan 
but was expended on Ananda’s armed forces.926  
 
In terms of endurance, however, the Hülegüids were the first to fall by 
the wayside with the death of Abū Sa’īd in 1335 without issue.  The 
Great Pivot held on until 1368 when the Yuan in East Asia fell to the 
Ming dynasty; with those Mongol Yuan elite who could do so trotting 
                                       
924 Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State, pp.27-28 
925 Masson Smith, ‘From Pasture to Manger’, notes that the Yuan had not been able to 
abolish the pasture based Five Aymaqs that had provided tammachi garrisons in 
China since Chinggis’ time and which still retained their links with Mongolia. They 
were the only forces that managed to retreat to the homeland in 1368. p.73 
926 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, pp. 325-326 
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briskly back to the steppe. In Mongolia today this subsequent post-
Yuan period is referred to as the Northern Yuan.  
In the terms of the definition above, therefore, the period from 1206 
to 1260 is the period of ‘Empire’ rather than the fall of the Yuan in 
1368. This means that the actual period of the Imperium under a 
supreme single recognised authority was barely fifty-four years. In his 
pithy article on the ‘Decline and Fall of the Mongol Empire’927 David 
Morgan agrees with Peter Jackson’s central message in his influential 
article on ‘the Dissolution of the Mongol Empire’928 that the Mongol 
Empire dissolved around the year 1260. Whilst there continued to be 
a Great Khan his writ did not ‘run the length and breadth of the 
Mongol Empire’ which thus ceased to be a ‘unitary state ruled from a 
central capital by a paramount emperor and his governmental 
machine’.929 This, to all intents and purposes, agrees with the 
definition of empire above.  Morgan also makes the point that, 
paradoxically, this was twenty years before it reached its greatest 
geographical extent after the definitive conquest of the Southern 
Sung.   
In comparison to other conquest dynasties in Central Eurasia in the 
first and early second millennium, the Sāmānids sustained their 
dominion for almost two hundred years, from 204-395/819-1005; the 
loosely federated Qarakhānids, with centres in Samarkand, 
Balasaghun and Kashghar, staved off destruction and decline for 
slightly longer, from 382-609/992-1212 when they were defeated by 
the Khwārazmshah. A similar length of time was achieved by the 
Ghaznavids, from 366/977 until they were conquered by the Ghurids 
in 582/1186. The Great Seljūqs from Toghril I in 431/1040 to the 
defeat of Toghril III by the Khwārazmshah in 1194 rather less at just 
                                       
927 David Morgan, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Mongol Empire’, Journal of the Royal 
Asiatic Society, Third Series, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Oct., 2009) p. 429 
928 Peter Jackson, ‘The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire’, Central Asiatic Journal, 22 
(1978), pp. 186-244 
929 Morgan, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Mongol Empire’ p. 429 
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over one hundred and fifty years, though the Seljūqs of Rum held on 
for longer, from 473-707/1081-1307. The two Türkmen ‘sheep’ 
dynasties, the Black, Qara Qoyunlu (752-874/1351-1469) occupying 
much of the territory of the late Hülegüids and the somewhat under-
appreciated White, or Aq Qoyunlu (798-914/1396-1508) also 
dominated much of the same area, each for just over a hundred 
years. 
The Mongols were not entirely alone in lacking endurance.  Thus the 
Ghurids, who conquered the Ghaznavids in 582/1186, were in turn 
conquered by the Khwārazmshah in 611-12/1214-1216. The 
Ma’mūnids of Gurgānj, who were patrons of Ibn Sīnā and al-Tha’alibi 
and a predecessor dynasty of Khwārazmshah Muhammad flourished 
from 385/995 until conquered by Mahmūd of Ghazna, in 408/1017, 
barely twenty-two years.  The meteoric and highly destructive expansion 
of the Khwārazmshahs, under Muhammad, from his conquest of the 
Ghurids in 582/1186 to the demise of his son in 1220, only lasted for a 
tumultuous thirty-four years.  
Whilst the Chinggisid controlled domains were of rather vaster expanse 
than some of the more compact empires in Eurasia, when considered in 
purely longevity terms, the Mongol ‘Empire’ under a single authority 
was clearly in the second division.  
The Mongols and ‘Peace’ 
If the period of the Empire is thus regarded as being between 1206 and 
1260, this period must arguably be the period of the Pax Mongolica.  
‘Pax’ however, has many connotations over and above that of the 
absence of war including those of concord, lawfulness or non-violence, 
all of which were implicit in the Pax Augustae and in the Roman case 
were underpinned by Roman ‘mores’ or customs and culture. ‘Culture’ 
unfortunately is also a particularly contentious concept in academic 
circles today, and has evolved in recent years to include a body of 
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sophisticated revisionist work. This recognises culture as a ‘‘a sphere of 
practical activity shot through by wilful action, power relations, 
struggle, contradiction and change.’ 930 Modern anthropological studies 
have shown that even societies deemed ‘simple’ and tribal are highly 
mutable, full of internal ruptures and power struggles and made by 
borrowings from outside as well as internal drives. Such 
characterizations have a deep resonance in the context of the ‘simple’ 
Mongols and their conquests. 
 
The Mongols’ approach to the idea of ‘peace’ was closely aligned with 
their imperial mission in that they had a heavenly inspired manifest 
destiny to conquer and rule the world.931 Rulers who had not yet 
submitted unconditionally were in rebellion and had to be punished 
through conquest or coerced submission. It would seem to follow that if 
peace means the absence of conflict, then the Mongols technically could 
not be at peace until they had conquered every polity in the world. If 
this view is accepted, then the only circumstances in which the Mongols 
could ‘Close the Gates of War’ and thereby achieve a Pax Mongolica was 
if there was no-one left to submit. Ergo, by this count alone there could 
not have been a Pax Mongolica. 
 
Moreover, during the reigns of Ögödei, Güyüg and Möngke, ‘peace’ 
defined as the non-existence of war, was conspicuous by its absence. 
On the other hand, this may well have been the peak of prosperity for 
the Mongol elite as Ögödei in particular was a khan of the old school 
who appreciated that his position required the distribution of the profits 
of empire to the Mongol elite and beyond as Juvaynī records in some 
                                       
930 Patrick Walker, Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes, London, 
Hurst & Co. 2009, pp. 14-15 
931 Those who have discussed this include De Rachewiltz, “Some Remarks on the 
Ideological Foundations of Chingis Khan’s Empire,” Papers in Far Eastern History 7, 
(1973), 21-36;  Allsen, Mongol Imperialism (Berkeley, 1987). Reuven Amitai, ‘Mongol 
Imperial Ideology and the Ilkhanid War’ in Mongols in the Islamic Lands, Ashgate, 
Variorum, XII esp. pp. 62-63 
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detail.932 It could thus be argued that for the Mongols, if not for the 
conquered peoples, Ögödei’s and then Güyüg’s short reign were a period 
of ‘abundance’ if not of ‘fecundity’.  
 
Pax and the Extended Lines of Communication 
 
In strategic terms, especially in relation to the communication network, 
Möngke’s elevation was a tipping point since his authority was not 
accepted by important elements within the Ögödeid and Chaghadaid 
uluses. This unleashed a period of ‘internal ruptures and power 
struggles’ as in the anthropological definition above. A first-hand 
account of what it was like to be caught up in such succession disputes 
is that of Ye-lu Hi Liang, the great-grandson of Chinggis Khan’s and 
Ögödei’s minister, Ye-lu Ch’u tsai.933 His career graphically illustrates 
the vulnerabilities both of those who served the Mongols as well as the 
communications network. In the meantime, as these ruptures have 
been extensively examined by scholars934it is not proposed here to give 
a blow by blow account of every confrontation but to tabulate the 
location of the main hostilities. These can be found the Table in the 
Appendices on Military operations during the period of intra-Chinggisid 
conflict the aim of which is to provide some indication of the extent of 
dislocation to strategic communications. 
Hostilities do not necessarily and inexorably lead to a cessation of 
communication and contact since there may be alternative routes or 
pauses in the intensity of the conflict. There is, however, clear evidence 
that during this forty-year period the overland communication network 
                                       
932 Juvaynī/Boyle I, p. 188, 201-202 ff.  
933 Ye-lu Hi Liang, tr. Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches I, pp. 157-163 
934 See especially Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State; Lane, 
Early Mongol Rule; Rossabi in his Khublai Khan devotes very little space to the 
internecine warfare. 
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was at times severely interdicted on all the main routes between east 
and west.  
The most authoritative references substantiating such a conclusion are 
from the Hülegüid west whilst important confirmation of the difficulties 
of communication comes from the Yuan at the opposite side of Eurasia.  
Firstly, in his capacity as vizier, Rashīd al-Dīn should have been one of 
the best informed members of Court his information is patchy. Thus he 
was able to give a thorough account of the activities of the 
aforementioned Ananda, the Islamisation of those he ruled and his 
relations with his grandfather, Qubilai as well as the influence of 
Ghāzān on his young relative.935 On the other hand, whilst Rashīd al-
Dīn was clearly aware of the enthronement of Qubilai’s grandson, 
Temür, which took place in 1294, he nonetheless remarks, apparently 
before the death Temür in 1307 that: 
Temür had many wives and concubines 
in his ordos but on account of the great 
distance and the closure of the roads the 
names of all of them have not so far 
been ascertained.936  
 
The second reference from the Hülegüid west is contained in the famous 
letter from Öljeitü to Philip IV (The Fair) of France where he says that 
the communication network had been reconnected.937 The third of these 
references is contained in the first letter of John of Monte Corvino 
(1247-1328) first Roman Catholic archbishop of Dadu who left Tabriz in 
1291 travelling east by sea via India arriving in the Yuan in 1293. 
Twelve years later, in January 1305, he wrote somewhat despondently 
to his Order back in Europe:  
                                       
935 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, pp. 323-326 
936 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle, p. 319 emphasis added 
937 Mostaert and Cleaves, Les Lettres de 1289 et 1305, 1962 
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As for the road hither I may tell you that 
the way through the land of the Goths, 
subject to the Emperor of the Northern 
Tartars, is the shortest and safest; and 
by it the friars might come, along with 
the letter-carriers, in five or six months. 
The other route again is very long and 
very dangerous, involving two sea-
voyages; . . . But, on the other hand, the 
first-mentioned route has not been open 
for a considerable time, on account of 
wars that have been going on.  
It is twelve years since I have had any 
news of the Papal court, or of our Order, 
or of the state of affairs generally in the 
west. . . . (i.e. since 1293)938 
There are also hints in the sources of the difficulties such obstacles 
to communication caused. Mention has already been made of Abaqa’s 
five year wait for the affirmation of his accession from Qubilai, which 
only just made it to through the hostilities to him in 1270. Five years 
later Qubilai was clearly in the dark over events in Central Eurasia 
since he demanded that both Baraq, the Chaghadaid Khan and 
Qaidu send back to him the pa’izas that he had conferred on them, 
evidently not knowing that Baraq had died four years earlier in 
1271.939   
As can be seen from the table, there was intense activity in the 1270s in 
Transoxiana where even before the attack on Bukhārā in 1276 by the 
sons of Alghu and Baraq which devastated all of Transoxania for seven 
years, the region had been unstable. By 1274 Yuan forces were involved 
in a further theatre of operations in the Tarim Basin which caused 
serious problems for Rabban Bar Sauma and his companion Markos 
travelling from Dadu westwards in 1278 hoping to reach Jerusalem. 
                                       
938 Yule, Cathay and the Way Thither, I, p. 200-201 
939 Yuan shih, 8/160; Biran, Qaidu and the Rise of the Independent Mongol State, p. 39 
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Their journey was particularly fraught since like the Polos, travelling 
east, they opted for the Southern Taklamakan route via Khotan and 
Kashgar. The party were stranded in Khotan for six months because 
war was then raging between Qubilai and the Ögodeid prince Hoqu. 
Rabban Bar Sauma laments that ‘the caravan roads and ways had been 
cut, grain was scarce and could not be found and many died of hunger 
and perished through want’.940 Escaping from Khotan they reached 
Kashgar, ‘and they saw that the city was empty of its inhabitants, 
because it had been already plundered by the enemy’.941  
Known Successful Traverses of Eurasia  
during the Intra Chinggisid Conflicts 
 
 
On the other hand, some travellers did make it through the maelstrom 
of internecine warfare between the Yuan, the Jochids and Hüleguids . 
In the mid-1260s there was a mission from Dadu to Tabriz under the 
command of Sartaq Noyan and ‘Abd al-Rahmān who returned with 
Bayan and possibly two mangonel makers. Abaqa’s emissary to Qubilai 
in the same period took five years for the return trip after which there 
was a pause in missions for ‘Reasons of State’ until the mid 1280s when 
Bolad and Isā kelemichi had a hazardous journey from Dadu to Tabriz. 
Only Isā made it back to Dadu as Bolad had to turn back to Tabriz. Also 
in the mid-1280s Arghun dispatched three emissaries to request a bride 
who arrived safely but his bride had to return by sea. In 1296 Baiju was 
seconded to Ghazan by Temür Qa’an though whether he travelled by 
sea or overland is unclear though Ghāzān sent his 1297 mission by sea. 
 
Rabban Bar Sauma was one of the few travellers who are known to have 
attempted to traverse Eurasia during this unsettled period who were not 
travelling for ‘Reasons of State’. Also travelling in the 1270s but as 
emissaries and in the opposite direction were the Polos. Despite some 
                                       
940 Rabban Bar Sauma, Sir W Budge, trans. Monks of Kublai Khan, Emperor of China 
Ch. I p. 139 
941 Rabban Bar Sauma/Budge Ch I, p. 139 
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scholarly sceptics, the consensus is increasingly that the second trip to 
the Yuan by the senior Polos, this time taking along the young Marco 
did occur, even if there are some anomalies in Marco’s memory of his 
sojourn in China. He, his father and uncle were making their way back 
to Qubilai also via the southern Taklamakan route having given up 
trying to reach the Yuan via ship. According to Marco, their journey 
took them a good three and a half years probably arriving at Shang-tu 
in May 1275942 thus slightly ahead of Hoqu’s devastation of the 
Southern Tarim which may account for Marco’s glowing account of the 
region. 
 
********** 
From this examination of the Pax Mongolica and the purported security 
of the roads which reputedly facilitated ease of communication two 
conclusions in particular stand out.  Perhaps unsurprisingly the most 
far-reaching is that at no time during the Chinggisid period did they 
slam shut the Gates of War and usher in a time of peace, fecundity and 
secure communications. For much of the period between Juvaynī’s 
comment about the security of the roads and that of Pegolotti the trans-
Eurasian routes were impeded by the intra-Chinggisid hostilities.  
Secondly is that the corollary of hostilities adding to the already 
considerable dangers of travel there is little hard evidence of large 
numbers of travellers shuttling with ease between China and the West 
as was seen in the previous chapter on contacts between the Hülegüid 
west and the Yuan east.943  
 
The best that could be said is that the period when strategic 
communications were least impeded was during the reigns of Ögödei, 
                                       
942 This was partly because of the bad weather they encountered and just possibly 
because of a year-long sojourn in Kan-chou (Campichu) in Tangut where ‘Messer 
Maffeo and Messer Marco Polo’ were on a ‘mission’ (I, p. 220) or ‘business’ (I, p. 223, 
note 5) though when this mission occurred is not evident from the text. 
943 William Bernstein, A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World, p. 91; 
319 
 
Güyüg and Möngke, thus a shaky case could be made for a Pax 
Ögödeid. There would, however, be the inevitable comparisons with the 
Pax Augustae. Even the most ardent admirer of Ögödei would be hard 
pressed to argue that the four proudest achievements in his own Res 
Gestae Divi Ögödei as enunciated in the Secret History viz: destroying 
the people of north China, setting up relay stations, having wells dug 
and establishing scouts and garrison troops among the people of the 
cities944 - stand with those of the Emperor Augustus in the Res Gestae 
Divi Augusti. 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that on multiple levels the term Pax 
Mongolica is misconceived. As Denis Sinor has starkly pointed out, 
neither the Turkic nor the Mongol languages have generic terms for war 
or peace.945   It is thus difficult to argue with Franke’s judgement that 
‘like so many historical tags, this is a statement that loses much of its 
seemingly incontrovertible truth when one considers the historical 
facts’.946 Morgan concurs with Franke’s further view, with which it is 
also difficult to disagree, that ‘it seems as if the Pax Mongolica is no 
more than one of those brilliant simplifications that can serve as 
chapter titles for world history books’. 
Demolishing the idea of a Pax Mongolica, however, is only half the 
battle. The important issue is how far the hostilities and interdiction in 
communication caused complications for the Hülegüids and this will be 
addressed in the concluding chapter.  
 
 
 
                                       
944 SH, para 281 
945 Denis Sinor, ‘The Inner Asian Warriors’ Journal of the American Oriental Society, 
vol. 101, No. 2 (April-June 1981) p. 135 
946 H. Franke, ‘Sino-Western Contacts under the Mongol Empire’ Ch. VII in China 
under Mongol Rule. 
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Chapter XI 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The chosen perspective here has been that of strategic communication 
between the two ancient civilizations of Iran and China. That the 
antiquity of such relations was acknowledged even in the Mongol period 
is shown by a comment in 1263 by Liu Yu, author of Chang Te’s 
account of his mission from Möngke Qa’an to Hülegü in 1259. Whilst 
Liu Yu gives full recognition to the trail-blazing achievements of Zhang 
Qian in the inception of relations between China and the Si yu, ‘the 
countries of the west’, during the reign of Han Wudi, there is an 
emphasis on continuity as well as change. Thus Liu notes that though 
‘the countries, their mountains and rivers, have up to our days been the 
same; but as those times belong to remote antiquity, the names of the 
countries have changed and it is difficult to inquire into their political 
changes’. 947 
The geopolitical changes to which Liu referred were the relentless 
procession of conquest dynasties of which the most recent to devour 
vast swathes of Eurasia was that of Chinggis Khan and his 
descendants. The transience of such empires, whose domains were held 
through the widely understood principle of Macht geht vor Recht, was 
acknowledged by the Seljūq vizier, Nizām al-Mulk in his comment that 
‘the government will change and pass from one house to another’.  
As Ibn Khaldūn observed in his study of the seemingly revolving door of 
conquest dynasties, not only defence and protection of the community 
from its enemies948 should be amongst the top priorities of a ruler but 
also maintaining the security of the roads.949 An interdiction of 
                                       
947 Chang Te, Si Shi Ki,  Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches  I, p. 155  
948 Ibn Khaldūn, 1969.p.5 
949 Ibn Khaldūn, 1969. 189 
321 
 
communications could impinge on the circulation of the profits of 
empire whether in the form of taxes or tribute or embassies bearing 
gifts as well as on the market place if merchants were unable to obtain 
their merchandise, whether luxury goods, raw materials or foodstuffs to 
the detriment of the ruler’s finances.  
It has been argued here that Hülegü and his successors indeed faced 
not only some of these difficulties but also other pressing challenges 
that complicated their efforts to remain in the saddle. The most crucial 
of these were the somewhat shaky foundations on which their 
legitimacy rested, that is, by what right they exercised their authority. 
Whilst Macht geht vor Recht was a perfectly adequate basis for 
command and control over subject populations, it was less so when it 
came to rivals for the succession. It was also a deeply troubling factor 
for their non-Toluid relatives that the Toluid tenure in the west and east 
was not by the dispensation of Chinggis Khan. Thus in this sense, in 
Chinggisid terms, the Hülegüid takeover of Azerbaijan and the Yuan 
occupation of China, both considered ‘collegiate’ territory  to be 
administered for the benefit of all the imperial family, was unlawful. 
The most that could be concluded then is that the extended lines of 
communication may have been an aggravating issue so far as 
succession in the Hülegüid west until the accession of Ghāzān was 
concerned. As Abaqa found, five years is a long time to wait to be 
confirmed in the rulership but as the last three Hülegüid rulers 
dispensed with this affirmation from the Qa’an for a number of possible 
reasons over and above the distance time, this latter would appear to 
have been a complicating factor only for Hülegü’s immediate 
successors.  
This was not their only headache. They also had to contend with 
hostile neighbours, lack of access to the profits of empire, intra-
familial confrontations, problems of reinforcement and a far distant 
overlord making the Chinggisid custom of consultation well-nigh 
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impossible. This latter may have been one of the more challenging 
issues for the Hülegüids in view of Möngke’s strictures on 
consultation on vital imperial matters. Thus when Qubilai removed 
the centre of gravity to Dadu, their overlord was 5,000 miles/8,000 
kilometres distant across inhospitable and hostile terrain. This over-
reach was exacerbated not only by the limited technology available 
and the nature of the hazards on both the overland and the 
alternative maritime routes but also by internecine strife within the 
imperial family which further endangered already vulnerable 
communications.  
 
It was argued that such considerations had potentially serious 
repercussions for the imperial family's tradition of command, control 
and consultation This not only meant that consultation, requests, 
responses and news may have been overtaken by events by the time 
the emissaries returned but also complicated the distribution to them 
of the ‘Profits of Empire’. As has been seen, the Hülegüids had to wait 
upwards of fifty years for their accrued income from their holdings in 
the Yuan to arrive from the China. In this context, what is 
particularly interesting is that after the economic crises of Ghāzān’s 
reign Öljeitü was able to put in hand an extensive building and 
infrastructure programme.  
 
Data on the degree of contact and consultation between the Yuan and 
the Hülegüid west has been set out in the Table on Travellers and 
Routes. It should be acknowledged that whilst this may well be a 
serious distortion of the actual position, taken with the data in the 
Table on the dates and location of hostilities a cautious conclusion is 
that Hülegüid-Yuan relations until the 1320s, that is the reign of Abū 
Sa‘īd, were unexpectedly limited. The main burst of consultative contact 
occurred during the Arïq Böke crisis in the early 1260s.  
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A reason put forward here for this seemingly sparse interaction is that 
the extended lines of communication did indeed complicate the 
consultative process. The fastest journey of which there is a record is 
that of Chang Te who took only seventy-four days from Qaraqorum to 
the Caspian in 1259 and then a further unspecified time to reach 
Hülegü in Tabriz. Six months for a return trip, providing there were no 
crises en route, was not a recipe for efficient administration, 
particularly if counter-responses were required. Neither is there any 
evidence of enthusiasm to make the journey east from the Hülegüid 
domains and no Hülegüid prince is known to have made the journey to 
visit his relatives in Dadu. 
 
There was thus an inherent dynamic within the rulership of distant 
outposts towards self-governance. ‘Autonomy’ should not, however, be 
confused with ‘sovereignty’ and as will be immediately recognised, there 
is a serious problem with the Chinggisid experience. The definition of 
‘Empire’ in the section on the Pax Mongolica, was that ‘it was supreme 
political power over several countries exercised by a single authority’. It 
was argued that this definition posed a problem when considering the 
exact period of the Chinggisid Imperium since not all members of the 
Imperial Family recognised a ‘single authority’ in the person of the 
Qa’an after the contentious elevation of Möngke to the Qa’anate in 
1251. This situation was further aggravated by challenges to the 
authority of his successor, Qubilai. The Hülegüids, however, did not 
challenge Qubilai. The response time involved in contact with the Yuan 
may have inhibited the consultative process, meaning that the 
Hülegüids were in effect self-governing but their recognition of Qubilai 
and his successors as Qa’an mean that the Hülegüids were not 
‘sovereign’.   Arguably, what held the Chinggisid endeavour together, 
even at its most fractious, is what Ibn Khaldūn calls ‘asabīyah,  that is, 
group consciousness or perhaps more fittingly, ‘corporate spirit’. 
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Contact, however spasmodic, naturally requires the means, hence the 
examination of the options, complications and limitations implicit in 
communication networks such as the Chinggisid Yām in the context of 
the widening geo-political and geographical horizons of the Mongols. It 
was argued that the Mongols did not open up the trans-Eurasian routes 
but that the Yām network followed the ancient pathways that had been 
opened up a millennium beforehand. Moreover, whilst it is not possible 
to prove beyond all reasonable doubt, there is no real evidence that 
relays of tough couriers galloped bags of mail from Yām to Yām across 
Eurasia.  
 
Thus the conclusion here is that the Chinggisid communication 
network was not a relay courier postal service. It appears to have 
operated not dissimilarly from that of the Roman cursus publicus which, 
as noted, Kolb forcefully argues was an ‘infrastructure’ for use by state 
officials and which had three purposes, also replicated in the Yām 
network. These were to secure state communications, transport 
government agents and the movement of certain goods.950 Similarly, the 
primary role of the Yām stations was to supply remounts and 
subsistence for emissaries rather than act as postal courier 
interchanges.   
Strategic communications, moreover, can only function if secure. From 
the data in Table VI it was concluded that the security of the roads 
linking the Hülegüids to the Yuan was most certainly not assured.  
Moreover, since there is a close association between ‘security’ and the 
alleged Pax Mongolica, it was further argued that the concept of a Pax 
Mongolica is misconceived. Whilst strategic communications were least 
impeded during the reigns of Ögödei, Güyüg and Möngke, a cautious 
                                       
950 Anne Kolb ‘Transport and Communication in the Roman State: The cursus 
publicus’ in eds. Colin Adams and Ray Laurence, Travel & Geography in the Roman 
Empire, London and New York, Routledge, [2001]  2011 pp. 95 and 98 
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case could be made for a Pax Ögödeid though it was argued that this 
would not stand comparison with the Pax Augustae.  
Whilst extended lines of communication are undoubtedly a complicating 
issue for governance it should be recognised that they are but one 
thread in a complicated web of actions and unforeseen consequences as 
rulers endeavour to retain their hold on power. As far as the ‘transience’ 
of the Chinggisid polities is concerned, David Morgan has argued that 
‘whilst imperial collapse in one form or another may be inevitable there 
is rarely anything inevitable about the specific circumstances in any 
particular instance.’951  Moreover, in his view, ‘an examination of the 
actual events suggests that the Mongol regimes could perfectly well 
have continued, had different decisions been taken at various points or 
had different circumstances prevailed’.952 
Neither does Morgan subscribe to the ‘decline’ view of the Hülegüid 
polity in the period before the death of Abu Sa‘id in 736/1335 CE.  In 
this context, what is intriguing is whether the extended lines of 
communication had a role in the aftermath following his demise. 
Morgan cogently argues that there is no compelling reason to suppose 
that the line of Hülegü would have collapsed if there had been a viable 
successor to succeed him. Rather, his early death without direct heirs 
brought about a situation in which ‘essentially the throne was up for 
grabs and the central government disintegrated as a result’.953   
Amongst those who temporarily succeeded in ‘grabbing’ the throne was 
a descendant of Arïq Böke in 736/1335. He was followed in 736/1336 
by a grandson of Baidu who had briefly seized the throne in 1295 who 
in turn was succeeded by a descendant of Hulegu’s son, Möngke Temür 
between 736/1336-737-8/1337-38 and in western Khurasan a 
descendant of one of Chinggis Khan’s brothers.  
                                       
951 Morgan, ‘The Decline and Fall of the Mongol Empire’ p. 437 
952 Morgan, ‘The Decline and Fall’, p. 437 
953 Morgan, ‘The Decline and Fall’ p. 433 
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A dearth of viable heirs was a potential issue also for the Ottomans to 
which Morgan draws attention since the ‘Law of Fratricide could create 
its own problems if applied with too much enthusiasm’.954  In the worst 
case scenario of no heirs being available, the proposed solution was 
apparently to import a Chinggisid sultan from the Crimea, since the 
‘Chinggisid line represented there was regarded in Istanbul as the only 
lineage whose prestige was comparable with that of the Ottomans’.955  
If the Ottomans were capable of putting together such a drastic ‘fall-
back’ plan the mystery is why there was not the same will in the 
Hülegüid domains to import a Toluid prince from further afield around 
whom the competing factions could unite when the more local 
candidates failed to sustain their own attempts on the throne. Thus, 
despite the supposedly warm Yuan-Hülegüid links, an increase in 
Yuan-Hülegüid communications during the Abu Sa‘id period and the 
earlier example of a bride being requested by Arghun from the Yuan, 
the obvious solution of importing a Toluid prince956 from afar, however 
distantly related, seems not to have been contemplated by the power 
brokers in the disintegrating Hülegüid domains.  
On the other hand, even though importing a Toluid descendant may 
have been the only means of keeping the Hülegüid domains within the 
Chinggisid sphere, the time factor involved in requesting such a prince 
from further afield would have meant a vacuum in the interim. It would 
therefore be possible to argue, perhaps not entirely convincingly, that 
the extended lines of communication did in fact contribute to the end of 
the Toluids in Western Eurasia. In the meantime, it is difficult to 
disagree with Morgan that what actually saw off the Hülegüids were 
early deaths and inconsistency of procreation followed by infighting 
amongst the elite.  
                                       
954 Morgan, ‘The Decline and Fall’ p. 436 
955 Morgan, ‘The Decline and Fall’ p. 436 
956 On the basis that it was extremely unlikely that a Jochid or Chaghadaid prince 
would be offered the vacant throne. 
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As far as the Yām is concerned, Chinggisid investment in the network 
resulted in a relatively unsophisticated communication system. Though 
contacts between the Hülegüids and Yuan were less than might have 
been expected, such communication networks were the arteries of 
Empire and this can be seen during the early period of the Chinggisid 
Imperium. However, taking account of the period of Hülegüid-Yuan 
relations from 1260-1334 being relatively short and their extended lines 
of communication only equalled by those of the later Russian Empire, 
the view that ‘perhaps this was the greatest and most efficient 
communications net known to the pre-modern world’957 is not borne out 
by the evidence.  On the other hand, one contention here has been that 
the Mongols deserve more recognition than they have received for their 
extraordinary navigational skills, not only with no technology but 
apparently neither navigating by the stars. Perhaps one of the few really 
positive spins relating to their irruption onto the world stage should be 
respect for their ‘cognitive mapping’ skills. 
Finally, Franke’s scepticism that interchange between China and the 
non-China West during the Chinggisid period was not ‘really more 
frequent and easy under the Mongols in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries than under the Six Dynasties and the T’ang’ mentioned at the 
beginning of the introduction would seem to be justified. Then again, 
ultimately it was to Ögödei’s credit that his ‘no frills’ communication 
system was in operation for upwards of seven hundred years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                       
957 Alef, ‘p. 4 
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APPENDICES 
TABLE I 
The Hülegüids 
Hülegü (r. 1256-1265) 
10 sons not all in the West 
 
Abaqa (r.1265-1281) 
Son of Hülegü 
 
Teguder/Ahmad (r.1281-1284) 
Sixth (?) Son of Hülegü 
 
Arghun (r.1284-1291) 
Eldest Son of Abaqa 
 
Geikhatu (r.1291-1295) 
Son of Abaqa 
 
Baidu (r.1295) 
Son of Taraqai, son of Hülegü 
 
Ghāzān (r.1295-1304) 
Eldest Son of Arghun/great-grandson of Hülegü 
 
Öljeitü  (r.1304-1316) 
Second son of Arghun/great-grandson of Hülegü 
 
Abū Sa’īd (r.1316-1335) 
Son of Öljeitü 
Died without issue 
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TABLE II 
QA’ANS/KHANS 
Chinggis Khan (r. 1206-1227) 
Ögödeids 
Ögodei Qa’an (r. 1229-1241) 
Third son of Chinggis Khan 
 
Güyüg (r. 1246-1248) 
Eldest son of Ögodei  qa’an 
 
Toluids 
 
Möngke Qa’an (r. 1251-1258) 
Eldest son of Tolui/fourth son of Chinggis Khan 
 
Yuan/Toluids 
 
Qubilai Qa’an (r.1260-1294) 
Second son of Tolui 
 
Temür (r. 1294-1307) 
Grandson of Qubilai 
 
Qaishan (r. 1307-1311) 
Great-grandson of Qubilai 
 
Buyantu (r. 1311-1320) 
Brother of Qaishan 
 
Gegen (r. 1320-1323) 
Son of Buyantu, Great-great grandson of Qubilai 
Yesun-Temür (r. 1323-1328) 
Great-grandson of Qubilai 
 
Toq-Temür (r. 1328-1329 and 1329) 
Great-great grandson of Qubilai 
 
Qutuqtu (r. 1329-1332) 
son of Qaishan, Great-great-grandson of Qubilai 
 
Irinchinbal (r. 1332) 
Son of Qutuqtu Great-great-great-grandson of Qubilai 
 
Toghan-Temür (r. 1332-1370) 
Son of Qutuqtu, Great-great-great-grandson of Qubilai 
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TABLE III 
THE JOCHID KHANATE 
1237-1357 
 
Jochi (d. 1227) 
Eldest son of Chinggis Khan (but disputed parentage) 
 
Batu (r. 1237-1256) 
Second son of Jochi 
 
Sartaq (r. 1254-1257) 
Son of Batu 
 
Ulaghchi (r. 1257) 
Son of Sartaq 
 
Berke (r. 1257-1266) 
Third son of Jochi 
 
Möngke-Temür (r. 1267-1280) 
Grandson of Batu 
 
Tode-Möngke (r.1280-1287) 
Grandson of Batu 
 
Tole-Buqa (r. 1287-1291) 
Great grandson of Batu 
 
Toqta (r. 1291-1312) 
Brother of Tole-Buqa 
 
Oz-Beg (r. 1313-1341) 
Grandson of Möngke-Temür 
 
Tini-Beg (r. 1341-1342) 
Son of Oz-Beg 
 
Xi Jani-Beg (r. 1342-1357) 
Brother of Tini-Be 
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TABLE IV 
 
CHAGHADAI KHANATE 
1227-1338 
 
Chaghadai (r. 1227-1242) 
Second son of Chinggis Khan 
 
Yesu-Möngke (r. 1246-1251) 
Son of Chaghadai 
 
Qara-Hülegü (r. 1251-1260) 
Grandson of Chaghadai 
 
Orghina (1242-1246) - Regent 
 
Alughu (r. 1260-1265/6) 
Grandson of Chaghadai 
 
Mubarak-shah (r.1266) 
Son of Qara-Hülegü 
 
Baraq (r.1266-1271) 
Great-grandson of Chaghadai, cousin of Mubarak-Shah 
 
Negubei (r.1271) 
Grandson of Chaghadai 
 
Toqa-Temür (r.1272) 
Grandson of Chaghadai, cousin of Mubarak-shah and Baraq 
 
Du’a (r.1282-1307) 
Son of Baraq, Great-great-grandson of Chagadai 
 
Konchek (r. 1308) 
Son of Du’a 
 
Taliqu (r. 1308-1309) 
Brother of Toqa-Temür 
 
Esen-Buqa (r. 1310-1318) 
Son of Du’a 
 
Kebek (r. 1318-1326) 
Son of Du’a 
 
Elchigidei (r. 1326) 
Son of Du’a 
 
Du’a Temür (r. 1326) 
Son of Du’a 
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Tarmashirin (r. 1326-1334) 
Son of Du’a 
 
Buzan (r. 1334) 
Grandson of Du’a and son of Du’a Temür 
 
Chingshi (r. 1334-1338) 
Grandson of Du’a and cousin of Buzan 
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TABLE V 
 
HAND LIST OF TRANS-EURASIAN958 TRAVELLERS 
INCLUDING ROUTES WHERE IDENTIFIABLE 
1210-1338 
 
Year Travellers Route 
606/1210 
 
 
Shiraz to Kashgar 
 
 
 
623-654/1226-
1256 
 
 
Sa’di of Shiraz959 
(580-690/1184-1291) 
Brought up by the 
Atabeg of Fars, Sa’d b. 
Zangi r.591/1195 
 
Possible source of 
travel advice for the 
Envoys from 
Southern Iran 
 
1. allegedly travelled to 
Kashgar under auspices 
of Khwārazmshah 
Muhammad 
 
 
2. Balkh, Ghazna, the 
Panjab, Somnath, 
Gujerat, Yemen, the 
Hijaz and other parts of 
Arabia, Abyssinia, 
Syria, especially 
Damascus and 
Baalbek, North Africa 
and Asia Minor. 
 
1219-1226 
Dadu- Samarkand 
Yeh-lu Ch’u ts’ai960 
(1189-1243) 
 
Accompanied 
Chinggis Khan and 
his armies on 
punitive expedition 
against 
Khwārazmshah 
Muhammad 
May-June 1219: 
Departure of Mongol 
Army – Eder River – 
Black Irtysh – Altai 
Mountains – T’ien-shan 
(in the Dzungarian Ala-
Tau) – Ili valley via the 
Talki Pass – Emil valley 
– plain of Qayaliq (west 
of modern Kopal in 
Kazakhstan) where all 
the Mongol forces and 
those of their allies 
assembled for the 
onslaught. – Skirted 
Lake Sairam – passed 
Almaliq – Balasagun – 
Talas – Samarkand. 
                                       
958 This means that e..g Zhao Gong and Ch’ang Ch’un are excluded 
959 E. G.Browne, A Literary History of Persia from Firdawsi to Sa’di, , p.525 ff 
960 E. Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources: Fragments 
towards the Knowledge of the Geography and History of Central and Western Asia from 
the 13th to the 17th Century, Vol. I, NY, Barnes and Noble, 1967; repr. of 1888 ed.), pp. 
9-24. 
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Thereafter based in 
Samarkand. 
1229 + 
Hamadan to 
Ögödei’s 
Court 
32 wrestlers961 Not Known 
dispatched with relay 
horses and forage 
630/1232-1233 
Tus, Khurāsān- 
Qaraqorum 
 
 
 
Körgüz and Amirs 
from  Khurāsān and 
Māzandarān to 
Ögodei’s court 
Via Bukhara 
Körgüz 
returned via Batu’s 
brother and Khwārazm 
632-633/ 
1234-1235 
 
Kirmān to 
Ögödei’s Court 
 
Rukn al-Din 
Qutlugh-Sultan, son 
of the Qutlugh-Khan 
of Kirmān 
His cousin Qutb-ad-
Dīn followed later 
Submission 
Kirmān, Shāh-Dād, to 
the east of Kirmān, on 
the edge of the Dasht-i 
Lūt. 
? 
Shiraz to Ögödei’s 
Court 
Tahamtan brother of  
Atabeg of Shiraz, 
Abū-Bakr /1226-
1260 
Submission 
Shiraz – no details of 
route 
1236 – Autumn 
 
Mongolia to Volga 
Mongol army 
campaign against 
north-western 
Eurasia, Russia and 
Eastern Europe 
3000 miles in 6 months 
(assuming a start in 
spring) at 16.7 mpd.962 
1240s 
? to Qaraqorum 
Isā kelemichi 
 
during Qubilai’s 
reign he established 
the Bureau of 
Western Astronomy 
and the Imperial 
Dispensary in 
Peking. 
Accompanied Bolad 
west in 1280s 
Not Known 
1240s 
Armenia to 
Qaraqorum 
 
Armenian Prince 
Awag963 
 
Georgian princes: 
Not Known 
 
Via Batu who sent them 
                                       
961 Rashīd al-Dīn/Boyle p.89 
962 John Masson Smith, Jr. Hülegü Moves West: High Living and Heartbreak on the 
Road to Baghdad,  
963 Kirakos Ganjakets’i’s History of the Armenians/Bedrosian, ch.29 
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Late 1240s 
Tiflis to 
Qaraqorum 
David Narin 
 
Followed by 
David Ulu964 
on to Güyüg 
1243-1245 
Vladimir (Rus) to 
Qaraqorum 
Constantine, son of 
the Grand Duke 
Yaroslav of Vladimir 
(r.1238-1246) 
Submission 
Via Batu and ‘Cumania’ 
then unknown 
1245-1247 
From Lyons to 
Güyüg’s Court at 
Syra Orda 
Franciscan Friars 
John of Plano 
Carpini and 
Benedict the Pole965 
Longest recorded 
return journey to 
central Mongolia 
Lyons, Bohemia, 
Poland, Kiev, north of 
Sea of Azov, Batu’s 
encampment on Volga, 
north of the Aral Sea, 
then possibly Taraz to 
Orda’s domain thus 
north of Lake Balkhash, 
Dzungarian Gate at 
Lake Arakol, thence 3 
weeks to Güyüg’s Court 
at Syra Orda. Return 
the same way 
1246 Güyüg’s (r.1246-
1248)enthronement 
Ambassadors 
travelling to attend 
 
1247-1250 
 
Cilicia to 
Qaraqorum 
Constable Smbat, 
brother of King 
Het’um of Cilicia re 
‘submission’ 
 
Returned with son 
of Sultan Ghiyath 
al-Din (of Rum) 
 
On February 7, 1248, 
Smbat sent a letter 
from Samarkand to his 
brother-in-law Henry I, 
king of Cyprus 
 
1246 
Vladimir to 
Qaraqorum 
Grand Duke 
Yaroslav of 
Vladimir966 (r.1238-
1246) 
To defend himself 
before Güyüg 
Via Batu 
Died on way back to 
Vladimir 
1240s 
Azerbaijan to 
Qaraqorum 
 
General 
Chormaghun to 
Ogodei. Booty plus 
t’obichaut/ 
Turkoman horses 
Unknown 
                                       
964 Kirakos Ganjakets’i’s History of the Armenians/Bedrosian, ch.45 
965 Carpini/Beazley pp. 133-137 
966 C. Raymond Beazley, The Texts and Versions of John de Plano Carpini ... reprint. 
from Hakluyt Society Latin p. 103, trans. p. 140 
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1240s 
Khurāsān 
to Qaraqorum 
The Amir Arghun 
made three treks to 
the east in 1240s to 
counter intrigues as 
well as to attend 
quriltais. 
 
 
 
also 
Qadaq Noyan 
First return via Merv 
Outward trip to Court 
accompanied by 
Juvaynī’s father via 
Taraz967 where heard of 
Güyüg’s death 
Arghun with Juvayni 
jnr968returned from 
Court via Almaliq and 
Merv 
 
To Güyüg to intrigue 
against Arghun 
Returned 1249 
Vladimir to 
Qaraqorum 
Son and heir of 
Yaroslav, Alexander 
Nevsky and his 
brother Andrei 
Invested with rule 
over Kiev 
Presumably via Batu 
c. 1248 
Cyprus to Emil, 
south of Lake 
Balkhash 
 
Dominican friar 
Andrew of 
Longjumeau 
 
Envoy to Güyüg’s 
widow, Oghul 
Qaimish 
Unknown 
1250-1255 
Cilicia to 
Qaraqorum 
King Het’um Outwards via Derbend, 
on the Casapian, Batu, 
and Sartakh, Ural river, 
Irtysh river,(the 
northern steppe or 
Jochid route) 
Circuitous route back, 
paying their respects to 
Hulegu, Sartakh en 
route to Mongke and 
Baiju.  
Return took eight 
months via Beshbaliq, 
Almaliq, Ili River, 
Alatau mountains, 
Talas, Otrar, 
                                       
967 Juvaynī/Boyle, II pp. 512 
968  Juvaynī/Boyle, II pp. 505-525 
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Samarkand, Bukhara, 
Tus, Mazanderan, Ray, 
Qazvin, Tabriz 
1251 
 
Möngke’s 
Enthronement. 
Ambassadors in 
attendance 
The Great Amir Arghun 
travelled via Taraz, 
Besh-Baligh. He met 
the Amir Mas’ud Beg in 
Besh-Baligh on his 
return from Möngke’s 
enthronement arriving 
too late in 650/1252 
c. 1251-1252 
Constantinople to 
Qaraqorum 
Baldwin of Hainault 
Envoy on behalf of 
Emperor Baldwin II 
Unknown 
Married to a Cuman 
princess thus probably 
via Batu? 
1249 – mid 1250s 
Cyprus via Persia 
to Qaraqorum 
A fraudulent cleric, 
Theodolus 
pretending to be an 
emissary to Mongke 
from Bishop Odo of 
Châteauroux, Papal 
Legate on the 
Seventh Crusade 
Unknown route to 
Qaraqorum but turned 
up with Mongke’s envoy 
at court of the Emperor 
John III Ducas 
Vatatzes, emperor of 
Nicea who sent back 
the gold paiza to 
Möngke after the death 
of the envoy 
651-653/1253-
1255 
Constantinople to 
Möngke’s 
encampment 
which, since it 
was December 
was presumably 
his winter 
quarters or 
qishlāq on the 
Ongqin river 
south of 
Qaraqorum. 
Friar William of 
Rubruck’s party of 
5.969 
Mission to bring 
succour to German 
Prisoners of Mongols 
at Taraz but passed 
them by without 
stopping. 
Unofficially 
travelling on behalf 
of King Louis IX of 
France 
 
Constantinople, Black 
Sea to Soldaia in the 
Crimea; north-east by 
the Sea of Azov on their 
right,970 to Scacatai’s971 
camp. Forwarded to 
Sartach, Batu’s son, 
taking two months to 
reach Sartach from 
Soldaia by ox cart. 
Forwarded by Sartach 
to Batu on the eastern 
bank of the Volga. From 
Batu’s encampment 
travelled north of the 
Caspian and 12 days 
beyond the Etilia/Volga 
the Iagan/Ural River. 
                                       
969 Rubruck’s Report to King Louis IX is a masterpiece of intelligence collection as well 
as providing the most comprehensive itinerary of all those who have left a record 
970 Rubruck, p. 108 
971 A relative of Batu’s. Rubruck, p. 98 
338 
 
The next six weeks 
whilst riding eastwards 
they were able to obtain 
remounts and hence 
following a route 
provided withYām. They 
then turned south 
towards Kinchac, a 
small town apparently 
located near Taraz and 
the River Talas972 
Then ‘Equius which 
Minorsky has identified 
this as Iki-oguz in his 
commentary on the 
Hudūd al-Ālam of 
372/982, probably to 
the south of today’s 
Taldi-Korghan973 itself 
south of Lake 
Balkhash. According to 
the Hudūd al-Ālam 
there were indeed 
‘stages’  manzil, in this 
area during the period 
of the Toghuzghuz 
occupation in the tenth 
century CE.974 Cailac 
was Rubruck’s next 
pause, identified as 
Qayaligh but the exact 
location is disputed 
though the most likely 
is near today’s 
Sarqan975 on the 
modern road to Lake 
Alakol since the next 
stage of his journey is 
indeed Alakol thus he 
too must have used the 
Dzungarian Gate 
egress. 
Rubruck passed north 
of Güyüg’s encampment 
                                       
972 Rubruck, p. 143  
973 Hudūd al-Ālam, Minorsky, p. 277 and Voyage dans L’Empire Mongol,p. 239. Note 9 
974 Hudūd al-Ālam, Minorsky p. 95 
975 Rubruck, p.148 and note 1. An interesting assessment is found in Voyage dans 
L’Empire Mongol p.239 quoting Russian and Kazakh sources - M. Bajpakov, Vestnik de 
l’Academie des sciences du Kazakhstan, 1968, no. 7 p. 24 
339 
 
on the Emil River plain. 
Despite serious 
topographical problems 
with his route at this 
point976 since he 
appears to have been 
heading north-east 
towards the Tarbagatai 
Mountains Rubruck 
confirms that this was 
an established Yām 
route, since he remarks 
that they ‘no longer 
came across habitations 
only the iams’.977 He 
spent the night in a 
Yām five days journey 
from Möngke’s Court. 
Rubruck appears to 
have covered around 
1242 miles/2000 km 
between 30 November 
and 27 December 
which, if the case, gives 
a very respectable daily 
travel rate of 46 
miles/67 km per day. 
Return journey entirely 
across Jochid territory, 
i.e. north of Lake 
Balkhash 
Autumn 1254-22 
January 1258 
Mongolia to 
Baghdad 
Hūlegū plus army 
 
5000 miles/8047 km 
Mongolia, ?Lake 
Zaysan, Almaliq, 
(fattened horses during 
summer of 1255) 
Samarkand, Kish (now 
Shahrisabz, crossed on 
2 Jan. 1256 Oxus/Amu 
Darya, camping at 
Shiburghan because of 
heavy snow- and hail-
storms. From there to 
besiege Tun, in 
Quhistan region of 
eastern Iran; Tus, 
                                       
976 See Rubruck p. 166 and note 1 and p.167 note.2 Also Voyage dans L’Empire 
Mongol, p. 241 note 4.  
977 Rubruck, p. 166 
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Radkan, Khabushan 
(modern Quchan) 
reaching Bistam on 2 
September 1256. 
Maymun Diz, the 
Assassin Master's 
castle, on 7 November 
1256. After his victory, 
Hülegü camped for the 
winter of 1256—57 near 
Qazvin and Lammassar.  
 
Hülegü started for 
Baghdad from Qazvin in 
March 1257. Diverted 
to Dinavar on 26 April—
and then back to 
Tabriz. Tabriz to 
Hamadan on 26 July 
followed by return to 
Tabriz. Thence to 
Hamadan again on 21 
September and finally 
set out for Baghdad.978 
655 & 657/1257 
& 1259 
Qaraqorum? To 
Suzdal 
Mongol officials to 
take a census of the 
population979 
Presumably via the 
‘Jochid route’ 
656/1258 + 
Hamadan to 
Qaraqorum 
Hülegü to Möngke 
informing him of 
Fall of Baghdad etc. 
Also dispatch of 
plunder 
Unknown 
Feb. 13 657-
661/1259-1263 
Qaraqorum to 
Tabriz 
Envoy, Chang-te, 
from Möngke to 
Hülegü 
 
74 days Qaraqorum 
to Mazanderan 
 
Away in total 
fourteen months 
Via country of Wusun 
i.e. east of Balkhash 
Knot) Black Irtysh 
River, Ulungur river, 
Emil, Lake Alakol, 
Almaliq northern slope 
of the Alatau, Sairam, 
Samarkand, 
Mazanderan, Tabriz 
 
                                       
978 John Masson Smith, Jr. has done a time and motion study of Hülegü’s move 
westwards. See Hülegü Moves West: High Living and Heartbreak on the Road to 
Baghdad,  
979 Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, p. 80, note 840 
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1260 – c. 1265 
Constantinople to 
Dadu 
Marco Polo’s father 
and Uncle, traders 
Constantinople, 
Soldaia, Sarai, 
Bukhara, (trapped for 3 
years)then  joined 
envoys from Hülegü to 
Qubilai. Rest of route 
unknown. 
1260s 
Tabriz to Dadu 
3 trans-Eurasian 
trips on behalf of 
Hülegü in his long-
distance 
negotiations for 
administration of 
his Cheng-te 
domain. Also 
arrangements for 
falconers 
Unknown 
1263-1268 
Mongolia to Tabriz 
Hülegü’s son 
Jumqur and 
remainder of 
Hülegü’s family 
Via Samarkand where 
Jumqur died 
Wives arrived after 
Hülegü’s death 
662/1264 
Dadu to Almaliq 
and  Tabriz 
Qubilai to Hülegü 
and Chaghaids 
ordering them to 
guard and 
administrate their 
respective territories 
against Arïq Böke 
To Tabriz via Almaliq 
662/1264-1265? 
Dadu to Tabriz via 
Almaliq 
Qubilai to Hülegü, 
Alghu and Berke re 
Arïq Böke 
 
Dadu to Almaliq, Tabriz 
and Berke on the Volga 
?-1265 
Dadu to Tabriz 
and return 
Sartaq Noyan and 
‘Abd al-Rahmān. 
Returned to Dadu 
with 
Bayan 
Including possibly 
two mangonel 
makers 
Unknown 
1265-1270 
Tabriz to Dadu 
and return to 
Sultaniyya 
Abaqa to Qubilai 
with request for 
confirmation of 
accession 
Overland  but  delays 
en route because of  
hostilities 
1266-1269 Marco Polo’s Father 
and Uncle 
Dadu to Ayas in Cilician 
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Return trip from 
Dadu to Venice 
Armenia, Acre, Venice 
November1271- 
May 1275 
 
Venice to 
Shangdu/Xandu 
The Polos 
 
envoys acting on 
behalf of both the 
Pope and Qubilai 
Considerable 
controversy over route. 
1271 Acre, Ayas, Sivas, 
Mardin, Mosul, 
Baghdad to Hormuz. 
Yule and Cordier are 
firmly convinced that 
the party travelled from 
Hormuz to Khānbalïq 
via Kerman, the 
Balkh/Termez region, 
Badakhshan, - Kunduz, 
Faizabad, then the 
Wakhan valley rather 
than following the Alai 
Valley, Sary-Tash route. 
From Tashkurgan the 
route took them via 
Kashgar, Yarkand, 
Khotan, Lake Lob, 
Tangut980 on northern 
frontier of China, to 
Kai-ping fu, 100 m. 
north of the Great Wall 
The route the party took 
from Dunhuang is 
perplexing. Polo 
mentions Etzina981 on 
the Hei Shui River 
which is where 
provisions were 
traditionally taken on 
for the crossing of the 
Gobi. Meanwhile, 
Cordier remarks that in 
Marco Polo’s time there 
was a direct route from 
Etzina to 
Qaraqorum982though 
this would have meant 
a double crossing of the 
Gobi to backtrack if the 
somewhat testy 
                                       
980 Referred to as Sachiu by Marco Polo 
981 Cordier is satisfied that this was the same as the ancient city of Kara Khoto. The 
Book of Ser Marco Polo, II, p. 54 of the supplement and Vol. I, p. 225 note 1. 
982 The Book of Ser Marco Polo, Vol. I, p. 225 note 1. 
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consensus that they 
followed the Huang 
He/Yellow River is 
correct. 
What is also curious 
about Polo’s account is 
that there are no 
mentions of remounts 
or board and lodging.983 
1278-1281(?) 
Dadu/Beijing to 
Jerusalem (not 
reached) 
Maragha 
Rabban Bar Sauma 
and Rabban Marcos 
 
Travelling as private 
individuals 
Dadu thence followed 
Yellow River southwest 
to Ningxia, taking two 
months then the 
southern track of the 
Taklamakan Desert to 
Khotan984 (This is an 
important corroboration 
of the Polos’ route in 
reverse) where they 
were stranded for six 
months because of 
conflict between Qubilai 
and H . Finally reached 
Kashgar which had 
been plundered. Their 
next recorded 
destination was Qaidu’s 
HQ on the Talas River. 
From Qaidu’s camp 
they headed for a 
monastery of their order 
at Tus from whence 
they continued to the 
first main centre of the 
Hülegüids at Maragha 
to meet up with their 
Mar Catholicus or 
bishop. 
c. 1283- 1285 
Dadu to Arrān 
Arghun’s winter 
īlchī-i Qā’ān or 
ambassador of the 
Great Qa’an, Bolad 
Unknown but perilous 
because of hostilies 
between Qaidu and 
                                       
983 Jackson rightly points out that Polo’s own perspective on late 13th century Asia would be 
refracted through the prism of Rusticello’s prose and that we cannot afford to lay too 
much stress on matters that the book does not mention since a copyist might have 
edited out some information in the narrative. Peter Jackson, ‘Marco Polo and his 
Travels’ Muslims, Mongols and Crusaders, p. 266 
984Sixty years later mentioned briefly by Mustawfi c. 1340 in the Geographical Part of 
the Nuzhat-al-Qulūb p. 251 as a great kingdom with celebrated towns such as 
Kashgar, but oddly New Talas and Sairam which were an immense distance away 
northwards across the Tien Shan.  
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quarters Noyan/Pūlād 
chīnksānk (c.1240-
1313)985 and Isā 
kelemichi 
Du’a 
1286 -1287 
Tabriz to Dadu 
īlchī-i Qā’ān or 
ambassador of the 
Great Qa’an, Bolad 
Noyan/Pūlād 
chīnksānk (c.1240-
1313)986 and Isā 
kelemichi 
Return journey from 
Arghun. Bolad became 
separated from Isā and 
turned back because of 
the hostilies between 
Qaidu and Du’a 
Only Isā made it to 
Dadu 
Arriving Dadu 
1286 
Tabriz to Dadu 
3 emissaries from 
Arghun with request 
to Qubilai for a bride 
Unknown 
1291 
Tabriz to Dadu 
John of Monte 
Corvino (1247-1328) 
 
1st Archbishop of 
Khānbalïq 
Travelled by sea 
But 
In 1305 wrote that 
As for the road hither I 
may tell you that the 
way through the land of 
the Goths, subject to 
the Emperor of the 
Northern Tartars, is the 
shortest and safest; and 
by it the friars might 
come, along with the 
letter-carriers, in five or 
six months.987 
1289 or 1290 
Attempted journey 
from Dadu to 
Tabriz 
Bride for Arghun 
and escort 
Overland but forced to 
turn back after 8 
months because of 
conflict. Route 
unknown 
1291-1294/5 
Dadu to Hormuz 
Marco Polo, his 
Father, Uncle and 
Bride for Arghun 
Bride for Arghun 
escorted by Polos by 
Sea to Hormuz arriving 
1294 
                                       
985 See Allsen, Culture and Conquest chapters 9, 10 and 11. 
986 See Allsen, Culture and Conquest chapters 9, 10 and 11. 
987  Cathay and the Way Thither, translated and edited by Sir Henry Yule, second 
edition revised by Henri Cordier (London: Hakluyt Society, 1914), Vol. III, Second 
Series, Vol. 37, pp. 45-51 
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1291 Geikhatu 
Possible request for 
decree on accession 
No details 
1296 
Dadu to Tabriz 
Baiju 
 
On secondment 
from 
Temür Qa’an 
(r.1294-1307) to 
Ghāzān (r.1295-
1304 
Unknown 
1297-1305 
Tabriz  to Dadu 
Melik Mo’azzam 
Fakhr-eddin Ahmad 
& Bocai Ilchi 
 
Sent by Ghāzān 
(r.1295-1304)to 
Temür Qa’an 
(r.1294-1307) 
 
Rashid al-Din 
mentions that ‘such 
goods and 
treasures as are 
still in Khitai and 
belong to the share 
of Hulegu Khan and 
his descendants, the 
Qa’an has ordered 
to be registered and 
kept until they have 
the means and 
opportunity to send 
them’. 
 
By Sea 
1304? 
Tabriz to Dadu 
Baiju’s return to the 
Yuan possibly as 
emissary of Ghāzān 
Unknown 
 
1305 
Dadu to Tabriz 
Possible return of 
Ghāzān’s mission to 
Iran 
With letter of John 
of Monte Corvino 
Unknown 
1304-1307 
Dadu to Hormuz 
Return to Iran of 
‘tribute’ mission 
from Ghāzān 
By Sea 
1306 Return to Iran of  
mission from 
Ghāzān with further 
Unknown 
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Dadu to Tabriz 
 
letter from John of 
Monte Corvino 
1307-1308 
 
Dadu to Tabriz 
Mission possibly to 
announce death of 
Temür Qa’an in 
1307 
A fast journey thus 
probably the  Jochid 
route? 
 
Arrived February 
1312 
Baghdad 
 
Dadu to Baghdad 
Ayadji Chinksank 
Devlet Shah 
Ambassadors 
from Yuan 
Emperor 
Buyantu 
(r.1311-1320) 
to 
Öljeitu 
(r.1304-1317) 
 
Unknown 
 
1312 
Baghdad to Dadu 
 
 
Öljeitu 
(r.703-716/1304-
1316) 
Envoys To 
Yuan 
Emperor 
Buyantu 
(r.1311-1320) 
 
Unknown 
1313 
 
Dadu to Tabriz 
Baiju dispatched 
west again, to 
consult with Öljeitu 
as well as bestow 
honours and a gold 
seal on Bolad, who 
had in fact died in 
April 1313.988 
Unknown 
April 1318 
Padua to Dadu 
3 years in China 
Returning to 
Padua in 1330 
Odoric of Pordenone Padua, crossed the 
Black Sea to Trebizond, 
Tabriz, 
Sultaniyya,Kashan, 
Yazd, Hormuz  thence 
by sea via India to 
Canton and Zaitoun, 
Overland by way of Fu-
cheu, the capital of the 
province of Fokien, to 
Quinsay, Nanking, 
Yangchufu, and finally 
                                       
988 Yuan Chueh, Ch’ing-jung chu-shih chi, ch. 34, p. 22b; Allsen, Culture and 
Conquest, p.77 
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 travelled by the great 
canal and the Hwang-
ho River to Dadu. 
Return overland via 
Tibet, Badakshan, 
Tabriz and Armenia 
1324-1332 
Tabriz to Dadu 
17 plus embassies 
Between Abū Sa’īd 
and Yuan 
Unknown 
1324-1327 
Tabriz to Dadu 
Request from Abū 
Sa’īd for honours for 
the Amir Chuban989 
via the Chaghadai and 
Jochid khanates 
 
1325-1354 Ibn Battuta 
Private individual 
Last Leg to China by 
Sea 
1332 
Tabriz? - Dadu 
Khodja Kamareddin 
(?) 
Ambassador from 
Abū Sa’īd 
(r. 717-736/1316-
1335) 
 
Unknown 
1336 
Dadu to Pope 
The Genoese Andalo 
de Savignon envoy 
from Yuan emperor 
Toghon Temur to 
Pope 
Unknown 
1338-c. 1347 
Constantinople to 
Dadu 
John de Marignolli 
Papal Legate 
 
Envoy to Yuan court 
from Pope Benedict 
XI 
 
Plus suite of thirty-
two persons and a 
magnificent war 
horse for the Yuan 
emperor 
Constantinople sailed 
across Black Sea to 
Caffa, on to Uzbek 
Khan at Sarai where 
they overwintered and 
were treated royally. 
Departed spring of 1340 
for Almaliq possibly via 
Urgench, in Khwārazm 
in 1339. He spent some 
time in ‘Kamul’ or 
Hami.990 This could well 
be reflected in 
Marignolli’s reference to 
the Sand Hills. Though 
his route thereafter to 
Khānbalïq is not 
                                       
989 YS, ch. 29. p. 651; Allsen, Culture and Conquest, p.39 
990 The Book of Ser Marco Polo, Vol. I, p. 211 note 1. Other travellers who passed through 
include the ambassadors from the famous embassy of Shah Rukh  in 1419-1422 as well as 
Benedict Goes in 1603 
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specified. His sojourn in 
Hami tends to confirm 
the continuing 
importance of the 
Gansu/Hexi corridor 
route 
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TABLE VI   
MILITARY OPERATIONS DURING THE PERIOD 
OF INTRA-CHINGGISID CONFLICT 
 
 
Date Protagonists Area Outcome 
1260-1262 Rival claimants to 
succeed Mongke: 
Qubilai v Arïq Böke 
Mongolia Upper 
Yenisei, Kirghiz 
country, Almaliq, 
Altai, Balkhash 
Knot, Kashgar, 
Khotan, Tangut,  
Otrar 
Submission of 
Arïq Böke in 
1264 
1262 Jochids attack 
Hülegü 
 
Invasion route, 
Derbend 
Force of 30,000 
under Nogai, 
inconclusive 
1261-1266 Huleguids and 
Jochids: but only 
in the wintertime, 
since they were 
unable to fight in 
the summer due 
to the heat and 
the flooding of 
the river 
  
1264 c Bukhara 
garrisoned by 
5,000 Jochid 
troops, 3,000 
Sorqaqtani Beki 
troops and 8,000 
‘collegiate’ troops. 
On Qubilai’s 
orders massacre 
of Jochid troops 
stationed in 
Bukhara 
Massacre of 
Jochid Troops 
 
1264/65 Berke, Jochid Khan 
support of Qaidu 
against Chaghadaid 
khan Alghu 
  
1266 Berke, Jochid Khan 
fought Abaqa 
Near Derbend Berke 
vanquished 
1266 Qaidu Talas Talas became one 
of his power 
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centres 
1266 Qaidu Seized Almaliq 
and advanced on 
Uighuria,Besh 
Baliq 
Devastated 
Uighur cities 
1268 Qaidu v Qubilai Qaidu forced to 
retreat from 
Almaliq to the 
west of Talas.  
Not controlled by 
Qaidu until 
c.1282 
 
Pre 1268? Baraq the 
Chaghadaid Khan 
deserts Qubilai 
Show of force by 
Qubilai at 
Khotan, southern 
Tarim Basin, 
within Qubilai’s 
area of control 
but Khotan 
plundered by 
Barak. 
 
 Qaidu versus Baraq Sri Darya Defeat of Qaidu 
 Qaidu reinforced by 
50,000 Jochid 
troops versus Barak 
Khojend on Sri 
Darya 
Defeat of Baraq 
who fled to 
Samarkand and 
Bukhārā 
1269 Quriltai attended by 
Qaidu, Baraq and 
Jochid 
representative to 
discuss peace 
proposal 
Talas  
 
Two-thirds of 
Transoxiana 
would be held by 
Barak and 
remainder by 
Qaidu and 
Jochids. 
Challenge to 
Qa’an’s control of 
Samarkand and 
Bukhārā. 
Qubilai’s 
authority 
effectively 
reduced  to that 
of regional khan  
1270 Baraq versus Abaqa Baraq prevented 
from expanding 
north or east, 
could only 
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expand into 
Hülegüid held 
land. First re- 
occupied 
Bukhārā; crossed 
the Oxus  and 
took Khurāsān 
from Abaqa  
 
668/1270 Baraq versus Abaqa July, Battle of 
Herat, Baraq 
defeated 
 
670/1271 
August 
Baraq versus Qaidu Almaliq region Night before 
Qaidu’s attack 
Baraq died 
(possibly 
poisoned 
Qaidu enthroned 
as Ögödeid Khan 
in Talas, with 
power to appoint 
Chaghadaids 
Khan 
Dissident 
Ögödeids and 
Chaghadaids  
1271 Baraq’s sons rebel 
against Qaidu 
Rebels rampage 
between Bukhārā 
and Khojend 
 
1271 Qaidu versus 
Qubilai’s son 
Nomuqan 
Almaliq 
Clash avoided 
Qubilai gives up 
Central Asia as 
too far for his 
forces from 
China. Qaidu 
reclaims Almaliq 
1272 Rebellion of 
Chaghadaids khan 
Negubei against 
Qaidu 
Qaidu dispatched 
army against 
Negubei, location 
unknown 
 Negubei fled east 
and was killed 
1273, January Abaqa versus 
Chaghadaids 
Abaqa’s troops 
enter Bukhārā 
Followed by 
Alghu’s sons’ 
troops retaking 
Abaqa’s troops 
plundered and 
destroyed for a 
week 
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Bukhārā 
1274/1275 Qubilai versus 
Hoqu. Guyug 
Khan’s son 
Hoqu based in 
strategic 
Hexi/Gansu 
corridor 
Hoqu fled to 
Khotan and 
Kashgar where 
he wreaked 
considerable 
destruction 
1276, 1278-
1283 
Qubilai  Reinforced 
southern 
Taklamakan 
Route 
 
1276 (-1283) Sons of Alghu and 
Baraq versus 
Qaidu. 
The sons attack 
Bukhārā and 
environs 
devastating 
Transoxiana for 
seven years  
 
1276-1279 Qubilai versus 
Southern Sung 
Southern China Qubilai militarily 
engaged on two 
fronts, against 
rebel princes and 
Southern Sung 
1278, 1283, 
1286 
Qubilai reinforced 
abandoned Uighur 
capital  
Besh Baliq Qubilai planted 
military 
agricultural 
colonies in Besh 
Baliq 
1277 - 1282 Qubilai versus rebel 
Toluid princes, 
Tugh Temür, 
grandson of Tolui 
and another 
grandson, Shiregi, 
the son of Möngke 
Qaraqorum taken 
by rebel princes; 
retaken by 
Qubilai, scene of 
conflict for five 
years 
Rebel princes 
plunder the late 
Möngke’s ordo 
1280 A son/grandson of 
Hoqu v Qubilai 
Qara Qocho Raid on granaries 
causing  severe 
famine  
1281 Qubilai versus 
Qaidu:  defeat of a 
force of Qaidu 
Khotan  
1282 Reconciliation 
between Qaidu and 
Baraq’s sons 
Qaidu appoints 
Du’a 
Chaghadaids 
Khan 
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1282 Qaidu/Chaghadaids Qaidu appoints 
Baraq’s son, Du’a 
the Chaghadaid 
khan. 
Alliance between 
Qaidu, Ögödeid 
khan and 
Chaghadaids, the 
latter the junior 
partners 
Pre 1283 Alghu’s sons  Submit to 
Qubilai 
 
1284 Qubilai versus 
Qaidu,  temporary 
defeat of Qaidu’s 
forces 
Tarim Basin  
1285 Qubilai versus 
Du’a: Qubilai’s 
forces defeated 
Qara Qocho and 
Uighuria 
Six month siege 
of Qara Qocho  
1286 Qubilai versus Du’a 
and Qaidu: 
Qubilai’s forces 
defeated 
Uighuria, Besh 
Baliq 
Du’a and Qaidu’s 
control of 
Uighuria 
consolidated, 
appropriated 
revenues of 
Uighuria and 
Tarim Basin 
Mid-1280s Qubilai v rebels in 
Tibet and 
descendents of 
Chinggis Khan’s 
half brother in 
Manchuria 
Nayan in 
Manchuria crushed 
Tibet 
Manchuria 
Qubilai 
dispatched forces 
to Mongolia and 
southern 
Manchuria 
Tibet had been 
partially 
controlled by 
Ögödeids;  
Qubilai in person 
led forces against 
Nayan in 
Manchuria 
1288 Yuan retreat from 
Tarim basin and 
Uighuria 
Khotan, Kashgar, 
Besh Baliq 
 
1288 Incursions by 
Qaidu’s and Du’a’s 
forces into 
northwest Mongolia 
Northwest 
Mongolia 
 
 
1288 Arghun versus 
Qaidu 
Attack on envoys 
from Khurāsān to 
Arghun by Qaidu’s 
forces under 
Balkh, Merv and 
Nīshāpūr 
 
An autonomous 
Mongol force, the 
Qara’unas ruled 
Balkh, 
ShAbūrghan, 
Badakhshan, 
354 
 
Chaghadaid 
command 
Merv 
Frequently raided 
Delhi Sultanate  
1289 Qubilai versus 
Qaidu 
Qubilai’s forces 
surrounded and 
retreated 
Eastern Altai 
Qaraqorum 
Yuan loss of 
Mongolian 
heartland 
 Qubilai versus 
Qaidu 
Retreat by Qaidu  
Qaraqorum Qaidu lost 
Qaraqorum but 
still held much of 
Mongolia 
westwards 
1289-1291 Arghun versus rebel 
commander Nauruz 
Invasion of 
Khurāsān by 
Nauruz in 1291 
plus Qaidu’s forces 
Khurāsān, 
Mashhad, Tus, 
Nīshāpūr, 
Badghis 
Invasion coincide 
with Arghun’s 
death leaving 
Nauruz free to 
pillage for a year 
1291 Desertion of 
Arghun’s 
commander 
Uighurtai to Qaidi. 
Jurjan and 
eastern 
Mazandaran 
 
1290-1293 Qubilai versus 
Qaidu, skirmishes 
Mongolia  
1292 Qubilai versus 
Qaidu and Melik 
Temür, Arïq Böke’s 
son. Defeat of Meliq 
Temür 
West of the 
Qanghai 
mountains 
 
1293 Qubilai versus 
Qaidu: Qaidu’s 
forces pushed out of 
Yenisei region  
Qirghiz domains 
on Upper Yenisei 
Mongolia 
Yuan regained 
control of 
southern Siberia 
and Mongolia 
1294 Death of Qubilai China 1295 
enthronement of 
Temür (1294-
1307) 
1295 Baidu/Ghāzān 
versus Du’a 
Invasion of 
Khurāsān and 
Mazandaran, 
Khurāsān, south 
of Herat 
Du’a pillaged and 
slaughtered 
throughout 
Khurāsān 
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Mazandaran by 
Du’a 
 
1297 Temür’s border 
commanders versus 
Qaidu and Du’a. 
Retreat of the latter 
Area between 
Yenisei and Irtish 
on borders of 
White Horde 
 
1298 pre Bayan, khan of 
White Horde versus 
his cousin Kuiluk 
who was supported 
by Qaidu and Du’a. 
Numerous military 
encounters 
North of 
Balkhash Knot 
and bordering 
Qaidu’s territory 
 
1298 Temür versus Du’a, 
Yuan forces 
defeated. 
  
1298/99 Temür versus Du’a. 
Defeat of Du’a’s 
forces 
Eastern Altai, 
near Khovd 
 
1299 Jochid internal 
struggle resolved  
 Toqto, Jochid 
Khan, support of 
Yuan and 
Hülegüids 
1300 Ghāzān versus Du’a Fars, Kirman Du’a played a 
leading role in 
raids on 
Khurāsān, a 
region given to 
his father’s Baraq 
at the quriltai of 
dissident princes 
in 1269  
1300 Temür versus 
Qaidu. Major Yuan 
assault on Qaidu, 
who beat strategic 
retreat 
Eastern Altai  
autumn of 1301 
– battles over 
several days 
 
Temür versus 
Qaidu. Qaidu 
launched major 
attacked on Yuan 
forces in autumn of 
1301. Round one 
resounding Yuan 
victory. Round two 
South of the Altai Du’a refused to 
join Qaidu in 
major assault on 
Yuan but 
eventually turned 
up 
Qaidu wounded 
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to Qaidu and Du’a. 
Round three to 
Qaidu 
and died shortly 
after the battle. 
Du’a also 
wounded 
1301 Death of Qaidu   
1302 Khan of White 
Horde, Bayan, 
suggests Mongol 
coalition of Jochids, 
Yuan, Hülegüids , 
White Horde etc. 
against Du’a and 
Qaidu’s heir, 
Chapar 
 
 Proposed 
coalition 
effectively 
checkmated Du’a 
and Chapar 
702/1302-03 Öljeitü v Qaidu’s 
son Sarban. Defeat 
for Sarban 
 
Tus, Meshed, N. 
Afghanistan 
Decisive victory 
for Öljeitü and 
Sarban’s fleeing 
forces wiped out 
by snow and 
blizzards 
sixth of Sha’ban 
702/March 26th, 
1303 
News of Qaidu’s 
death reached 
Ghāzān in Syria 
  
1303 - Autumn Du’a, Chapar and 
Arïq Böke’s son 
Melik Temür sent 
an emissary to the 
Yuan to seek an 
end to the fighting. 
  
1304, late Chapar and Du’a 
sent another 
emissary to Yuan 
announcing their 
surrender  
  
    
1304, September Emissaries arrive at 
Öljeitü’s court from 
Temür Qa’an, 
Qaidu’s heir and 
Du’a 
  
1305-1306 Ögödeids versus 
Chaghadaids  
Khurāsān, 
Samarkand, 
Ögödeid princes 
upset by Peace 
proposal fought 
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skirmishes Bukhārā, 
Khojand, Talas,  
Chaghadaids 
Talas laid waste 
1306/07 Surrender of 
Ögödeid khan 
Chapar to Du’a 
Northern and 
western Mongolia 
 
 
Ögödeid property 
distributed 
between Yuan 
and Chaghadaids 
1307 Qurilatai convened 
by Du’a 
Almaliq  
1307 Death of Du’a 
Instability in 
Chaghadaid ulus 
because of 
contested 
succession 
Almaliq Intra-Chaghadaid 
conflict 
1309 Ögödeid princes 
battle Du’a’s son 
and successor, 
Kebek 
Almaliq Ögödeid forces 
defeated 
1310 Ögödeid prince 
Chapar surrendered 
to Yuan but en 
route plundered his 
rival’s domain on 
Emil 
Emil River 
Yuan Court 
 
1313-1314 Invasion of 
Khwārazm 
controlled by 
Jochids by Baba, 
descendent of Jochi 
Qasar 
Khwārazm  Baba sought a 
rift between 
Jochids and 
Hülegüids – 
rejected by 
Öljeitü and killed 
1318 Invasion of Abū 
Sa’īd’s domains by 
the Jochid Khan 
Uzbeg 
Invasion route 
Derbend 
 
1325 Choban, Abū Sa‘īd’s 
senior amir, 
campaign against 
Jochids 
Invasion route 
Derbend 
 
1334 Invasion of Abū 
Sa‘īd’s domains by 
the Jochid Khan 
Uzbeg 
Invasion route 
Derbend 
 
1337 Chaghadaid 
succession dispute 
West of Almaliq Friar Pascal’s 
caravan held up 
in Chaghadaid 
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khanate because 
of fear of war and 
plunder  
1339 Chaghadaid 
khanate, succession 
dispute 
Almaliq After succession 
of Ali Sultan 
(r.1338-1339), 
friars martyred   
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TABLE VII 
Some Place Names and their Alternatives 
 
Polities  Known as today Alternative Names 
Armenia Armenia 
South of Georgia 
Greater Armenia as 
distinct from Lesser 
Armenia or Cilicia, 
Hermenia 
Bolghar Russia; Left bank of the 
Volga, 90 miles below 
Kazan 
Bolgara, Great Bulgaria 
Cataia Northern China  Khitai, Cathay 
Cilicia Turkey, bordering the 
Mediterranean along 
the Taurus mountains 
Lesser Armenia 
Cumania Russia, north-west of 
Black Seas and north of 
Caspian Sea 
Kun, Polovtsy, 
Πoдoвцьi, Qipchak, 
Desht Qipchak, 
Zolotaya orda, Golden 
Horde, Falones, Phalagi, 
Valvi 
Gazaria Crimea  
Ilkhanate Iran and Azerbaijan Persia, Lords of the East 
(Levant) 
Jebāl/Irāq-i 
‘Ajam 
Iraq of the Persians or 
Western Iranian Plateau 
to be distinguished from 
“Arab” Iraq or 
Mesopotamia 
 
Ulus of Jochi 
See Kipchak 
Khanata 
  
Kao-li Korea Koryo,  
Khitai North China Cathay, Qidān, Liao 
Dynasty 
Khwarazm Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan 
Xwārasm 
Kipchak 
Khanate 
Russia Jochid Khanate, Lords 
of the West, Ponent 
Longa Possibly South East 
Manchuria 
 
Manzi South China Man-tze, Mangi; M. 
Nangiyas from Ch. Nan-
chia or southern people;  
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Rum Turkey Seljuq Sultanate of 
Iconium 
Seres China Great Cataia 
Solanga N. Korea Solangqa, Koryo 
   
Southern Sung South China See Manzi  
Tangut  North-western Chinese 
provinces of Ningxia, 
Gansu, eastern 
Qinghai, northern 
Shaanxi, north eastern 
Xinjiang and south  
west Inner Mongolia 
Separated from 
Qaraqorum by the Gobi 
Hsi Hsia, Xi Xia, Qashi, 
Minyak, Mji-njaa, Hexi, 
Great Xia State of the 
White and Lofty, Ho Hsi 
(west of the [Yellow] 
River) 
Uighuria China, Xinjiang  
Ulus of 
Chaghadai 
Uzbekistan, Middle Empire, 
Imperium Medium, 
Empire of the Medes, 
Ulus of Orda Russia, north of Aral 
Sea to north of Lake 
Balkhash 
Ulus of White Horde 
Yuan China  
   
   
Rivers Located today in: Alternative Names 
   
Amu Darya 
 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
Rises in the Pamirs and 
debouches into the Aral 
Sea via Khwarazm 
Oxus, Амудария;         , 
Ceyhun; دنيس ومآ‎, 
Jayhoun, Vaksu, 
Chu River Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan Чүй, 
Emil China, Kazakhstan Эмель, Emin, Émǐn hé, 
额敏河 
Huai He China (formed border 
between Jin and 
Southern Sung) 
Hwai Ho, Quiqa Moren 
Ili China, Xinjiang Uighur 
Autonomous Region, S-
E Kazakhstan 
ىل ىئ ى       , Или, 伊犁河 
Irtysh Russia, Siberia Иртыш, Yertis, ش ىترې ئ;  
Karamoran China Yellow River, Black 
River 
Khalka   
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Kherlen Mongolia Хэрлэн гол 
Ob Russia, Siberia Обь, Kolta, Umar 
Onon Mongolia Онон гол, 
Orkhon Mongolia Орхон гол, Orkhon gol 
Ruo 
Shui/Heishui 
China, Gansu 
Inner Mongolia 
弱水, literally: "weak 
river" Etsin Gol,  Ejin 
River), Black River, 
Dong He, Xi He 
Selenge Mongolia/Russia Selenge mörön, Selenge 
gol, Сэлэнгэ мөрөн 
Sri Darya Rises in Tien Shan and 
debouches into the Aral 
Sea. Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, 
Kazakhstan 
Jaxartes, Seyhun River, 
Сырдария,     ر   ;       ; 
Yakhsha Arta, Yinchu, 
Pearl River 
   
   
   
Volga Russia Во лга, Itil, Etil, Sarı-su 
Yellow River China, Qinghai, 
Sichuan, Gansu, 
Ningxia, Inner 
Mongolia, Shaanzi, 
Shanzi, Henan, 
Dhandong 
 
Huang He, Хатан гол 
Ȟatan Gol, Шар мөрөн 
Šar Mörön 
Yenisei Russia, Siberia, 
Mongolia 
Енисе  й, Gorlog, 
   
Lakes & Seas   
   
Alakol Lake Kazakhstan Алакөл 
Aral Sea  Sea of Sïr, Sïr Tengizi. 
Azov Sea  Sea of Sudak 
Lake Baikal Russia, Siberia о зеро  айка л,  айгал 
нуур 
Lake Balkhash Kazakhstan 
Semirechye 
Balqaş köli; Озеро 
 алхаш, 
Black Sea  Greater Sea, Euxine, 
Pontus, Mare Maurum 
v. Nigrum 
Caspian Sea  Bahr-i Khurz, Vatuk, 
Baku, Darya Ghilani, 
Mare Seruanicum, Sea 
of Shirwan, Mare 
Salvanicum, Sea of 
Baku, Sea of Sarai, Sea 
of Bascon 
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Ebinur Hu China Ev nuur; 
   
Issy Kul Kyrgyzstan (founder of 
Ghaznavids born at 
Barskhan on shores of 
Issy Kul) 
Ysyk Köl, Ысык-Көл 
Иссык-Куль  
Pontus Sea of Marmara Mare Ponticum 
Sairam Lake China, Xinjiang – N NW 
of Yining 
Sairmam Nor, Süt Köl, 
赛里木湖; Sàilǐmù hú, 
Blessing Lake 
Lake Zaysan Kazakhstan Зайсан көлі, Zaisan 
nuur, Noble Lake, озеро 
Зайсан 
   
  Sea of Sïr, Sïr Tengizi. 
   
Mountains & 
Passes 
  
   
Altai Western border of 
Mongolia 
Chin Shan 
Kirgizskii  Formerly Alexandrovskii 
range 
Nantau China, between Bejing 
and Kalgan/Great Wall 
 
Qara Tau   
Tarbaghatai   
Tien Shan China, Xinjiang, 
Between the Tarim 
Basin and the Jungdar 
Pendi 
T’ien Shan, Tian Shan, 
Yin Shan 
   
Iron Gates: 
 
Derbend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kalugah 
 
Talki Defile 
 
 
Western Shore of 
Caspian. A pass 
through the ancient 
wall from the Castle of 
Derbend along the 
ridges of the Caucasus, 
known as the Rampart 
of Alexander or Sadd-i-
Iskandar, Dagh bary 
 
South of Shahrsabz 
 
North of 
Kuldja/Urumtsi  
 
 
 
Iron Gates, Darbandi-
Rum, Bab-al-abvab, 
Demir kapi, the 
Sarmatic Gates of 
Ptolemy, The Claustra 
Caspiorum of Tacitus,  
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Kalgan China, Gate in the 
Great Wall north of 
Beijing 
Chang-kia-kau 
Nankow Pass 30 miles northwest of 
Beijing 
Chamchiyal 
   
Towns & 
Areas 
  
Almaliq China, western 
Xinjiang, south of Lake 
Sairam 
Kuldja, Kildzha,Gulja, 
Yining, Armalec,  
Amol-e Shatt 
Strategic 
crossing on left 
bank of the 
Oxus river 
where the 
highroad 
across 
Khurasan led 
to Bukhara 
Turkmen Republic Charzhou 
Andkhudh Eastern edge of Qara 
Qum desert now near 
the border of 
Afghanistan with 
Turkmenistan. 
An important assembly 
and staging post for 
caravans heading for 
Transoxiana until 
recent times.  
Andkhuy 
Astarābād Iran, south-eastern 
corner of the Caspian 
Sea 
Gorgān 
Ayas Turkey, Gulf of 
Scanderoon, chief port 
of Cilician Armenia 
Layas, Ayacio, Aiazzo, 
Giazza, Glaza, La Jazza, 
Laiacio,  
Balāsāghūn Qarakhitai capital, 
exact whereabouts 
uncertain but probably 
on the headwaters of 
the Chu River in the 
foothills of the Kirgizskii 
range.  
Quz Ordu, (but by the 
Mongols as Quz Baligh 
(Good City)  
Balkh South of the middle 
Oxus  
In region known in 
medieval times as 
Tokhārestān 
Baudas Iraq Baghdad,  Baldac, (Ch. 
Bao-da) 
Beijing China, north-east Chung-tu, Yen-king, 
(Jurchen/Chin capital) 
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Chun king, Ta Ching fu, 
Chung-tu, Chungdu, 
Zhongdu, “Imperial city 
of the centre”, Peking, 
"the northern capital. 
Khanbalig,  Khan Baliq, 
Cambaluc, Great 
Capital, Jungdu, Ta-Tu, 
Dadu, Daidu, Beiping 
Besh-Baliq/ 
Beshbalig 
China, northwest 
Xinjiang, northern slope 
of the Tien Shan. 
One of the Uighur’s 
principal cities 
Urumtsi,Urumchi,  
Bishbalik, Bie-shi-ba-li, 
Pentapolis,Pei t’ing, 
Wulumuqi, Town of the 
Five Castles 
Bukhara Soghdian city now in 
Uzbekistan 
 
Cambaluc China See Beijing 
Chungdu China See Beijing 
Chung-hsing Tungut/Hsi Hsia capital  Yinchuan 
Cimesquinte Uzbekistan Samarkand, Siemisekan 
Dandānqān Turkmenistan. 
Northern Khurasan 
between Merv and 
Sarakhs site of decisive 
battle in 431/1040 
between Ghaznavids 
and Seljuqs 
 
Dunhuang China, western end of 
Gansu Corridor 
Tun huang, Sha Chou, 
Sachiu 
Emil China, Kazakhstan 
East of Lake Alakol 
Ye-mi-shi, Omyl,  
Equius One of the principal 
residences of the 
Chaghadaid ulus. 
Vicinity of Almaligh, 
(near modern Kuldja) 
 
Quyas 
Ghazni Afghanistan in region of 
Zābolestān 
 
Gintarchan Russia Gittarchan, Astrakhan 
Hami China, Xinjiang 
Province 
Camul, Kamul, I-wu-
lum I-chou 
 China, Southern Sung 
Capital 
Hang-chau fu 
Herat Afghanistan on Heri 
Rud 
Harāt 
Kai-ping fu China, near base of Qubilai’s summer 
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Khingan Mountains 100 
miles north of the Great 
Wall and c. 367 miles 
from Beijing 
retreat; City of Peace; 
Shangtu, Upper Court;  
Shangdu Keibung, 
Djao-Naiman Sumé 
Kalgan China, Gate through 
Great Wall 
 
Kara-jang China Mongolian for Yunnan 
Kara Khodjo China, Tarim Basin 
One of the principal 
Uighur cities. 
Kara Khocho, 
Qaraqocho Huo-chou, 
Fire City 
Khara Koto Western Inner Mongolia Etzina, Hēichéng, 黑城, 
Black City 
Kashgar China, Xinjiang 
Province 
Cascar, K’o-shi-ha-li 
Kayalik/Kopal Russia Cailac 
Kerman Persian, province in 
southeast Iran 
 
Khan-Baliq China See Beijing 
Khwarazm Uzbekistan, Karakalpak 
region.  Located on 
lower Oxus river 
Chorasmia 
Khojand On Syr Daria south-
east of Tashkent 
Khujand, K’u-djan,Hu-
ch’an 
Khovd Foot of Altai mts. On 
Buyant river 
Hovd, Khobdo 
Khurasan Northeastern province 
of Iran but wider region 
in earlier times 
including lands lying 
beween the region of 
Ray as far as eastern 
Afghanistan and the 
frontiers of India 
Khorasan 
Kiakhta   
Kinjanfu China, capital of Shensi 
was in Tangut 
Sian, Quengianfu 
Kish  Shahrisabz, 
Kongi/Konfu China Chin-i-Kalan, Great 
China, Canton 
Liang-chou China, originally a 
Tangut city on southern 
edge of the Gobi 
Wuwei, Hsi-liang 
Merv Turkmenistan (northern 
Khurasan) was bastion 
of Arab power at time of 
Arab conquests 
Marv, Mary 
Ning-hsia Tangut capital Egrigaya 
Ordu-Baliq Mongolia  Karabalghasun, 
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Otrar  Oltrarrre 
Parvān Afghanistan, lower 
Panjir valley and a stage 
on the route from 
Ghazna and Kabul to 
Balkh and upper Oxus 
 
Pulad North of Lake Sairam in 
Xinjiang, China. 
Bolat, Po-lo, Bu-la 
Qamju China, Kansu, was in 
Tangut 
Kanchow 
Qaraqorum Mongolia  
Qayaligh Upper reaches of the 
Chu River right bank of 
the Ili, west of Kopal. 
Ogodei’s grandson 
Qaidu’s ulus, granted in 
1252. 
 
Quinsai China Hangchow,  
   
Sarai Russia, bank of the 
Akhutba branch of the 
Volga, 70 miles above 
Astrakhan 
The Palace; Centre of 
the ulus of Jochi. 
Destroyed by Timur in 
1395-6 
Sarakhs On frontier between 
Iran and Turkmenistan 
on the Tajūn/Tedzhen 
river 
 
Semirechye Kyrgyzstan  Land of the seven rivers, 
Yeti Su 
Shang-tu S-E Mongolia K-ai-p’ing fu, Xanadu 
Qubilai’s summer 
residence 
Shash Uzbekistan Chach,Tashkent 
Shebargān On the Herat-Merv-al 
Rudh-Balkh road in the 
modern Afghan 
province of Juzjān. In 
earlier Islamic period 
was the chief town of 
Guzgān 
Shoborqān, Shoburqān 
Oshburqān  
Sistan Iran and Afghanistan  Nimruz 
Soldaia Crimea Soldachia, Sudak 
Tabriz Northern Iran Tauris, Torissi 
Talas (see 
Tarāz below) 
 T’a-la-sz 
Tana Russia. 30 kms north of 
Rostov and on southern 
bank of the estuary of 
the Don debouching 
into Sea of Azov. 
Azov, Azaq, Azof 
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Starting point for 
caravans to the Volga 
and beyond 
Tarāz Approx. 170 miles NE of 
Tashkent 
Talas 
Tauris Northern Iran Tabriz 
Termed Uzbekistan on upper 
Oxus/Amu Darya and 
of great strategic 
importance as a 
crossing place en route 
from Balkh to upper 
Oxus right-bank and 
beyond 
Termez  
Tokhārestān Northern 
Afghanistan/south of 
the upper Amu Darya 
with Balkh as its chief 
city. Today Baghlān is 
the chief town of 
Baghlān province 
 
Tus Iran, Khurasan on 
Nishapur-Sarakhs road. 
Shrine of the Eighth 
Imam of the Shi’a  
Mashhad 
Uliassutai  Uliastai 
Uzgand Kyrgyzstan, Ferghana 
Valley;  the seat of the 
early Qarakhanid khans 
Ozkend 
Urgench Khwarazm  Urghanj 
Yenching  China Dadu, Ta-Tu, Peking, 
Beijing 
   
Zaitun China Zayton, Chin-cheu 
Chuanchow, Caiton, 
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TABLE VIII 
MEASUREMENTS and WEIGHTS 
The Definition of “Travel” (safar) 
According to Islamic Law is based on 
‘distance’ 
 
Hanbalīs, Shāf’īs and Mālikīs all 
agreed that the distance of 
'travel' was 4 Barīds or 16 
farāsikh  but disagreed on 
whether this was covered in one 
day or two at 8 farāsikh a day 
The majority opinion within the 
Hanafī school appears to be that 
five farāsikh can be travelled in 
a 24-hour period thus taking 
longer at three days 
Rabat 
An Afghan term for a 
caravanserai but also used as a 
measure of distance, since these 
are established every four 
farsakhs or sixteen miles.  
Farsakh Arabicised from the old Persian 
parsang being the distance 
which a laden mule will walk in 
the hour, which varies from 
three to four miles. 
 
Parasang (farsakh) in Ancient Iran  Between 2 ½ and 3 ½ miles 
which is equivalent to 12,000 
Common Ells or Tailor’s Cubits 
((Gaz-i-Khayyati) or equal to 40 
Roman stadia, but varying from 
between 30 to 60 depending on 
terrain. 
Originally the distance which 
could be covered on foot in an 
hour or ‘marching mile’ which 
for foot-soldiers was about 2.48/ 
4 km  
Herodotus refers to an army 
travelling the equivalent of five 
parasangs per day 
Farsakh (Khwārazm  pre Malik Shah) 15,000 paces 
Farsakh (Azerbaijan and Armenia pre 10,000 paces 
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Malik Shah) 
Farsakh (pre Malik Shah in the 2 Iraqs, 
Kurdistan, Luristan, Khuzistan, 
Khurāsān, Fars, Shabankarah and Diyar 
Bakr) 
6,000 paces. 
Farsakh (as laid down by Malik Shah d. 
1092)  
6,000 paces 
Farsakh (laid down by Öljeitü (r.703-
716/1304-1316). 
 
8,000 Tailor’s Cubits (Gaz-i-
Khayyati) 
Farsang   Is a metric unit today of 6 km or 
4 miles 
Barīd  A Barīd was the distance that a 
messenger could travel before he 
needed to stop to allow his 
animal to rest. Eventually, the 
term began to be applied to the 
'messenger' himself and then to 
the actual 'message' 
Four farsakhs made up 
one Barīd  
 
Rabat 
An Afghan term for a 
caravanserai but also used as a 
measure of distance, since these 
are established every four 
farsakhs or sixteen miles.  
Dhirā (cubit) 3,000 dhirā to the Arabic mil 
and 3 mils to the farsakh 
Degree and Minutes= darajahs and 
daqīqahs 
 
 
Miles 
 
Arabic mil/Mile 3,000 dhirā, 6,474 feet or 1 
1/15th geographical mile 
Dhirā (cubit) 3,000 dhirā to the Arabic mil 
and 3 mils to the farsakh 
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Roman mīllia measured as a thousand paces 
by foot  -  A 'pace' was defined to 
be a full stride of a Roman 
soldier - the distance a Roman 
legion could march in 1,000 
paces or 2,000 steps. A Roman 
foot was 29.6 cm and a standard 
pace was 5 Roman feet, thus the 
Roman mile would have been 
4,856 feet or 1,480 metres. But 
surviving milestones on Roman 
roads are often closer to 5,000 
feet or 1,520 metres. 
Marhalah  
(Arabic) 
A day’s journey – 25-30 mils 
(Arabic miles) to the marhalah 
majirā Approx. 100 Arabic mils 
therefore 4 days journey  
English Mile 1,609 m or 5280 feet  
Bohemian Mile  
(probably used by Benedict the Pole)  
7 km or 4 and 3/8 English miles 
= Average distance covered by a 
pedestrian in 2 hours 
League 1,500 paces 
Adopted by the Western Europe 
from the Farsakh 
Mamzil  
/Menzil (Türkish) 
A measure of distance on a time 
basis. A distance that a caravan 
could be expected to cover in a 
single day was a menzil, 
meaning a day’s travel of about 
30 km. 
A caravan could travel this 
distance in six hours or eight 
hours in difficult desert terrain.  
Also 10 manzils = 270 Arabian 
mils 
Potai 
 
A Türkic measurement 
 
A potai is the common unit of 
road measurement amongst the 
Türkis and it 
varies according to the nature of 
the country over which the 
traveller passed. 
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For purposes of calculation, it may 
be reckoned at between two and a 
quarter and two and a half miles 
depending on whether the number 
of potai was for mounted men riding 
ponies or for the slower moving ass 
or camel.  
 
Tash 
A Türkic measurement especially in 
Tarim Basin 
So called from the stones put up 
by the roadside to mark the 
distances. Probably about five 
miles per hour but varied 
according to terrain 
Chi 
A Chinese measurement which 
under the Sung is estimated at 
12.28 inches.  
Cun 
A Chinese inch. Ten Chinese 
inches or cun make a foot, so 
the Chinese inch = 1.23 English 
inches 
Li 
A traditional unit of distance in 
China of approximately 1/3 mile 
or 500 metres. 
Degree and Minutes= darajahs and 
daqīqahs 
 
In the time of al-Ma’mūn it was 
noted by al-Farghānī that to one 
celestial 
degree corresponds on the 
earth's surface 562/3 miles, of 
which each contains 4,000 
cubits 
Arrow Shot 180-275 metres 
Mongolia Horse Distances in: 
Half a day 
The distance travelled by the 
horse in a half day or for 5 – 6 
hours - roughly 40- 50 km or 24 
– 31 miles 
Mongolia Horse Distances in: 
10 – 12 hours 
The distance travelled by the 
horse for 10-12 hours is about 
100 km or 62 miles 
Mongolia Horse Distances:  
A Short Day 
A short day is understood as 
one day going a distance of 120 
– 150 km or 74 - 93 miles 
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Mongolian Measurements: 
One tuu  
the distance between the ends of 
outstretched thumb and middle 
finger 
Mongolian Measurements: 
One span 
 
the distance from the tip of the 
thumb to the second joint of the 
middle finger 
Mongolian Measurements: 
One blunt span 
 
the distance from the tip of the 
thumb to the second joint of the 
middle finger 
Mongolian Measurements: 
One fathom 
the distance between the tips of 
the middle fingers of the 
outstretched arms of a man 
Mongolian Measurements: 
One delem 
 
From the tip of an outstretched 
arm to the tip of the middle 
finger on the heart or centre if 
the body 
 
Mongolian Migratory Distances: 
In Khangai 2 – 6 times a year 
On the steppe 5 – 19 times a year 
 
Average migratory distance 10 
km 
Mongolian Migratory Distances: 
On the steppe 5 – 19 times a year 
 
 
Mongolian Migratory Distances: 
In the Gobi: 10 – 20 times a year 
 
Average migratory distance: 50 
km 
Silks: 
Between 3rd to 10th centuries a bolt of 
Chinese silk  was 1 Chinese foot wide 
and 40 Chinese feet long which in today’s 
Width: 22 inches or 56 cm 
Length of bolt: 39 feet or 12 
metres 
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equivalent is:  
This standard-sized bolt fell into disuse 
after the fall of Tang and the Central 
Eurasian economic reverted to a 
subsistence economy 
‘ alafah pl. ‘ ulūfah Arabo-Persian term for fodder, 
but equated to food ration under 
the Mongols and could include 
the provision of robes 
batman Turko-Mongolian: Equated in 
the Rasulid Hexaglot with the 
Arabo-Persian mann, a variably 
dry measure 
tambin Jug – at one time the amount of 
the wine ration for official 
messengers in the Yuan 
vedro Old Russian for bucket and 
designated the official liquid 
travel ration.  
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TABLE IX 
Glossary of Terms and Concepts 
Appendix I defines the concepts and terms used in this paper plus 
others that are common in the sources and historiography in the spirit 
of the OWTRAD Project Glossary where encouragement is given to the 
more explicit, more consistent use of such terms whilst acknowledging 
that such definitions are not the only correct or infallible ones.  Those 
concerning communication and travel related activities are based on 
those defined in the Trade Routes’ Glossary, Old World Trade Routes 
(OWTRAD) project overseen by Dr T. Matthew Ciolek.991  
 
Abbreviations:  
(Af.) = Afghan;  (Ar.) = Arabic; (C.) = Chinese; (Fa.) = Farsi; (M.) = 
Mongolian; (La.) = Latin; (Tk.) = Türkic; (Tm.) = Türkmeni; (Tr.) = 
Türkish 
 
Adab Ar)  originally = custom. In early Islam it came to mean 
good upbringing, urbanity and courtesy, culture based on 
poetry, oratory, historical and tribal traditions of the 
ancient Arabs. During Abbasid period the idea was 
broadened to include Iranian epic and narrative works, 
Indian fables and Greek philosophy  
Ail: Yurt (qv)  (Türkish) livestock keeping family 
Aimag: (M) The meaning of this term has changed over time. In 
the twelfth century an aimag was understood as a group 
of ails, which were essentially blood-related and of related 
tribes. In addition, ails and individual persons, who 
normally would have been members of another kinship 
group, could also have belonged to an aimag, A large 
aimag can be described as a federation. 
According to the Yuanshi, the word aimag was used in 
connection with the olon vang (many princes) generally in 
order to emphasise that aimag belonged to olon vang. 
                                       
991 Ciolek, T. Matthew. 2006-present. A Trade Routes’ Glossary: 
Architectural,Geographical and Historical Terms relating to Long Distance Trade, 
Communication and Pilgrimage Routes. Old World Trade Routes (OWTRAD) Project. 
Canberra: www.ciolek.com-Asia Pacific Research Online. Version 1.7 (Aug 2009). 
www.ciolek.com/OWTRAD/trade-routes-glossary.html 
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These were the people who had close relations to the 
golden tribe (altan urug) of Chinggis Khan, the Borjigid 
Aiqaq   (M) Informer 
Al-tamgha  (M) An official seal to authenticate documents  
Altan Urug:   (M) The Golden Family’ i.e. the closest family members of 
Chinggis  Khan  
Amir Islamic term for high dignitaries. Used in the Chaghadai 
Khanate to designate the head of a clan, while the title khan 
was reserved for the direct descendants of Chinggis Khan.  
Anda (M) Blood Brother. The duties of an Anda relationship 
comprised peacefulness, assistance in the event of enemy 
attack and also support in combat during revenge raids or 
conquests.  
Aqa (M) Elder Brother or more senior member of a family as 
distinct from Ini, a junior or younger member of the family 
Atabeg (TM) originally the guardians of Saljuq princes  
Authority Authority is distinct from political power. Legitimate 
authority generates a duty to be obeyed but effective or de 
facto authority can exist without being legitimate.  The 
attempt to rule without legitimacy is the exercise raw 
power - not authority 
Avahana (Fa.)the relay-post system of the Achaemenids (539-330 
BC) on the Sardis-Susa/Royal Road (translations and 
cognate terms: barid (Tr.), cursus publicus (La.), hsin-chu 
(C.) i-chan (C.), Yām (Tk.) 
Ayimaq (M) A Group of related families camping together 
Bahā’dur (M) Brave, added to the given name of a warrior hero 
Bakhsh (M) share of the profits of empire such as peoples, booty 
etc. 
Barīd (Tr.) The postal service established in the 13th c. by the 
Mamluk Sultans to permit regular and speedy relay of 
official messages. Translations and cognate terms: 
avahana (Fa.); cursus publicus (La.); hsin-chu (C.); i-chan 
(C.), Yām (Tk.) 
Basqaq  (M) Chinggisid governor of a conquered territory 
Ba’urchi (M) Cook or steward, title of a member of the Keshig (q.v.) 
Bazaar  (Fa.) A Persian variant name for a market place.  
    Translations and cognate terms: Pazar (Tr.) Carsi 
(Tr.) 
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Beacon (En.) A tall structure, such as a tower or cairn, whose  
during the day and the fire lit at its top at night seved as a 
navigation marker for travellers at sea or those in 
featureless terrain.  
Bilig   (M) wise saying of a dignitary 
Bitikchi (M) Secretary or scribe 
Bo’ol (M) Bo’ol refers in general to members of a conquered tribe 
who were obliged to serve the victorious tribe by, for example, 
tending the herds, beating during hunts etc. bo’ol could be 
voluntarily entrusted by their parents to a lord even as 
children. Some Russian and Mongolian historians equate 
bo’ol with slave.  
Borjigid (M) In the Mongolian federation, Borjigid or Khiad/Khiyat 
Borjigid was the central grouping. The Borjigid consisted of 
the descendants of Bodonchar, Chinggis Khan was his 
eleventh-generation descendant. Members of the Borjid held 
very influential positions in all aimags of Outer Mongolia up 
to the 19th century. 
Buke’ul (M) Food Taster and member of Keshig responsible for 
supplies 
Bulghaq/ (Tr) denoted both ‘enemy’ or ‘in revolt’ 
Bulgha (M) 
 
cagaan yastan (M) White bone lineages or aristocrats 
Capar/chapar (Fa.) a post rider. A mode of travel along the 5 Government 
post-roads in 19th c. Persia viz  ‘from Teheran to Resht, 
Tabriz, Meshed, Kerman and the Persian Gulf port of 
Bushire. These so-called roads [were], however, often mere 
caravan-tracks, sometimes totally hidden by drifting sand 
or snow.’ 
Chapar-khanehs (Fa.) postal stations which in 19th century Persian were 
placed on average five farsakhs or about twenty English 
miles apart. Translations and cognate terms: mutatio(La.); 
sekka (Fa.); Yām (Tk.); yi (C.); zhi (C.) see also Khanqah 
Caravan (Fa.) A convoy of land travellers and their pack animals or 
wheeled vehicles journeying together as a team. 
Translations and cognate terms: kafila (Ar.) 
Caravanserai (Fa.) roadside inn providing lodging for caravan traffic, i.e. 
merchants, their servants, their animals and their 
merchandise, on the main trade routes. Water for 
drinking, washing and ritual ablutions was provided, 
implying a year-round presence of large amounts of 
drinking water. They also kept fodder for animals and had 
shops for travellers where they could acquire new 
supplies.  
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Cherig (m) Auxiliary troops 
Conquest Overcoming and taking of control of a place or people by 
use of military force. Derived from Middle English with the 
general sense 'acquire, attain' and from Old French 
conquerre, based on Latin conquirere 'gain, win', from con- 
(expressing completion) + quaerere 'seek'. It can be seen, 
therefore, that the element of military force, though 
implicit today in the term, is not necessarily implicit in the 
original meaning. 
Central Asian rulers looked upon war and conquest as the 
business of displacing rival elites in a process which had 
little to do with the inhabitants of a territory who were 
viewed as passive   
Cursus publicus (La). The imperial postal system of the Roman Empire. It 
was primarily concerned with official business, such as 
the carriage of government or military officers, government 
payload such as monies from tax collection and official 
despatches. It could be made available to private 
individuals with special permission and for a fee. 
Translations and cognate terms:  avahana (Fa.); barid 
(Tr.); hsin-chu (C.); i-chan (C.), Yām (Tk.) 
Darqhan  Persian gentry or landowner   
Pl. Darghad 
 
Darughachi (M) a post generally reserved for Mongols appointed 
alongside the regular heads of many agencies in both 
central and territorial administrations as mandatory co-
signers of all documents issuing from these agencies. 
Derived from daru, to press down, possibly referring to 
one who holds people in subjection, or one who controls 
subject people as well as the act if fixing a seal 
El/Il (TK) A word common to Mongolian and Türkic with the 
sense of ‘peaceful’ or ‘pacified/submissive’ as distinct to 
those not yet pacified or brought under submission or in 
revolt see bulghaq/bulgha 
Elchi/Ilchi (M) Envoys who conveyed messages between both friendly 
and enemy tribes, calling for a common battle against 
enemies, demanding support for raids and advice on 
economic problems. In the SHM, two forms of conveyance 
of messages are described: viz: the speech and the song 
Empire Supreme political power over several countries exercised 
by a single authority 
Farsakh,Farsang (Fa. Ar.) Persian measure of distance on a time basis, 
originally the distance which could be covered on foot in 
an hour, or ‘marching mile’. 
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Grand Strategy denotes the process of planning, co-ordinating and 
directing the use of all of the resources of a polity - social, 
political, economic and military – toward the attainment of 
a political objective. Political-military means to ends -  a 
state’s theory on how it can best “cause” security for 
itself.... A grand strategy must identify likely threats to a 
state’s security and it must devise political, economic, 
military and other remedies for those threats. Priorities 
must be established among both threat and remedies 
Hanging path In earlier times a trestle path built along sheer cliffs and 
steep sides of inaccessible mountain valleys as in the 
Karakoram mountains and in Qinling.  
Hazāra  Military unit of one thousand troops 
Hsin-chu (C.) literally [people’s] letter agencies in Ming and Ch’ing 
China this was a postal system which handled private 
communications and documents. Translations and 
cognate terms:  avahana (Fa.); barid (Tr.); cursus publicus 
(La.);  i-chan (C.), Yām (Tk.) 
 
I-chan  (C.) in Ming and Ch’ing China a postal service of mounted 
government couriers for delivery of official 
communications and documents complemented by the p’u 
system of foot couriers. Translations and cognate terms:  
avahana (Fa.); barid (Tr.); cursus publicus (La.); i-chan (C.), 
Yām (Tk.) 
Il/el A word common to Mongolian and Türkic with the sense of 
‘peaceful’ or ‘pacified’ as distinct to those not yet pacified 
or brought under submission 
Ilchi (TK. E Elĉi) Emissary. More a personal envoy rather than a mere 
‘messenger’ 
Il Khan Possibly originating as a Jochid title meaning subordinate 
to the Khan or Great Khan. Rashīd al-Dīn refers to this 
title in connection with the Jochid Khans as well as to 
those of Iran, also used by the Armenian historian Vardan 
in relation to Hülegü but the Armenians had been close at 
one stage to the Jochids. Despite these documentary 
references, and because there are reservations about the 
exact interpretation of Ilkhan, the least controversial 
course seems to be to refer to Hülegü and his successors 
and their khanate/sultanate as the Hülegüids which also 
has the merit of bringing them into line with their Jochid 
relatives to the north as well as the Chaghadaids.  
 Possible connection with eleventh century Qarakhanid 
title of Ilig Khan meaning Territorial Khan   
Ini   (M) Younger brother or junior member of a family 
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Inji   (M) servant given as part of a dowry 
Irged/pl.Irgen (M) Simple people = Members of a livestock keeping family 
ail or people who do not belong anywhere/‘foreign’ people 
Itinerarium pictum  (La.) A Roman travel document with a route-map of the 
recommended itinerary 
Itinerarium scriptum (La.) A Roman travel document with written instructions 
issued to officers of the state administration or the army 
providing the timetable of the journey, details of the 
approved itinerary (‘viandi ordo’) and secured the bearer 
access to free meals and accommodation 
Keshig   (M) The Guard or Household of the Khan or senior prince 
Khabir    (Ar.) A desert guide, caravan leader 
Khamag Mongol Confederation of Mongol tribes before the foundation of the 
empire in 1206 
Khan   Ruler of an Ulus (q.v.) 
Khan (Fa.) an (urban) establishment where commercial 
travellers could lodge for a period with facilities provided 
for the sale of their wares, unlike caravanserais which 
were short-term resting places on a route 
Kharita the bag or pouch in which the couriers of the barīd 
conveyed letters; black silk pouches were used by caliphal 
envoys 
Khar yastan   (M) Black bone lineages – commoners or low people 
Khāssa  Special royal servant or intimate of a ruler  
Khāssa Khādem As above but one who was also a eunuch 
Khātūn  (M) Title of Mongol (and Türkish) princesses 
Khuree (M)_A Khuree migration was a large group migration in the 
12th – 13th centuries which consisted of several hundred 
paternally (yasan torol) and maternally (cusan torol) 
related members 
Khurged (M) Sons-in-laws and brothers-in-law - later replaced by 
the term tabunang. Generally aristocratic men who 
married women from tribes of good background in order to 
form valuable connections and friendships 
Legitimacy No single and universally acceptable definition of 
legitimacy exists. The concept of legitimacy is closely 
intertwined with a network of normative and empirical 
concepts in political science, such as power, authority, 
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rights, obligation, sovereignty, consent, institution and the 
state.  
The transformation of physical coercion into legitimate 
authority. An attempt to rule without legitimacy is an 
attempt to exercise power—not authority 
War was an effective way of gaining and retaining power 
because victory provided legitimacy. Pre-modern test of 
legitimacy: Traditional systems of elite dynastic rule were 
expected to provide security and economic stability in 
exchange for obedience.  
Li (C.) a traditional unit of distance in China of 
approximately 1/3 mile or 576 metres 
 
Malon (He.) A spot where caravans, individuals or even armies 
encamped for the night.  
Mansio (La.) A place for an overnight stay along the official Roman 
network, the cursus publicus. Approximately every 15 
miles/24 km was a mansio, which was a full-scale wayside 
inn with stables, tavern, rooms for travellers and bath 
houses.  Mansiones also housed the detachment of troops 
that guarded the roads along their whole length. These 
would check the identities, travel permits and cargoes of 
road users.  
Manzil (Ar.) the halting place of a stage or march, or a day’s stage 
Menzil (Tr.) Türkish measure of distance on a time basis. A 
distance that a caravan could be expected to cover in a 
single day which was about 30 km. A caravan could travel 
this distance in six hours or eight hours in difficult desert 
terrain. 
Migration:  See also Khuree and Otor. Larger nomadic tribes such as 
the Khamag, Mongol, Jalair, Kerait, Naiman, Merkit, 
Ongut and the Tartars each possessed its own region of 
pasturage which extended from the mountains into the 
lowlands. No livestock keeper could personally choose the 
seasonal migration paths: these followed the ancient 
tradition of pasture land use. 
Mile (La.) the distance a Roman legion could march in 1,000 
paces or 2,000 steps. A Roman foot was 29.6 cm and a 
standard pace was 5 Roman feet, thus the Roman mile 
would have been 4,856 feet or 1,480 metres. But surviving 
milestones on Roman roads are often closer to 5,000 feet 
or 1,520 metres. 
Moshref Lit. “one who overlooks, supervises”. Either an intelligence 
agent particularly in the Ghaznavid period, tasked with 
reporting back to the Sultan on the propensities of officials 
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and royal relatives or an official with supervisory duties 
within the palace administration or royal workshops. 
Mutatio (La.) in Roman times a staging post for changing mounts 
which was roughly every 5 miles or 8 km, the most a 
horse could safely be ridden hard. It was essentially a 
stable wehre mounted messengers could change horses 
with a tavern to obtain refreshment. Translations and 
cognate terms: chapar-khaneh (Fa.) mutatio(La.); sekka 
(Fa.); Yām (Tk.); yi (C.); zhi (C.) see also Khanqah 
Nerge (M) A hunting term for encirclement of prey but also used 
for a similar formation frequently used by the Mongols in 
battle 
Nöker /Nökhör (M) privileged personal retainer, companion at arms 
Noyan   Commander 
Nutug (M) In Mongolia a herder’s customary pastures; place of 
residence or migration region; nomadic population and its 
entire livestock; nb: ownership conditions did not relate to 
property in the economic sense, but rather to access to 
pasture land. Similar terms to nutug are yurt and etugen 
which in essence do not differ in meaning from nutug. 
Obog (M) obog and urug are used almost interchangeably in the 
sources. An obog usually consisted of patrilinear 
descendants, yasan torol. It was thus an agnatic kinship 
group 
Oghuz/Ghuzz Turk federation known from time of the early Turkish 
empires – included Seljuq family 
Oghul (M) Son in Türkish but a title of Mongol princes of the 
blood     
Ordo (M) Royal encampment of a Chinggisid prince or one of his 
wives consisting of retainers and their families who were 
tied to their master/mistress and could not leave of their 
own volition.  
 
Ortaq (M) Merchant partner of a prince or other senior official 
using capital supplied by the prince 
Otog Ancient Türkish, Soghdian and Mongolian for homeland, 
home, hearth and family. An otog consisted of ail groups 
that were related to one another, family relations, 
however, not being the decisive criterion for the union. A 
unit that was obliged to mobilise a definite number of 
warriors and to collect taxes. More frequently used in the 
15th and 16th centuries 
Otor  (M) An Otor migration is when livestock keepers migrate 
without their households and with only one species of 
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animal in order to make use of feed reserves in distant 
pastures. They allow their animals to graze at a location 
until the pasture is exhausted and then they move on 
Osh A hostile relationship between individual persons or tribes.  
Paiza/Pa’iza Chinese p’ai tzu – a tablet of authority similar to a 
passport though requiring protection for the holder as well 
as enabling the requisition of mounts, supplies etc. 
Different grades. 
Polity A state as a political entity; an organized society – used 
herein instead of state 
Power Political power is the ability of a state or agent to get 
others to act in ways that they desire even when the 
subject does not want to do what the agent wants him to 
do 
P’u (C) In Ming and Ch’ing China a postal service using foot 
runners as couriers for the delivery of official 
communications and documents. They were 
complemented by the i-chan system of mounted couriers.  
Qa’an   (TK) Türkic title for the supreme leader 
Qarakhanids Turk federation r. 382-609/992-1212. Established in 
Transoxiana, Ferghana and Eastern Turkestan 
Qara…..  (M) Commoner or black 
Qarshi  (M) Palace 
Qipchaq Türkic nomadic peoples conquered by the Jochids. Also 
known as Cumans, Xifjax, Xbsax (Armenian); Polovsky, 
(Russian), Pallidi, Falones, (German); Phalagi, Valvi, 
Xartes (Armenian), Qangli. Closely associated with the 
Khwarazmshahs and the Qipchaq Mamluks of Egypt-
Syria. 
Qorchi   (M) Bodyguard – Archer, Quiver bearer 
Quriltai (M) Assembly at which important questions were discussed 
including nomination of a Qa’an and decisions concerning 
raids  
Rabad (Tm.) suburbs or trade quarters of a city, surrounding the 
shakhristan 
Ribat/Rabat (Ar.) A fort, or a fortified rest house on a land route, or a 
fortified caravanserai. Also a monastic fortress/theological 
boarding college for volunteer fighters (i.e. jihadis) 
Road A problem arises in a work such as this to articulate the 
pathways used by travellers since a ‘road’ is a way 
between two locations whose surface has been artificially 
improved, i.e. smoothed, levelled, widened, drained, paved, 
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etc.  A track, bridle path or pathways are the terms 
generally used herein. 
Robat (Af.) an Afghan term for a caravanserai but also used as a 
measure of distance, since these establishments are every 
four farsakhs or sixteen miles.  
Sāhib Dīwān Senior official, Treasurer 
Samanids Originally Iranian dihqāns or landowners in Transoxiana. 
Largely autonomous amirs ruling over Transoxiana and 
Khurasan 204-395/819-1005 
Sarai/Serai (Fa.Hi.) A palace but also a caravanserai especially in India 
used for a building for the accommodation of travellers 
with their pack animals 
Sardoba (Uz.) A reservoir with a cupola for drinking water 
constructed at places used by caravans for short rest 
periods during a day’s hourney.  The Uzbeki sultan 
Abdullakhan (1583-1598) is said to have built between 
400-1,000 such structures.  
Sekka (Fa.) A relay post station. Translations and cognate terms: 
chapar-khaneh (Fa.) mutatio(La.); sekka (Fa.); Yām (Tk.); yi 
(C.); zhi (C.) see also Khanqah 
Shagird chapar (Fa.) A ‘post-boy’. A hired guide who rides with a traveller 
from one chapar-khana or post station to another. 
Shahna (Fa) The Arabic-Persian equivalent of Basqaq (q.v.) 
Chinggisid Governor  
Signal Route the movement of information via pathways dedicated to 
the delivery of messages through the use of semaphore 
stations, beacons, watch-towers, homing pigeons  
State As distinct from a Mongol Ulus. The state is a modern 
political construction that emerged in early modern 
Europe, but has been replicated in all other parts of the 
world. The most important aspect of the state that makes 
it a distinctive and new form of political association is its 
most abstract quality: it is a corporate entity with a 
territory and is considered as an organized political 
community under one government. One state is 
distinguished from another by its having its own 
independent structure of political authority, and an 
attachment to separate physical territories. 
Strategic The coherent use of power to attain desired objectives 
Tabūnang Sons-in-laws and brothers-in-law - replaced the earlier 
term Khurged . Generally aristocratic men who married 
women from tribes of good background in order to form 
valuable connections and friendships 
Tamgha  (M) An official seal to authenticate documents 
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Taq   (Uz.) a crossroad market place 
Tim (Uz.) A self-contained market place of particular 
architectural form, distinct from the crossroad markets 
(taqs) of Bukhārā. 
Tuman (M) Army unit of ten thousand also province under military 
administration. E 
Turqaq/  (T) Day Guard  
Ulus The population subject to a Mongol prince - domain plus 
people  
Uruq   (M) Family, posterity 
Watchtower A regularly manned and well-elevated observation post. It 
can be a standalone structure or constructed as part of a 
fort or a caravanserai. Watch-towers could form a part of a 
signals route 
Yabghu Ancient Turk noble title held by an eleventh century 
Oghuz rival of Seljuq family based at Jand on lower Syr 
Darya 
Yām (Tk.) Post station with relay mounts. A standard Yām, 
under a system established (1206-1227) by Chinggis Khan 
was manned by a postal master and had 20 horses for use 
by government couriers. Translations and cognate terms: 
chapar-khaneh (Fa.) mutatio(La.); sekka (Fa.); Yām (Tk.); yi 
(C.); zhi (C.) see also Khanqah 
Yāmchi  Official in charge of a post station 
Yarghuchi  (M) Judge 
Yarlïgh/jarliq  (M) Decree or Ordinance 
Yasa (M) The inviolable decrees of Chinggis Khan binding future 
generations 
Yeke terge’ür Royal Road – also with the meaning of the road along 
which Temujin proceeded on his way to supreme power 
Yi   (C.) a postal station with relay mounts  
Yosun (M) Often linked with Yasa (qv) as the Yasa and Yosun of 
Chinggis Khan. Traditions sometimes defined as 
‘customary law’ 
Yurt   (T, M) domain of a Mongol prince 
Zhi (C.) a postal station with relay horses that could also 
provide shelter, fresh horses, food and supplies 
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